MGW 2010A2 South Korean Adv Cps
Sob Jb Rk
A2 South Korean Adv CP
A2: Rights of The Child Soft power CP
A2: strikes cp
A2: strikes ext.
A2: strikes ext.
Negotiations could solve the nuclear crisis
A2 Bilateral Talks CP
Bilat ext.
A2 Sanctions
A2: RRF
A2: Rights of The Child Soft power CP
- Rights of the child passage won’t be perceived internationally
- The fact that the rest of the world has ratified and there are still child’s rights problems proves that it isn’t enforced or effective.
- All of the rights in the treaty are all ready enforced in the United States; nothing would change. Mason 05
(Mary Ann, Journal of Social History, “The U.S. and the international children's rights crusade: leader or laggard?”
What is the role of the United States in this new and burgeoning children's rights movement? While it fully participated in the drafting process, it is one of only two nations in the world that has failed to ratify the Convention. The most often heard explanation of why the U.S. has not ratified the treaty is that we already have in place everything the treaty espouses; it would make no practical difference.
- The treaty was drafted 50 years ago and every country other than Somalia has passed it clearly the global perception is that this is common ground for human rights not a step forward.
- Perm: do both
- Solving the humanitarian crisis in North Korea is a much large internal link into soft power the counter plans chances of solve should be seriously questioned.
- The impact to soft power is solving the nuclear crisis North Korea which passing the counter plan doesn’t do.
A2: strikes cp
1. Blowing up nuclear bases doesn’t prevent mining North Korea would just get more material.
2. Soft power is also essential for Asian stability
Cossa et. al. 09
(Ralph A. Cossa President of Pacific Forum CSIS, Brad Glosserman Executive Director of Pacific Forum CSIS, Rear Admiral Michael A. McDevitt, USN (Ret.) Vice President and Director of Strategic Studies at the Center for Naval Analyses, Nirav Patel Bacevich Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Dr. James Przystup Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University, Dr. Brad Roberts research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region: Security Strategy for the Obama Administration”, February 2009 Accessed 6/22/10 AW GW)
America’s philosophy toward Asia should include efforts to help Asian nations increase their domestic capabilities and guide their own destinies. A narrow focus on security and major diplomatic issues will fall far short of this mark. The Defense Department (and/or State Department) can’t do it all; Washington needs to use all the tools in its toolbox. Although American competence has been called into question by failures from Iraq to Katrina, a broad appreciation for the technical skills of U.S. professionals, from soldiers to doctors to businessmen to Peace Corps volunteers, has not been seriously eroded. In fact, America may find that its greatest impact will come from the unglamorous tools of technical assistance in areas that can make the difference to nations on the cusp of prosperity. From issues of food affordability and scarcity and the possible depletion of fish stocks to disaster risk management to judicial reform, American proficiency is a powerful asset and a means with which to rebuild American soft power. By investing in the professional competence of other nations—through technical assistance to government and industry, support of education and health programs, and leadership in regional and global fora to address shared challenges like environmental degradation—America can provide indispensable help to Asia and reclaim its moral authority
3. Bombing North Korean bases would create huge civilian casualties demolishing American soft power
4. Perm do both
5. CP DOESN’T SOLVE. The US must use soft power over hard power with the DPRK
China Daily 09
(“Diplomacy the Path to Peaceful Peninsula” April 7, 2009 Accessed on 6/22/10 AW GW)
If the Obama administration can rein in its own military, as well as its dependent allies in Seoul and Tokyo, and pursue the avowed aim of a world free of nuclear weapons, DPRK might play along. "Pyongyang's basic stance is that as long as Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul remain adversaries, it feels threatened and will acquire nuclear missiles to counter that threat," writes Leon Sigal, an expert on the Korean crisis, in the January 2009 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. However, "if Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul move toward reconciliation it will get rid of these weapons. Whether the DPRK means what it says isn't certain, but the only way to test it is to try to build mutual trust over time by faithfully carrying out a series of reciprocal steps." Short of fuel and unable adequately to feed its own people, the DPRK badly needs international economic assistance. The other five parties should strive for an immediate quid pro quo involving massive but graduated assistance to the DPRK in return for denuclearization. Such a result would not only pave the way for a settlement on the KoreanPeninsula but could also enhance the prospects of containing Korean nuclear technology from being exported to other states. The DPRK launch represents a step back in the region, but there is a way forward. The Six Party talks must resume and come to acceptable terms. In the 21st century, choosing militarism over diplomacy invites disaster.
A2: strikes ext.
