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Activism Through the Looking Glass:

Colorado GASP, Philip Morris, and the Role of Public Relations

Ashli A. Quesinberry

110 Terrell Hall

University of Georgia

Athens, GA 30602

706.548.7865

Abstract:

As a result of litigation over the past decade, tobacco companies such as Philip Morris have been forced to disclose more than four million internal documents, including public relations plans and tactics, never intended for public scrutiny. This essay draws on these documents to argue that despite industry efforts to thwart tobacco control groups, activists have been able to adopt successful counter public relations techniques. Through the use of a case study, the essay posits that disciplinary theory needs to be more inclusive of activist public relations.

The public controversy over the health hazards of smoking is not unique to the last few decades. Beginning in the 1920s, physicians met tobacco industry advertisement claims with outrage and incredulity, flooding the newspapers with editorials. In response, tobacco companies hired public relations experts to counter the rising tide of campaigns against the product. Some of these campaigns are infamous today. From Edward Bernays’ organization of the Torches of Liberty parade, where women carried smoking “symbols of freedom” to publicize their suffragist demands, to his creation of a “Green Ball” to elegantly emphasize the fashionability of Lucky Strike’s new green packaging, to Old Gold’s promise of “Not a Cough in a Carload,” the tobacco industry’s efforts to legitimize its products have been varied and creative (Pollay, 1990). Equally imaginative have been activist group attempts to dissuade the public that smoking is glamorous, an acceptable stress-reliever, or an innocuous social pastime. Joining forces with medical associations, these groups have been responsible for the ban against television advertising, for persuading government to place warning labels on cigarette packaging, and for reducing the amount of smoking among Americans.

The gains of these activist groups appear even more substantial as scholars begin to realize the extent of public relations activity mobilized by the tobacco industry. As a result of litigation over the past decade, tobacco companies have been forced by court orders to disclose more than four million internal documents, including memoranda and draft documents never intended for public scrutiny. Analyses of these documents are unearthing instances of industry deception and manipulation that deepened the threat to public health posed by tobacco use. Document researchers are uncovering plans to create bogus trade associations to block local and state anti-smoking legislation. Tobacco document research is also detailing how the industry conducted systematic surveillance of tobacco control groups in an attempt to thwart criticism and exposure. For example, Ruth Malone (2002) analyzed the tobacco industry surveillance of two tobacco control organizations, STAT (Stop Teenage Addiction to Tobacco) and INFACT (formerly the Infant Formula Action Coalition). Malone uncovered, through the documents released by the settlement, that the tobacco industry used spies in tobacco control meetings and conferences, attempted to paint individual tobacco control activists as extremists, illegally audio taped tobacco control sessions, and employed public relations firms to help gather intelligence. Clearly, as Malone (2002) asserts, “the covertness and intensity of the surveillance described here are [sic] remarkable” (p. 958). Scholars are learning that by employing tactics such as these, coupled with more typical public relations activities, the tobacco industry is continuing to exert powerful influence on public debate and policy.

Access to the documents provided by the settlement, then, provides a clear picture of ongoing tobacco industry public relations designed to protect its increasingly threatened social legitimacy. A brief history of the industry’s legitimacy challenges is in order. In 1986, Surgeon General C. Everett Koop made an announcement that got both the public’s and the tobacco industry’s attention. Koop’s report that environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) could cause lung cancer in non-smokers became a bane to the tobacco industry and ammunition for tobacco control groups. Over the years, the tobacco industry had followed a basically defensive public relations strategy, where, according to Kluger (1997), “cigarette makers had held off serious government restrictions by firming up their political alliances, challenging the scientific case, confusing the public, and reassuring their customers” (p. 734). Koop’s report, however, made cigarette smoking more than an indulgent habit; rather, it was a threat to public health. Throughout the 1990s, then, a battle began between activist groups such as Colorado GASP (Group to Alleviate Smoking Pollution) and the industry over the ETS issue. As activists tried to convince the public of the dangers of ETS, the industry responded by questioning scientific studies and reducing the tar and nicotine in their cigarettes. As a Philip Morris memo conceded, the tobacco control movement was becoming more sophisticated: “Primarily, its growing pragmatism and political savvy have provided a tremendous boost to its efforts to eliminate the use of tobacco products” (Advocacy Institute Memo, 1992, p. 4). To impede the growing success of these groups, Philip Morris began to formulate the public relations strategy of accommodation in the late 1980s-early 90s to deal with the ETS issue. A 1991 memo, for example, suggested how tobacco executives could respond to criticism by stressing accommodation, or cooperation between smokers and nonsmokers. Documents such these also indicate that the accommodation stance was beginning to gain momentum in the company’s public relations arsenal. One message point is illustrative of this early stance:

Overall, I think the solution to the ETS is based in plain common sense and common courtesy. And that has to do with accommodation. Yes, smoking can be annoying to some. But both smokers and non-smokers should and can be accommodated by providing separate areas in restaurants, waiting rooms and other public places. Accommodation takes care of the problem in almost all situations. (Han, 1991, p. 1)

In other words, the accommodation strategy became a tactic for Philip Morris and other industry players to attempt to ward off growing restrictions regarding public smoking.

