The Comparative Effects of Religious Regulation and Existential Security on Religious

THE COMPARATIVE EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS REGULATION AND EXISTENTIAL SECURITY ON RELIGIOUS INVOLVEMENT:

A CROSS-NATIONAL ASSESSMENT

by

Jaime Dean Harris, Ph.D. Candidate

The PennsylvaniaStateUniversity

Abstract

Using data from the 2001 International Religious Freedom Reports, the 2003 United Nations’ Human Development Report, and Wave 4 of the World Values Survey, this study explores the relationship between religious regulation and national rates of religious involvement. Ordinary least square analysis is used compare models employing various regulation variables against models which emphasize traditional indicators of socio-economic modernization and existential security. The analysis reveals that there is statistical evidence supporting each model. Restrictions on religious supply and factors affecting individuals’ sense of deprivation have significant roles in predicting religious variation.

Introduction

Scholars have developed various theoretical explanations concerning the determinants of religious participation and belief. Secularization theoriesarguing that religious involvement declines as societies modernize have enjoyed an unusually protracted and relatively unquestioned authority for decades; however,recent studies have challenged the primary tenets of the secularization doctrine and numerous technical criticisms and refinements have been offered by both secularization supporters and opponents. In this essay, I address challenges raised by proponents of religious economy models and attempt to conduct an empirical test of the core tenets of two competing perspectives: the existential security thesis and religious economy models.

This research examines the predictive power ofboth religious supply and demand. Proponents of religious economy models place emphasis on religious supply as an explanation of variation in religious involvement while Norris and Inglehart’s existential security argument focuses more on the factors altering demand for religious products. This analysis finds that both are useful in predicting variation. Further, I argue that specific forms of religious regulation have different effects on religious involvement, and these distinctions are important in refining religious economy models.

I utilize new data from the U.S. State Department’s International Religious Freedom Reports that quantifies governmental and non-government practices that constrain religious supply as well as multiple measures of modernization for 66 countries to test these competing theories. The analysis improves upon past research by relying on data from a large number of countries rather than focusing primarily on cases within in United States and Western Europe, and tests the applicability of the religious economy model across a variety of geographic and cultural regions.

Literature Review

Overview of Classic Secularization Theory

For decades, the prediction of imminent secularization was accepted as a near universal truth in the social sciences and led to an era of research that treated religion as a social footnote if not ignoring it as a causal factor entirely. Indeed, since the time of the Enlightenment, the decline of religion has been considered one of the fundamental, unchanging principals of social science (Hadden, 1987; Fox and Sandler, 2004). Arguably, one of the reasons for secularization doctrine’s longevity is the broad array of definitions and predictions that fall under the nebulous secularization label. The variation among secularization hypotheses is so great that, as Philip Gorsky (2000) states, it is more accurate to speak of the “secularization paradigm” than to refer to a single, unified secularization theory. Four broad orientations can be distinguished within the secularization paradigm: transformation, privatization, disappearance and decline.

The classic secularization theses are similar in their assertions that religious involvement declines because the cognitive and structural prerequisites for societal modernization leave less need and room for religion in normal routines. Essentially, the classic secularization paradigm focuses on transformations in the wider socio-economic structure and subsequent religious implications. Barring the disappearance or reversal of social and technological progress, the decrease of religion is unavoidable.

Existential security

Focusing on human need as a predictor of religious involvement, Norris and Inglehart (2004) have developed one of the more compelling arguments supporting demand-side theories of religious involvement. The central idea is that religious involvement will decline in the presence of modernity; however, unlike previous theories, Inglehart and Norris’ propose an argument for religious variation rather than unavoidable decline. The mechanism driving this variation is referred to as existential security and is identified as a state in which the basic necessities of existence and physical security are not threatened. They argue that individuals in poorer, less-developed nations are more susceptible to premature death, disease, hunger and a number of other hardships that result in a higher demand for religion as a source of emotional comfort and assurance as well as a provider of physical necessities. Economic development and improved standards of living increase existential security which decreases the importance of religious values and subsequent religious involvement. Norris and Inglehart find considerable support for this argument after conducting a cross-national analysis and conclude that overall religious demand is associated with socio-economic conditions (2004). Existential security potentially encompasses similar measures as those utilized in classic secularization theory, but conceptually and theoretically it is largely considered independent of modernization. Because its primary mechanisms rely upon individuals’ level of deprivation rather than societal progress, there is theoretical room for a society thatis, by most conventional measures, modernized, yetstill sustains high levels of religious involvement. The United States is an obvious example.

Gill and Lundsgaarde’s analysis demonstrates and inverse relationship between state welfare spending and religiosity. They argue that there may be a substitution effect that accounts for individuals’ lack of need for religion in welfare states. While they acknowledge that it is not true for everyone, the authors suggest that deprivation and necessity draw people to religious participation, but provisions from the state have the opposite effect. In essence, it is the same need-based motivator that characterizes Norris and Inglehart’s existential security thesis. It is expected, then, that indicators of well-being will affect religious behavior by influencing individuals’ demand for religion. Utilizing this logic, I develop the following hypothesis regarding the relationship between human need and religious involvement.

