On Inner Speech
The Role of Inner Speech in Higher Mental Processes
Anke Werani
The functions of inner speech as an essential and important process that interrelates speaking and thinking are discussed in this article. Since the foundation of ‘Cultural-Historical Psychology’ by Vygotsky, research on the relation and connection between thinking and speaking has become more intense. Vygotsky assumes that the research of speaking and thinking contains the comprehension of complex functions of human consciousness (Vygotsky, 2002). In this context, encompassing functions of speech and functions of consciousness, the interest in inner speech has increased. Inner speech has, however, also become an important research area for psycholinguistic studies. It has finally become clear that the role of speech must be better integrated in the research of thinking processes, regulation functions, language processes, consciousness, voluntary acts and the development of personality.
Keywords: cultural-historical psychology - speaking and thinking - inner speech - genesis of inner speech - functions of inner speech
Introduction – Psycholinguistic Research: a statement
Studies on inner speech are well known but inner speech is, unfortunately, a neglected area in psycholinguistic and psychological research. This is surprising given that speech plays such an important role in our lives: speech is used for communication, but from a psycholinguistic point of view, it is also used for cognitive processes (Vygotsky, 2002; Kegel, 1977). In the integration of communicative and cognitive processes, inner speech interconnects both processes. The aim of this text is to expound the functions of inner speech and reflect on those concerning communicative and cognitive processes. Due to the ability to speak and to use language, human beings develop consciousness: a consciousness that is intimately connected with inner speech. Furthermore, the ability to use language is one that organizes our behavior via two fundamental functions: orientation and regulation. It is assumed, that inner speech is involved in speech production processes (communicative aspects) as well as in higher mental processes (cognitive aspects).
In no other area of psychological research is speech so central for the examination of mental processes as in Soviet Psychology. According to Hörmann (1976) Soviet Psychology was never psycholinguistics in the sense that it had to prove the psychological reality of linguistic theories and models. Psycholinguistic research was long misunderstood as an ancillary science for linguistics as well as for psychology. Thus it is important to realize that Soviet research involves many aspects of speech psychology which must be understood as very intensive form of psycholinguistic research. The question is whether there are, in fact, two kinds of psycholinguistic research: on the one hand there is a more linguistically orientated psycholinguistic which bases on the paradigm of cognitivism (e.g. Cutler, 2005); on the other hand psycholinguistic research is based on the speaking, thinking and acting human being. It is important and necessary to continue the Soviet research in a psycholinguistic way and many work was done up to now (e.g. Wertsch, 1991; Chaiklin, 2001).
With reference to Vygotsky (1986), three aspects of Soviet Psychology essential to psycholinguistic research will be summarized and explained shortly[1]: the keywords are speech, development and social activity. These areas always interact and are difficult to keep separate from each other. Nevertheless, I will try to focus on these three points first.
As mentioned above, (inner) speech is necessary for communication as well as for cognition. (Inner) speech is an important ability central to our consciousness (generally) as well as necessary for higher mental functions (specifically). To focus on speech processes as a fundamental mechanism for cognitive processes is a point of view deviating from the mainstream research of psychology which needs to be discussed with reference to cognitive sciences. Currently, cognitive sciences form the bulk of psychological research. In cognitivism the different abilities of the human brain are divided into individual areas. Speech therefore is only a part of cognition as for example awareness, memory, problem solving and so on (see for example Anderson, 2001). In my opinion, it is a very formalized view when one, for example, tries to look at the process of thinking as one of data processing. Furthermore, it is a simplification of the thinking process to present the results in quasi cybernetic models. Speaking is nothing other than one of the cognitive processes. Speech is not accepted as a tool for cognitive processes. It appears problematic to regard human abilities in such an isolated way. One has to primarily consider human beings in a holistic way, and think about what constitutes humans (Wertsch, 1988). From my psycholinguistic perspective, it is impossible, for example, to be aware of oneself, to be able to remember or to solve problems without speech. The central role of inner speech is to combine communicative and cognitive skills and, furthermore, to point out that speech is a basic part of higher mental processes and essential for them.
The historical method suggests that the research of higher mental processes must take into account phylogenetic and ontogenetic aspects. This means that the historical method includes the development process in the research of higher mental processes. Vygotsky feels confident that human consciousness has a socio-historical origin. The historical principle also highlighted the importance of linguistic acting and combined it with the concept of internalization (Vygotsky, 2002).
One of Vygotsky’s basic assumptions is that individual consciousness develops through relations with others, through social activity. Human consciousness and all other higher mental processes therefore have a social genesis. Vygotsky’s conviction is that an individual grows up interacting with his environment and his culture. The influence of these socio-historical aspects must always be taken into consideration when thinking about humans and their social and mental lives.
