Wilhelm had a negative influence over Germany, particularly considering Bismarck was no longer there to balance alliances. Wilhelm pursued a policy called “Weltpolitik” (the aggressive pursuit of imperialist goals) because he believed Germany was a world power without the trappings of a world power. For example, in 1896 Wilhelm intervened in South Africa with the Kruger Telegram in a move designed to insult Britain and show Germany’s position on the world stage. However, by 1912 the policy of Weltpolitik was dropped.
Wilhelm’s aggressive attempts to take advantage of France in 1905 and 1911, and Russia in 1908 only served to alienate the Great Powers.
In 1912 a new Army Bill was introduced which increased the size of the German army from 663,000 to 761,000. This expenditure had to be justified to the tax payers so Government spokesmen began to talk about the growing risk of war. In Germany, warlike nationalism was rampant and people spoke of the coming struggle between the Teutonic peoples (Germans) and the Slavs.
After the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Germany told her that she should take war-like action and that if Russia became involved, Germany would stand together with Austria. This was known as the “blank cheque”. Wilhelm pressured the Austrians to not co-operate with British mediators. Wilhelm hoped to break up the Entente powers. He was hoping that Britain and France would refuse to support Russia.
Germany just waited for a Russian reaction and did not attempt any diplomatic activity. The German newspapers had already warned of the Russian danger and Russia had announced her Great Military Plan. This worried Germany greatly because the Plan aimed to build 5,000km of railroad, which would make the Schlieffen Plan redundant by 1917. In 1914 Germany thought she could not lose; if Russia backed down it would be a triumph and if she didn’t the Russians would be blamed for causing hostilities. By July 28th Wilhelm seemed to have lost his nerve, but Russian mobilisation plans had worried people in Berlin. The Germans only had one war plan and so were severely restricted. Every hour of delay cost the Germans the chance to deal a knock out blow to France (the Schlieffen Plan).
When Germany declared war on Russia on August 1st she was able to convince her people that they were fighting a ‘defensive war’. In accordance with the Schlieffen Plan she delivered an ultimatum to Belgium demanding free passage for her troops. On August 3rdGermany declared war on France. On August 4thBritain declared war on Germany.
Responsibility for the war has often been said to lay with a small group of men in Vienna and Berlin. Wilhelm, Bethmann-Hollweg, Franz Joseph, Hotsendorf, Berchtold and Von Moltke were all willing to gamble on a full scale European war, while Austria would have preferred a localised Balkans conflict. Germany believed a continental war was inevitable and, because of the Schlieffen Plan, the sooner the better. They believed in 1914 that although they were not well prepared, they were better prepared than the French and Russians.
Germany felt war was the best approach to deal with the encirclement of the Great Powers around her. She wanted to prevent a future in which the Entente powers reigned supreme and the Slavs enveloped the Teutons.
Some historians have placed a lot of the blame with Von Moltke, whose mind has been described as beset with pessimism bordering on paranoia. His belief that 1914 was the right time was completely wrong.
One of the most negative arguments about Germany is that she had been actively planning an aggressive war. After the war began, Germany began to plan grand imperialist plans to take over large chunks of Europe and Africa. It is unclear whether she went to war because of these imperialist aims or if, finding herself at war, she began to think about what she would do with the victory she hoped to win.
The War Guilt Clause in the Treaty of Versailles after the war blamed Germany for causing hostilities. Some Germans at the time would seem to agree. In February 1915 Bethmann-Hollwig said “responsibility for unleashing this war depresses me”. In June 1915 Von Moltke said “they have sacked me and it is dreadful to be condemned to inactivity in this war which I initiated”. However, in the years that followed, Germany wanted to share responsibility for the war with other countries.
The Schlieffen Plan reduced the time that might have been available for negotiation. Once it was actioned, European war was inevitable.
Naval rivalry was a major source of friction between Germany and Britain. All European powers aimed to have a bigger war machine than the others. However, it could be argued that the existence of large armies may actually have served to deter war.
