SWOT ANALYSIS
(Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats)
Problem:
Evaluate the contribution of Khrushchev to the Cold War developments.
STRENGTHS / WEAKNESSES1. The thaw (de-Stalinization) in the Soviet Union and the satellites.
2. The peaceful co-existence with the West before 1960:
- a more liberal attitude, Khrushchev was open and ready to talk, 3 summits (1955, 1959, 1961);
- the smaller concessions of 1955;
- Austrian State Treaty 1955 Geneva;
3. The agreements after the Cuban Crisis 1962:
- the “Hot line” between Kremlin and White House;
- the Nuclear Test Ban 1963;
- caution and relaxation. / 1. Restrictions on liberalization in the East European countries:
- the Warsaw Pact 1955, consolidation of communist block;
- limits of the Polish October changes 1956;
- the bloody suppression of Hungarian Revolution 1956 November.
2. The expansion of Soviet influences in the Third World:
- Khrushchev reached out to Egypt by supplying it with Soviet military experts from 1955 and Russian arms through Czechoslovakia;
- Khrushchev political travels to Central Asia (Afghanistan, India, Burma) 1955;
- the campaign against colonialism (military aid offers, speech at the UN 1960).
3. The West Berlin Crisis:
- Demands for Americans to withdraw from W. Berlin: 1958 & 1961 (Vienna 3rd summit);
- The Berlin Wall August 1962.
4. The Cuban Missile Crisis October 1962, the world was taken to the brink of nuclear war.
5. The nuclear arms race:
- the ICBM (Soviet-invented) 1957;
- the world’s first, Soviet-made, earth satellite (Sputnik 1) 1958;
- the USSR gained parity with USA in the ICBMs & SLBMs.
OPPORTUNITIES / THREATS
1. After 1953 and especially 1956, less repressive and more liberal regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern European states resulted in better living conditions of ordinary people.
2. Khrushchev’s 1956 speech and encouragement for de-Stalinization of the satellites aroused great but temporary enthusiasm and hopes in Poland and Hungary. The satellites gained a chance for more freedom in their internal affairs and some took advantage of it to choose their own different way to socialism (Poland after October 1956, Czechoslovakia only in 1968). The Polish October Movement of 1956 initiated a series of Polish revolts against the communist regime.
3. The new style in Khrushchev’s foreign policy towards the West (direct meetings, open talks, letters, telephone link) set a pattern for the future.
4. Khrushchev proved that peaceful co-existence was possible (in contrast to what Stalin had said) and even some difficult problems were solved. This encouraged similar attempts to end problems by negotiations and prepared the Détente in 1970-79.
5. The Cuban Crisis paradoxically brought a positive effect because both sides realized how easily nuclear war could be started. Superpowers became more cautious, and responsible in mutual relations.
6. Mao Zedong condemned Khrushchev for betraying communism and for conspiring with the imperialists, which began a widening rift between China and the USSR. This reduced the possibility of a joint attack by these two powers on the West. / 1. By the bloody suppression of the Hungarian uprising Khrushchev showed that the satellites would not be allowed to leave the Soviet bloc and that their aspirations of independence or democracy would end tragically.
2. In spite of the peaceful co-existence policy the Soviets intended to continue expansion in all regions of the world.
3. The USSR’s parity with the USA in the nuclear arsenals brought a danger that another Soviet leader in future might use this weapon. The Soviet leaders seemed more likely to take this extreme action, due to their ideology and dictatorial power, in contrast to the American counterparts who were watched by and responsible to their electorate, the Press and the political opposition.
4. The experience of the Cuban Crisis left threatening feeling that nuclear disaster could be caused easily not only by an irresponsible leader, but also by an unfortunate coincidence or an accidental action of, for example, a naval commanding officer panicked into giving wrong orders.
Author : EWELINA MARCINIAK Teacher of History in Liceum Ogólnokształcące nr.3 ( IB School 000704) in Gdynia. Gdynia, November 2004