By 1993, however, the industry need for the accommodation stance heightened. That year, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) labeled ETS as a class A carcinogen, meaning that, “airborne cigarette smoke was labeled a ‘serious and substantial public health risk,’ responsible for approximately 52,000 deaths year” (Kluger, 1997, p. 737). After the announcement, tobacco companies recognized that they faced an increasingly skeptical public as well as increasingly regulatory government. Clearly, as an industry report noted, “Class A designation is a major threat to our business” (Wirthlin Group, 1993, p. 2). In light of this report, then, the tobacco industry began consumer research to test a variety of messages used in responding to the ETS issue. They discovered that the industry strategy of denying the harm of ETS along with its accommodation strategy was not effective. Indeed, focus groups revealed the following, “At the very best, people don’t care if tobacco companies are telling the truth about the EPA manipulating data and at the worst, they believe they are purposefully lying. The bottom line is that consumers perceive tobacco companies as putting their health at risk to make a profit” (Wirthlin Group, 1993, p. 3). In essence, focus groups revealed that the message the public was most likely to support was that of accommodation. According to Wirthlin Group research, accommodation, “is the most effective at moving people to a more tolerant position towards ETS,” and “is considered the most reasonable solution to the second-hand smoke issue” (1993, p. 3).

Philip Morris thus began featuring this message when communicating with a variety of publics. Regardless of the target group, a message of reasonableness and workable solutions prevailed. Philip Morris Vice President of Corporate Affairs Ellen Merlo sums up the accommodation program stance best, “We want the public to know that we take these issues seriously, that we have reasonable proposals to address them ad that workable solutions do exist” (Merlo, 1995, p. 1). Accommodation became the top strategy in fighting the proliferation of smoking bans (Merlo, 1994). Indeed, Merlo asserts, “Part of our response to the ETS issue is to shift it from a health matter to a social one by acknowledging that some people find tobacco smoke annoying. We recommend…accommodation of smokers and non-smokers as an alternative to total smoking bans” (Merlo, 1993, p. 8). This message thus becomes a primary one in Philip Morris’ public relations effort throughout the nation, but especially in the state of Colorado.

Colorado was a target state for these messages during 1993-1995 as industry plans and tactics reveal (NSA/Accommodation Program Partnership, 1993). Perhaps because Colorado was a relatively low-smoking state, coupled with the level of GASP’s activism, Philip Morris decided to counteract its increasingly non-smoking climate there. Even though activism was strong, Philip Morris saw an opportunity, as a memo indicates, “Colorado media is amenable to taking a broader view of tobacco industry issues” (Russell, Zimmerman & Head, 1995, p. 1). Philip Morris thus sought to increase activity in Colorado because a “proactive and personal approach will allow us to intercept anti-tobacco messages earlier in the pipeline, allowing us to respond to negative stories by providing balance and perspective to both media and public debate (Russell, Zimmerman & Head, 1995, p. 5). Confidential documents even show that Philip Morris spies had infiltrated Colorado activist meetings in order to respond to GASP’s efforts (Philip Morris Memos, 1992-1993).

Yet, in spite of these powerful public relations tactics, grass roots anti-smoking organizations, such as Colorado GASP are able to adopt successful communication strategies. In the face of protracted and well-financed efforts on the part of tobacco industry operatives to “neutralize” the impact of activist efforts in various health campaigns, grassroots organizations continue gain persuasive ground. Although these tobacco control groups began slowly mobilizing against the tobacco industry in the 1970s, over the years groups as California GASP and Americans for Nonsmokers’ Rights were able to pass local ordinances against smoking by portraying the tobacco industry as outsiders and appealing to public health issues. Fast-forwarding to the 1990s, we see how these efforts continued to gain momentum. California, Massachusetts, Arizona, and Oregon had all passed major tobacco control programs through tobacco tax increases. Glantz (2002) believes, for example, that, “The California Tobacco Control program prevented 2 billion packs of cigarettes (worth $3 billion to the tobacco industry) from being smoked” (p. 368). In terms of Colorado GASP, in particular, the small group that began in 1977 encouraged Coloradoans to pass local smoking ordinances, prevented the Colorado Restaurant Association from working with Philip Morris, and worked to expose tobacco industry deception in that state.

