1200 MW Teesta 3 hydro Elect project : Completing one year of crippled operation. First anniversary of Teesta 3 project. WHITE PAPER.
1200 MW Teesta 3 project in Sikkim , with 6 units of 200 MW each and 10% continuous overload capacity completes 365 days of operation at 2400 hrs of 27 Feb 2018. The project owner Teesta Urja Ltd had wrongly declared the commercial operation of three units on 23 Feb 2017 and remaining 3 units starting from 0000 hrs of 28 Feb 2017. This claim of Commercial operation is under legal challenge.
The Government of India policy on execution of hydro elect projects has several aspects. First is the principle of PPP ie Public Private Partnership. Second is the practice of awarding the transmission line ( for evacuation of power) to the same party that is constructing the hydro power project. This, presumably to ensure that there is no mismatch between completion of power project and its associated transmission line.
In case of Teesta 3 while the Govt of Sikkim awarded the power house to Athena group , this group soon transformed into Teesta Urja Ltd with 26 % equity of Sikkim govt and 74% to a consortium including Athena. The Athena group is reported to be associated with the then CM Andhra YSR Reddy. The ownership of Teesta 3 was originally with the 74% equity holders but in 2015 Govt of Sikkim acquired 51 % of the equity of TUL and became owner .
The transmission line to evacuate Teesta 3 power was planned as the 400 kV double circuit line with quad moose conductor. Thus each phase would have 4 conductors , each circuit would have 12 and the double circuit line would have 24 conductors. This line was planned to terminate at Kishanganj substation of Powergrid corporation located in North Bihar.Line length was 215 km .
As part of PPP policy the Teesta 3 project was a JV with the public party being Sikkim govt (26% equity) and private sector party being TUL (74% equity).
The transmission line Teesta 3 to Kishanganj was to be executed by a JV of TUL (74% equity) and Powergrid Corporation ( 26% equity). Thus TUL was the controlling party in the Power project as well as in the transmission line project.
2 The power project was delayed over 64 months and TUL declared the Commercial Operation Date (COD) as 28 Feb 2017. While the power house was put on generation 64 months late, there was no ground for transmission line to be incomplete. Yet it was . The same entity TUL was executing the power project as well as the transmission project. TUL knew better than anybody else that the power house was 64 months late. TUL knew better than anyone else that the 1200 MW/1320 MW hydro power project is required to run at 100 % capacity ( 110% with continuous overload capability) during high flow season ( June to Sept/Oct) so as to maximize energy , and further to give daily peaking during lean season. It was too obvious that a power house of 1320 MW capability must have a transmission system that can handle 1320 MW on continuous basis. Yet TUL concentrated on completing the construction works of power house without matching efforts or progress on transmission front.
The ad hoc arrangement of looping one circuit of 400 kV line from Teesta 3 with Rangpo was adopted which was already catering to 510 MW Teesta 5 (NHPC) and 4 nos IPP hydro projects of 100 MW . With addition of 1320 MW capacity from Teesta3 the total generation of region became 2230 MW whereas the loading limit on Rangpo Binaguri line was kept at 1700 MW. The hit of 530 MW had to be taken by Teesta 3 exclusively due to two factors-First that Teesta 3 power was originally planned to be delivered at ER grid at Kishanganj and not Rangpo. Second that GOI had taken conscious decision to adopt PPP mode for transmission project by allocating the execution of Teesta 3 to Kishanganj line to the generation project developer TUL and for non completion of this line the hit of 530 MW had to be taken by TUL only as NHPC or the other 100 MW IPPs could not be expected to do pro rata backing down. The simple logic is that if TUL had ensured matching of line with power house the transmission constraint would not have occurred.
The executing agency for line was TPTL ( a JV of TUL and PGCIL). PGCIL as a 24% equity partner cannot disown responsibility, more so as PGCIL has a significant role as CTU under the E Act 2003 with onerous responsibilities given in section of the Act.
The CEA monthly transmission reports ( critical lines) states WRT Teesta 3-Kishanganj line as under
Hydro projects [ Teesta III (1200MW), Tasheding (96MW), Dikchu (96MW), Teesta-V (450MW), Jorthang HEP (110MW), Chujachen HEP (110MW) ] in Sikkim may face evacuation constraints in absence of Rangpo – Kishanganj section of line
This statement was practically modified to the extent that the hit of transmission constraints and loss of zero cost energy was entirely taken by the party responsible viz TUL while all the other hydro stations stated were able to achieve full generation within the loading limit of 1700 MW (Rangpo-Binaguri D/C with twin moose conductor). During high flow period (June to Sept/Oct 2017) the NHPC Teesta 5 and other 100 MW hydro IPPs operated at full capacity as per their (excess) water availability the balance margin upto loading limit of 1700 MW was to be utilized by Teesta 3 which was around 880 MW.
Present position The present position regarding evacuation of power and transmission constraints is (a) The completion target of Teesta3-Kishanganj D/C line is stated as 31 March 2018. ( b) The quantum of pending works makes it doubtful if the line will be completed and loaded by 31-3-2018.
As on 31-12-17 out of 590 tower foundations 555 had been completed and 35 were pending which were to be completed : Jan (13) Feb(19) and March (3). In Jan as against target of 13 tower foundations , only 5 were completed.
As regards loop in loop out of line at Rangpo , presently only one circuit has been looped in. Loop out portion of two ckts was to be constructed by PGCIL and is now delayed with new target of June 2020. It is not known what arrangement is adopted by TPTL/PGCIL so that both the circuits to Kishanganj can operate on load in case the rest of line works are completed by TPTL.
The two alternatives possible are (a) Disconnect the loop in ckt to Rangpo and run both the ckts from Teesta 3 direct to Kishanganj. (b) Run one circuit from Teesta3 direct to Kishanganj and second circuit with LILO at Rangpo.
