Samantha Hecht and Michelle FleischmanApril 2006
APUSH 9Ms. Fenner
AP Review – History of the Supreme Court
I. Timeline of Cases
Constitution through Civil War
Marbury v. Madison, 1803
McCulloch v. Maryland, 1819
Gibbons v. Ogden, 1824
Worcester v. Georgia, 1832
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 1857
Ex parte Merryman, 1861
Ex parte Milligan, 1866
Reconstruction through World War I
Slaughterhouse Cases, 1873
Munn v. Illinois, 1876
Santa ClaraCounty v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 1886
Wabash v. Illinois, 1886
In re Debs, 1895
United States v. E. C. Knight Co. (“Sugar Trust Case”), 1895
Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896
Lochner v. New York, 1905
Muller v. Oregon, 1908
Between World Wars
Schenck v. United States, 1919
Debs v. United States, 1919
Scopes v. State of Tennessee (“Scopes Monkey Trial”), 1927
Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States (“Sick Chicken Case”), 1935
World War II through Civil Rights Era
Korematsu v. United States, 1944
Ex parte Endo, 1944
Sweatt v. Painter, 1950
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 1954
Mapp v. Ohio, 1961
Gideon v. Wainwright, 1963
Miranda v. Arizona, 1966
End of Civil Rights Era to Present
Tinker v. Des MoinesIndependentCommunitySchool District, 1969
New York Times v. United States, 1971
Roe v. Wade, 1973
United States v. Nixon, 1974
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 1978
Plyler v. Doe, 1982
Bush v. Gore, 2000
II. Cases by Subject Matter
Powers of states and of the federal government and its branches
Marbury v. Madison, 1803
McCulloch v. Maryland, 1819
Gibbons v. Ogden, 1824
Worcester v. Georgia, 1832
Ex parte Merryman, 1861
Ex parte Milligan, 1866
Wabash v. Illinois, 1886
United States v. Nixon, 1974
Bush v. Gore, 2000
Civil Rights
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 1857
Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896
Korematsu v. United States, 1944
Ex parte Endo, 1944
Sweatt v. Painter, 1950
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 1954
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 1978
Business
Slaughterhouse Cases, 1873
Santa ClaraCounty v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 1886
United States v. E. C. Knight Co. (“Sugar Trust Case”), 1895
Labor Laws
In re Debs, 1895
Lochner v. New York, 1905
Muller v. Oregon, 1908
Freedoms
Schenck v. United States, 1919
Debs v. United States, 1919
Scopes v. State of Tennessee (“Scopes Monkey Trial”), 1927
Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States (“Sick Chicken Case”), 1935
Tinker v. Des MoinesIndependentCommunitySchool District, 1969
New York Times v. United States, 1971
Rights
Mapp v. Ohio, 1961
Gideon v. Wainwright, 1963
Miranda v. Arizona, 1966
Roe v. Wade, 1973
Plyler v. Doe, 1982
III. Influential Chief Justices
Marshall Court under Chief Justice John Marshall, 1801 – 1835
- Established the doctrine of judicial review (notably Marbury v. Madison)
- Affirmed federal supremacy over state governments
- Revolutionized decision-making manner of court (delivered majority opinions)
Warren Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren, 1953 – 1969
- Removed segregation from public schools in Brown v. Board of Education
- Gave Mexican-Americans the right to serve on juries in Hernandez v. Texas
- Established arrest procedure in Miranda v. Arizona
- Warren Commission for investigation of the assassination of JFK
IV. Significant Supreme Court Cases
Marbury v. Madison, 1803 (Chief Justice John Marshall)
Background: William Marbury was appointed to the Supreme Court by John Adams, and after the change of administration, Thomas Jefferson ordered new secretary of state James Madison not to deliver Marbury’s commission papers. Marbury applied for a writ of mandamus, authorized by the Judiciary Act of 1789, demanding the delivery of his papers.
Constitutional Questions: Did Marbury have a right to his commission? If so, was he entitled to some remedy under U.S. law? Was that remedy a writ from the Supreme Court?
