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The Exemplary Foreigner: Cultural Heritage Activism in Regional China
Dr Gary Sigley, Asian Studies, The University of Western Australia
DRAFT: Not for Citation
Introduction: Players and Arenas in China’s Cultural Heritage Field
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the world’s most populous nation. It is also one of the most diverse in terms of geography, ethnicity and culture. The peoples who have over time inhabited the space we now associate with ‘China’ have created a vast treasure trove of material and non-material culture, which collectively makes for a rich human cultural heritage. This has been recognised by the Chinese government through the formal designation of cultural heritage, both tangible in the form of historic buildings (such as the Imperial Palace) and structures (such as the Great Wall), transport routes (such as the Grand Canal) and intangible heritage in the form of performance (such as Peking Opera), festivals (such as the Dragon Boat Festival) and handicrafts (such as paper-cutting). Some of the better preserved sites and cultural traditions, such as those listed above in parenthesis, have obtained international recognition through inscription in the network of UNESCO Cultural World Heritage. Nonetheless, regardless of whether it be tangible or intangible heritage, official recognition is always framed in terms of a specific national narrative. Cultural heritage from this view is part and parcel of legitimising the party-state’s ‘China dream’. This is an ongoing process which has gone through various periods with differing ideological emphasis. Yet although the party-state is often able to assert its hegemonic ambitions, the designation of cultural heritage never goes completely uncontested.
First and foremost, asthe PRC continues its economic and social transformation both the party-state and society in general have‘rediscovered’ China’s cultural heritage. This rediscovery, in contrast to the sustained critique and attack on ‘traditional culture’ during the Maoist period (1949-1978), takes a number of forms. Firstly, from the perspective of the party-state, the construction of a unified sense of China’s cultural heritage works towards solidifying a form of cultural nationalism and the shaping of a common identity during a period of rapid social transformation. In this sense, as social values and structures undergo change, traditional culture, insofar as it supports the status quo, can be deployed as a stabilising force. Secondly, cultural heritage manifest in both material and non-material forms, is now identified as a resource that can be deployed to promote economic development, especially in the burgeoning domestic tourism and leisure industry. Thirdly, cultural heritage can serve a pedagogic function that seeks to educate the citizenry in the value of heritage and in the ‘progress’ that has been made in the reform era (post-1978) and thereby legitimising the party-state’s form of cultural nationalism. Fourthly, from a grass-roots societal perspective, cultural heritage is embraced as a means of strengthening local identity and a sense of place. This can work with government and commercial forces but it can also be posed against them. As we shall explore below, there is much more to be said of cultural heritage in the context of a rapidly changing China, suffice to say at this stage that thesefour approaches capture much of what is happening.
‘Rapidly changing China’ is, however, a rather vague and tired concept. Broadly it refers to the ongoing processes of urbanisation, industrialisation, modernisation (a term that has merit when considering the emergence, proliferation and desire of ‘modern lifestyles’), globalisation and, perhaps most importantly, marketisation. The irony is that whilst the party-state and society are embracing – that is, rediscovering and reinventing – China’s cultural heritage, at the same time the remaining material and non-material heritage is experiencing an unprecedented period of destruction. The terraforming of the Chinese landscape through urbanisation (in which villages and rural lifestyles are destroyed), engineering projects such as dam construction which submerge large tracts of heritage sites along China’s many rivers (Demattè, 2012), and the effects of increased mobility through transport infrastructure construction that brings modern lifestyles to remote regions, to name but a few, contributes to the large-scale loss of both material and non-material culture.Furthermore, the material and non-material culture that is ‘preserved’ risks being significantly diluted through the impact of crass commercialisation for the aforementioned purpose of promoting mass tourism and the culturally insensitive tastes of the nouveau riche who in Chinese are derisively referred to as the ‘hill-billy rich’ (tuhao土豪).
Into this milieu has emerged a growing field of cultural heritage activism. Ali Mozafarri (2015: 2) defines heritage activism as that which ‘comprises collective challenges by people with a common purpose and solidarity to protect and conserve heritage as a conveyor and basis for collective identity, through sustained interactions with elites, opponents and authorities.’ This activism also takes many forms and, I would argue, includes both ‘people’ and ‘institutions’. The party-state is not a monolithic entity but is instead made up of diverse forces and agencies. In this case whilst elements of the party-state apparatus may be seen to be undermining cultural heritage protection – through, for example, the promotion of mass tourism – other agencies are actively involved in heritage protection. The most obvious example is the State Administration of Cultural Heritage (SACH) (Guojiawenwuju, 国家文物局) and its counterparts at provincial, municipal and prefectural levels. Non-government organisations (NGOs) dedicated to cultural heritage education and protection are an example of a form of non-state activism (although it should be noted that in China there are many NGOs directly funded and administered by the government which the literature refers to as ‘government non-government organisations (GONGOs)). Last but not least, individuals and groups, often in the form of a grass-roots community (Nitzky, 2013), are another important instance of cultural heritage activism in contemporary China, which along with NGOs make up the buds of an emerging heritage-orientated civil society.
