What is wrong with the Knowledge Argument?
“The appropriate evaluation of Knowledge argument remains controversial… It is thereforesafe to predict that the discussion about the knowledge argument will not come to an end in the near future,” states Nida-Rümelin (2009). I this paper I argue that the knowledge argument about whether we acquire knowledge about phenomenal states or not is statedinvalidly. The reason for this is that the rangesfor the application of two perspectives of consciousness,which play a crucial role in the Knowledge argument– the first- and the third-person perspectives–overlap each other. To make this point clear I construe a thought experiment where these two perspectives of consciousness are kept separate. The consequences that are drawnfrom the thought experiment are then discussedin relation tothe Knowledge argument put forward by Frank Jackson (1982) and in relation to the ongoing philosophical debate.
1.The two perspectives of consciousness
Many scholars of consciousness have drawn attention to the essential differences between two ways of knowing the world around us – from the first- and the third-person points of view. The old philosophical dispute was resurrected when Nagel (1974) presented his today classical paper, “What is it like to be a bat.” The distinction between different points of view was also a core point in Frank Jackson’s (1982) argumentation for the falsity of the Physicalism. In the contemporary discussions one often refers to the issue in terms of the problem of ‘epistemic asymmetry’:
One of the basic problems in developing a theory of consciousness is the so-called ‘epistemic asymmetry.’ We know of conscious experiences in two essentially different ways: through direct inner acquaintance and through access from the outside, i.e., the third person perspective. For centuries, philosophers have been troubled about whether and how the introspective knowledge of phenomenal states from the first person perspective can be brought into accord with our knowledge from the third person perspective. (Metzinger 1995, p. 215)
The focus of this paper is ‘epistemic asymmetry’. I firsthave to specify,however,the way in which ‘epistemic asymmetry’ will be discussed. When Metzinger in the quotation above emphasizes the two fundamentally different methodological approaches to conscious experiences – one from within (from the first-person perspective) and one from without (from the third-person perspective) – heintroduces the first-person perspective as providing “introspective knowledge of phenomenal states.” It is not however clear in what way introspective knowledge acquired through the process of self-observation, a process of the mental activity of a subject who is looking into his own mind, can be seen as a result of a first-person point of view on his own first-person-point-of-view experiences. Isn’t it sooner a methodological attempt to grasp one’s own experiences by taking the third-person perspective on one’s own first-person-point-of-view experiences? Without pursuingthis issue further I would like to invite the reader into my discussion of‘epistemic asymmetry’ in the following way. I suggest discussing the first- and the third-person perspectivesas two essentially different pathways, by which consciousness expresses itselfin its encounter with the world. One way then is, for example, the experience of the blueness of the sky from the first-person perspective, another – the acquisition of the knowledge about this experience from the third-person perspective. The third-person perspective is understood here as the acquisition of knowledge about experiencing, whether it be the knowledge expressed in any introspective assertion or knowledge aboutthe structures of the brain involved in this experience. The crucial point here is the distinction in employing these two perspectives – the first-person perspective isnon-reflective in contrast to the detached and reflective nature of the third-person perspective.
When Eilan (1995, p. 54) reflected uponhow the question of the mutual exclusiveness of two perspectives could be answered she put it in following words:
The most direct way of securing this result is to say that it is constitutive of the employment of the first person perspective that one not represent oneself as an object at all, but rather, serve as the unrepresented focal point of representation from that perspective. … The third person requires substantive self consciousness, the representation of oneself as one object among others.
The main point of this distinction is that to express what many thinkers would call a “first”-personal belief about oneself one need adopt, to borrow Eilan’s expression, an “externalist” stance on oneself.Eilan (1995, p. 53) expresses this idea by following words: “Now consider a thought one might express with an utterance such as ‘I am in pain’ where the ‘I’ is taken to be expressive of substantive self consciousness. This presupposes detachment, disengaged or objective treatment of oneself as one object among others.”
The fact that one has a unique,first-hand acquaintancewith one’s own experiences (without sharing this ability with anyone else) does not change the fact that every act of referring to these experiences requires employing a frame of reference wherein one can see oneself as an object among many others. The only frame of reference that allows this kind of reflective investigation is, to my mind, the third-person perspective. It is in the sense of investigating an object (and not experiencing it, which would imply employing the first-person perspective) where the methodology of referring to oneself and the methodology of referring to someone else are identical. In the discussion below I shall regard reflexivity and self-consciousness as the prerogatives of the third-person perspective alone.The proposed distinction between the two perspectives of consciousness is crucial for the discussion that follows.
