The role and importance of spatial and sustainability objectives
within the TfN strategy framework

1. Hierarchy of consideration: In general when environmental NGOs are asked to participate in a process (such as a project reference group) the assessment they make will be based on following a sequence such as: first i) establish what is the overarching strategic framework which the particular scheme is contributing to, and assess the characteristics and validity of that strategy; then ii) check in particular the longterm objectives it is seeking to achieve: both sustainability (economic/social/environmental) and spatial objectives; and only then iii) proceed to examine the particular transport characteristics of the scheme. We will not want to proceed immediately to stage iii) before satisfying ourselves in relation to the preceding stages i-ii) in the hierarchy. We will also not be content to assess a project on the basis of an already prescribed modal choice without previously having examined the options within a multimodal framework.
What this means in a particular case like Trans-Pennine Tunnel is: we would go back and assess the validity of the DfT and TfN strategic frameworks from which the project apparently emerged; establish that the high-level objectives had been properly set (or indeed set at all); assess the priority for action on this particular corridor (Manchester-Sheffield, multimodal) alongside other candidate corridors/locations; and only then consider transport interventions (alongside non-transport ones) but within a genuinely multimodal assessment process. Our dissatisfaction with the TPT process (and the other Strategic Road Studies) is that they have not proceeded sequentially through the above hierarchy but instead essentially asked reference group participants to start their assessment only from stage iii) - without the benefit of stages i-ii) - and of an already prescribed road mode-only intervention. It goes without saying that we would expect all the above process to be properly supported by rigorous analysis and an evidence base, which reference group participants are prepared to challenge.

2. Relevance to TfN and TPT processes: Whilst this hierarchy of consideration will apply generally there are particular circumstances that make it all the more important for the TfN strategy process. You will know that we raised the issue of How does improving the Manchester-Sheffield road corridor fit into an overall spatial & transport strategy for the Northern Powerhouse?in our TPT ‘Testing the feasibility’ submission of October 2015 (Q6, and see also Qs 3-5) and we did this for at least three reasons: our previous involvement in the Northern Way initiative made us understand that one of the reasons for its lack of progress was that it had not been able to define what its spatial rationale was; that we are aware of the potential planning, land use and environmental impacts, particularly in the NW; and that a project of this huge scale might disproportionately affect funding allocations and consequently spatial outcomes across the rest of the wider Northern Powerhouse (NP) region. So our view from the start has been that a question of this magnitude requires a foundational analysis - to make explicit the spatial opportunities and consequences of NP interventions - a view only reinforced by our (re)reading of the various TfN strategy documents from 2014 onwards which demonstrated to us that such a spatial analysis had apparently been overlooked.

3. What such an analysis would reveal first of all is the existing and BAU spatial distributions: the present unequal, and possibly divergent distribution of economic activity, the momentum of that distribution into the future, the asymmetrical plans promoting that momentum, and how the institutional structures of the NP, TfN and the constituent combined authorities should respond to any divergences. We know that Greater Manchester is significantly further advanced in its strategic spatial planning, which is highly ambitious and has major transport components. We know also that the other combined authorities are variously substantially behind in analysing or articulating their own spatial strategies. Therefore Manchester already has and can only increase its ‘first mover’ spatial advantage. In the context where, as we both know, the remit for TfN does not formally intrude into the plans of combined authorities within their own areas, proceeding without an analysed understanding of ‘NP spatial opportunities and consequences’ risks reinforcing asymmetrical outcomes and distorting funding allocations which are not under TfN strategic direction. Against this institutional background there does therefore need to be a test of whether a TfN strategy that ignored individual combined authority plans/programmes would still achieve established NP spatial outcomes.
4. Such a baseline spatial analysis could also include an examination of European comparators such as Randstadt and Rhine/Ruhr, which the TfN reports from 2014 on have invoked without being able to substantiate with specific evidence. That then led this comparison to be the subject of a critique such as contained in the Centre for Cities report.

5. The next stage of the spatial analysis would examine a series of outcome choices which when analysed and aggregated could bebundled into a more limited number of spatial scenario options:
- Will the NP/TfN interventions result in either convergent or divergent economic outcomes across the NP area over the long term? The wider context for this analysis - that the status quo within the UK as a whole is a pattern of continuing future divergence - would allow all these relative distributional movements to be revealed.
- Relatedly will they encourage spatial distributions which have either a unipolar or multipolar tendency? The present distribution for the UK as a whole is unipolar in characteristic (with London/Greater SE disproportionately advantaged); the NP/TfN strategy needs to understand whether proposed interventions will either tend to recreate this unipolar approach in the North (with Manchester in place of London) or alternatively result in a broad distribution of benefits across the North.

- Relatedly how will they affect the distribution of benefits across hierarchies of cities/regions, at various levels e.g. Manchester/Leeds/Sheffield/Newcastle/Hull, or Leeds/Bradford/Huddersfield/Halifax, etc? Outcomes from these choices would become influential in making corridor or modal route choices.

- What are the spatial choices and points of emphasis between nodes (cities), corridors and hinterlands? Shifting the focus between each of these will result in different distributions of benefits, and what should be preferred modal choices for proposed interventions. We have also called for the TfN strategy to debate a fundamental principle as to whether benefits would be better obtained between (inter) or within (intra) regions. In relation to TPT we have pointed out that the conceptual uncertainty as to whether the intervention is meant to be strengthening nodes (i.e. Manchester & Sheffield centres) or hinterlands (Greater Manchester, and particularly Manchester Airport, & South Yorkshire as a whole) introduces uncertainty about the choice of route corridor, and a contradiction about modal choices (rail interventions benefit strengthened city centres; road interventions potentially undermine them.)

6. To be clear: this does not have to involve the considerable complexity of preparing a formal spatial strategy for the North. Instead its purpose would be to elevate the issue of spatial objectives to the top of the NP/TfN agenda; provide foundational background analysis and forecasting; and develop a relatively limited range of spatial scenarios which decision-makers could then use to set overarching spatial objectives and thus steer their top-level strategy, modal preferences, route/corridor choices, and investment programmes.

7. Once this has been done then the process can then move on to the setting of sustainability objectives (by integrating and optimising the balance between economic, social and environmental benefits and disbenefits), and from there make a number of other critical choices including:

- the extent to which carbon reduction should be a formal policy driver for the TfN strategy? We have made repeated representations that it should be (with a quantified reduction target acting as a constraint for the entire intervention programme) and that its absence at present strips the process of credibility.
- how should you achieve agglomeration benefits? Our understanding is that e.g TPT does this by promoting longer journeys by road, rather than shorter journeys by sustainable modes. This overturns previous approaches to increasing sustainability.
- overall preferences as to the type of modal intervention (there was a pronounced and unexplained shift between the One North (July 2014) and NP One Agenda (March 2015) reports in support of road interventions).
8. The above reasons set out our argument for why the developing TfN transport strategy must be deficient unless it is based on evidenced and established spatial and sustainability objectives.
Anthony Rae on behalf of Lillian Burns and Anne Robinson 27th October 2016