In building on the work of James M. Jasper (2014; 2015) I will refer to these various state and non-state actors as ‘players’. Broadly defined players are ‘those who engage in strategic action with some goal in mind’ (Jasper, 2015: 10). The space in which these players operate is an ‘arena’, which Jasper (2015: 14) describes as ‘a bundle of rules and resources that allow or encourage certain kinds of interactions to proceed, with something at stake.’ An arena consists of formal and informal aspects. Formal aspects include, for example, the body of relevant heritage laws. Informal aspects might refer to the unwritten rules of social interaction, such as in the Chinese case the notion of ‘guanxi’ (关系) which refers to the important role of mobilising personal relationships (Yang, 1994).Rules in this instance are flexible, can be changed or even ignored. This is especially so in the case study in regional China that will be examined here where the Chinese saying ‘Heaven is high and the emperor far away’ (tian gaohuangdi yuan天高皇帝远) is apposite when describing how locals get around heritage restrictions.
The particular location of the case study to be explored below is the historic village of Xizhou (喜洲) in Dali Bai Autonomous Prefecture, approximately twenty kilometres from the famous old town of Dali (大理) and not far from the shores of the Erhai lake on one side and the Cangshan mountains on the other. Dali Prefecture is part of Yunnan Province (云南省). Yunnan, which literally means ‘south of the clouds’, is located in China’s southwest and shares domestic borders with Sichuan, Guizhou, Guangxi and Tibet, and international borders with Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam. Dali is thus firmly located in China’s extensive ‘borderlands’. It is one of the most topographically and culturally diverse regions on the planet.
The chapter further focuses on one particular ‘player’, the Linden family. The Lindens are an American family who operate a boutique hotel and cultural programming centre – the Linden Centre – in Xizhou. Brian Linden, who will be the main focus here, is a good example of the ‘exemplary foreigner’ and reminds us that in the field of cultural heritage activism we should not assume that the activist is always a local national subject, or that ‘activism’ necessarily expresses itself as a form of open resistance to the state. As the notion of ‘player’ suggests, heritage activism is about building alliances, articulating a mission, marshalling resources, and constant negotiation. ‘Heritage’, as noted above, is best conceived as a process rather than a static object.
In building the Linden Centre the Lindens have had to engage in all of these activities within the local ‘cultural heritage arena’ constituted as a coming together of other institutions and players. Brian Linden himself can be situated as a unique player within China, that is, as the ‘exemplary foreigner’. By ‘exemplary foreigner’ I refer both to the important role of the ‘exemplar’ or ‘model’ (mofan模范) in Chinese culture (Bakken, 2000) and to the status of ‘the foreigner’ in the PRC as an outsider who performs a certain role that cannot be played by the national subject. ‘Perform’ is quite appropriate here when we consider that an ‘arena’ is also a place where performance occurs and where drama unfolds. Brian Linden, as a charismatic, skilled and passionate player takes on the act of performance, crossing adroitly between Western and Chinese culture well aware of the different nuances in speech, body language, and so on, that reminds one strongly of Erving Goffman’s (1956) pioneering research on the role of ‘performance’ in everyday life. In the Maoist period the ‘exemplary foreigner’ had little scope in adjusting the performance. As Anne-Marie Brady (2003a) notes, the foreigner was ‘made to serve China’ and much of the power was clearly in the hands of the party-state and in particular the system of ‘foreign affairs’. In the post-1978 reform era there is much greater scope for foreign players to act out their performance according to their own desires and missions. Nonetheless to do so effectively still demands that the foreign player is well aware of the boundaries and formal and informal rules. In this regard the Lindens have proved particularly flexible and are a good example of the ‘exemplary foreigner/s’ in the contemporary context when it comes to grass-roots cultural heritage activism. What the Lindens are doing can hardly be described as a ‘social movement’, which Alain Touraine (2002: 90) describes as ‘organized conflicts or as conflicts between organized actors over the social use of common cultural values’. On the contrary, the players within the cultural heritage field in Dali tend to avoid open conflict. As will be explained below this is not because the power of the party-state is overwhelming but, on the contrary, the autonomy of grass-roots communities allows them space to make their own decisions about cultural heritage, whether for good or ill. In the face of government priorities that overwhelmingly supports economic development almost at any cost (consider the environmental pollution crisis now inflicting much of eastern China) and a desire to avoid stirring up ethnic discontent (by for example not upholding the strict cultural heritage regulations that pertain to what villagers can do with their property), it is not surprising that cultural heritage preservation finds itself in a disadvantaged position. It is into this space, in the absence of a broad based social movement, that the Linden Centre marks out its position and attempts to define a positive alternative to cultural heritage preservation.