Austria’s main concerns were internal integrity (staying in one piece despite her polyglot nature) and controlling events in the Balkans.
Austria maintained a neutral stance during the Russo-Japanese war. However, two new people came to prominence who favoured expansionist policies. Conrad Hotzendorf was the Austrian Chief of Staff and he favoured war with Serbia. Aehrenthal believed that expansion would stop the disintegration of the Austio-Hungarian Empire. Aehrenthal’s policy led to the annexation of Bosnia in 1908, which resulted in humiliation for the Russians.
Austria seriously thought her empire was threatened by the Pan-Slavic ambitions of Serbia. However, she believed the best way forward was not war, but rather an alliance against Serbia with Turkey and Bulgaria. Berchtold, who replaced Aehrenthal after his death, believed the threat of military action against Serbia, rather than actual conflict, was the way to get what he wanted.
When a Serbian assassinated the Archduke, the heir to Austria’s throne, it was an affront to Austria’s dignity that could not be overlooked. To do nothing would be to destroy Austrian prestige and credibility in the Balkans and possibly spell the end of Austria’s Great Power status.
If Austria did not have backing from Germany she was not prepared to go to war with Serbia, who had backing from Russia. They hoped that if they had German backing, the Russians would keep out of the problem. Austria got what she wanted on 5th July with the “blank cheque” from Germany.
The Austrian Emperor refused to invite the other Crowned Heads of Europe to the Archduke’s funeral. Some historians have suggested he did not want them to have a chance to have discussions which might have resulted in a diplomatic solution rather than war.
Austria was determined to have a war, however, they only wanted a localised Balkan war. They took decisions in Vienna, unaware that Germany was not focused on Austria-Hungary’s problems in the Balkans. Germany had her own plans for war (the Schlieffen Plan) and these plans were taking on a momentum of their own. Without telling the Austrians, Germany intended to take a very different road when the war started.
Austria was desperate to avoid the break-up of her Empire, however, by going to war this was the one thing that she did achieve.
It was Serbian nationalists who assassinated the Austrian Archduke.
Nationalism was an explosive force and it was at the root of the quarrel between Austria and Serbia that led to the outbreak of war, however, it doesn’t explain why a Balkan War escalated into a world war.
Russia had suffered humiliation with their defeat in the Russo-Japanese War and this had also been the death of her imperialist ambitions in Asia. She had also suffered humiliation over the Bosnian Crisis.
Relations with Germany had not been good since Wilhelm had tried to exploit the Moroccan situation.
Russia wanted to make sure she was never humiliated again and therefore undertook a massive rearmament programme. Russia’s economy had grown a little 1908 – 1914. She had received loans from the French, reequipped the army and enlarged the navy.
While this was going on, it was important that Russia avoided confrontation until they were ready. In 1911 she dropped her objection to the German Berlin-Baghdad railway. In return, Germany agreed she would not give support to Austrian aggression in the Balkans. This was something Germany would go back on with the ‘blank cheque” after the assassination.
Control of the Straits in the Balkans was strategically and economically important to the Russians. However, Russia was too weak to stand up to the Austrians. Military weakness carried with it the prospect of humiliation. Russia could not bear to think that she might not be regarded as a Great Power.
The great Russian military programme was due to be completed in 1917. It would have doubled the artillery, increased the size of the army and reduced mobilisation to only 18 days. It would seem from this that Russia intended to be strong enough to face any future diplomatic crisis without having to back down.
However, Russia’s next diplomatic crisis occurred in 1914, not 1917. Russia thought Austria would use restraint after the assassination and the ultimatum was a bolt from the blue. Russia believed that to issue such an ultimatum, Austria must have the support of Germany. Tsar Nicholas II was a weak and ineffectual leader. Faced with a united front from his military advising general mobilisation of the troops, Nicholas agreed. As far as the Russians were concerned, mobilisation did not mean war. However, it did for Germany. The Russians were simply reacting to events rather than making them. According to their military plan, they would not be ready for war until 1917, however, the military leadership felt reasonably confident in 1914. Although they did not declare war, they did not want to suffer humiliation again.
