REPORT ON

A FULL ANNOUNCED INSPECTION

OF

HMP & YOI ASHFIELD

1 – 5 JULY 2002

BY

HM CHIEF INSPECTOR OF PRISONS

INTRODUCTION

Ashfield was the first juvenile Prison Service establishment to be run by the private sector, in this case Premier Prison Services. It operates under contract from the Prison Service, which in its turn undertakes to deliver the regimes and environment required by the Youth Justice Board. Because of these dual and treble arrangements, Ashfield is the most invigilated establishment in the entire prison system. Local management is overseen by the company itself, a Prison Service Controller, the Prison Service’s Juvenile Operations Manager and the Youth Justice Board’s monitor. It also had a committed Board of Visitors.

Yet this report is probably the most depressing I have issued during my time as Chief Inspector. It describes an establishment that was failing, by some margin, to provide a safe and decent environment for children, or to equip the young people in it with the education, training and resettlement opportunities that are supposed to be at the core of their sentences. This is in spite of the fact that it was dealing with a particularly vulnerable and needy population, and one for which the Prison Service and Youth Justice Board are specifically committed to providing regimes and an environment that meets those needs and vulnerabilities.

Our conclusions will not come as a surprise to any of those overseeing the establishment, or to those now running it; though some of our findings were unknown to them. Indeed, concern within the Prison Service was so great that shortly before the inspection the Director-General had taken the unprecedented step of assuming direct managerial control of the establishment, on the grounds that the safety and security of those within it could not be guaranteed. At the time of our inspection, a temporary Prison Service Governor and team were in charge.

As a result of these moves, we were aware that Ashfield when we inspected it was a safer place than it had been. It was also poised for significant changes to attempt to ensure a better regime for the young people there, which were due to take effect the week after our announced inspection.

However, the scale of the problems uncovered in this report will not make it easy to transform Ashfield into a safe and positive juvenile establishment. Since the Prison Service had taken over direct management, some of the most serious and obvious manifestations of unsafety had been tackled: assaults and the use of force had both declined from previously very high levels and the wings no longer felt physically unsafe or chronically unstable.

Nevertheless, at the time of this inspection, we found that underlying systems and processes were insufficient to provide the minimum requirements of a safe environment for the young people there. First night and induction processes, critical to ensuring safety in the early days of custody, were not properly carried out and vulnerability assessments were meaningless or inaccurate. In some areas, many staff were so unsure of their proper role that they relied upon young prisoners themselves to carry out key tasks. Bullying was not addressed and it appeared to us that many children were afraid to leave their cells. Effective child protection procedures and links were not in place or properly understood, staff were not subject to enhanced criminal records checks, and some staff had strip-searched children on their own.

The Prison Service is committed to the principles of the Children Act, which requires that children should be protected from the risk of significant harm. We did not believe that Ashfield, at the time of our inspection, could confidently claim to do so.

The problem was not simply the absence of proper processes. Ashfield had recently become an establishment for juveniles only. Fundamentally, the majority of staff lacked the experience, confidence or skills to manage this difficult and demanding population rather than simply reacting to it, containing it or hoping that it would manage itself. Those staff who did have the understanding and experience stood out, both on the wings and in projects like the reorientation unit and the family liaison work. But they were rare beacons in an otherwise dismal landscape. Nor did management systems within Premier appear to provide the support and guidance that inexperienced staff might need: indeed, staff seemed reluctant to discuss problems and difficulties.

Similarly, education and training suffered from inexperienced and frequently changing staff, poorly managed and struggling to provide a good quality service. Their work was further undermined by the fact that many children never got to education at all, or on time. A spot check during the inspection revealed that nearly half of the young people were in their cells during the core day, and less than a quarter were in education. We welcomed the fact that changes to the regime, to greatly improve the quantity of education and training, were about to be implemented. But OFSTED were unconvinced that staffing and management were adequate to meet the demands of these increased hours, or provide quality training.