Hypothesis 1: As socio-economic well-being increases,

religious involvement decreases.

The last two decades have witnessed a number of scholars arguing forcefully against the “old” paradigm citing the persistence of religious behavior and belief in modernized nations of the world as evidence of classic secularization’s inaccuracy. Some have gone so far as to suggest the secularization paradigm be thoroughly reexamined if not discarded altogether (Stark, 1999). Proponents of religious economy models of religious involvement offer a systemic critique of the secularization paradigm and offer an alternative perspective on religious involvement.

Religious Economy Models

The principal assumption of the economic model of religious involvement is that religious organizations are sensitive to market forces of supply and demand, and religious markets within a society can be divided into producers and consumers (Stark and Finke, 2000). Religious firms act as suppliers providing products in the form of doctrines and practices and “choose the characteristics of their product and the means of marketing it” (Finke and Iannaccone, 1993). Individuals act as rational, self-interested consumers through belief and participation in certain religions that appeal most to individual tastes and preferences (Finke and Stark, 1998; Stark and Finke, 2000). In this way, religious firms and consumers seek to maximize their benefits in a mutually favorable exchange. Because the assumption of cost/benefit analysis in the religious economies model is so central it has often been labeled the “rational choice” theory of religion[1].

What distinguishes the economic theory of religion from more conventional explanations of religious change is a matter of emphasis. Rather than focusing on individuals’ demand for religion as an explanation of patterns of religious behavior, increases and decreases in religious participation are attributed to variations in religious supply. Supply-side theorists argue that religious demand is relatively stable among populations (Finke and Iannaccone 1993; Stark and Finke 2000; Jelen, 2002) and suggest that religious organizations “typically attract members through open and active recruitment” (Froese, 2001). Focusing on religious firms rather than on religious consumers, and, contrary to more conventional notions of religious behavior, it is argued that massive increases in religious participation like that of the First and Second Great Awakenings in the United States are not products of sudden changes in demand but of successful marketing campaigns by religious providers (Finke and Iannaccone, 1993).

Fluctuations in religious participation are the result of variations in the religious market. Stark and Finke (2000) argue that greater levels of religious pluralism within a society—numbers of distinct firms in a single market—increase organizational innovation and competition for adherents and resources. “A particular religious firm can flourish only if it provides a commodity that is at least as attractive as its competitors,” (Iannaconne, 1991:158) and, essentially, the greater the number of religious firms competing in a market, the greater the variation and specialization of the product. With more specialized products available, firms can establish themselves in one of the numerous and stable “niches” within a market which, in turn, drives the participation rate up (Stark and Finke, 2000).

Religious economy proponents assert that supply-side competition is an important predictor of religious involvement, and utilizing pluralism as a proxy for religious competition, studies have found support for this argument both domestically (Finke and Stark, 1988; Finke, 1990; Finke and Stark 2005) and abroad (Fox and Tabory, 2008; Iannaccone, 1991; Hamberg and Pettersson, 1994). In this analysis, I examine external factors that act to regulate the religious market and potentially stifle organizational competition. Further, by focusing on practices and policies that proscribe free competition rather than pluralism, this analysis lifts the assumption of market neutrality—that is, I do not assume that all religious firms in a market can or do compete equally. Measures of government and social regulation of religion are more direct and valid measures of religious market freedom, and, therefore, better indicators when testing the religious economy model.

Government Regulation of the Religious Market

The structure of the religious market is subject to influence from several sources, but regulatory actions of the state are perhaps the most readily observed and investigated. Grim and Finke define government regulation as “the restrictions placed on the practice, profession, or selection of religion by the official laws, policies or administrative actions of the state” (Grim and Finke, 2006:7). Because of the power advantage, the ability of the state to produce and enforce legislation renders it a major, if not the most important, source of market regulation—both economic and religious.

Chaves and Cann examine religious participation cross-nationally for eighteen Western industrialized nations. Utilizing a six-point scale of “direct financial subsidy or benefit to a religious institution” (1992:280), they find that increased state regulation of the religious market is indeed associated with decreased religious participation. In fact, they argue that religious regulation is a more important determinant of religious participation than pluralism. Studies of Eastern Europe during and after Communist rule also illustrate the diminutive effect state regulation can have on religious participation (Froese 2001; Froese and Pfaff, 2001). Numerous other studies report similar findings from various regions around the globe (Barro and McCleary, 2003; Gill, 1994, 1998; Stark and Iannaccone, 1994; Yang, 2006). By increasing the cost of competition and producing barriers to entry, government regulation diminishes religious involvement. Fox and Tabory (2008) explicitly test and confirm this proposition. These findings give rise to the second hypothesis of this research.

