Acknowledgements
I thank Mr. E. Deenadayalan, General Secretary, The Other Media, for pursuing the funding agency to release funds for the project. Mr. Deena has been very much involved in every step of the progress of the project, making it sure that I am able to do the work without any problem. Mr. Deena has spared his invaluable time to discuss with me at every stage of my work. I am very much indebted to him.
I express my deep sense of gratitude to Ms. Taranjit Birdi, Coordinator for the Fact Finding Mission for Bhopal’s Gas Tragedy for considering me as one of the members for the mission. Ms. Birdi, has given me constant support, encouragement and has given her precious time in discussing the progress of the work, at every stage of the project. I owe a lot to Ms. Birdi as she helped me all through the project.
I thank, Mr. Satinath Sarangi, Chairman, Sambhavana Clinic, for providing assistance at a very crucial juncture, where everything seemed hopeless and a point where the work could have been shelved, if not for his timely assistance. Mr. Satinath, metallurgical scientist himself, anticipated my problems and thereby did the needful. I thank very much two of his colleagues, Mr. Diwakar. K. Sinha and Mr. Ramesh Mishra for collecting breast milk samples from the field and storing them in the best possible way, until analyses.
I am grateful to Mr. Ravi Agarwal, Coordinator, Srishti, for chanelising the funds for the project and providing his staff to take care of the accounts of this project.
My sincere thanks to two esteemed chemical scientists – Dr. Padma Vankar & Dr. Rashmi Sanghi, Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur (IIT-K), for carrying out a very tedious analysis with a lot of dedication.
I thank a few of my friends - Mr. Nityanand Jayaraman, formerly with Greenpeace, Ms. Leena, The Hazard Centre, Ms. Sunita Dubey, Toxic Link and Mr. Soe, The Other Media., for their help. I thank Mr.R.S. Sharma from the Toxic Link for his help.
I express my gratitude to Hivos, for providing funds to pursue the project.
I am indebted to my parents for giving me support at every moment in life.
Last, but not the least, my dear wife, Jaya, who encouraged me all through the work, helped me collect samples from the field, translated and computed mathematical values derived from the analyses into self explanatory graphs and most of all kept my morale high, all through the project.
Contents
Page
Acknowledgements
Introduction1
Union Carbide India Limited2
Manufacture of Sevin
MIC storage
Factory- 2nd December1984
The Disaster5
Safety system in the factory
UCIL’s financial status before disaster
Compensation9
Post-disaster era11
ICMR’s 5.5 crore rupees projects12
Fact Finding Mission of Bhopal Gas Disaster 15
Survey of Environmental and Human Contamination16
Materials & Methods and Results for Heavy metals22
Materials & Methods and Results for Organic Compounds30
Graphical Representation:
Heavy Metals44
Volatile Organic Compounds52
Pesticides59
Halo-organics64
Overall Contamination70
Discussion73
Toxicology of compounds 75
References78
Report on the extent of Chemical Contamination of Human and Environmental samples around residential areas adjoining The Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL),
Bhopal.
2001.
By
Dr. Amit Nair
Environmental Consultant
The Other Media
New Delhi
Report on the Chemical Contamination of the Environment and Residential areas adjoining Union Carbide Factory, Bhopal.
by
Dr. Amit Nair
Introduction:
The world’s biggest chemical disaster has been the 1984 Bhopal Gas Tragedy, which is responsible for claiming over five thousand of lives and rendering more than two lakh people morbid. The crucial question of how a calamity of such a magnitude had been allowed to occur? Unless, safety norms, preventive maintenance and management failures had been flouted altogether, the mishap would have never occurred.