Finally, there was no effective resettlement strategy, or proper liaison with Youth Offending Teams or the wider community. Training plans, which should drive the sentence, were not properly completed, linked into education and residential experience, or effectively monitored. There was no written drug strategy, or drug strategy group.

These are not problems that can be sorted out overnight, or by a change of management or regime. They raise two questions: how the establishment reached such a state and what needs to be done to recover it. Much of this is outside our direct remit, but needs tackling if Ashfield is to be turned round and similar problems avoided in the future.

There can be no doubt that one of the main underlying issues has been the problem of staff recruitment and retention. This links to the level of staff salaries, and the extent to which salary scales can reward experience and continuity. Too many staff were new, young and with no custodial or youth experience. They lacked confidence in enforcing appropriate behaviour in a calm and proactive way. At management level, too, in the period prior to the arrival of Prison Service personnel, there was insufficient experience of working with children and young people in order to support young and inexperienced staff; and no sense of a supportive management culture that allowed problems to be positively dealt with. These difficulties were compounded by the size of the establishment and its units.

What was also evident was the absence of the basic building blocks of a safe and positive environment: such as suicide and self-harm, child protection, vulnerability assessment, training planning and regime delivery: These are not ground-breaking or cutting edge procedures, but ones which are now expected and accepted in the rest of the juvenile custodial system, even if they are not always fully delivered. At Ashfield, they were barely grappled with. It was like an island, isolated from developments and expectations in the rest of the system. And it was an island whose contours appeared to be the precise terms of the contract negotiated with the Prison Service, rather than any wider understanding of the needs of children or, necessarily, the increasingly demanding requirements of the Youth Justice Board.

The extent to which that contract, as renegotiated, allowed or required Premier to fulfil Youth Justice Board requirements is not a matter for this Inspectorate. What is, however, apparent is that Ashfield was not doing so and had not been for some time. All the bodies responsible for monitoring – the Prison Service Controller, Juvenile Operations Manager and Youth Justice Board – agreed with this analysis and said that they had been raising significant concerns for some time. Indeed, the Area Manager’s extreme concern over some time (and that of the Inspectorate on a previous visit) had prompted the Director-General’s direct intervention. Yet none of these monitors had been able to act decisively to prevent a drift becoming a crisis. The Board of Visitors, too, was frustrated that its repeated concerns had not been acted on earlier.

In our view, the division of responsibility among Premier and its parent company, the Prison Service’s contract monitors, its juvenile operations manager and the Youth Justice Board was a significant factor in this. The monitoring bodies had the power to penalise, but not directly prevent. Their different criteria and perceptions sent messages which were sometimes mixed, or even contradictory. Premier itself was unable, or unwilling, to look beyond the terms of the contract it had itself renegotiated with the Prison Service after the Youth Justice Board reforms. There were insufficient mechanisms for collective, coherent and proactive management in the interests of the children and young people at Ashfield.

These underlying issues will need to be addressed in order for Ashfield to function effectively and safely. Normally, our reports contain a number of main recommendations, that the establishment needs to address as a matter of priority. In the case of Ashfield, given recent events, we do not believe that the establishment alone can do so. It requires concerted and planned urgent action by all three of the players - Premier, the Prison Service and the Youth Justice Board.

The Prison Service, Youth Justice Board and Premier should together agree a targeted and timetabled urgent action plan to remedy the severe deficits uncovered in this report, including a revision of the contract, if it does not allow Premier to meet the requirements of PSO4950 and the YJB standards. The action plan should include

  • An overall vulnerability strategy, covering child protection, anti-bullying, substance use, mental health, and reception and induction procedures
  • Provision of effective training plans, including suitable accommodation, administrative support, consistency and training of staff, involvement of residential and educational staff, and the setting and monitoring of detailed and specific targets
  • A comprehensive resettlement strategy managed by a multi-disciplinary resettlement policy committee
  • Better links with outside agencies, including Youth Offending Teams and local statutory and voluntary organisations
  • Agreed and clearly understood systems, accountabilities and responsibilities for implementing, monitoring and reporting on the Action Plan.