The conventional understanding of the first- and the third-person perspective in the way described by Metzinger in the quotation above giverise, as we are going to see, to methodological confusion. It prevents many researchers of consciousness not only from being able properly to distinguish first-person phenomena from third-person phenomena but also from being able to discuss the phenomenon at issue in the light of correct methodological means.The gain of the proposed distinction is that the two perspectives of consciousness, while mutually exclusive, no longer overlapeach other on the basis of reflective investigation. The consequences of this distinctionwill be further highlighted in the thought experiment where the two perspectives of consciousness are kept separated. Frank Jackson’s case of the neurophysiologist Maryis interesting in this respect. To argue for the falsity of Physicalism Jackson (1982) uses the same strategy – the two perspectives of consciousness in different stages of Mary’s research were separated: first Mary knows all the physical facts about human color vision from the outside, i.e. from the third-person perspective, and only later on does she completeher knowledge with a new experience of colors from the first-person perspective – by actually seeing the colors.Here is a brief summary of Jackson’s anti-materialist argument.
The case of Mary
Mary is a brilliant neuroscientist who spent her entire young life in a black-and-white environment studying human color vision through a black-and-white television monitor. As time goes by Mary acquires all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on whenwe see (chromatically) colored objects. This information includes facts about the surface reflectance properties of objects, wavelengths of light and causal interactions between retinal stimulation and processes in the brain. Jackson then asks: “What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a colour television monitor? Will she learn anything or not?” His answer is: “It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it” (Jackson, 1982, p. 130). The knowledge that Mary acquires after her release is about what it is like(Nagel, 1974) to experience colors. This new knowledge should be, according to Jackson, non-physical in its nature, for Mary knew all the physical information about color vision before her release. The conclusion is thus that Mary’s previous knowledge was incomplete; and since Physicalism requires that all facts are physical facts, Physicalism is false.
The way Jackson formulates his thought experiment restson the underlying assumption that Mary’s knowledge – when incomplete (without any access to first-person experiences) and when complete – is knowledge about the one and same type of object, i.e., color-experiences. There is no consensus in the ongoing philosophical debate about whether Mary really gains new knowledge or not. However, there seems to be a mutual agreement between most of the participants that the two different perspectives that consciousness can have on its objects of investigation deal with one and the same type of object. In this paper I call this assumption into question. I claim that the two essentially different ways of knowing the world of phenomena – from the first-person point of view[1] and from the third-person point of view – have two essentially different types of objects under their consideration.[2]
I begin with posing the problem by means of a thought experiment where the two perspectives of consciousness are, like in Jackson’s case, keep separated. However, the main difference of the thought experiment presented here is that it is based on the distinction between the first- and the third-person perspective sketched above.
2.The case of a man who lived in two worlds
Sven suffers from a disorder that stumps all the scientists. Sven’s behavior has been studied and observed in a great number of different medical and neurological examinations but a physiological explanation for Sven’s disorder has never been found. Because of his disorder Sven is forced to live in two phenomenally different worlds which have no connection with each other. The cause of this is that Sven in his daily life is unable to constantly switch between the first-person and the third-person perspective. On certain days in his life Sven experiences his environment only from the first-person perspective while on other days he is completely left to live in the world of the third-person perspective. When Sven is in his first-person-perspective world he experiences his environment with all his senses in a colorful and nuanced way. However, because of his inability in that world to see himself and others from a perspective other than his own Sven is unaware of his disorder and cannot correct his behavior vis-à-vis his environment. Therefore Sven in a social context acts inadequately and improperly and is often regarded by others as quite egoistic and self-centered. Sven’s egocentric behavior is explained by the fact that Sven, because of his dysfunction, acts at the developmental level of a child who hasn’t yet developed the cognitive ability to see himself and his environment from another person’s perspective.[3]
When Sven is living in his third-person-perspective world he is an outstanding scientist interested in neuroscience and perception. The distinguishing quality of Sven’s behavior in this world is that he is almost completely missing any perception of the world through his senses. Sven seems to be missing a sense of touch; his hearing and vision are experienced as very limited. Sven cannot distinguish chromatic colors, cannot smell anything, and cannot experience taste or even hunger. When Sven studies human perceptions he cannot therefore rely on his own personal experiences but almost exclusively studies his objects only from the third-person perspective. However, Sven’s inability to experience the world through his senses doesn’t prove to be so much of a handicap for his scientific work.[4]As an eminent neuropsychologist Sven has a solid knowledge about how the various sensory faculties are built up and what happens in the brain when it is exposed to various stimuli. As one of the most successful scientists in his field Sven has found and described very complex and intricate connections between different sensory faculties and various structures in the brain. Owing to his ability in his “scientific world” to see himself and others from a third-person point of view Sven can also reflect over his relationships with other people. Sven is aware of his disorder and knows that he has complete access to the world of the senses when he is in his “egocentric” self – Sven has been informed of this by doctors who have observed him. However Sven has no recollection of experiencing the world from a first-person perspective.