CP DOESN’T SOLVE. US soft-line approach on North Korea key – failure to implement allows North-South Korean alliance that would push the US out of Korea
Lee, Professor of Pacific Basin Studies and Government at Claremont McKenna College, 2006 (Chae-Jin, “A Troubled Peace: US Policy and the Two Koreas” pgs. 279-280, jb)
Viewed from the perspective of Washington's current national interests, it would be a worst-case scenario if South Korea and North Korea were to improve their relations to the extent that they would form a "marriage" and compel the United States to disengage itself from the Korean Peninsula as the "odd man out." Another undesirable scenario would be a "unit veto" system, where all three players—the United States and both Koreas—refuse to cooperate with each other. The best scenario, however, would be a very cordial and positive "menage a trois," in which all three countries cooperate with each other. So long as the United States and North Korea fail to come to a fundamental resolution of several pending issues, including disputes over weapons of mass destruction, the trilateral relationship will hover between the best and worst scenarios, at least for a while. If the United States and North Korea remain antagonistic to each other, South Korea may then become a pivotal player in a "romantic triangle," in which it can enjoy good relations with both the United States and North Korea and can assume the crucial role of reducing the hostilities between the two protagonists.
CP DOESN’T SOLVE. The US must use soft power over hard power with the DPRK
China Daily 09
(“Diplomacy the Path to Peaceful Peninsula” April 7, 2009 Accessed on 6/22/10 AW GW)
If the Obama administration can rein in its own military, as well as its dependent allies in Seoul and Tokyo, and pursue the avowed aim of a world free of nuclear weapons, DPRK might play along. "Pyongyang's basic stance is that as long as Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul remain adversaries, it feels threatened and will acquire nuclear missiles to counter that threat," writes Leon Sigal, an expert on the Korean crisis, in the January 2009 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. However, "if Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul move toward reconciliation it will get rid of these weapons. Whether the DPRK means what it says isn't certain, but the only way to test it is to try to build mutual trust over time by faithfully carrying out a series of reciprocal steps." Short of fuel and unable adequately to feed its own people, the DPRK badly needs international economic assistance. The other five parties should strive for an immediate quid pro quo involving massive but graduated assistance to the DPRK in return for denuclearization. Such a result would not only pave the way for a settlement on the KoreanPeninsula but could also enhance the prospects of containing Korean nuclear technology from being exported to other states. The DPRK launch represents a step back in the region, but there is a way forward. The Six Party talks must resume and come to acceptable terms. In the 21st century, choosing militarism over diplomacy invites disaster.
A2: strikes ext.
Negotiations could solve the nuclear crisis
Michishita, Assistant professor of the Security and International Studies Program at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo, 2009
(Narushige, “Playing the Same Game: North Korea’s Coercive Attempt at U.S. Reconciliation”, The Washington Quarterly • 32:4 pp. 139-152, KK/EL)
In 2002, Kang Sok-ju, first vice foreign minister and Jong-il’s right-hand man, reportedly said, ‘‘What is wrong with us having our own uranium enrichment program? We are entitled to possess our own HEU, and we are bound to produce more powerful weapons than that.’’ Kang Sok-ju also said that North Korea considered the 1994 Agreed Framework nullified and stated that the DPRK would resolve this issue if the United States concluded a nonaggression treaty with the DPRK, lifted the embargo on North Korea and stopped interfering with Japanese—North Korean normalization, normalized relations with the DPRK, and compensated North Korea for previous delays in light water reactor construction.5 Now that North Korea has acknowledged possessing the uranium-enrichment program, it is on the table to be negotiated.
A2 Bilateral Talks CP
1.North Koreans want us to pull off of the offensive talking to them alone wont solve. They only have one piece of evidence saying they solves you can look at our whole 1ac as reasons pulling out is key.
2. Perm: do both
3. Diplomacy doesn’t work – roguestates like North Korea can’t be dealt with using softline policies
Choo, Ph.D. and research fellow at the Korea and Japan Studies Program at Johns Hopkins University, 2003 (Yong Shik, “Handling North Korea: Strategy and Issues”, accessed at Project MUSE, JB and ZB)
Neoconservatives, the main pillar of foreign policy thinking in the Bush administration, view the Pyongyang regime as a major threat to U.S. post-Cold War security. Their position on “rogue states” has been consistent: no persuasion, no compromise, only victory. According to this camp, the United States and rogue states are pitted against each other in irreconcilable conflict; becauseU.S. values and its economic system threaten to undermine the foundations of such regimes, rogue states will attempt to upset the international order the United States has worked to build under its hegemony. “They have, and will continue to have, a clear and immutable interest in flouting [it].”4 With such a damning view of rogue nations, neoconservatives believe that only regime change can finally resolve these issues. They criticize engagement policies for failing to eliminate the threat from Pyongyang and, in fact, propping up the Kim Jong Il regime, which otherwise would have continued toward the collapse it was approaching in the mid- 1990s. Thus, U.S. neoconservatives advocate aggressive containment or even regime change for North Korea. Needless to say, such hawkish views are welcomed by anti-communist hardliners in Seoul.