What exactly poisoned so many lives is still a matter of conjecture. The plant was undoubtedly manufacturing carbaryl (Sevin), a formulation of it with lindane (gamma HCH), small quantities of aldicarb (Temic) and butaphenyl methyl carbamate, all destined for use in the Indian market. However, there has been confusion surrounding the nature of the poisonous gas that took so many lives. Was the gas MIC or phosgene, or a mixture of both or some other deadly toxic gas? The examination of the residues from the faulty tank, revealed twelve compounds. These were MIC, its timer called MICT, Dimethyl urea, Trimethylurea, Trimethylbiuret, Dimethyl isocyanurate, Cyclicdione, Monomethyl amine, Dimethylamine and Trimethyl amine, HCN and Nickel salts. Interestingly, the parent carbide factory is still tight lipped about the nature of the gas. If they had indicated the nature of the gas or the antidote, immediately after its release, perhaps, thousands of lives would have been saved, but the company would have to open its Pandora box. Beyond any doubt and taking in view of the magnitude of the disaster, these gases were perfect chemical warfare agents. It is quite possible that deadly gases or its initial cocktails were being manufactured in India, and were being shipped elsewhere, either to the parent company or to other points where they could be put in shells or missile systems and used in chemical warfare.
The developing countries would be the right choice since labor is extremely cheap, compensation are just for namesake where the cost of human life is negligible when compared to the developed country. Hence the cost-benefit ratio is in favour of
Developing countries. Why has it become so important to doubt the companies’ antecedents?
The UCIL had a large stockpile of phosgene when the disaster had occurred. The quantity of the phosgene stockpiled were many folds more than what was required for the manufacture of the pesticide carbaryl. Phosgene, chemically known as carbonyl chloride is a deadly gaseous toxin, used in World war-II, as a lethal chemical warfare agent. The MIC release has shown the world its potential to annihilate mankind and its use as a good chemical warfare agent.
What happened on the night of 2nd December 1984?
Union Carbide India Limited.
The parent Union Carbide Corporation (UCC), West Virginia, USA, proposed the design for the plant at Bhopal, India. The parent plant had followed double standards, as it gave priority to cost considerations rather than human safety at Bhopal while at its Virginia plant human and environmental safety were priority.
The UCIL manufactured the pesticide carabaryl (Sevin), (Union Carbide, Oct, 1978).
. The production was intended primarily for demand within the country. However, the plant had a production capacity far greater than the production planned for UCIL, Bhopal. Interestingly, the demand and use in agriculture for carbaryl in India were far below the output from the UCIL plant. Therefore, the UCIL plant had been running steadily under-capacity and high cost of maintenance was already being built-in (DSF-Report, 1985).
In the manufacture of Sevin, two lethal compounds available- Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) and Carbonyl Chloride (Phosgene) are required. Initially, MIC was imported to manufacture Sevin, but in 1977, the UCIL plant obtained the technology for the production of MIC from the parent UCC, and by 1980 the UCIL commenced the production of MIC. The basis for the gas tragedy was essentially due to the transfer of an outdated, second-hand and unsafe technology from the MIC plant, at Danbury, USA. It is understood that Canada had refused permission for the manufacture of MIC and was subsequently shipped off to Bhopal.
Incidentally, even the most developed countries with an extremely well organised disaster and crisis management groups prohibit the manufacture or storage of MIC. For instance, France does not permit the manufacture of MIC on its territory. Both, France and West Germany, allows the storage of MIC not more than 60 tonnes, even after safety measures designed of taking worst possible scenarios.
Although, an alternative technology that does not require MIC to manufacture Sevin is available, why such a process was not commercialized and why the process involving not only the use but also the synthesis of MIC, is intriguing.
Manufacture of the carbamate pesticide, Sevin (Carbaryl).
To manufacture Sevin, there is a need to initially use three ingredients.
They are: -
1. Phosgene - (COCl2)
2. Monomethylamine (MMA) - CH3-NH2
3. Methyl Isocyanate (MIC)- CH3N=C=O
Phosgene also known as carbonyl chloride is manufactured by reacting chlorine with carbon monoxide. The chlorine for this reaction is brought to the plant in a tanker while carbon monoxide was produced from petroleum coke when it was made to react with oxygen. The UCIL had a facility to produce carbon monoxide.
