To What Extent Were the Persians Responsible for Their Own Defeat in the Persian Wars?

To what extent were the Persians responsible for their own defeat in the Persian Wars?

To a considerable extent, the Persians were responsible for their own defeat in the wars of 490 and 480-79 BC. Their commanders made crucial mistakes at Marathon and Salamis that caused their forces to be routed by the Greeks. Even so, there were other factors at work.

When Darius’ army set out in 490 BC, it outnumbered the Greeks by three to one. However, thanks to the quick thinking and persuasive power of the Athenian general Miltiades, the Greeks were able to block its advance at Marathon.

Having fought with the Persians in Thrace, Miltiades knew that their equipment was inferior. They relied on their cavalry to destroy the enemy. It was for this reason that hedeployed his forces in the high ground, where the Persian cavalry could not be utilised.

Both sides faced off against each other for several days, with neither willing to strike first and give away the advantage. Finally, Miltiades ordered his forces to attack. Herodotus’ account does not tell us why he took this risk, but it would seem to be because the Persian cavalry were absent at that time. A Byzantine source called the Sudasupports this view. If so, it was a crucial mistake on the part of the Persians.

Miltiades now took full advantage of the situation. When the Greeks got to within a mile of the Persian line, he ordered that the centre be weakened and the flanks reinforced. He then directed his troops to run towards the Persians, to minimise the impact of their archers. As the battle raged, Miltiades ordered his flanks to close in on the Persians, trapping them in a killing zone. Now the Persians made their second crucial error. Most broke and ran – some back to their ships, others into the nearby swamp where they drowned. The rest were cut to pieces by the Greeks.

Although the Persians sailed on to Athens, Miltiades’ army got there first, so they had little choice but to return home to lick their wounds. The First Persian War was over.

When the Persians returned to Greece in 480, they came with a far greater force and better strategy. This invasion was land and sea, with the navy keeping the army supplied.

The plan worked well for the Persians up until their arrival at Salamis. Xerxes had captured Athens, and now he had the Greek navy bottled up in the narrow straits. The Greek ships could not stay there indefinitely. All Xerxes had to do was wait for them to emerge, then his bigger fleet could destroy them. However, as A.T. Olmstead has noted, he needed a spectacular victory, and so was tricked into acting rashly. Themistoclessent a trusted slave into the Persian camp, claiming that the Greek navy was in disarray. Xerxes believed the story, and sent the bulk of his fleet into the straits – exactly as Themistocles wanted.

Expecting the Greek navy to be retreating, the Persians were taken by surpriseand surrounded. In the ensuing battle they lost over 200 triremes. The Greeks lost a mere 40.

It was now that Xerxes made his second big mistake. So incensed was he by the defeat, he executed some of his captains. This incensed the others, and they sailed their ships home. According to Olmstead, it was this as much as the defeat at Salamis that deprived him of his navy. Unable now to supply his army, Xerxes was forced to return home with the bulk of it.

The Greeks went on to defeat the remnants of Xerxes’ army at Plataea, thanks again to the absence of the cavalry. They then pursued the navy to Asia Minor, where they destroyed it. The Second Persian War was over.

In many ways, the Persians were architects of their own defeat. Though their preparations were meticulous and their forces vastly larger than those of their adversary, their tactics and weapons were inferior. They also had less cohesion and motivation than the Greeks. More than anything, though, their leadership was inferior.Miltiaresand Themistocles were far better generals than counterparts – particularly Xerxes, who made serious tactical errors.