Legal Update:
Selected Recent Cases Under Title I
of the Americans with Disabilities Act and
Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act
Prepared by: Jeanne Goldberg, Senior Attorney Advisor
Office of Legal Counsel
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
January 2, 2008
Note: This training handout summarizes selected decisions under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, many of which illustrate principles of general applicability. Remember that some state and local laws contain different definitions and broader protections thanprovided under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.
I. Individual with a Disability
- Substantially Limiting Impairment
Greenberg v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 2577030 (Sept. 10, 2007). Plaintiff, a telephone company employee who worked on installation and maintenance of telephone service, was morbidly obese and had other medical conditions (sleep apnea, hypertension, hypercholesterolemia, hyperlipidemia, and Type II diabetes). He was subject to company’s “safe load limit” for jobs that required climbing, but for a period of time his supervisor avoided this by hand-picking him for job assignments that would not require him to climb. When the company decided to apply its safe load limit policy uniformly, plaintiff was given 25 weeks to lose 50 pounds, but was terminated when he failed to do so. Analyzing his claim of disability discrimination, the court ruled that plaintiff failed to show he was substantially limited in the major life activity of caring for oneself, since he was able to bathe and dress himself as well as perform household chores. Nor did he show that he was substantially limited in working, since he did not establish that he was limited in performing a class or broad range of jobs.
Nadler v. Harvey, 2007 WL 2404705 (11th Cir. Aug. 24, 2007) (unpublished). Plaintiff alleged denial of reasonable accommodation when his employer denied his request for a modified compressed work schedule with a flexible start time to accommodate his sleep disorder. The court held that plaintiff failed to show that his insomnia and depression substantially limited him in the major life activity of sleeping. “’Difficulty sleeping is extremely widespread,’ and a plaintiff must present evidence, beyond vague assertions of ‘a rough night’s sleep’ or a need for medication, ‘that his affliction is [ ] worse than [that] suffered by [a] large portion of the nation’s adult population.’” Here, with medication, plaintiff obtained between 4 and 7 ½ hours of sleep per night, with an average of 5 ½ to 6 ½ hours, and his sleep quality was between 50 and 80 percent. The court ruled that this evidence showed plaintiff was “limited” but not substantially limited in sleeping, and thus failed to meet the definition of an “individual with a disability.”
Littleton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 1379986 (11th Cir. May 11, 2007). Plaintiff with mental retardation applied (with the assistance of an employment coordinator with the AlabamaIndependentLivingCenter) for a cart-push associate position but was not hired, and challenged his non-selection as disability discrimination. The court held that assuming thinking, communicating, and social interaction are major life activities, the limited evidence offered in the case failed to show that plaintiffwas substantially limited in any of these, or in the major life activities of learningor working.
Carlson v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 2007 WL 1632267 (11th Cir. June 7, 2007) (unpublished). Plaintiff with epilepsy failed to demonstrate that she was substantially limited in any major life activities. While the evidence showed that she was unable to do anything during her seizures, it also showed that the seizures last one to three minutes and that she has had very few of them in her lifetime. Her epilepsy was well-controlled with medication and her only limitations were on her inability to drive for six months after a seizure, and to engage in activities such as bungee jumping, scuba diving, piloting a plane, working in elevated places, or swimming alone. The court held that none of these is a major life activity in and of itself, and that plaintiff failed to show based solely on her driving restriction that she was substantially limited in the major life activity of working.
EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff, a morbidly obese dock worker, failed as a matter of law to establish that he had a physical impairment within the meaning of the ADA. The court held that morbid obesity, defined as “body weight more than 100% over the norm,” is an impairment within the meaning of the ADAonly in cases where it is shown to have a physiological cause.
Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp., 472 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that her endometriosis substantially limited her in a major life activity.
Jenkins v. Cleco Power, LLC, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 1454363 (5th Cir. May 18, 2007). Work accident resulted in plaintiff fracturing his left femur, requiring extensive surgery and resulting in permanent leg deformity, difficulty with motion and weight bearing, and various limitations including an inability to sit for extended periods of time. Plaintiff proved that he was substantially limited in the major life activity of sitting, where the evidence showed that he could, with intermittent breaks, only sit for a maximum of three hours per day, which is significantly more restricted than the average person in the general population.
