Chapter in

‘Islam’ in ‘the West’: Key Issues in Multiculturalism

Editors: Max Farrar, Simon Robinson, Yasmin Valli, Paul Wetherly (Palgrave, 2012)

Chapter 15

Islamism and Terror:

A Western Way of Doing Politics

Max Farrar

Introduction

This chapter aims to set out the history of Islamist ideology and political practice, one variety of which is branded as ‘Al-Qaeda’ (AQ). It argues that Islamists’ political methods are thoroughly implicated in modern Western ideology and political practice. Not only, as this book argues, is the contested field of Islam part and parcel of the variegated and contradictory set of territories and discourses labelled ‘the West’, so also the specific form of Islam that intervenes politically in world affairs, labelled Islamism, is derived from, and contributes to, the specific types of politics practised in the modern West. Thus this chapter aims to dispel the popular misconception that Islamism is atavistic, or utterly different from political practice in modern democracies. While its ideology is clearly more emphatically linked to religion than that of any contemporary Western political parties, this provides no reason to suggest it is completely distinct from Western ideologies. (Europe’s Christian Democrats profess their religious leanings, and the British Conservative Party has been aptly described as the Church of England at prayer.) Islamism was deliberately developed as a response to the ideologies of capitalism, communism and fascism, initiated in the West. Although its use of military methods against Western targets in Kenya and Egypt began in the 1990s, adding attacks on targets in the West in the 2000s, political Islam and its violent methods arose in the Middle East in the earlier part of the Twentieth Century. While the context of this chapter is the ‘war on terror’ following 9/11 and 7/7 (see The 9/11 Commission Report,and for the UK see Ahmed (2006), Rai (2007)), it will explain the deeper roots of Islamism rather than examining Western governments’ efforts combat terrorism.[i] Through brief enquiries into the lives and works of Hassan al-Bana, Abdul ala Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden, this chapter will show that radical, political Islam – like the revolutionary movements formed in Europe – is a complex and layered phenomenon with varying positions on the role of violence, deeply indebted to Western political praxis.

Defining ‘Islamism’ and ‘terrorism’

‘Islamism’ is used in this chapter as a catch-all term for those varieties of Islamic belief and practice which are explicitly political, in the Western sense of the term. Unlike those Muslims who argue that Islam is a complete system in which religion and politics are one and the same, Islamists argue that there is a need for concerted, specifically political action, with organisations, publications and actions (from petitions, demonstrations and elections to assassinations and suicide bombing) designed to further their ideology. Differing from most Western political organisations, those formed by Islamists claim to base themselves entirely on the word of God as expressed in the Holy Quaran, and in the words and deeds of God’s Messenger, the Prophet Mohammed, as related by his closest companions and passed down as the Sunnah.[ii] Nevertheless, these organisations and activities replicate in their structures and tactics European political formations, in particular those with a revolutionary agenda (of the left and of the right).

I derive the term ‘Islamism’ from contemporary writers on Islamist ideology and practice such as Kepel (2004) (who also uses the term ‘political Islam’), Roy (2004) (for whom ‘political Islam’ has failed and is being replaced by ‘neofundamentalism’), and Aslan (2006 p. 239) who describes ‘Islamism’ as ‘a new ideology’ inspired by the work of Sayyid Qutb (see below). For Mandaville ‘political Islam’ and ‘Islamism’ are synonymous; he defines this phenomenon as ‘a particular kind of Muslim politics: one that seeks to create a political order defined in terms of Islam (usually a shari’ah based state)’ (Mandaville 2007 p. 20). Mandaville further identifies ‘radical Islamism’, a variety of Islamism characterised by its antagonism to the nation state. ‘Radical Islamists’ advocate in place of the nation state ‘a pan-Islamic polity or renewed caliphate’. They emphasise ‘violent struggle (jihad) as the primary or even exclusive method for the pursuit of political change’ (Mandaville 2007 p. 239). (In this chapter, to stress the Al-Qaeda network’s emphasis on aggressive, violent jihad, I use terms such as ‘violent Islamism’, to show the distinctiveness of their position within the broad camp of Islamism, which contains non-violent organisations.) Ruthven (2004) usefully explains the similarities between Islamists and other types of what he calls ‘fundamentalism’ within Hinduism, Judaism and Christianity. For Ruthven, the grouping this chapter refers to as ‘Islamists’ are included in the broad category of ‘fundamentalists’. A British research report defined Islamism as:

A political ideology, whose key tenets include: belief that Islam is not a religion, but a holistic socio-political system; advocacy of Sharia (Islamic) law as divine state law; belief that a transnational Muslim community, known as the Ummah, should unite as a political bloc.

