ARMED FORCES
1. Summary
Table1.
Total Strength / Army / Air Force / Navy163,000 / 122,500 / 23,000 / 17,500
2. Summary
This is the new format for the summary table - please complete.
Table2.
Total Strength / Army / Air Force / NavyActive Personnel / 163,000 / 122,500 / 23,000 / 17,500
Reserves / 110,000 / 110,000
3. Assessment
Venezuela's armed forces were, for most of the second part of the 20th century, a good example of a professional, modern and competent fighting force, at least by Latin American standards. The National Armed Forces comprise four traditional elements: an army, navy, air force and national guard. They have been traditionally non-political, but recent changes within the armed forces - and a deeper relationship with the Cuban military - have prompted a rethink about their roles and missions. While some institutional change has been under way since 1999, the past few months have seen an acceleration of this process, from symbolism and rhetoric that equates the regime's importance to the survival of the modern state to organic, administrative and constitutional changes.
Military service is theoretically obligatory for all male citizens although, in practice, a voluntary military service system is employed. Conscripts, of whom there are approximately 18,000 at any given time, serve for 30 months, from the age of 18. Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) are time-expired conscripts who re-enlist voluntarily for extended periods of service and generally make the armed forces their careers. All four armed forces also include females.
Each of the armed forces has its own comprehensive system of schools for officers, NCOs and specialists. There is also a joint service Institute of Higher Studies for National Defence, at Caracas, at which high-ranking officers and selected civilians pursue studies in overall security and defence strategy.
3.1. Military Reform
In March 2007, the Venezuelan Army began the promotion of what it calls "the new military thought" among its ranks, redefining the armed forces' active role in the consolidation of 21st century socialism in Venezuela. This was re-affirmed during May 2007, with the official elevation of a new motto: 'Country, Socialism or Death!'. Each soldier must pronounce these words before referring to a superior.
Accordingly, the non-political nature of the armed forces has been challenged as the motto suggests that the armed forces should support whoever is in power and, in this case, socialism is the government's policy.
On 31 July 2008, a new Organic Law which establishes the roles and missions of the Bolivarian armed forces was published including guaranteeing the sovereignty of the State through military operations, cooperation in internal order and an active participation in social development. This law, in this some senses, makes the armed forces a part of the national development agenda. The law also established a new General Command for the National Bolivarian Militia (ex-People’s Militia); changed the name of the Bolivarian Armed Forces to the National Bolivarian Armed Forces; and created new ranks, that of Major General (for the army, National Guard and Aviation) and Admiral-in-Chief (for the navy).
On 13 September 2008, Chavez announced the creation of five strategic defence regions (Regiones Estratégicas de Defensa - RED), as part of the overall military revolution. These new regions will be:
Central: Vargas, Caracas, Miranda, Aragua, Carabobo and Yaracuy - Commanded by (Army) Major General Juan Vicente Paredes Torrealba;
Western: Falcón Lara, Trujillo, Mérida, Táchira and Zulia - Commanded by (National Guard) Major General Luis Motta Dominguez;
Los Llanos: Apure, Portuguesa, Barinas, Cojedes and Guárico - Commanded by (Air Force) Major General Jorge Arevalo Oropeza Pernalete;
Eastern: Delta Amacuro, Monagas, Sucre and Nueva Esparta - Commanded by (Navy) Admiral Pedro José González Díaz; and
Guyana: Bolívar and Amazonas - Commanded by (Army) Major General Félix Antonio Velásquez.
Critics of the creation of the reserve force say that it will eventually serve as little more than a political militia at the behest of the president, especially as its chain of command is separate to the rest of the military. Analysts dismiss as unrealistic the suggestion that it will number 15 million and a figure of 300,000 is more likely. Legislation that governs and regulates the reservists had not yet been approved in June 2005, although such a law was on the National Assembly’s calendar. A reserve force was legally created in 1990, but it was never executed. Critics also fear that the reservists will be armed, but the government has said that they will not be armed with the FAL rifle, which is being phased out and is to be replaced with the Kalashnikov AK-103. Russia has already sold 100,000 AK-103s to Venezuela, and Venezuela is in advanced stages of setting up two Kalashnikov rifle production factories in cooperation Russia's Izhevsk Manufacturing Plant (IMP). Reports suggest the factories are scheduled to begin production by late 2009.
General Melvin López Hidalgo, former chief of the National Defence Council (Codena), said that the military reservists would comprise both passive and active components, although only the active component will undergo military training. He has also said that the reservists will facilitate the development of the country, and that their role will not be purely bellicose.
The armed forces were officially re-named the National Bolivarian Armed forces in 2007. Ironically, Simon Bolivar, the 19th century liberator who gained most of South America's independence, was a promoter of capitalism and free trade.