Bryson v. Regis Corp., ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 2326046 (6th Cir. Aug. 16, 2007). Plaintiff sued her employer, alleging, among other things, that defendant violated the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA) when it terminated her from her job as a hair stylist and salon manager because she could not return to work following her FMLA leave for knee surgery. Interpreting the disability discrimination provisions of the KCRA as consistent with the ADA, the court concluded that plaintiff was not an individual with a disability. The court noted that notwithstanding complications following surgery, within thirteen months her knee “had improved considerably and was well-resolved,” she had no work restrictions, and she was eventually able to stand for as much as fifteen or twenty minutes, and sometimes as long as an hour, hour-and-a-half, or two hours, even though it was not all day as she had once been able to do.
Williams v. Excel Foundry & Machine, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 1574613 (7th Cir. June 1, 2007). Foundry worker had accident resulting in fracture of his spine in several places. After being released from various initial restrictions, he still remained permanently impaired in his ability to stand for long periods of time and to balance himself. “Although able to stand for 30-40 minutes while constantly moving, after longer periods he experienced a sharp, aching pain in his back and left leg resembling the sensation of a pulled muscle” that could be alleviated by sitting or lying down for a brief period. When he returned to work, he was accommodated by the employer, which allowed breaks every hour to sit or lie down for a few minutes before returning to work. When he was subsequently terminated for starting a rumor about the company’s actions toward another employee, he alleged that the real motive for his discharge was disability discrimination in violation of the ADA. The court ruled that he could not proceed with his claim because he failed to prove he was an individual with a disability, i.e., substantially limited in standing or any other major life activity due to his impairment. Citing EEOC’s ADA regulations providing that a person is substantially limited in the ability to walk if he “can only walk for very brief periods of time....,” 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. Section 1630.2, the court held that “thirty to forty minutes is not a ‘very brief’ period,” so the inability to stand for longer periods did not constitute a substantial limitation in standing.
Squibb v. MemorialMedicalCenter, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 2325173 (7th Cir. Aug. 16, 2007). After a third back injury sustained when lifting or moving a patient, plaintiff, a registered nurse, required surgery, a significant recovery period, and pre-operative and post-operative physical restrictions. She challenged her subsequent non-selection for various positions and her termination as discrimination and denial of accommodation under the ADA. The court affirmed summary judgment for the employer on the ground that plaintiff failed to establish she was an individual with a disability. Specifically, the court ruled that her inability to sleep for longer than 3-4 hours per night did not substantially limit her in sleeping; her inability to sit for more than 30 minutes at a time did not substantially limit her in sitting; and her supervisor’s documented observation about her difficulty walking did not establish a substantial limitation in walking. Moreover, her difficulty buttoning and zipping clothing in the back, brushing the back of her hair, and performing such household tasks as cooking, cleaning, and grocery shopping, was insufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact on the question of whether she was substantially limited in caring for herself, in light of activities that she could perform, such as bathing, brushing her teeth, dressing herself, and driving. The court also held that her light-duty work restriction alone did not demonstrate a substantial limitation in working absent evidence of the range of jobs available in her geographic area that would fall within her physical restrictions. Additionally, the court ruled that plaintiff’s evidence did not show she was substantially limited in the major life activity of engaging in sexual relations, but that even if it did, the Eighth Circuit joined the view of the Seventh Circuit (contrary to the position of EEOC and other courts) that there must be a nexus between the major life activity that is substantially limited and the need for accommodation.
Adams v. Potter, 2006 WL 2431118 (6th Cir. Aug. 22, 2006) (unpublished). The court found that although plaintiff, a mail handler, had a 20% disability rating from the Veterans Administration due to a back injury that required two surgeries and still restricted his activities, it is “debatable” whether it substantially limited any major life activities. Although deciding that it need not resolve the issue of whether the plaintiff has a disability (since he was not qualified), the court stated that “to classify [the plaintiff] as disabled because he cannot lift heavy objects or stand for long periods of time or engage in repetitive bending, twisting, or stooping motions would require a broad definition of disability – a definition that would cover almost everyone who suffers from a back problem.” SeealsoRolland v. Potter, 492 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2007) (Postal Service’s placement of employee in “rehabilitation position” pursuant to workers’ compensation program did not establish that he was an “individual with a disability”; his limitations were not substantial enough to meet the definition). ButseeSpence v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, EEOC Appeal No. 0120041082 (Aug. 2, 2007) (EEOC held, consistent with Commission precedent, that complainant was substantially limited in the major life activity of lifting based on his long-term ten-pound lifting restriction).
