Tayside Strategic Co-Ordinating Group

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TAYSIDE STRATEGIC CO-ORDINATING GROUP

Report to SCG Meeting

11 June 2009

Report by – Civil Contingencies Co-ordinator

Subject –A/H1N1 Planning to Manage Wider Consequences

For Discussion and Decision

Abstract – This report provides information on current local A/H1N1 activity and outlines some of the issues to be considered in order to ensure that levels of preparedness are appropriate to respond to amore virulent and widespread phase in the autumn.

1 Introduction

1.1 A national response to A/H1N1 was initiated on 27 April 2009in line with the Scottish Pandemic Framework. Since that time the number of affected countries has risen steadily to 66, the number of cases worldwide to over 20,000 and in Scotland to over 230. In Scotland 11 of those affected are presently hospitalised.

2 Tayside Response

2.1 The A/H1N1 related Tayside SCG met at an early juncture to set the following strategic objectives –

To raise levels of awareness of local and national flu pandemic plans
To co-ordinate and share information locally and nationally
To ensure expedient implementation of measures within the flu pandemic plans in order to:
Prepare proportionately to the risk
Identify and investigate suspect cases
Support national efforts to prevent, detect and slow or limit spread
Treat affected people
Protect, advise and reassure staff and public
Manage consequences whilst retaining public confidence
Minimise potential, health, social and economic impact
To maintain delivery of vital services and utilities

To maintain order

To promote return to normality and recovery at earliest opportunity

2.2 Tayside SCG has sinceprogressed A/H1N1 related work within sub groups dealing specifically with –

Mass fatalities
Community Care
PPE
Schools Guidance
Environmental Cleaning
HR Policies (derogations and new legislation)
Antiviral distribution
Critical supplies
Recovery

2.3 An informal local debrief has also been conducted with those most involved to date and the following points were noted –

What’s worked well?
Partnership generally
Being on the front foot due to Exercise Cauld Craw
Information flows across SCG
Question and answer mechanism

What could be improved?
Collaboration across Scottish Govt (SG) and the SCGs
Regulation of sub groups
Administrative support to sub groups
Resourcing at EPO level
Timescales too demanding
Clearer vision of what fully prepared looks like
Information flow from SG Directorates
Document sharing
Early sight of national policy i.e. social distancing

What further preparation is needed?
Learning from previous experiences
Pandemic plans review
Understanding change involved when moving into command/control phase (WHO 6)

3 Planning to Manage Wider Consequences

3.1 At national level, SG planning activity is now being focussed on how to enhance the state of preparedness on the assumption that there will be a more virulent and widespread phase of the A/H1N1 virus in the autumn. Levels and intensity of this planning activity will be informed by emerging scientific assessment and prognosis.

3.2 From a national (and local) perspective key sectors where pandemic preparedness is vital include –

Critical national infrastructure
Transport
Agriculture and food supply
Economy, business and industry
Emergency services
Education and children’s services
Community care services
Colleges and universities
Justice services

4 Tayside Preparations

4.1 Given the foregoing, Tayside SCG members may wish to consider what further local action is required across these key sectors to enhance preparedness ahead of anticipated deterioration of the situation in the autumn.

4.2 While there is a wide range of activity that can be undertaken, members may wish to balance the known risk against the strategic objective to prepare proportionately to that risk when determining what success would look like in terms of being as well prepared as possible come the autumn.

4.3 Levels of preparation can obviously extend from being content with the current situation to fully reviewing, revising and exercising pandemic plans over the next few months. Members may wish to give a view on how further specific A/H1N1 activity can be best achieved while routine business activity continues alongside.

4.4 In terms of levels of preparedness already declared, members and other agencies have indicated that business continuity arrangements are either complete or well in hand. In view of the need to maintain critical services during a widespread outbreak, members will wish to know that further confirmation of progress towards any enhanced state of preparedness will be requested from SG in June and August.

4.5 Local discussion at working group level has included consideration of impact when key suppliers cannot meet routine obligations. It may be that strategic leads, while formally confirming their organisation’s state of readiness, will wish to include reference to critical supply chains.

4.6 Indication that due consideration has been given to this issue may be regarded as best practice. Again the matter may be reasonably addressed through confirmation from strategic leads on the extent of theirorganisation’s dependence on critical suppliers,accompanied by an assessment of that supplier’s state of readiness and what action is being taken to address any concerns.

5 Recommendation

5.1 Members are asked to –

a)Note the content of this report.

b)Agree what success would like in terms of being prepared for the autumn.

c)Decide how their organisation and critical supplier business continuity arrangements should be confirmed.

d)Reflect on A/H1N1 action taken to date and agree any response or change in arrangements required.

e)Identify challenging issues which may require SG assistance over the next few months.

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