Decisions: An appointment is effective once its commission is signed and sealed. According to the legal principle that where a right exists, a corresponding remedy for violation of that right must also exist, Marbury was entitled to a remedy. A writ from the Supreme Court was the correct remedy because Marbury had no other course of action open. Marshall also ruled the Judiciary Act unconstitutional because it gave the Court original jurisdiction necessary to issue a writ of mandamus, and the Constitution gives Congress no power to increase original jurisdiction.
Precedent: Marbury v. Madison declared the Supreme Court the final judge of constitutionality—the principle of judicial review.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 1819 (Chief Justice John Marshall)
Background: Maryland passed a law that placed a significant tax on the operations of the Baltimore branch of the Second Bank of the United States (created in 1816). Bank cashier James McCulloch issued bank notes without paying this tax and appealed to the Supreme Court after the Maryland court ruled against him.
Constitutional Questions: Is Congress permitted to charter a bank? Does a state have the power to tax a federally established institution?
Decisions: Congress does have power to charter a bank because that is a power necessary to carry out powers specified in the Constitution. Marshall acknowledged states’ right to tax institutions, but declared federal agencies to be outside this reach and protected from taxation.
Precedent: Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress has the right to take actions necessary to carry out its powers specified in the Constitution—these are its implied powers.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 1824 (Chief Justice John Marshall)
Background: The State of New York licensed New Jersey steamboat operator Aaron Ogden to operate a ferry between the two states. Ogden obtained an injunction against Thomas Gibbons, operator of a competing ferry service that had been licensed under regulation of coastal trade, maintaining that navigation was a form of commerce and could thus be regulated by states.
Constitutional Question: Can interstate navigation be regulated by states?
Decision: Under the Commerce Clause, only Congress can regulate interstate navigation.
Precedent: Congress has power to regulate all aspects of commerce (overrode state laws).
Worcester v. Georgia, 1832 (Chief Justice John Marshall)
Background: In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 1831, the Marshall Court had ruled that Native American tribes did not have the status of foreign nations (and instead were “domestic dependent nations”). Under this ruling, Georgia attempted to extend control over the Cherokees in its territory.
Constitutional Question: Do states have authority in Native American affairs?
Decision: The Cherokees were ruled to be an autonomous, defined community in which the federal government, but not individual states, has authority.
Precedent: States were no longer permitted to redraw territorial boundaries of Native American lands or forbid residence there, because Congress has the sole authority to regulate affairs in Native American communities.
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 1857 (Chief Justice Roger Taney)
Background: Dred Scott, a slave from Missouri, was taken to the WisconsinTerritory, a free territory under the Missouri Compromise. Scott believed that this ended his slavery and sued for his freedom when his owners refused to stop hiring him out for labor.
Constitutional Questions: Who was responsible for declaring state citizenship, and was Scott a citizen? Was he a free man?
Decision: Under Article III of the Constitution, only the federal government is authorized to grant or withdraw state citizenship. When Article III had been written, African Americans were not considered citizens, so therefore Scott was not a citizen. Even though the Missouri Compromise would have made Scott a free man, the Court declared that under the 5th Amendment, Congress had no power to outlaw slavery. Thus slaves were property, and Scott was a slave.
Precedent: The Missouri Compromise was declared unconstitutional, only the second time an act of Congress was so found by the Supreme Court. The decision of Scott v. Sanford is seen as an extension of the pressure to expand American slavery.
Ex parte Merryman, 1861 (Chief Justice Roger Taney)
Background: In the months after firing on FortSumter, President Lincoln found it necessary to send reinforcement troops to the Washington, D.C. area and suspend the right to a writ of habeas corpus within the “military line.” Many Confederate officials were arrested without stated charges. Lieutenant John Merryman, among them, filed for a writ of habeas corpus to be released from arbitrary imprisonment.
Constitutional Questions: Is the President allowed to suspend a writ of habeas corpus?
Decision: Taney delivered his opinion that Lincoln was wrong with impressive force. He likened Lincoln’s actions to those of English monarchs, removing the President’s power to suspend writs of habeas corpus.