While there are a number of elements that likely contribute to these groups’ ability to create gains against a better-funded competitor, including committed volunteers, skills in increasing membership, and efforts to mobilize communities to act, one increasingly effective activist group practice deserves closer examination. As GASP and others face continual pressure from tobacco industry tactics, it appears they are learning from these industry procedures. Like its opponent, tobacco control groups design direct mailings, secure media attention, and create effective advertising campaigns. In short, tobacco control groups are increasingly employing public relations tactics to reach their goals. Groups such as GASP illustrate that activist and social movement organizations no longer depend just on protests and petitions to push for change but are adopting the techniques used by their corporate opponents. In this essay, then, I study Colorado GASP’s ability to counter tobacco industry activity in its state through the use of public relations techniques; concomitantly, I explore how a well-funded and politically connected industry attempted to deflect or quiet GASP’s voice of challenge. By looking at how both GASP and Philip Morris communicate during the years 1993-1995, with the general public, with member groups, and with restaurant owners and patrons, we can begin to understand how activist groups in general are learning to use public relations tactics effectively. To provide us with a framework to analyze GASP’s activities, however, it is necessary to first explore the relationship between public relations and activism.

Activism and Public Relations Theory

It is somewhat difficult to provide an activist framework for evaluating public relations as disciplinary theory operates from a management perspective. That is, the discipline continues to privilege studies that understand how corporations can benefit from skillfully communicating with their operating environments (Duffy, 2000; Karlberg, 1996; Rodino & DeLuca, 2002). Even definitions of the practice support this perspective. Wilcox et al. (1998), for example, define public relations as the “communication function of management through which organizations seek to alter, or maintain, their environment for the purpose of achieving organizational goals” (p. 4). Although this perspective is prevalent in both defining the discipline and directing its research, several scholars criticize this focus for a variety of reasons. Karlberg (1996) suggests that a management-based approach encourages instrumental, and not critical, analyses of public relations strategies. That is, by investigating only how a campaign achieved its goals, scholars miss its broader impact on society. Jones (2002) argues that there needs to be a renewed focus on the “publics” in public relations. He suggests that technologies such as the Internet have made it possible for public groups to interact with the historically elite sectors of society, meaning that it is now imperative for public relations scholars to revise their understandings of what constitutes publics and how to interact with them. Kruckeberg and Starck (1988) support this view from a slightly different perspective, suggesting that an alternative approach to public relations research should be one that “stimulates and activates attempts to restore and maintain a sense of community” (p. 26). After tracing a line of theory that attempts to develop these more inclusive perspectives, I will provide a framework that is useful in examining GASP’s activist public relations.

Some scholars are trying to answer the call to conceive of public relations more broadly, but their efforts continue to reflect a management perspective. One such attempt to refocus public relations research and practices is seen in J. Grunig and L. Grunig’s (1992) influential two-way symmetric model of public relations. Instead of seeing public relations merely as persuasion or information transmission, a historically popular way at looking at public relations activity, the authors argue that communication between an organization and its public can be dialogic, symmetrical, and can work to facilitate mutually beneficial, balanced understandings. Although several scholars have called for more research and practice that follows the two-way symmetric model of public relations, public relations theory and analysis still tends to overlook how publics can participate in this process. Indeed, as Karlberg (1996) points out, the Grunig model supports citizen involvement and competition among interests groups, but, “the research that he and his colleagues have followed thus far has focused almost exclusively on corporate and state communicative practices, and not on the communicative needs, constraints, and practices of citizen groups themselves” (p. 271). He suggests that public relations scholars need to remedy this oversight in order for the concept of true symmetry to be understood, as well as practiced. Karlberg is concerned that corporations possess both the resources and skills to dominate the public sphere. He calls for the discipline to explore why citizens are often ill equipped to communicate on a symmetrical level and to concentrate on providing them with the communicative skills needed to do so.

In response to Karlberg’s (1996) call for a change in perspective in public relations research, Kovacs (2001) explores how activist groups can utilize communication techniques for empowerment. In a reversal of the discipline’s tendency to suggest how a corporation can overcome the tactics generated by such non-governmental organizations (NGOs), she examines an activist group’s strategic use of public relations to develop a successful, long-term relationship with an organization. Kovacs draws on the emerging public relations literature that suggests that relationships are not only beneficial in achieving outcomes but are also intrinsically worthwhile for their symmetrical effects. In Kovacs’ study, concerned activist groups employed public relations strategies and relationship building techniques to increase the accountability of the British broadcasting system. Kovacs points out that activists can use traditional public relations techniques, such as environmental scanning and communicating with diverse targets, to influence the broadcasting system. As such, Kovacs (2001) illustrates how activists need not only use combative techniques, but can also use conciliatory ones, to achieve communicative influence. She takes issue, then, with Karlberg’s implication that the power imbalance activist groups often face calls for more aggressive public relations techniques. In other words, “any combination of nonviolent, nonagressive asymmetrical techniques, beginning with media advocacy, may be used to move the agenda forward. Activists should revert to symmetrical strategies as soon as they achieve recognition” (Kovacs, 2001, p. 432). While I applaud Kovacs’ willingness to demonstrate how activist groups can successfully utilize public relations techniques, her analysis does not go far enough.