To gain support from a demoralised army, Chavez also announced a 30 per cent pay increase to all members of the armed forces from 1 July 2007. This was followed by some 5,000 promotions for army, navy and air force personnel, effectively commissioning a new generation of Venezuelan - or Bolivarian - officers during June 2007.
A study, which was begun in January 2006, anticipates the implementation of a new national defence doctrine based on asymmetric (mainly guerrilla) warfare and the creation of large 'citizen' armed forces to go with it; the re-organisation has taken shape. However, the most significant change occurred on 21 August 2007, when the 'Bolivarian Armed Forces' were stood up through a constitutional modification. The forces - with a clear mandate of protection and support for the construction of a socialist homeland - where to have five main and equal elements: the Bolivarian Army, Bolivarian Navy, Bolivarian Aviation, Territorial Guard /which replaced the National Guard) and the Bolivarian People's Militia.
In theory, the Territorial Guard's main units where to be 300-strong cells known as 'communal councils'. In theory, the guard is to form 50,000 communal councils with a standing force of 15 million. However, the National Guard invoked constitutional powers and survived, preventing its abolition.
Further changes to the current defence doctrine were made during July 2009 with the Venezuelan Air Force's Integrated Aerospace Defence Command (CADAI) and the army's electronic-warfare unit were transferred to the Strategic Operations Command (CEO).
The reforms also included the activation of new types of units, such as the Rivers Squadron, which will operate from small bases on the country's river and lake systems performing what Chavez described as "water guerrilla warfare". Reserve units will be upgraded to combat battalions. New 'militia divisions' will be drawn up from organisations such as the Armed Forces' Polytechnic National University (UNEFA), indigenous communities, agricultural unions and workers affiliated to state-run companies: Venezuelan Petroleum and the Sidor steel works.
Under the expansion programme, all branches of the armed forces are to be enlarged, beginning with armoured battalions, which are to be doubled.
One of the most controversial reforms is in article 60 of the new organic law, which allows for foreign nationals that have graduated from Venezuelan defence institutions to have a rank of officer in the Venezuelan armed forces.
3.2. Joint Forces Interoperability
3.2.1. Tri-Service Interoperability
Under the provisions of the new organic law, the armed forces have been re-organized, with the creation of a new territorial figure, the Integral Defence Strategic Region. There are five such regions, with the commander of each of them being a Major General appointed directly by the President. Each of these Major Generals (a position of recent creation), is in control of all armed forces inside its TO.
3.2.2. Multinational Interoperability
The new Armed Forces organic Law allows Venezuelan forces to operate as an ally or in a coalition without the need for parliamentary permission, the authorization need only to come from the President.
Although its main international allies include Russia, China, Belarus, Iran, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Cuba and Bolivia, only these last two have an active military-to-military relationship that includes deploying personnel for joint exercises and intelligence training. Venezuela’s interest in creating a NATO type defence structure in South America have been met with little to no support from any of the major powers in the area. This has also not been successful with the ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance) countries besides Bolivia and Cuba.
3.3. Force Projection
The armed forces could not be capable of large scale, long-term deployments, however they have the capability of engaging in a limited invasion of most of its island neighbors and could perform guerrilla-type operations inside Colombia and Guyana for several months. The Venezuelan Navy is expanding its amphibious warfare capabilities and hopes to be able to support de deployment of a two-brigade size force by 2012.
3.4. Force Readiness
Rapid deployment capabilities are not clear and new units are being stood up every couple of months. The main rapid reaction capability is in the Para brigade, with the form of the designated “Rapid Reaction Unit” as well as with the Para-commando unit; these can be augmented by other special forces tasked units, some of up to brigade size, such as the Caribe brigades and the Light Armor Brigade. Marine Infantry units can also be considered in this category. The main air combat capability is still in the F-16 squadron and increasingly in the Sukhoi Su-30MKV units, with probably 4 of the former and 6 of the latter available at any one time for RR duties.
3.5. Force Sustainment
In early 2007, the defence ministry announced plans for the creation of a strategic reserve force to consist of 15 million of Venezuelans. During the swearing in of the first group of reservists, in April 2007, approximately 20,000 individuals were present. April 13, the anniversary date of the collapse of the coup that temporarily ousted Chávez in 2002, has been designated as “Reservists Day”. The government has insisted that participation in the reserves is voluntary.
This has lead to the creation got he National Bolivarian Militia. The NBM is to be formed from the standing reserve forces, which amount to some 110,00 troops organised in 48 (mostly infantry and support) battalions. These have been augmented by about 300,000 people with the introduction of the recently created Armed Forces University, and the Militia sought to have about 500,000 members in theory by 2009. These new armed forces have a simple, well-defined role: contribute to building the 21st century socialist state and prepare for a resistance war through asymmetric warfare against invading forces.