The rest of the chapter is divided into four sections.In the first section I outline in more detail the trends, paradoxes and contradictions in what I refer to as China’s ‘cultural heritage revolution’. In the second section I turn our attention to the emerging field, or ‘arena’, of cultural heritage activism in the PRC. The third section provides the necessary background and introduction to the historic village of Xizhou and the Linden Centre. The fourth and final section focuses exclusively on Brian Linden as a ‘exemplary foreign player’ in the Xizhou ‘cultural heritage arena’.
China’s Cultural Heritage Revolution
The PRC is in the midst of a ‘cultural heritage revolution’. By ‘revolution’ I mean a radical repudiation of the previous approach to ‘cultural heritage’ and its replacement with a new approach, one that is informed by quite different assumptions (although of course not without some level of continuity). The official party-state approach to cultural heritage in the PRC can be divided into three major periods since 1949.
The Maoist period (1949 – 1978) was characterised by an orthodox Marxist approach to cultural heritage. During this period cultural heritage was primarily viewed through the grid of class analysis. Material and non-material culture was divided into that which was the product of ‘good classes’ – that is, of the workers and peasants – and that which was the product of ‘bad classes’ – that is, of feudal and bourgeois ruling classes (including that of ‘foreign imperialists’). One example is Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) which was regarded as a product of the working masses and obtained official state sponsorship and support post-1949. On the other hand, ‘traditional culture’ was by and large regarded as ‘feudal’, ‘superstitious’ and ‘backward’. This critique was backed up by concrete measures aimed at destroying the physical vestiges of material culture – or converting them into modern and secular functions such as schools, factories and offices – and prohibiting the continuing practice and dissemination of non-material culture. In its place, it was claimed by the party-state, that a new ‘socialist culture’ was being created (this also involved ‘sanitising’ some forms of traditional culture and readapting them for the party-state’s mission). In this scheme of things more recent ‘revolutionary heritage’ was more valued than China’s thousands of years of material and non-material culture. When the latter was highlighted it was generally done so to support the party-state’s revolutionary cum nationalist narrative.The ‘arena’ during this period was heavily dominated by the party-state and its agencies. The number of ‘players’ was also strictly limited and controlled. The agency of individuals and communities at the grassroots was significantly curtailed, although acts of resistance did take place through, for example, the hiding of cultural artefacts and the secret transmission of some cultural practices.[1]
The ushering in of the policies of ‘reform and openness’ (gaige kaifang改革开放) constitutes the beginning of the second period. This transitionary period – from 1978 to 1992 – witnesses a reversal in the officialposition on ‘traditional culture’. The direct physical attacks on material culture cease and the prohibitions against many forms of non-material culture are lifted. The party-state institutions credited with cultural heritage preservation become much more active and begin to increase contact with external agencies (thereby facilitating the absorption of a more standardised and global cultural heritage discourse such as the ratification of The Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage in 1985). A number of heritage censuses were conducted, the most significant of which took place in 1982, to gather a more precise knowledge of how much material and non-material culture had survived the ravages of the previous century. This also involved the expansion of cultural heritage scholarship which, now no longer formally restricted by (but by no means completely free from) the orthodox Marxist approach, begins to explore in more detail China’s material and non-material cultural legacy.
Whilst the party-state begins to reassess the position of ‘traditional culture’ (chuantong wenhua 传统文化) and even begins to openly declare it to have a positive function in social development (alongside what have now ironically become known as the ‘socialist traditions’ (shehuizhuyi chuantong社会主义传统)or ‘red traditions’ (hongsechuantong红色传统)), during the 1980s cultural affairs bureaus were severely underfunded and encouraged to find innovative ways to generate revenue. This sometimes resulted in cultural heritage buildings being turned into pool halls or rented out for other forms of entertainment purposes. These practices were later prohibited but it did not stop the cultural heritage sector seeking for more stable and lucrative forms of revenue, an ongoing issue that has been somewhat alleviated by considerable increases in state funding in recent years and the development of mass tourism (of which more below).
Cultural heritage at the grass-roots, especially non-material culture also begins to experience a revival during this transitionary period, especially in regards to religious practices. This includes the officially recognised religions of Buddhism, Daoism, Catholicism, Protestantism and Islam, as well as ‘folk religion’(which was never formally recognised as a ‘religion’). Aspects of ‘folk religion’ were stillregarded as vestiges of ‘feudal superstition’ but over time the prohibition is relaxed or local officials turned a blind eye. Much of this grass-roots revival is part of a general revival of cultural identity taking place across China in the wake of the Maoist period, both amongst China’s 55 officially recognised ethnic minorities and as well as the Han Chinese, the latter itself an incredibly diverse group with many regional cultural variations. A good example is the revival of the annual ceremonies and rituals in honour of the legendary ‘Yellow Emperor’. These ceremonies, which perpetuated a narrative of common ancestral origins and national unity, were endorsed by the local authorities and even patronised by high level officials (Sautman, 1997).