Christensen v. Titan Distribution, Inc., 481 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2007). Affirming jury verdict for plaintiff on claims of age and disability discrimination (failure to hire), the court found that a reasonable jury could conclude plaintiff was substantially limited in the major life activity of working, based on his combination of limitations: (1) could not engage in prolonged walking, standing more than two hours at a time, frequent bending or stooping, or jumping from heights over one foot; (2) 35% impairment rating of leg and a 15% impairment rating of his body as a whole; (3) on short-term disability leave for knee replacement surgery and recovery from June-August, and had to abide by his doctors restrictions concerning walking and bending his knee; and (4) could only perform 50% of the jobs in the job market and was prevented from performing jobs of “medium and above strength demands” that required lifting 50 pounds or more.
Burnett v. LFW, Inc., 472 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff’, who was diagnosed with prostate cancer shortly after his termination, could not show that at the time of his termination his then-undiagnosed cancer, which caused frequent urinating and limitations on strenuous physical activity, substantially limited a major life activity.
Didier v. Schwann Food Co., 465 F.3d 838 (8th Cir. 2006). Route sales manager failed to prove that his right arm injury substantially limited him in the major life activity of caring for oneself, where by his own admission he was able to dress himself, tie his shoes, write, dial the phone, wash dishes, and prepare meals, and in addition had learned to shave and perform other grooming with his left hand.
Holt v. GrandLake Mental HealthCenter, 443 F.3d 762 (10th Cir. 2006). Employee who was terminated for poor performance alleged disparate treatment based on disability. The court held that her mild form of cerebral palsy did not substantially limit her in the major life activities of either performing manual tasks or caring for oneself, where the evidence showed only that she had difficulty with or could not perform a small number of manual tasks such as cutting her own nails, slicing and chopping food, and occasionally had difficulty buttoning her clothing and chewing/swallowing her food.
Scheerer v. Potter, 443 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2006). Postal employee with Type 2 diabetes failed to show he was substantially limited in the major life activity of eating because “the predominant purpose of his dietary restrictions was to lose weight – as millions of other non-disabled individuals seek to do - rather than to control rapid fluctuations of his blood sugar levels that could lead to immediate and dire consequences. Moreover, his diet followed the general contours of the diets of most individuals seeking to lose weight.” Plaintiff also failed to show a substantial limitation in walking, standing, or sleeping.
Samuels v. Kansas CityMissouriSchool District, 437 F.3d 797 (8th Cir. 2006). Teacher failed to establish that she was substantially limited in a major life activity based on injuries from a car accident and two falls, where the evidence was limited to the fact that she took five months of leave from her position and then returned on a part-time basis performing light duty clerical work. At the time she was medically evaluated pursuant to her request for various accommodations, her own doctor stated she was restricted from lifting more than five pounds, standing or walking for more than a maximum of one hour each day, sitting for more than one hour without interruptions for rest and stretching, and lacked capacity to climb, stoop, crunch, kneel, or crawl. However, the school district’s doctor examined the teacher and rendered the opinion that her impairments were resolved without any lasting effects. The school district paid for an independent medical evaluation to resolve the discrepancy, and that physician concluded the teacher was not disabled and was not entitled to an accommodation. The court held that this evidence supported the school district’s decision to deny accommodation at the time the request was made, notwithstanding the fact that a year later a physician who evaluated the teacher pursuant to her workers’ compensation claim found a 60% permanent partial disability.
B. "Record of" a Substantially Limiting Impairment
Dunning v. United Parcel Service, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2007 WL 162939 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 18, 2007). Long-lasting periods of inability to lift following shoulder injuries and surgeries over a period of years could support a finding of a “record of” substantial limitation in the major life activity of lifting.
Seealso Knight v. Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, 2005 WL 758239 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 2005) (unpublished) (affirming jury verdict in plaintiff’s favor, court held that the defendant police department discriminated against the plaintiff based on his record of a disability, or based on what it regarded as his disability, by its unofficial policy of refusing to rehire disability pensioners, even if they were medically cleared to return to work); Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Sys. Co., 362 F.3d 564 (9th Cir. 2004) (on remand from the Supreme Court, the court held that plaintiff provided enough evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find that the employer refused to rehire him because of his record of past drug addiction and not because of an unwritten policy barring the rehire of employees previously terminated for violating personnel conduct rules; although the individual who made the decision not to rehire the plaintiff testified that she was not aware of the plaintiff’s history of drug addiction or the reason for his resignation, she had seen a letter from his Alcoholics Anonymous counselor indicating that he was a recovering alcoholic, had pulled his entire personnel file (which included his positive drug test results that led to his resignation in lieu of termination three years earlier), and the employer admitted in writing that it refused to rehire the plaintiff based on his history of substance abuse).