The monomethyl amine was also brought in by a tanker, and was allowed to react with phosgene in the presence of chloroform to produce methyl carbamoyl chloride (MCC) and hydrogen chloride gas. The process is called phosgenatation.
The methyl isocynate (MIC) is produced when Monomethylamine (MMA) is heated.
Overviews of the chemical reactions are: -
1). COCl2+CH3NH2 ------CH3NHCOCl + HCl + Heat
PhosgeneMMAMCC Hydrogen Chloride
In step 1, the reaction proceeded in the presence of chloroform (CHCl3).
2). CH3NHCOCl ------CH3N=C=O+HCl
MCCMIC
The MIC was collected and stored in stainless steel tank while the remaining HCl, Chloroform were collected recycled for use once again.
3). CH3N=C=O + alpha napthol ------* OCONHCH3 Carbaryl (Sevin)
In step 3, the reaction proceeded in the presence of carbon tetrachloride (CCl4).
Note: The MMA and chlorine gas was brought in by tank truck from other parts of India and stored in tanks and used whenever MIC was needed to produce Sevin
Other pesticides: Although Sevin was the major pesticide; smaller amounts of other carbamate pesticides were also manufactured using MIC. These were aldicarb (Temic) and butyl phenyl methylcarbamate and a formulation of Sevin-lindane was also made at UCIL.
Could MIC production and storage be avoided in India?
Sevin is not an affordable pesticide to Indian farmers and unlike like DDT and BHC, they were not broad spectrum. So there was actually no need to manufacture Sevin for Indian farmers and putting at risk the lives of so many people by storing and all the more producing MIC in India. Furthermore, the Government knew that there was no provision in the state or even the country to handle a disaster, and why was this issue sidelined to produce MIC.
Earlier, UCIL used to import MIC for the production of Sevin. In 1977, the company entered into a contract with the parent company to produce MIC and by 1980, UCIL began production of MIC. There was no need to produce and store MIC in India, and even the most developed countries fear to store let alone produce MIC.
In fact, there was already a process patent by Union Carbide Corporation which does not require MIC for Sevin or other carbamate manufacture. This is a two step reaction where first, the sodium-1-napthoxide is made to react with phosgene and the intermediate product of this reaction enters second reaction where it reacts with methylamine to produce reacts Sevin.
Factory - UCIL on December 2, 1984
The following sequence of events began at 10:20 pm, Sunday, December 2, 1984, near the end of the second shift. In the storage tank 610, it is understood that 41 metric tonnes (91,000 pounds or 11,290 gallons) of MIC was stored. The liquid level in this tank was 70% of capacity, which is below the maximum operating level. This level
results in a headspace of 2 feet and 9 inches in the eight feet diameter tank. All the valves to and from the tank were closed except for the relief valve containing the rupture disc and the safety valve. The pressure in the tank was reported to be 2 pounds per square inch (psig) at 10:20 pm at the second shift that lasts till 10:45 pm.
At 11:00 pm (third shift), the control room operator noticed that the pressure at the tank 610 was 10 psig, however, this was not thought unusual since the tank operated between 2 and 25 psig. The field operator reported MIC leak in the structure near the Vent Gas Scrubber (VGS) and process filters, but the source of MIC was not detected.
At about 12:15 am on 3 December, the field operator reported a MIC release in the MIC process area. The control room operator found that tank pressure had increased to 30 psig and within moments was beyond 55 psig, which was above the top of the scale. The operator turned the switch to activate the VGS, but the VGC was removed from an operating mode to a standby mode. The return to operating mode from the standby mode was dependent on an activation of the circulating pump.
The reason for the release of MIC was that water had accidentally entered the storage tank 610. The presence of higher amounts of chloroform and the presence of iron from the corrosion of the stainless steel 610 tank, favored a heat generating reaction (exothermic), resulting in a release of 50,000 pounds of MIC gas in the atmosphere. This was because the safety valves became unseated for 2 hours, before being reseated *once again. However, it is quite difficult to ascertain whether other toxic gases were also released since UCIL was tight-lipped about it from the onset of the disaster.
