ISC 8 WG 3 : Responding to Denials

ISC 8 WG 3 : Responding to denials

Group members

Aneta Bakalova Bulgaria

Kasturi Varley IAEA

Bernard Monot France

1. Database

The IMO GISIS database has assisted the ISC in identifying specific cases of denials and the underlying issues. However the confidentiality of some information has precluded the full and open reporting that is needed to identify all major issues and the magnitude of denial to be quantified.

A modified format for six-monthly reporting was developed at ISC 7 to remove concerns regarding confidentiality of reporting. This form consists to collect the main reasons for denial according to the geographic region.

The WG 3 has to organize the maintenance of the existing data base in the IMO system, and create a new IAEA database collecting all modal denials/ delays using the new air and sea denials/delays of class 7 forms.

Recommendations

IAEA should invite IMO to arrange a sustaining maintenance for the previous data base in order to keep the forms and the analysis available. The legacy of the works performed in these past years should be kept.

IAEA should implement a new data base using the new air and sea denials/delays of class 7 forms. Into the national network, the National Focal Points (NFP)are the key players. So far they will be in charge to dispatch the new forms to their relevant stakeholders (consignors of class 7 Dangerous Goods ) with the cover letter provided by the IAEA.

Once again we recommend IAEA to take this opportunity to insist through the Member States without NFP to nominate appropriate officials.

1. Analysis of the established data base and maintenance – root causes

-Reports on air transports

The data comprises of 51 reports of incidents occurring between 18 February 2007 and 22 January 2011.

Only three reports involved the complete denial of carriage of the shipment.The rest of the reports involved delays ranging from 30 mins to 48 hours.

The delays below an hour may seem insignificant given the area’s well known weather problems, but deliveries of Fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG) with a half life of only 2 hours were seriously affected. Scheduled airline transport is probably not a viable delivery method for such short half lived substances.

The longer delays also significantly impacted Molybdenum 99 and Iodine 131 shipments with half lives of 3 and 8 days respectively. This was mainly due to supply chain issues rather than loss of function i.e. planned procedures were just delayed. Some shipments of Iodine 123 with a half life of 13 hours suffered 24 hour delays.

Several shipments were offloaded due to weight restrictions. This is probably because time critical cargo is usually loaded last to facilitate a rapid offload upon arrival.

Take off weight calculations usually only take place within an hour of departure and can change radically with evolving weather conditions.

A few shipments were delayed by a computer dispatch system producing incorrect airwaybills and labels which were picked up later by acceptance personnel at the airport

Incorrectly applied or nonvisible hazard labels caused some delays.

Shipments were delayed by up to 24 hours when misdirected by the airline or when inadvertently combined with a similar package with different destination.

Five of the reports offered no reason or even duration for the delay so were considered incomplete.

There were some notable successes in the face of adversity summed up well by a paraphrased comment: “Direct contact with the Airline’s Dangerous Goods Manager may significantly facilitate some shipments”

-Reports on sea transports

On the same period, a data base review allows the identification of issues that need to be addressed to facilitate the carriage of radioactive materials by sea. The data base shows different situations:

Up to 182 reports analyzed,92 % are denials and 8 % are delays totally opposite to the air transport. The main reasons are: carriers denials 60 % and ports refusals 24 % .

Three recommendations are offered:

1. That at a senior level the Secretariats of the IAEA and IMO should approach senior managers of a number of the major container companies/groups to invite them to discuss the issues involved with denials ad delays to encourage their involvement in seeking solutions to the identified problems. Initially these approaches could, perhaps, focus on the carriage of radioactive materials used in medicine

2. That consideration should be given to expanding the membership of the International Steering Committee to specifically include representatives of the international shipping and port industries.

Non-governmental organizations such as the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and the International Association of Ports and Harbours (IAPH) have consultative status at the IMO and already play an active part in the deliberations of that Organization’s Facilitation Committee which, inter alia, considers denials and delays. The involvement of representatives of such NGO’s could assist the work of the International Steering Committee and enhance its standing in the international shipping and port industries. It is suggested that quiet diplomacy and an inclusive approach could yield results.

It is probable that the reasons denials and delays will only be fully determined through direct dialogs with individual shipping companies and ports. Engaging their international organizations could be the prelude to opening such a dialog.

1. Those submitting reports to the Database should do so as close to the actual incident and reports should not be “grouped” as in the past. Advice and training should be provided on completing reports to facilitate any subsequent investigation. A procedure should be established to access the completeness of reports before they are entered on the Database, including referring reports back for revision.

Recommendations

It is proposed that the DWG analysesthe database on a three-monthlybasis for air transports and a six-monthly basis for sea transport to take into account the life span of the radioactive material shipped by air.