Some historians have argued that if Nicholas had provided firmer leadership, war could have been avoided, however, other historians have countered this with the argument that war would only have been postponed.
Nationalism had inspired Bismarck’s war with France and the seizure of Alsace-Lorraine. Losing Alsace Lorraine had been a bitter blow for France in 1871 and French nationalists were keen for revenge. Since then, France’s foreign policy had been cautious. However, her negative feelings about Germany were reignited by the Moroccan Crises. Germany’s tactics in Morocco caused widespread nationalist agitation in France and from then on French leaders became more assertive.
The French knew in 1911 that they were not strong enough to wage war. When Poincare became President in 1912 he brought a more robust stance to foreign policy. He pledged support to the Russian Tsar, increased French investment in Russia, supported the British navy in the Mediterranean and changed policy from defensive to offensive.
France wanted a war but was not ready for one. Some historians have argued Alsace Lorraine was not a good enough reason for France to go to war. When the assassination took place, the French President was on a trip to Russia and was out of communication as the crisis led to war. By the time he had returned to Paris, it was too late to change the course of events. France’s actions were reactionary (reacting to events rather than creating them) and her policies were defensive.
The French knew that war was inevitable by 1st August, however, they were wary of rushing into the fight as they had done in 1870. They did not want to be accused of starting the conflict.
The Commander in Chief, Joffre, worked out that every 24 hours France delayed her mobilisation, she would lose 15-20km of territory to the Germans. However, France still resisted declaring war, even though her alliance with Russia called for it.
On 4th August Germany issued a statement saying that French planes had bombed the German city of Nuremburg and declared war on France. This accusation was false, however, Germany’s Schlieffen Plan dictated that she need to defeat France before facing Russia.
After the war started, France’s main concern was to stop Germany defeating Russia and becoming dominant in Europe. Her short term goal was to expel German troops from her territory. Her long term goals were to recover the lost provinces of Alsace-Lorraine.
The British were worried about Germany’s restless diplomacy, the Moroccan Crises and naval rivalry. These things had pushed them firmly into the Entente camp with France and Russia. However, there was no obligation for them to get involved in a continental struggle as there was no military alliance. The British were also worried about German economic power. They felt Germany needed to be kept in her place.
Anglo German relations were improving in 1914 and when the July Crisis came. Britain was not planning for war and was not even certain what they would do if war broke out. The Prime Minister, Asquith, said Britain would not become involved in any continental war. King George V stated England would maintain neutrality in the case of war.
As late as 1st August Britain was still not intending to become involved in a war. The Cabinet eventually made the decision to go to war only after those who opposed the decision had resigned.
The British Commander in Chief lacked any real role in the decision making process. This was in sharp contrast to the roles played by his German and Austrian counterparts.
In the end, the Government sold the war to the British public on the premise of saving gallant little Belgium. In reality they had decided to go to war to prevent Germany from overrunning France and dominating the continent. One dominant power on the continent was a situation they had been trying to avoid since Elizabethan times. Britain’s policy was reactionary and passive (reacting to events rather than creating them).
It can be argued that Britain did not take a firm enough stand against Germany and Austria to prevent the war from happening. They could have prevented the blood loss by making it clearer they would stand by France and Russia. However, divisions within the British Cabinet made such a statement impossible.
It was Germany’s build up of her naval forces which prompted Britain to end her policy of “Splendid Isolation”. Recognising a major threat to her security, Britain had concluded agreements, albeit limited, with her two major colonial rivals, France and Russia. Europe was divided into two armed camps: the Entente Powers and the Central Powers and their populations began to see war not merely as inevitable but welcome.
Belgium was an issue for Britain because in the hands of an enemy her ports offered a major threat to British naval supremacy.