STUDY QUESTIONS FOR M.A. EXAMINATION IN EPISTEMOLOGY
AUGUST 2007
1.Wittgenstein remarks, "We just do not see how very specialized the use of 'I know' is. -- For 'I know' seems to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression 'I thought I knew'." (On Certainty) How, if at all, do the fundamental problems of epistemology arise from ways in which the use of 'I know' is very specialized, and what implications does this have for the problems themselves?
2.What, if anything, is the difference between our way of knowing about abstract objects, our way of knowing about theoretical entities posited by the advanced sciences, and our way of knowing about everyday physical objects surrounding us?
3.Many philosophers before recent times considered geometry as an exemplar of knowledge. Does geometry provide us knowledge of necessary truths, or even truths, about the world, and if so, how?
4.Does science show that we never directly perceive physical objects? What difference does it make whether it does or not?
5."It does seem to me very certain that I know little, if anything, with certainty regarding the future." (G. E. Moore, "Four Forms of Scepticism") Can we have any knowledge of the future? If so, explain how. If not, explain why not.
6.We must depend on memory for much of our knowledge, yet memory is notoriously sometimes unreliable. How do we know when memory is reliable? If your answer is that we never know, then what is one to say about our knowledge, including our knowledge of times in the past when our senses have deceived us?
7."We know some things non-inferentially or directly or immediately because it is impossible that all our knowledge be based on inference." What support can be given for this claim? Is it, in final analysis, tenable?
8."It is important to remember that talk of deception only makes sense against a background of general non-deception. (You can't fool all of the people all of the time.) It must be possible to recognize a case of deception by checking the odd case against more normal ones." (Austin) Is this a good line of response to the argument from illusion?
9. Philosophers from Arnauld and Locke on, if not before, have introduced the analytic-synthetic distinction to handle certain problems in epistemology. In recent times, however, Quine and others have argued that the distinction is not tenable and must be abandoned. What is at stake in abandoning the distinction?
10.What is tacit knowledge? Some say the notion of tacit knowledge is an oxymoron. Why? If tacit knowledge is an oxymoron, exactly what relation do we have to the grammar of our native tongue?
11."No naturalistic criterion for justified belief is possible, for given any naturalistic criterion, one could still ask whether we are justified in accepting beliefs that satisfy the criterion, and that question would not be trifling." Discuss this argument as a sweeping reply to naturalized epistemology.
12."The common sense belief that the sun goes around the earth was not adequate grounds for rejecting the Copernican model. Why should the common sense belief in the existence of physical objects be any better basis for rejecting epistemological skepticism?" Discuss.