The NFP will inform the intermodal bodies (IAEA, IMO, ICAO, etc…) about the denials and delays issues. The intermodal bodies will be committed to act with the NFP to solve the problem.

1. Denying Denial – lack of reports

In general, there is a lack of agreement around the world about the extent of denial. This is partly because industry is, in fact, finding sub-optimal, costly and time consuming solutions to getting their product from one destination to another which has economic and social consequences. No report equals to no denials; it means that complete harmonization between countries relevant regulations (including local regulations) has been obtained. Reporting instances of denials and delays make stakeholders aware of the problem and start actions aiming to minimize or eliminate such instances. To this effect, a report form was developed for reporting sustainability problems in transport of radioactive material.

1. Government InvolvementLack of nomination of NFPs, NFPs are passive. Events (e.g. London Olympics, Shanghai World Expo, French elections)

1. Industry Mistakesover-zealous response; lack of transparency)
2. Confidential Denialmention radiopharmaceutical refusal to report many cases)
3. ResponsePROTOCOL TO ADRESS THE PROBLEMS, new reporting system

-Industry consignor role : when a denial or a delay is identified the consignor should fill up the relevant form and address it to the IAEA and the NFP. The reasons for denial and delays should be carefully identified to facilitate the future actions

-NFP role : is similar to the role and responsibilities of NFP as mentioned in the Denials / Delays handbook.

-Inter-Agency Group (IAG): when an intermodal problem is detected, the IAEA or NFP should inform the IAG about the issue and it shouldprovide support in order to solve the problem.

-Regional coordinator role: is similar to the role and responsibilities of RC as mentioned in the Denials / Delays handbook, especially on their support to the NFP to solve the issue.

-“Roving ambassador’s” role: is to facilitate communication at the highest level possible between IAEA and specific countries.(See recommendation 1 under “sea transport analysis”)

1. RESPONDING TO DENIALS – what is effective

-Once a problem has been detected, the NFP has several solutions to propose according to the causes of denials and delays.

-These solutions have been identified in the ISC action plan.

• Harmonization is mostly out of reach for the NFP. Some initiatives as the Club of Competent Authorities have to be encouraged
• Awareness, lobbying and communication are the core solutions to address these problems
• Training has to be proposed in a second step with the materials provided by IAEA or Intermodal bodies
• Economic seems to be very difficult to put in place due to the large number of stakeholders and the difficulties to get the relevant figures.

1. Current status

There are a number of positive developments regarding the issue of denial of shipment.

There is an increased acceptance of carrying Class 7 by air, this may be attributed to the availability of communication tools e.g. the IATA video or the correlation between air transport of medical radioisotopes and cancer therapy, suggesting that the issue with the air mode is more related to one of negative perception of Class 7.

In general there has been a trend towards more pro-active responsesby various stakeholders, including industry, National Focal Points and the IAEA, demonstrating the belief in the importance of the issue of denial of shipment and the commitment to reducing its impact.

Following the series of Regional Workshops that were organised by the IAEA in 2007-2009, industry and Regional Co-ordinators have been organising regional workshops which involve a broad cross-section of stakeholders in transport of Class 7, in order to continue the positive experience in providing forums for the exchange of experience in dealing with denial of shipment.

Nevertheless, a number of problem areas remain:

Overall, there is little improvement in the denial of shipment of Class 7 by sea. Maritime transport typically requires a vessel to make many calls along a transport routeand may experience denial from transit ports. If just one transit port along a maritime route prevents Class 7, this prevents transport along that route. Some countries act as bottlenecksdue to them having important ports of call, but there are no or a limited number of ports that will accept Class 7. While countries may have implemented the IAEA Transport Regulations, denial could still be an issue due to the following reasons:

• There may be additional requirements for Class 7 which make the transport unsustainable.
• There may be multiple regulatory bodies whichcould result in conflicting requirements for Class 7.
• There may be requirements which conflict with those of other countries along a route.

The level of acceptance of Class 7 by maritime carriers has also not improved significantly, which may be attributed to the training cost relative to the small number of shipments. Further, there is a significant financial risk that could arise from ad hoc decisions by authorities or cargo handlers leading to delays, denials and possibly costly re-routing of the cargo vessel.

In 2012 there was a spate of incidents involving undeclared radioactive material which had been contaminated during its production, this was discovered on arrival at destination or while transiting en route; these materials were then to be repatriated. The denial arose from carriers being unwilling to now carry the Class 7 material back to its origin. These instances were resolved individually by the regulators in each country by communication with their counterparts in the originating country to obtain acceptance. Difficulties were experienced in dealing with maritime carriers whose head office may be based in a third country.