Simcox, Stuart and Ahmed (2010 p. xii)

It is notable that in this definition, advocating violent methods of putting their aims into practice is not mentioned; most Islamists are not violent.[iii] Tariq Ramadan (2004) explains that there are four major tendencies among devout Muslims, only some of whom could be described as Islamists. (Ramadan does not use the term Islamism, but makes clear that among the six tendencies some are explicitly political.) According to Ramadan the main groupings are Traditionalists, Salafis, Liberals, and Sufis. ‘Scholastic Traditionalism’ contains a variety of schools of thought, each of which offer differing interpretations of the Quaran and the sunnah, that are closely followed by all adherents to each ‘traditional’ school. In the UK, the Deobandis, the Barelwis and Tablighi-Jamaat fit within this category, while the Taliban are their Afghani representatives. Salafis[iv] come in three varieties. Salafi ‘literalists’ are similar to the ‘traditionalists’ but the important difference is that they reject any scholarly interpretation of any kind, reading the Quaran and sunnah directly and literally. Salafi ‘reformists’ on the other hand allow for interpretation, arguing that the original texts can be adapted to modern conditions. Al-Banna, Mawdudi and Qutb (discussed below) and their followers are salafi reformists, in Ramadan’s classification. ‘Political literalist salafis’ share a commitment to political action based on the sacred sources but their politics are explicitly revolutionary and they regard the West as ‘the realm of war’. In the UK they are represented by Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) and Al-Muhajiroon. The latter is banned in the UK for its explicit support for the AQ network, while HT is banned in Egypt. Olivier Roy emphasises the increasing importance of a grouping within the salafis whom he calls ‘neofundamentalists’. These reject all types of political action because it distracts from the main priority – purifying the self – and implies that something more is needed than the imposition of the shariah[v] law (Roy 2004 pp. 247 – 8). Ramadan then describes an Islamic tendency he calls ‘liberal or rationalist reformism’. This group includes the supporters of Ataturk’s reforms in Turkey. They follow a personal and spiritual version of Islam, do not refer too closely to the Quaran and sunnah, reject the sartorial styles of the salafi and the traditionalists. They are liberal in the Western sense on matters such as human rights and democratic pluralism, but socially conservative on matters such as homosexuality. Finally, there are the Sufis, who also come in several varieties, all having an intense focus on the inner life, meditated upon via the holy texts, and sometimes giving rise to mystical experience (Ramadan 2004 pp. 24 – 28).

The strength of Ramadan’s classification is that it conclusively refutes the view of Islam – offered by European and American right-wing parties and commentators – that Islam is homogenous, inherently violent and utterly antithetical to Western thought and society. As Ramadan makes clear, the majority of tendencies within Islam are apolitical and devout in much the same way as are committed, apolitical Christians, Jews or Hindus. Other Muslims take social and political roles that can be defined as broadly secular. In this chapter, only two tendencies within this many-sided religion will be analysed. These two ‘Islamist’ tendencies are those described by Ramadan as salafi reformists or literalists. Both are intensely political, but differ in their tactics. The ‘liberal’ Muslims in the West are often politically active too, but are usually less radical, supporting the mainstream political parties, making no more of their religious beliefs than do politically active Jews, Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists and Christians, and thus cannot be described as ‘Islamist’.

The distinctive feature of the Al-Qaeda network[vi] is that it employs methods of political violence initiated by the Nineteenth century Nihilists in Russia, developed by some Anarchists and by the Bolsheviks and Nazis in the first half of the Twentieth Century, and then employed again by the armed revolutionary movements in Europe and the USA in the latter half of the Twentieth Century. It is worth recalling how prevalent (and in some cases long-lasting) these Western armed revolutionary groups have been over the past fifty years. They included the Weather Underground in the USA, the Angry Brigade in England, Action-Directe in France, the Red Brigades in Italy, the Red Army Faction in West Germany, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the north of Ireland, and ETA (Basque Homeland and Freedom) in northern Spain. (Neuman (2009) explains the parallels between ‘Western’ and ‘Islamist’ terrorism.) Picking up on the continuity between violent Western revolutionary organisations and AQ, Mohamedou (2011 p. 93) goes so far as to argue that ‘Al Qaeda is a political organisation, not a religious one’. Despite sharing their belief that spectacular violence will further their cause, the AQ network differs from these Western movements in several respects. The most obvious is that its members believe in God while the others are either opposed to religion, or make little reference to religion. Secondly, it fails to set out a detailed manifesto, claiming only to stand for a new Islamic ummah[vii] to be governed by shariah law. Thirdly, while the others adopted the organisational model of a political party or a covert military organisation, Al-Qaeda, after its initial emergence out of a merger of other radical Islamist organisations, operates now as a network of individuals and small groups who ally themselves with AQ’s principles of ummah and shariah and its violent methods. Finally, because its ideology and violent methods have acquired such a large following across the globe – because it seems to be the only effective antidote to the expanding hegemony of corrupt, militarised capitalism aiming to annihilate Islam – it has unleashed a violent response from the West of unprecedented proportions. These are, however, differences of kind, rather than type: AQ remains firmly in the mould of Western violent revolutionary politics. Its declared motives are entirely comprehensible within the framework of modern political, anti-imperialist movements familiar to the West: removal of the United States’ military bases in the Middle East, ending support for Israel’s illegal occupation of Palestinian territory, and reversal of Western support for corrupt dictatorships in the Arab and Muslim world (Mohamedou 2011 p. 97).