The world’s greatest industrial disaster had occurred at the Union Carbide Plant!
The Disaster.
The disaster struck in the midst of night. Almost 3000 people died and an average of 500,000 people affected. Many died in their sleep while those who managed to run out of their homes were blinded and chocked by the gas and died of suffocation in the streets. Many died after reaching hospitals since doctors were not able to identify the poisonous gas and the neither the parent company or UCIL were ready to reveal the type of gas released. The initial acute toxic effects were vomiting and burning sensations of the sensory organs like the eyes, nose and throat followed by acute respiratory failures. Disorders. Those who were not immediately knocked down died due to pulmonary edema (collection of liquid within the lungs) and bronchio spasm (constriction of the air passage tubes). The survivors were later found to have severe abnormalities and damages in their respiratory, gastrointestinal, musculo-skeletal, reproductive and immunological systems. Most of the survivors showed neurological disorders like depression, irritability, fatigue, disturbed balances and headaches.
Today, the aftermath victims of the Bhopal gas tragedy are those in moribund state i.e. between living and dead. Many cannot even walk for a short distance due to severe dispnoea (labored breathing), many have blurred vision and even eyeglasses have not helped them from eye watering.
For the present day victims, the society has closed its doors and the government unwilling to take needful legal action against Union Carbide Company, for absolutely no fault of theirs!
The cause! How safe was the “Safety System”?
The main reason behind the disaster is the failure of the safety systems meant to monitor, store or counter and avert any possible mishaps. The safety system comprises of Relief Valve Vent Header (RVVH), the Vent Gas Scrubber (VGS) and the Flare tower (FT) were not maintained properly and hence not satisfactorily operating. The function of the VGS was to neutralize escaping MIC with caustic solution. The motors meant for pumping caustic solution into the VGS ware not operative. The final safety measure was the Flare tower, where the neutralized gas, if VGS was unable to cope with neutralizing the whole of the escaping MIC, the remaining would be burnt off. The line connecting the VGS to the FT was extensively corroded due to poor maintenance and was sent for repairs without incorporating a standby system (see figure-1. for design for MIC storage). Also, the FT was inadequately designed to perform its task, as it was only capable of handling only a quarter of the gas released. The ultimate step in the event of a leak was the water curtain designed to contain any remaining gas from the FT. This was so poorly designed that it was too short to reach the top of the flare tower. A number of pressure gauges, pumps and meters were either under repair or malfunctioning. The valves, vent lines and feed lines are to be replaced every six months but they have been used over two years. It is beyond doubt that poorly maintained accessories meant in storing the MIC, allowed the entry of certain chemicals and water in minute quantities, which initiated a runaway reaction to spill a disaster. In fact, many clues after the accident indicate the possibility of an onset of uncontrollable reactions within the MIC storage tank 610. Water was found in the vent line connecting the tank 610 and RVVH. Also, caustic soda was found in RVVH.
Although, the UC is tight lipped about the mechanical problems that occurred during the disaster, nevertheless there are several concrete indications to show that there were serious problems associated with the MIC storage tank 610 themselves. The chilling unit meant to keep MIC at low temperature was switched off for economic reasons (DSF- Report, 1985). The meters monitoring the MIC storage tank 610 were faulty. A pressure of 20 pounds per square inch was being shown as 2 pounds per square inch (psi) by the pressure gauges. Further, it appears that even the Rupture Disc (RD) was not functioning at the time of the disaster. If the RD had ruptured, the pressure gauge connected between RD and Relief Valve (RV) should either indicate build up of pressure or otherwise read zero in its scale. Normally, if anything has to get into the storage tank, it has to pass through the Relief valve (RV), which would open only when the pressure exceeds a permitted value inside the MIC storage tank. Even, if the RV was faulty and water and chemicals were passing through it, still would have to pass through the RD, which is a gas tight seal, designed to rupture only when the pressure builds up beyond a threshold limit which is lower than the value set for RV. It appears that even the RD was faulty.