3.6. Adaptability
Its armed forces are being developed for an internal security role as well as an external inter-state conflict role. At the same time focusing on asymmetric defence from a perceived threat from the United States and modernizing and expanding its conventional forces in an effort to create a deterrence capability.
4. Doctrine and strategy
US military doctrines had supplanted the successive original influences of Germany, Chile, France and Belgium. However, traditionally warm relations with the US have deteriorated since Chávez began to build closer political ties with Fidel Castro of Cuba.
A “Bolivarian” doctrine (with heavy Cuban influence) is now being impressed into all branches of the armed forces. This is constantly being modified, with other strong influences coming from Iran, China and Russia. The New Venezuelan armed forces have a larger presence in the politics of the state, as their new role includes the collaboration for the socialist revolution. This has led to evolution of doctrine into the “New Military Thinking”.
4.1. Current Doctrine
New Military Thinking has, among other things, changed the denomination of a number of units. During 2008, when it began to be implemented the Cazador (Hunter) brigades and battalions have changes their denomination to Caribes. The Caribes are a local indigenous people and this shift in names is designed to promote local culture.
The new doctrine states that the armed forces are to be humanist and socialist, which is a direct contraposition of the 1999 Constitution, that states the armed forces should be a professional and non-partisan institution.
4.2. Evaluation
The current doctrine has a clear political agenda and its effects are still likely to be taken in as the “New Military Thinking” develops. There is likely to be issues regarding unity of command in the foreseeable future, as political appointees take on new roles and leadership positions that had previously been reserved for senior and experienced officers.
5. Defence structure
According to the 1999 constitution and the law of the armed forces, the president is commander-in-chief of the armed forces. In this position he exercises ultimate command on a day-to-day basis. Furthermore, in practice detailed and minute presidential control of the military has become a key feature of the Chávez government. Under the new constitution, military appointments are the remit of the president and no longer require approval from the legislature.
In February 2001, President Chávez named José Vicente Rangel as the former defence minister, the first civilian to occupy the position in modern times. Chávez also created the position of armed forces chief, who is in charge of operational matters, while the minister's role is restricted to political and administrative matters.
The Defence Ministry has recently changed its title to the Ministry of the Popular Powers for Defence. As such a new chain of command has been established. The Inspector General, who had been previously acknowledge as a de facto deputy minister is now in charge or Human Rights and Tribunal Inspectorate. The Chief of Staff for Defence is in charge of several strategic directorates that comprise: Personnel, Strategic Intelligence, Operations, Logistics and acquisitions, Planning & Budgeting and Education. There is a military intelligence direction and an administrative services direction.
The Junta Superior de Las Fuerzas Armadas Nacionales (roughly translated as the Higher Council of the Armed Forces) is the principal corporate adviser of the president on defence matters. It includes, ex-officio, the minister of defence, the inspector general of the armed forces and the commanders-in-chief of the army, navy, air force and National Guard.
Chavez has been an enthusiastic promoter of the creation of a NATO-type alliance in South America but, despite his evangelising, his concept has had little or no effect on other regional powers, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile or Colombia. Efforts are now centred on the ALBA countries (ALBA, which means 'Dawn' in Spanish, is the acronym for the 'Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America', reformed in 2009 to Bolivarian Alliance) comprising Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Venezuela. So far only Bolivia has shown a major interest in this: in late August the 'Antonio José de Sucre binational military engineer force' stood up in Trinidad, Bolivia, and began the construction of a USD14 million dyke project funded by Venezuela. Honduras was an official ALBA member, but its participation has been suspended since a civilian-military movement ousted President Manuel Zelaya the June 2009. The new Honduran government is unlikely to renew its ALBA commitments.
During 2007, the Strategic Operational Command (Comando Estratégico Operacional: CEO) was created. This new organisation is the highest unit in charge of joint planning, direction and execution of operations. General Jesús González (promoted to Major General in September 2008) was appointed as the first CEO and was directly subordinate to the Minister of Defence. The CEO was put in charge of coordinating all armed forces operations in Venezuela. Each of Venezuelaʼs five strategic defence regions is commanded by a General or Admiral, who has absolute planning and operational command of all forces (army, navy, air force and National Guard) inside its region and reports directly to the CEO.
In March 2009 the CEO gained complete control over the armed forces, with the Defence Ministry being transformed into a purely administrative organisation in charge of overseeing the development of the armed forces and directing the country's defence policy. General Carlos Mata Figueroa was announced as the new CEO commander, and Vice-President Ramón Carrizales was appointed the new Minister of the Popular Powers of Defence