The aspects of speech, development and social activity must always be seen in connection to each other. The fundamental structure of speaking – of communication - is dialogical; in other respects, the ability to speak would not be conceivable. The dialogical structure starts with language acquisition: the psychological parent teaches the child to speak; otherwise, the child is not able to acquire language. That means we are not able to learn language independently. Life starts with social interaction in the form of dialogical speech. Vygotsky (2002) assumes that overt speech, particularly egocentric speech, is internalized in early childhood. All externally produced utterances are internalized, that means all dialogical structures ‘get inside’. In a smooth transition interpsychic processes change into intrapsychic processes. Whenever we talk to ourselves, it might be a part of our self or an imagined partner. Mead (1967, 1968) distinguishes between ‘I’ and ‘me’ where ‘I’ is the realised self, spontaneous and creative, and ‘me’ is the part of oneself he calls the generalized other. The generalized other is a kind of conscience; it is the majority opinion in us with all our cultural norms and values. This includes the internalized imagination, how others see us and what they expect from us.
Beside these aspects of development and the fundamental assumption of interaction, humans usurp their mental processes by cultural social signs (Vygotsky, 2002). ‘Like a tool the sign determines the structure of the mental process which it affects’ (Matthäus, 1988, [translation aw]). Vygotsky points out that human create new stimuli in the process of the work activity (beyond the stimulus-response-pattern) which he designates as signs (e.g. numbers, words, characters). Primarily signs have a social character since they serve communication and thus determine social behavior. First, the word is like a command for others and is furthermore a tool to regulate one’s own behavior. Then the child assumes this behavior for itself, which has been shown to it by others (Matthäus, 1988). In general, all mental processes are thus always social, derived from social signs. The sign, Vygotsky stresses, affects its meaning and not its physical condition. Vygotsky wishes to regard all mental function and human consciousness against the background of social, corporate and historical results. He establishes the historical view in psychological research just as he does the concept of internalization. Furthermore, signs are abstract. They are detached from direct stimuli and could focus on oneself. Hence, not only external stimuli could initiate behavior but also intended words. Vygotsky enlarges the stimulus-response-pattern by introducing signs as mediating elements. The signs exist outside the individuals. The system of signs is internalized in the course of development. The relation of speaking and thinking is based on the social contact between humans. Internalization of speech passes through three phases: social, egocentric and the internalized phase. In general, higher mental processes are acquired through social activity. Through social activity individuals develop and form mental functions.
Therefore, the higher functions lie outside the individual and they occur in interpersonal relations. These social, interpersonal relations are transformed into intrapersonal processes; this is the idea of internalization: all humans develop from a social to an individual human. This assumption suggests that for the study of psychological processes not only the individual or the individual psyche has to be taken into consideration, but also the individual concerning its cultural environment (cp. Wertsch, 1988).
In conclusion, explanations of consciousness and abstract thinking must be analyzed closely with linguistic abilities. It is suspected that the roots of these complex processes are found in the social existence forms of humans. Consequently, the key-function of language is focused, which allows prescinding characteristics from objects, to code them, and to generalize them. The basic difference of this opinion compared with traditional psychology is that the sources of human consciousness are neither found in the spirit’s depths nor in the independently dealing mechanisms of the brain. The sources of consciousness are sought in the real relationship of humans to their reality, in their social development, which has to do naturally with working and speaking. Social work is inseparably joined with the consciousness development of the human being and characterizes the life activity of the human being that starts new behavioral forms above all with the division of work. These new behavioral forms are independent from elementary biological motives. Work, and therewith division of work, brings out the formation of social behavioral motives. Exactly in the context of all these factors, humans create new, complex motives of action.
Finally, speaking with each other depends on at least two interlocutors: oneself and another person. The other person could really exist, or he (they) could be imagined through intrapsychic. The principle therefore is a dialogical structure and the convinction that the fundamental structure of being is social. My focus is the transition from interpsychic to intrapsychic processes. One theme is therefore the genesis of inner speech; I will treat it at another date (Werani, in preparation). In the following, I will expound on intrapsychological structures of human beings and the role of inner speech. My research on inner speech always includes interpsychic processes. Undoubtedly, inner speech is one of the most interesting themes of psycholinguistic studies.
Functions of inner speech
Inner speech is a principal issue of psycholinguistic research. In this article I will focus on the functions of inner speech and relate these functions to higher mental processes. According to Wertsch (1988), Vygotsky distinguishes higher mental processes by four characteristics: (1) internal instead of external regulation (arbitrary), (2) consciousness, (3) social origin and social nature, (4) semiotic mediation. The relatively autonomous cognitive system of an adult in a civilized society is created by the collective regulation of acting. One fundamental tool for higher mental processes is inner speech. Soviet psychologists describe inner speech in a basic way (Vygotsky, 2002; Luria, 1982; Ananjew, 1963; Galperin, 1967a+b; Sokolov, 1972). Their point of view will be demonstrated below.
Vygotsky (2002) founded a widespread concept of inner speech. He was concerned with the genesis of inner speech as well as its semantic and syntactic structure.[2] His concept constitutes the background for all continuance, and therefore is fundamental and groundbreaking for all psycholinguistic research.