Hypothesis 2: Controlling for other factors, government/state imposed regulation will decrease the religious participation within a country.

Communism

It is important to stress that Communist regimes represent a unique and particularly aggressive blend of government and social regulation. Traditionally, Communist policies regarding religion are repressive and have a negative impact on both religious supply and demand. For example, according to 2001 International Religious FreedomReport for China, “the Government seeks to restrict religious practice to government-sanctioned organizations and registered places of worship to control the growth and scope of the activity of religious groups,” (p. 1) and has “banned all groups that it has determined to be cults,” (p. 3). The extensive regulation of religious activity and the barriers to entry placed before new firms fosters a religious market that cannot and will not sustain high levels of religious involvement. Demand is also affected as Communist regimes adopt an atheist government position and often ban religious instruction for minors in an attempt to devalue religious influence and delegitimizes religious authority.

Yang’s (2001) examination of the practices in Communist China and Froese’s examinations (Froese and Pfaff, 2001) of religious variation before and after Communist rule in Eastern Europe demonstrate that intentional government regulation and persecution may not eradicate religion in and of itself, but it can most definitely devastate the infrastructureand networks required for religious maintenance and transmission. Though both examinations reveal an increase in religious involvement following the elimination or relaxation of Communist regimes, the intensive efforts to abolish religion, including anti-religious propaganda and education, should still have had a substantial effect on the general population. It should come as no surprise, then, that religious involvement remains considerably lower in current and formerly Communist countries.

Social Regulation of the Religious Market

Research on the effects of regulation has typically been state-centered; however, there is no reason to believe that non-government institutions, associations and social actors cannot have a significant and similar impact on the religious market and, subsequent participation (Grim and Finke, 2006). In fact, legal policies and practices are only one possible source of market regulation, because regulatory power is not nested solely within the state. Non-governmental influences can and do directly affect religious participation as well.

Social regulation and government regulation are similarly defined, but whereas government regulation concerns the policies and practices of the state, social regulation refers to restrictions placed on religion by “other groups, associations, or the culture at large” (Grim and Finke, 2006). The regulatory power of non-state actors often equals or surpasses that of the state, and, like their more formal counterparts, non-state actors can successfully utilize various forms of regulatory practice and even coercion to engage in “expansionist and/or protectionist actions aimed at controlling the religious marketplace” (Grim, 2005:22). Religious cartels, as demonstrated by Finke and Stark (2005), had a great role in manipulating the growth and development of the United States religious economy. A more coercive element is added to this argument suggesting that in the absence of government regulation, a dominant religious group can suppress the growth of religious competitors with threats and intimidation (Jelen, 2002). One need only look to the U.S. State Department’s International Religious Freedom Reports to find demonstrations of religious social power. In numerous Islamic countries with constitutions professing freedom of religion and expression, the social and normative dominance of Islam, accompanied by prejudice, discrimination and violence, creates a religious market that may be free from state regulation but is subject to the influence of the dominant Islamic culture (International Religious Freedom Reports, 2001).

Unlike government regulation, social regulation often relies on previous religious commitment and activity. It is also much more dependent upon informal social networks often tied to religious organizations. Therefore, one could expect that social regulation could be positively correlated with religious involvement, especially in countries with an overwhelming religious majority. The relationship between social regulation and religious involvement is probably more complex and less direct than that of government regulation. From these arguments, I develop two competing hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3: Controlling for other factors, an increase in social regulation will decrease religious involvement.

Hypothesis 4: Controlling for other factors, an increase in social

regulation will increase religious involvement.

Hypothesis 3 follows a strict interpretation of the religious economy model, and predicts that any market regulation will significantly decrease religious involvement. Hypothesis 4, however, suggests that the extensive use of networks and non-government associations as a source of social influence will actually maintain and possibly augment rates of religious involvement.

Religious Beliefs and Practices

Distinguishing between attitudes and behaviors is a matter of social science convention. It is well known that certain attitudes correspond with certain behaviors, but to conceptually conflate the two or to consider one a direct measure of the other is a mistake. For this study, the multidimensional nature of religious behavior is acknowledged, and religious belief is distinguished from religious practice in the overall conception of religious involvement. I argue that the effects of religious regulation on belief and practice are not equal and reveal the boundaries of religious regulation.

In the two largest world religions, Christianity and Islam, individuals are called upon to express their faith through congregation, proselytizing and prayer. Because of the institutionalized nature of this particular form of religious practice, I argue that it is more susceptible to religious regulation—that is, State and non-State regulators have a greater capability of interfering with religious practice. Legal restrictions, harassment and the desecration of minority holy sites are relatively common occurrences in many countries and the fear of reprisals for public expression may very well discourage overt displays of religious commitment (International Religious Freedom Reports, 2001).