The entire management and staffing of the prison should be reviewed. This should include ensuring that there is

  • a strong senior management team, which includes managers with experience of working with juveniles
  • management systems in place that can deliver the requirements of the action plan and support staff in doing so
  • salary levels and promotion opportunities that assist staff recruitment and retention
  • training for staff who lack experience of working with juveniles
  • ensuring that all staff with direct contact with children are subject to enhanced Criminal Records Bureau checks
  • an effective personal officer scheme

Anne OwersOctober 2002

HM Chief Inspector of Prisons

CONTENTS

Paragraph / Page

INTRODUCTION

/ 3
FACT PAGE / 13
HEALTHY PRISON SUMMARY / HPS1-HPS62 / 15
CHAPTER ONE / ARRIVAL IN CUSTODY
Courts and transfers / 1.01-1.11 / 27
Reception, first night and induction / 1.12-1.59 / 29
Legal rights / 1.60-1.72 / 40
CHAPTER TWO / DUTY OF CARE
Anti-bullying / 2.01-2.15 / 43
Child protection / 2.16-2.29 / 46
Self-harm and suicide prevention / 2.30-2.43 / 49
Race relations / 2.44-2.61 / 52
Substance use / 2.62-2.79 / 57
Maintaining contact with family and friends / 2.80-2.113 / 61
Applications, requests and complaints / 2.114-2.123 / 67
CHAPTER THREE / HEALTH CARE
Introduction / 3.01-3.06 / 70
Environment / 3.07-3.10 / 71
In-patient facility / 3.11 / 72
Records / 3.12 / 72
Staffing / 3.13-3.23 / 72
Delivery of care / 3.24-3.46 / 75
Paragraph / Page
CHAPTER FOUR / ACTIVITIES
Introduction / 4.01-4.04 / 80
Education and training / 4.05-4.45 / 81
The wider regime / 4.46-4.60 / 89
Faith and religious activity / 4.61-4.78 / 93
CHAPTER FIVE / GOOD ORDER
The rules of the establishment / 5.01-5.05 / 98
Security / 5.06-5.15 / 99
Rewards and sanctions / 5.16-5.21 / 101
Disciplinary procedures / 5.22-5.33 / 102
Use of force / 5.34-5.39 / 105
Treatment of vulnerable young people / 5.40-5.46 / 106
The reorientation (segregation) unit / 5.47-5.53 / 107
CHAPTER SIX / RESETTLEMENT
Management of resettlement / 6.01-6.04 / 109
Re-integration planning / 6.05-6.07 / 110
Training planning / 6.08-6.28 / 111
Offending behaviour work / 6.29-6.37 / 115
Key workers (personal officers) / 6.38-6.52 / 117
CHAPTER SEVEN / SERVICES
Catering / 7.01-7.11 / 120
Prison shop / 7.12-7.25 / 122
CHAPTER EIGHT / RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Director General of the Prison Service, the Youth Justice Board and Premier Prison Services / 8.01-8.02 / 126
To the Director General of the Prison Service and Chairman of the Youth Justice Board / 8.03 / 127
Paragraph / Page
To the Chairman of the Youth Justice Board / 8.04-8.06 / 127
To the Director of Ashfield / 8.07-8.101 / 128
Examples of good practice / 8.102-8.112 / 142

APPENDICES

I Inspection Team
IISummary of Trainee Questionnaires and Interviews
IIISummary of Young Prisoner Questionnaires

FACT PAGE

Task of establishment

HMP/YOI Ashfield is a Premier Prison Services establishment holding remanded and sentenced young offenders (young people between the ages of 18-21 years) and juveniles (children and young people between the ages of 15-18 years).