Even if Sven in his “egocentric” world lives in state of a happy ignorance about his condition he is “painfully” cognizant of his affliction in his “scientific” world. In the latter world Sven has insight into the fact that he, time after time, is caught in a dilemma of never being able to meet his other phenomenal I. Those researchers and doctors who have studied and observed Sven’s behavior for many years have tried to answer the question Why. When no physiological explanations of Sven’s disorder could be found (all of Sven’s sensory modalities and underlying structures in the brain work as they shouldwhen their neural functions are tested by functional magnetic resonance imaging) psychiatry then became the next avenue. Certain parallels have been established between Sven’s disorder and Dissociative Identity Disorder – a mental affection which expresses itself in that one cannot integrate different parts of one’s personality.[5] However that which distinguishes Sven’s disorder from all the other known cases is that Sven’s disassociated personalities seemto appear on two different levels– for in one of his personalities (the ‘egocentric’ one)Sven does not have any self-image – and, in addition,Sven doesn’t show any characteristic signs of identity disorder such as being “passive, dependent, guilty, and depressed” (DSM-IV, 526) in either of his states. Rather Sven works so well he can with mental health professionals in the attempt to integrate the two separated parts of his personality. However, despite all efforts to the contrary this project seems doomed to fail. The problem is that, on the cognitive level, Sven is not capable in his first-person-perspective world to have any conception of himself. Since his ability to self-reference is missing no one can succeed in making Sven conscious of his mental disorder – first-person-Sven has difficulties comprehending that there exists another part of himself that he should integrate with.The problem has also no solution in Sven’s other world where he, from his third-person perspective, fights in vain to come in contact with that part of himself which (in the third-person world) lacks any means (senses) with which to express itself. All attempts to integrate Sven’s dissociated personalities seems to come up against an insoluble problem – in each of his worlds Sven lacks the means to capture that part of himself which in the actual world is missing. Sven, together with the entire scientific community, stands bewildered in the face of his untreatable disorder.[6]
Why doesn’t Sven succeed in integrating his two dissociated personalities?
The reason Sven’s two separate personalities never meet each other lies in the fact that those things which Sven is able to deal with in his two worlds are of essentially different natures. When Sven is in his first-person-perspective world he experiences the world through all his senses. When Sven is in the third-person-perspective world he has no contact with the world of the senses but instead has the first-person’s experiences of others as the object for his investigations. In one of his worlds Sven experiences the world; in the other he turns away from experiencing to studying the processes underlying these experiences. More concretely this takes its expression in the following way. When Sven is in the world of the senses, he experiences, for example, an apple as a red, tasty and fragrant object. Then that object loses all its meaning in Sven’s “scientific” world. In his “scientific” world Sven studies instead the structures of the brain which are activated in connection with the experience of an apple. In the world of phenomena it is the apple which lands in focus; in the world of science it is the neurological structures in the brain which are studied. As long as Sven is in his “scientific” world any connection with the world of phenomena (and therefore also with that Sven that lives in the world of phenomena) is broken.[7]
Why doesn’t Sven succeed in integrating his two dissociated personalities? The answer to this lies in the very nature of the fact thatthe two worldsthat Sven is obliged to live in,are irrevocably separated bythe two different types of objects. In the world of first-personal experiences it is colours, sounds, smells, pains or any other, what some philosophers would call qualia, that fall intoSven’s focus. In the world of third-personal scientific reflection it is essentially different entities, such as neurological structures, processes, schematic descriptions or scientific classifications that Sveninvestigates. The reason whythe two worlds never have anything in common is that the first-person perspective of Sven’s phenomenal world and the third-person perspective of Sven’s scientific world relate to each other in a special way – one of the perspectives (the scientific world’s perspective) has the other perspective (the phenomenal world’s perceptive) as an object of its investigation. As a consequence, the scientific world’s perspective does not (!) investigate the very object which is under focus for the perspective which it studies; i.e., the third-person perspective does not investigate the type of objects which are under focus for the first-person perspective. In different words, Sven, in his scientific world of reflective investigation can never reach out to the objects of his phenomenal world, which is to qualia.[8]This, in its turn, leads to Sven’s different personalities forming themselves in different ways. The fact that Sven in his two worlds deals with essentially different objects accounts for the fact the Sven in neither of his worlds can ever “meet” his other self.