Position from June 2018 onwards.
In case the work of TPTL in completing the pending works remains pending during period 01 June 2018 onward ( ie if target slips from March 18 to beyond June 18) then the position in 2017 high flow period will be the same for 2018 high flow period and similar spillage and energy losses will occur.
In case the line works of TPTL are completed during the period June to Sept 2018 then spillage and energy losses would occur upto the date when Kishanganj lines are loaded.
In case the Kishanganj line is completed before 01 June 2018 there would be no transmission constraint and no spillage loss .
The detailed analysis can be done only if it is known about what arrangement is adopted at Rangpo , knowing that loop out works at Rangpo can not be expected before June 2020 ( PGCIL works) .
Assessment of energy losses in 2017
During 2017 high flow period the Teesta 3 power was restricted to about 880 MW since the line to Kishanganj was not ready.The daily energy figures of Teesta 3 are given in attached sheet. The energy losses are assessed as under for period June to Sept 2017.
The 10% overload capacity is provided so as to obtain extra energy at zero cost when surplus inflows prevail. The gross power of Teesta 3 is taken as 1320 MW , and net as 1304.16 MW. Over the period June to Sept ( 122 days) the energy possible @1304.16 MW is 3818.6 MU . The actual energy (June to Sept) was 2356.4 MU. Energy loss due to backing down/transmission constraints is hence 1462.2 MU.
The actual energy sent out during June to Sept 2017 is as under
Jun / Jul / Aug / SepActual MU / 537.6 / 646.18 / 549.57 / 623.07
Avg MW / 747 / 868.5 / 738.7 / 865.4
The Energy actually sent out is as under
March-May 2017 771.2 MU
Jun-Sept 2017 2356.4 MU ( transmission restrictions)
Oct 2017 upto 27 Feb 2018 1281 MU
Total 01 Mar to 27 Feb18 4408.6 MU
While TUL declared that all its 6 units are commissioned from 0000hrs of 28 Feb 2017 the hard fact remains is that the transmission line to Kishanganj is still not ready even though one full year has elapsed while the interim arrangement of Rangpo is unable to take the full 1320 MW power from Teesta 3. Even during lean season( winter) Teesta 3 is not giving 1200 MW or 1320 MW during evening peak and instead is giving lower peak in Morning and further reduced peak in Evening peak hours. The summary is that transmission line delay has crippled the Teesta 3 both during high flow season ( spillage and energy loss) as well as lean season ( peaking not achieved in Evening peak hours).
Public Sector Funding
This project has been constructed with funds (debt) taken from public sector institutions. The debt component which was initially Rs 4560 Cr was later enhanced to 6312 Cr as under
FI/Bank / REC / IIFCL / PNB / Canara / BOB / LIC / OBCRs Cr / 2381 / 500 / 1095 / 538 / 294.7 / 370 / 295
UBI / Dena / PSB / REC-2 / Total
147 / 147 / 50 / 714 / 6312
FUTURE OUTLOOK
The future of this project hinges on several commercial and technical factors.
Commercial : Power purchase Agreements were signed with PTC India . While PTC signed PPA with TUL for purchasing the entire 1200 MW power, PTC in turn signed Power Sale Agreements (PSAs) with Punjab for 340 MW, Haryana for 200 MW, UP for 200 MW and Rajasthan for 100 MW totaling 840 MW or 70% out of 1200 MW. Balance 30% ie 360 MW PTC was to sell on short term/merchant basis . None of the 4 purchaser States has so far agreed to purchase its share of Teesta 3 generation because the capital cost of project increased from Rs 5700 Cr to Rs 14000 Cr, which would increase the tariff from the original estimate of Rs 2 per unit to now about Rs 5 per Unit. The net result is that the entire power of Teesta 3 is being sold in Power Exchange, where the rate would be fluctuating around Rs 2 to Rs 3 per unit. The commercial rate also depends upon declaration of Commercial operation of the 1200 MW station which is under challenge as it infringes the Regulations and Agreement .
Technical The technical factors involved are : First and foremost the commissioning and loading of transmission line to Kishanganj. The target of March 2018 is not likely to be met. The issue is whether this line can be commissioned before 01 June 2018. If the line slips beyond 01 June the water spillages and energy loss will repeat in 2018 on the pattern of 2017. In 2017 the energy loss is estimated as 1462 MU. Taking an average sale rate of Rs 2.5 per unit the financial loss to TUL would be around Rs 365 Cr. How to complete the line before 01 June and avoid a repeat of losses on 2017 pattern is the key challenge.
Today, on 27 Feb TUL will be completing one full year of operation of 1200 MW Teesta 3 ( with wrongly claimed commercial operation of 28 Feb 2017), a project crippled by failure of the same project developer TUL to complete Kishanganj line which remains incomplete despite passage of one full year. TUL also has set up a rare record of claiming commercial operation of a 1200 MW station without the matching transmission line and operating crippled with transmission constraints. Even in lean flow season the full peaking during evening peak hours was not achieved due to transmission bottleneck.
For a station having design energy of 5200 MU , to attain an energy loss of 1462 MU is a significant event, more so as this loss was not due to hydrology failure but due to transmission project management failure . The PPP model of project execution has indeed proved to be a huge failure.
While other public sector projects such as Nathpa Jhakri and NTPC Kol Dam regularly operate to utilize 10% overload capacity during surplus water conditions Teesta 3 of PPP model is unable to operate its units at 1200 MW even on short term basis for peaking while the operation at 1320 MW is yet to materialize even for short term peaking in lean season .
All India Power Engineers Federation
27 Feb 2018 45 Ranjit Bagh
Opposite Modi Mandir, Patiala 147004