The Problem of Evil.
There are two versions of the problem of evil. Both challenge belief in God by noting the fact that the world contains evil; in particular, people suffer without having done anything to deserve that suffering. The traditional problem of evil can be given in the form of an argument, and it goes like this.
1. If God exists, he is omni-benevolent, omniscient and omnipotent.
2. Benevolent beings do not allow innocents to suffer if they can prevent this.
3. Innocents suffer.
4. Assume God exists.
5. God knows that innocents suffer (since he is omnicscient).
6. God could if He chose prevent this suffering (since he is omnipotent).
7. Hence, God is not omni-benevolent.
This contradicts the definition of God in 1, so
\8. God does not exist.
The problem of evil, in this form, is a traditional puzzle in both Theology and Philosophy of Religion. Attempts to rebut the argument are called ‘Theodicies’. Two important Theodicies are reprinted in part in the text. In general, a Theodicy attempts to show that it is possible for the suffering of innocents to serve some greater good which an omni-benevolent being is bound to pursue (i.e. it is possible that there is some good, such that a being who permits evil in order to make it possible to achieve this good is in fact acting benevolently).
A second form of the problem of evil is different. It allows that a Theodicy might be correct, in that the suffering of innocents might serve some larger and overriding good. But it goes on to deny that this good could in any way make up for the evil necessary to secure it, so that it is wrong to endorse the project, no matter how great the good, which requires the suffering of innocents. This is Dostoevsky’s complaint-- the children who suffer as part of God’s plan are seriously wronged. We may forgive those who have harmed them for whatever wrong they have done us, but we cannot forgive them for the wrongs they have done the children—this is not in our power to do, for these evils are not inflicted on us. But God could have prevented these evils and didn’t. To endorse God’s project, his plan, is to endorse the doing of this evil to the children, and to forgive the wrongdoers and to encourage others so to do. But to do this would be wrong.
Some Objections to the Traditional Problem of Evil.
Objection 1:
One might argue that Premise 3 is false: innocents do not in fact suffer.
The burden here is to show that each person who suffers is in fact not innocent. Since children, even infants, too young to understand right from wrong do suffer, it seems clear that some people who are not blameworthy, some people who are not morally culpable, do suffer. Hence, one must adopt some form of the doctrine of original sin.
The objection, as it stands, seems cogent (provided, of course, one accepts the doctrine of original sin). But it invites a reformulation of the argument from evil. What is problematic about the suffering of innocents is that it is a case of apparently undeserved suffering. Benevolence is inconsistent with letting innocents suffer because such suffering is undeserved, and benevolent persons do not let others suffer undeservedly when such suffering can be prevented. Rewriting the argument we have:
1. If God exists, he is omni-benevolent, omniscient and omnipotent.
2. Benevolent beings do not allow persons to suffer undeservedly if they can prevent this.
3. People do suffer undeservedly.
4. Assume God exists.
5. God knows that persons suffer undeservedly (since he is omnicscient).
6. God could if He chose prevent this suffering (since he is omnipotent).
7. Hence, God is not omni-benevolent.
This contradicts the definition of God in 1, so
\8. God does not exist.
Objection 2:
One might claim that what it means for God to be benevolent is something different than what it is for mere humans to be benevolent. So while humans cannot be benevolent if they permit innocent suffering, God can.
The problem here is that we are distinguishing between two different properties, benevolence-for-humans and benevolence-for-God. We have some understanding of what the first is, and on that understanding, God cannot have this property if innocents suffer, and he is both omniscient and omnipotent.
The other form of benevolence, however, is entirely undefined—it is a property with a name only, and no quality thereby named. In particular, this property, whatever it is, is consistent with the absence of benevolence-for-humans. So whatever feature it is we meant to mark by the distinction between benevolence and non-benevolence, this feature cannot be marked using the idea of ‘benevolence-for-God’—the contrast between benevolence and its absence has been lost. So when we claimed that God was benevolent, we thought we were saying something about the degree to which he cared about people. As it turns out, given the distinction between properties, this is not so. In fact, we have no idea at all what we are saying. So those who endorse the problem of evil should respond to this objection simply by saying that they understood God to be a being who is by definition loving in the way ordinary benevolence requires. If this is not so, they have no argument against God’s existence, but that God is very different from the God they supposed we believed in.
Objection 3 (the Theodicy objection):
One can argue that although innocents suffer, such suffering is consistent with the existence of a benevolent, all knowing and all powerful God, provide the suffering is necessary for some greater good, the achieving of which makes it permissible, even obligatory, to allow innocents to suffer. Generally the idea here is that to achieve the greater good, God must allow free will, and this requires that He permit some persons to inflict undeserved suffering on others, if they so choose.
Objection 4:
One might argue that we are simply not in a position to judge whether or not God acts benevolently. This objection is really an imprecise version of some other objection, or a simple refusal to engage the argument.
The argument from evil is in fact an assessment of God’s benevolence, on the supposition that he exists. If we are not in a position to judge whether God acts benevolently, then there must be something wrong with the argument—either it has a false or contentious premise, or it is invalid. If objection 4 is taken this way, then it is appropriate to ask for a precise specification of the flaw in the argument from evil.
On the other hand, the objection might just indicate an unwillingness to engage in any project which might have as a possible outcome a criticism of God. In this case, there is, properly speaking, no objection to the argument, to the correctness of its premises or its validity, and hence no objection to the conclusion. There is simply an unwillingness to consider whether or not the conclusion might be right.