Area organisation

Juvenile Operational Management Group

Number held

Certified normal accommodation was 400

Operational capacity was400

Approximately 100 places were designated for young offenders (aged 18-21) with 300 places available for juveniles (aged 15-18).

On 2nd July 2002 the number of children and young people held was 289.

Last inspection

This was the first full inspection of the establishment. An education inspection had been carried out in September 2001.

Brief history

HMYOI Ashfield is a private prison built and run by Premier Prison Services. Built on the site of the former remand centre Pucklechurch Prison it opened as a young offender institution in November 1999.

The establishment had re-rolled at very short notice in May 2001 to accommodate sentenced young offenders previously held at Gloucester. The population of young men aged between 18 and 21 had previously been entirely unsentenced.

In May 2002 the Prison Service exercised its powers under section 88 of the Criminal Justice Act to resume the management of the establishment from the contractor Premier Prisons. The young offender population had been removed in order to facilitate improvements in the regime. However, the expectation of the establishment was for this population to return following the improvements required by the Prison Service.

Description of residential units

The accommodation is provided in two house blocks with services provided in an adjacent building. These services include a range of workshops, education and physical education.

Residential units:

Avon A58 remanded juveniles

Avon B43 sentenced juveniles

Avon C61 sentenced juveniles

Avon D40 sentenced juveniles

Severn A58 young offenders

Severn B44 sentenced juveniles

Severn C64 sentenced juveniles

Severn D39 young offenders

HEALTHY PRISON SUMMARY

Introduction

HPS1All inspection reports carry a summary of the conditions and treatment of prisoners, based on the four tests of a healthy prison that were first introduced in this inspectorate’s thematic review, Suicide is everyone’s concern, published in 1999. The criteria are:

  • Safety: all prisoners are held in safety
  • Respect: prisoners are treated with respect as individuals
  • Purposeful activity: prisoners are fully and purposefully occupied
  • Resettlement: prisoners are prepared for their release and resettlement into the community with the aim of reducing the likelihood of their re-offending

Safety

HPS2At the time of the inspection, in our view, Ashfield was a safer place than it had been for some time. However, the fundamental structures upon which the safety of an establishment holding juveniles depends were not in place.

HPS3Systems and strategies such as anti-bullying, an effective rewards and sanctions scheme, rigorous management of self-harm and robust child protection procedures provide a framework within which competent, suitably-trained and well-managed staff are able to protect children from harm effectively.

HPS4Although we acknowledged futureplans and the commitment and enthusiasm of many staff, neither the necessary systems nor sufficient staff with the required level of knowledge and expertise were in place at Ashfield.

HPS5A holistic approach is needed to ensure the safety of children. Such an approach would incorporate systems that address their general welfare, such as an effective personal officer scheme, and take account of assessed individual need, such as systematic training planning. There was no personal officer scheme in place and training planning was inadequate.

Good practice

HPS6The reorientation unit was well managed by an officer with a childcare background who had a good understanding of the difficult behaviour that the staff were required to manage.

HPS7The procedures for handing over from evening duty staff to night staff were thorough. Similar processes for handover from night staff to day staff would be advisable.

HPS8Night duty staff had a good knowledge of open F2052SHs and knew the location of all new receptions on the induction unit.

Areas for development

HPS9The rewards and sanctions scheme was completely ineffective and did not have the confidence of either staff or the young people. This had implications for the management of good order and consequently the overall safety of children and young people.

HPS10Those responses to cell bells that we observed were not good. At least three cell bells on one of the wings on Severn Unit had been out of action for a month, despite the efforts of staff to get the necessary repairs carried out.

HPS11Supervision of children and young people in the visits waiting area was poor.

HPS12We were concerned that enhanced Criminal Record Bureau checks were not being carried out on all staff with direct contact with children, despite the fact that the establishment had been made aware of the importance of doing so.

HPS13In reception, children and young people were undergoing strip-searching procedures with only one member of staff present.