#5-417
Meetings with Generals Yu Ta-wei,
Chou En-lai, and Hsu Yung chang
April 22–23, 1946 Chungking, China
YU Ta-wei, April 22, 2:00 P.M.
General Yu, vice minister of war, paid an unofficial visit and learned first-hand of Marshall’s frustrations with how the military situation had deteriorated while he was out of the country. “A great part of these difficulties could have been avoided by the National Government,” which had delayed the sending of Executive Headquarters field teams to Manchuria, insisted that the cease-fire agreement did not apply to those provinces, and had sent in troops. “I do not know who the Generalissimo’s advisors are but whoever they may be, they are very poor ones,” Marshall said. The government had advanced toward Chihfeng contrary to the original agreement and had failed to abide by the agreement to evacuate the Communist forces near Canton.
Concerning the present state of affairs in China, “no one has offered any alternative except a great war and you can not support a great war.” The United States would not support the government in such a war. Moreover, the Generalissimo’s recent speeches had “murdered” Marshall’s efforts to get a large loan for China. “The Kuomintang had a good chance to have peace in Manchuria but it did not utilize this chance. The Communists are taking advantage of their positions and are becoming stronger every day. The Government has gotten into a bad spot and I have to figure a way out.” (Foreign Relations, 1946, 9: 788–90.)
Chou En-lai, April 23, 10:00 A.M.
To correct the inflated figures the Communists were using, Marshall informed Chou that by June 1 the U.S. Navy would have transported 228,000 government troops into Manchuria. Chou admitted that there was a race to occupy the vacuum in Manchuria left by the Soviets’ withdrawal and that this made it more difficult to discuss troop redispositions. He reminded Marshall that the Communists had urged the government to move into Manchuria, but the Nationalists had instead attacked the Communists in Jehol province. The Communist party did not intend to monopolize Manchuria but instead desired international cooperation. His ability to negotiate, Chou said, was diminishing due to the current situation in Manchuria. Now the government insisted on taking Changchun by force and then negotiating; the Communists thought the fighting should cease immediately and then negotiations begin. Moreover, the previously agreed ratio of one Communist to fourteen Nationalist divisions in Manchuria was no longer appropriate. Having just completed drafting a proposal for an immediate cease fire (see ibid., pp. 792–93), Marshall handed Chou a copy. (Ibid., pp. 790–92.)
Hsu Yung-chang, April 23, 2:30 P.M.
General Hsu—a former army commander, provincial governor, and government minister—had recently been appointed the government’s representative on the Committee of Three, and General Marshall wished to describe to Hsu the situation as he saw it. Since the Nationalist government had allowed itself to get into “a dangerous position, compromises are necessary.” The two sides were “poles apart and refuse to alter their course through a fear that the other party would obtain a favorable position,” and “the fear is at its worst on the Nationalist side.” The government had adopted an adamant attitude toward numerous minor matters that Marshall listed (see his comments to General Yu above), gained little from this, and “lost a lot.” Now that circumstances were changing, the Communists were becoming bolder. Marshall thought that the national government showed poor judgment in seeking unilateral control of Manchuria.
At the end of the meeting, Marshall handed Hsu a copy of the draft cease-fire document. It called for Committee of Three approval of occupation zones and of further government troop movements into Manchuria. Ultimately Chiang Kai-shek did not accept Marshall’s draft; he proposed one of his own, which the Communists then rejected. (Ibid., pp. 793–95.)
Recommended Citation: ThePapers of George Catlett Marshall, ed.Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens (Lexington, Va.: The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981– ). Electronic version based on The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 5, “The Finest Soldier,” January 1, 1945–January 7, 1947 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), pp. 529–530.