Vygotsky deals with Piaget’s concept of egocentric speech. Vygotsky was able to show that egocentric speech is a pre-stage of inner speech. Egocentric speech increases when children are given problems and it helps them to solve problems. ‘Besides its role of accompaniment to activity and its expressive and release functions, egocentric speech readily assumes a planning function, i.e., turns into thought proper quiet naturally and easily.’ (Vygotsky, 1986, p 86).
It is easy to single out the functions of inner speech by Vygotsky because he distinguishes two different situations whereby function can be deflected. First, uttered speech represents ‘speech-for-others’; it is directed toward the social activity, and it has a function for communication and thereby for behavioral regulation of others. Second, inner speech is ‘speech-for-oneself’; it is directed toward one’s own psychological activity and it becomes a function for self-regulation. Vygotsky speaks in general from a ‘mental orientation’ and about ‘becoming aware, overcoming difficulties and obstacles’. ‘It [inner speech] does not merely accompany the child’s activity; it serves mental orientation, conscious understanding; it helps in overcoming difficulties; it is speech for oneself, intimately and usefully connected with the child’s thinking’ (Vygotsky, 1986, p 228).
Inner speech becomes a means for thinking; it is, according to Vygotsky, involved in both communicative and cognitive processes and is therefore a transition from speaking to thinking and vice versa.
Luria (1982) extended Vygotsky’s view by three aspects: (1) Investigation of inner speech regarding its control function, (2) inclusion of neurophysiological processes regarding psychological activity, which correspond in particular with language disturbances after brain-damage, (3) consideration of syntax during language acquisition (language production and reception). Luria emphasizes Vygotsky’s view that inner speech plays an important role for intellectual and behavioral regulative functions.
Most important regarding inner speech is, according to Luria (1982), the volitional act: ‘A volitional act is (…) mediated by speech. By this we mean not just external speech as a means of communication, but also the child’s own regulative forms of speech. A typical form of such regulative speech is the inner speech which originates in external speech but evolves into a novel psychological formation.’ (Luria, 1982, p 106).
Luria is interested in the development of self-regulation and the function of regulation of inner speech. The result of his research is a gradated differentiation of this function. The basis of this development lies in the acquisition of the ability of the child to subordinate itself to the language of the adult. ‘We have already said that the source of self-regulative speech is the process whereby the child submits to adults’ speech. The speech of the adult, often accompanied by pointing gestures, brings about essential changes in the organization of the mental activity of the child. Labeling by the mother and her pointing gestures focus the child’s attention.’ (Luria, 1982, p 90).
I think it is an important step in language acquisition that the child no longer only directs its attention coincidentally toward new attractions that appear but also is directed by the speech of adults. This development, directing the child’s attention through adult’s speech, begins with linguistically accompanied gestures and ends in directing the child’s attention by linguistic gestures. Due to the language of the adult, a restructuring of the child’s attention thus occurs. Language evokes an orientation reflex (Luria, 1982, quotes here Bronstein and Bruner (1973)). The mother connects the word with an object; thus, the reaction of the child takes a specific form. The word of the adult becomes the regulator of the child’s behavior. The organization of its behavior thus lifted onto a qualitatively higher level by the word. This reaction can be reinforced when the adult strengthens his linguistic expression by an action (e.g. the investigator not only names the object, but acts with it). However, the dullness of the action consistently prevents their linguistic subordination. The regulating influence of speech is overridden, to a certain extent, by the accomplished action.
The child has to subordinate its behavior to an adult’s verbal commands (Luria, 1982). It acquires a system of verbal instructions and begins to use these instructions for the regulation of its own behavior. Then the structure between the child and the adult changes fundamentally, with the commands becoming intrapsychological and internalized. The child achieves a new level of behavioral regulation – that of self-regulation. The child starts to regulate its behavior through its own speech. The ability of self-regulation is realized through expanded speech, which gradually turns inward and becomes inner speech.
Luria pointed out the emergency of language: language deepens and enriches one’s direct perception and forms consciousness. In this case words are also involved in building up mental processes (Luria & Judowitsch, 1970).
According to Luria this development could be summarized as follows: ‘… the subordination of an act to verbal instruction is by no means simple and does not emerge suddenly. Volitional acts, subordinated to the oral instruction of an adult, develop gradually’ (Luria, 1982, p 96). Inner speech acquires in the course of development an adjustment factor for all kinds of mental and applied acts. Speech belongs to nearly all basic functions of human activity. Speech is involved in acting and affords a new point of entry to the area of mental activity (Luria & Judowitsch, 1970).
Inner speech is a substantial condition for the development of higher mental processes and for thinking. On the one hand, thinking develops from action. On the other hand, thinking functions more logically, if actions and uttered speech can be internalized, abstracted and generalized. Luria assumes that inner speech has a special status between uttered speech and thinking. It establishes a relationship between thought and word, and mediates between thinking and speaking. Furthermore, inner speech is involved in all language-dependent and language-accompanying mental processes. Luria & Judowitsch (1970) explicate this assumption as follows: ‘inner speech is involved in nearly all types of human mental activity’ (p. 60, [translation aw]).