4. China fills into to deter North Korea when we withdrawal
Bandow 2009(August 31, Doug, Senior fellow at the Cato Institute, “How to Deal with North Korea”, Date accessed: 6/25, JH)
Withdraw U.S. forces from South Korea. The Republic of Korea has a vast economic and technological lead over its northern antagonist and is fully capable of defending itself.Nor do American conventional forces help resolve the nuclear issue; to the contrary, by putting U.S. military personnel within reach of the North, Washington has created 28,000 nuclear hostages. Moreover, eliminating America's military presence on the peninsula would be the strongest possible signal to Beijing that it need not fear pressing the North to deal and reform, even at the risk of the latter's collapse. The North's coming leadership transition will yield both opportunities and dangers. The Obama administration should recognize the limitations inherent to any policy toward the North, while doing its best to promote a peaceful resolution of the Korean confrontation.
5. Deterrence checks North Korea – empirics prove
Kang, professor of government at Dartmouth, 2003 (David, “International Relations Theory and the second Korean War”, published in International Studies Quaterly, September 2003, jb)
The explanation for a half-century of stabilityand peace on the Korean peninsula is actually quite simple: deterrence works. Since 1953 North Korea has faced both a determined South Korean militaryand, more importantly, U.S. military deploy-ments that at their height comprised 100,000 troops as well as nuclear-tipped Lance missiles. Even today they include 38,000 troops, nuclear-capable airbases, and naval facilities that guarantee U.S. involvement in any conflict on the peninsula. While in 1950 there might have been reason for confidence in the North, the war was disastrous for the Communists, and without massive Chinese involvement North Korea would have ceased to exist. Far from exhibiting impulsive behavior after 1950, North Korea's leadership has shown extreme caution. Given the tension on the peninsula, small events have had the potential to spiral out of control, yet the occasional incidents on the peninsula have been managed with care on both sides. The peninsula has been stable for fifty years because deterrence has been clear and unambiguous.
Bilat ext.
Deterrence solves North Korean aggression
Kang, professor of government at Dartmouth, 2003 (David, “International Relations Theory and the second Korean War”, published in International Studies Quaterly, September 2003, jb)
When outright North Korean invasion began to appear unlikely, scholars fell back on preventive war, and then preemptive war, the madman hypothesis, and then the desperation hypothesis as reasons to view the North as the aggressor. Yet for fifty years the reality on the Korean peninsula has falsified these predictions one by one. Deterrence on the peninsula has been strong enough to swamp any other potential causes of war on the peninsula, and continues to be so today. This study has shown that scholars need to be self-conscious in their application of assumptions and causal logic. If a well-specified theory such as preventive war or power transition does not appear to be borne out by the empirical record, scholars should acknowledge this and attempt to understand why. Although North Korea is merely one case, it is an important case and one that has figured prominently in the scholarly literature. Preventive war and power transition theories actually predict that North Korea will not undertake adventurous actions. However, scholars have consistently misapplied these theories to the Korean peninsula. Scholars should pay closer attention to the antecedent conditions of the theories, and also be more self-conscious about the behavioral variables that implicitly carry the bulk of the argument.The literature has focused on measuring power, and less energy has been spent on measuring satisfaction with the status quo. If perceptions and intentions matter, then the theory should explicitly state how these behavioral variables relate to the timing, sequence, and intensity of the preventive motivation. Scholars should not let these variables sneak in and do the heavy lifting. Other ad hoc arguments that are also thrown into the mix should be identified and discarded. The most common example of this"ad hoc-ism"is the "you never know" critique. This critique argues that there is a non-zero probability that North Korea may attack, and that therefore we should take steps to counter that possibility. This critique is theoretically and methodologically unfounded. Whether couched in terms of "accidents happen" or "mistakes get made" or "you never know, leaders under stress do irrational things," this argument is no more than an assertion that uncertainty existsin the world. Without a causal argument that links North Korean leaders to an unprovoked attack, using uncertainty as the prime cause of such an attack is vacuous. We have no logical reason to think that North Korean leaders are any different than any other leaders in the world, nor do we have any logical reason to think that deterrence which has held for fifty years might suddenly dissolve like dew in the summer sun. The preventive war and power transition theories are similarly susceptible to "you never know-ism."If in 1992 (or 1978, or 1961) scholars argued strongly that a window of opportunity was closing for North Korea, and yet by 2001 there has still been no invasion, it is spurious to argue "you never know," and that North Korea may still launch a preventive war in 2003. If North Korea is seeking accommodation with the rest of the world, why did they re-start their nuclear weapons program? In a climate where the U.S. calls North Korea a terrorist nation and top U.S. officials such as Rumsfeld discuss war on the peninsula, it is no surprise that the North feels threatened. If North Korea really wanted to develop nuclear weapons, it would have done so long ago. Rather, it restarted its program as a deterrent to U.S. "preemptive action" against it.