In this chapter the term ‘terror’ is employed in light of the considerable debate that has surrounded this term. The expression ‘One person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter’ calls attention to the problem of interpretation which is provoked by the word ‘terror’. Acts of political violence, resulting in death, destruction and injury, have often been legitimated by supporters of the movements or parties which perpetrate this violence on the grounds that the means are justified by the ends, where the ends are framed as ethically sound. Those who legitimate these acts of violence often object to the use of the term ‘terror’ because its negative connotations draw attention away from the putative justice of the actors’ goals. For leftist revolutionaries of my (1960s) generation, the sporadic violence employed by the movements against British colonial power by the African National Congress in its opposition to apartheid in South Africa, the bombs ignited by the IRA in support of Sinn Fein’s demand for a united Ireland free of British control, and the military actions of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, were all seen as justified, even when there were civilian casualties, since their causes were seen as morally and politically correct, and because other means of undertaking politics were being blocked, usually by the military power of the dominant groups. Today, while there was a feeling among some leftists after 7/7 that the USA ‘had it coming’, no leftists actually support the AQ movement, since they do not regard the imposition of Islamic law as a justifiable goal. In this chapter, however, the question of motive, means and the ethics of the ultimate aim are severed from the description of the action. I follow Jessica Stern’s approach: ‘terrorism [is] defined as an act or threat of violence against non-combatants with the objective of exacting revenge, intimidating or otherwise influencing an audience’. As Stern points out, ‘[t]his definition avoids limiting perpetrator or purpose’ (Stern 2003 p. xx). Thus, states can be seen as employing terror tactics – torturing captives, destroying property, killing soldiers in retreat – just as liberation movements can. Similarly, religious movements – such as those who affiliate themselves with Islamic Al-Qaeda and some Hindu, Jewish and Christian fundamentalists – employ terror with the aim of intimidating their enemies, influencing their supporters, and reversing the policies of their enemies, as Stern (2003) so vividly describes. Terrorism, therefore, is an intensely political phenomenon – ‘a form of armed conflict’ (Mohamedou 2011 p. 101) – employed by a variety of types of organisation.

The origins of political Islam

Islamism is normally thought to originate in the work of the Iranian-born al-Afghani (1839 – 1897) and the Egyptian Muhammad Abduh (1849 – 1945) (Rahnema 2008). For reasons to be explained later, the work ofMuhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab (1703 – 1792), often referred to in the context of radical Islam, is not included here as a foundation for political Islam. In this section, I will describe the three major figures whose aim to reform and modernise Islam established the Islamist tendency among the world’s Muslims: Hassan al-Banna, Abdul Ala Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb, pointing to their close relationship with modern Western modes of operation. Later, I will set out AQ’s relationship to these ‘founding fathers’.

Hassan al-Banna (1906 – 1949) and the Muslim Brothers in Egypt

The radical, political tendency in Islam emerged in its organised form in Egypt in the early Twentieth Century when Hasan al-Banna declared in 1928: ‘We are brothers in the service of Islam . . . hence we are the Muslim Brothers’ (Aslan 2006 p. 236). Al-Banna had arrived in Cairo in 1923 and was immediately struck by ‘the depravity and rampant secularism that had gripped the city. Traditional Islamic ideas of egalitarianism and social justice had been swept aside by the country’s political and religious elites . . .Westernized Egyptians ruled over millions of impoverished peasants’ (Aslan 2006 p. 235). According to Commins (2008 p. 128): ‘[A]n observer of Egyptian society during the 1920s might have concluded that the tide of western secular culture would soon sweep away Egypt’s Muslim culture’. Al-Banna rejected the European capitalist modernisation programme of the Egyptian elites, which immiserated the poor and corrupted their morals (Aslan 2006 pp. 235- 6). His diagnosis of their plight was that Muslims had departed from ‘true’ Islam. They must commit themselves to living according to the Quran and the Sunnah (Commins 2008 p. 133). He drew thousands of supporters as he preached in public parks, coffee shops and people’s homes for what he called ‘the Islamisation of society’ (Aslan 2006 p. 236). Posted in 1927 by the government to teach Arabic in Ismailiya, he established the Muslim Brothers in that town. By the time he was transferred back to Cairo in 1932, it was ‘poised to grow as a nationwide movement’ (Commins 2008 p. 132). It had quickly developed into a mass movement mainly based in the recently educated lower middle classes in the towns (Kepel 2004 p. 28).[viii] With its vertical organisational structure, with himself at the head as ‘General Guide’, the only concession to democracy was a Consultative Assembly of between 100 and 150 members. Al-Banna conducted its annual meetings (Commins 2008 p. 145). With their own publications – propaganda tools learned, al-Banna acknowledged, from Europe (Commins 2008 p. 148) – the Brothers entered national politics. After the 1939-1945 war the Brothers contributed to the violent campaign against British colonialism and against other Egyptian political parties. A Muslim Brother assassinated the Prime Minister in December 1948. The Brothers were involved in the political ‘mayhem’ during 1949 (Kopel 2004 p. 29). Al-Banna himself was killed by the secret police in February 1949 (Commins 2008 pp. 132-3).