Precedent: Only Congress is allowed to suspend writs of habeas corpus. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 formally disallowed the President’s power, and Taney’s opinion was restated in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2004.
Ex parte Milligan, 1866 (Chief Justice Salmon Chase)
Background: Lambdin Milligan and four other men were accused of plotting to steal Union weapons and invade POW camps. In 1864 a military court sentenced Milligan and his cohorts to death by hanging, but set their execution to May 1865. They were thus able to argue their case after the Civil War was over.
Constitutional Question: Is suspension of habeas corpus constitutional, and if so, when?
Decision: Suspension of habeas corpus is constitutional only when civilian courts have been forced closed (i.e. during times of war). The decision, although it provided for suspension of habeas corpus when only military courts are in operation, specifies that citizens may be held but not tried without charges.
Precedent: As an extension of the decision, the Supreme Court held that the President’s power to suspend habeas corpus in wartime does not extend to the creation of an entire military court system.
Slaughterhouse Cases, 1873 (Chief Justice Salmon Chase)
Background: Twenty-five New Orleans butchers, truckers, and slaughterhouse employees filed attempts to stop the creation of a new corporation in the slaughterhouse business. Lower courts ruled in favor of the corporation, and five cases appealed to the Supreme Court.
Constitutional Questions: Did the 14th Amendment apply to corporations? Based on the due process, privileges and immunities, and equal protection clauses in the amendment, was the corporation constitutional?
Decision: In a narrow interpretation of the 14th Amendment, the Court ruled that it did not restrict the “police powers” of states: the Privileges and Immunities clause only affects rights of national citizenship and not state citizenship. Therefore, the corporation was constitutional and did not violate the butchers’ 14th Amendment rights. The Court held that the amendment was intended to protect former slaves and thus should not be broadly applied.
Precedent: The Slaughterhouse Cases became material for some conspiracy theories regarding the extent of government powers because they involve dual citizenship.
Munn v. Illinois, 1876 (Chief Justice Morrison Waite)
Background: During the industrial revolution of the late 1800s, many states established bureaus and commissions to regulate the new industrial society, especially concerning railroads. Illinois, in response to local merchants upset by railroad rate policies, state declared railroads to be public property and authorized the state legislature to pass laws establishing rates and eliminating rate discrimination. The Munn & Scott railroad company appealed to the Supreme Court.
Constitutional Questions: Are commercial institutions (i.e. railroads) public property? Can private companies be regulated by states under the 14th Amendment?
Decision: The Court held that railroads are public property. Regarding the 14th Amendment, it saw the private company Munn & Scott as a utility operating in the public interest, and could thus be regulated by the public interest (state legislature).
Precedent: States can regulate commerce.
Santa ClaraCounty v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 1886 (Chief Justice Morrison Waite)
Background: The Southern Pacific Railroad Company refused to pay a tax on its franchise, roadways, fences, and rolling stock assessed by the California Board of Equalization. Santa ClaraCounty brought in an action to state court to recover the unpaid taxes. The California state court ruled in favor of the railroad that the tax was void because the board did not have jurisdiction. The railroad had been denied equal protection of the law because a private corporation was seen as a person under the 14th Amendment and the tax had been calculated at full monetary value without the discount given to private property owners. The county filed a writ of error to the Supreme Court.
Constitutional Questions: Did the state board have jurisdiction over the railroad? Was the tax constitutional?
Decision: The Supreme Court agreed that the board did not have the jurisdiction to assess the tax. In the California Constitution, fences, specifically, are part of “land, and improvements thereon” and thus constituted a separate tax assessment. The Supreme Court decided that since part of the assessment was illegal, it did not support the county’s request for the entire tax, and ruled in favor of the railroad.
Precedent: Although the 14th Amendment is not specifically mentioned in the Court’s opinion, the Santa ClaraCountydecision supported the principle that corporations are people and thus entitled to equal protection under the amendment.
Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Co. v. Illinois, 1886 (Chief Justice Morrison Waite)
Background: Illinois law penalized railroads that charged more money for passengers or freight shipped shorter distances than for longer distances. This statute was intended to avoid discrimination against small towns not served by competing rail lines and was applied to intrastate sections of interstate railroads. The railroad company in question charged more for goods shipped from Gilman, Illinois to NYC than from Peoria, Illinois when Gilman was 86 miles closer to NYC.
Constitutional Question: Does a state have power to regulate intrastate portions of interstate commerce?
Decision: The Supreme Court found the Illinois statute invalid, declaring that Congress has exclusive power to regulate interstate railroad rates. States are only allowed to regulate commerce within their borders.
Precedent: As a result of the decision, Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act (1887), which created the Interstate Commerce Commission to investigate and oversee railroad activities. The decision also greatly strengthened the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
In re Debs, 1895 (Chief Justice Melville Fuller)
Background: Eugene V. Debs, president of the American Railroad Union, was involved in the Pullman Strike in 1894. A federal injunction had ordered the strikers back to work because of the interference with U.S. postal services. Debs refused to end the strike and was cited for contempt of court; he appealed the decision.
Constitutional Question: Did the federal government have the right to issue the injunction, considering that it dealt with both intra- and interstate commerce?
Decision: The Court ruled unanimously in favor of the federal government, declaring that it had a right to regulate interstate commerce (and thus to issue the injunction), guarantee the operation of the postal service, and “responsibility to ensure the general welfare of the public.”
Precedent: In re Debs reinforced the Wabash decision that the federal government has the exclusive right to regulate interstate commerce.
United States v. E. C. Knight Co. “Sugar Trust Case,” 1895 (Chief Justice Melville Fuller)
Background: The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 attempted to control monopolies. Its provisions outlawed all trade agreements or combinations that restricted trade between states or with other countries. The E. C. Knight Company acquired nearly all of the sugar-producing capacity in the U.S., and the government wanted to destroy this monopoly.
Constitutional Question: Does the Sherman Antitrust Act apply to monopolies in the manufacturing and distribution of a good?
Decision: The Court ruled in favor of E. C. Knight Company and held that the Sherman Antitrust Act did not apply to its case because it did not involve commerce.
Precedent: Under the decision, action against manufacturing monopolies had to be taken by states, making regulation difficult. The E. C. Knight precedent was eventually narrowed to its particular facts and thus held no sway over new cases.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896 (Chief Justice Melville Fuller)
Background: After the end of Reconstruction in 1877, southern states passed Jim Crow laws that prohibited African Americans from using the same public facilities as whites. In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court had ruled that the 14th Amendment applied only to the actions of state government, and thus did not protect African Americans whose rights were violated by individuals and private business owners. Louisiana passed a law in 1890 requiring separate accommodations for the races, including separate railroad cars. Citizens attempting the repeal of this law persuaded Homer Plessy, one-eighth black, to buy a first-class ticket and refuse to move after he informed the conductor of his lineage. Plessy was arrested and appealed on the grounds that his “privileges and immunities” of equal protection had been abridged.
Constitutional Question: Are “separate but equal” public facilities constitutional?
Decision: The Court upheld the Louisiana statute, ruling that “separate but equal” accommodations are constitutional. The Court also rejected the claim of Plessy’s lawyer Albion Tourgée that the statute implied inferiority of African Americans and was as such a violation of the 14th Amendment: it held that instead, the law was merely a separation of the races as a matter of social policy.
Precedent: The Plessy decision was the legal foundation for de jure “separate but equal” doctrine, and it provided for further segregation laws.
Lochner v. New York, 1905 (Chief Justice Melville Fuller)
Background: New YorkState’s 1895 Bakeshop Act limited bakery work to 10 hours per day or 60 per week. Bakery owner Joseph Lochner was fined $25 for overworking an employee in 1899, and $50 for a second offense in 1901. Lochner appealed his second conviction.
Constitutional Question: Was New York’s ten-hour bakeshop workday limit constitutional?
Decision: The Court decided in Lochner’s favor, ruling that although the New York law had been intended as a health measure, it was not a legitimate exercise of the state’s acknowledged “police powers” of the due process clause in the 14th Amendment. The decision stated that the 14th Amendment protects an individual’s rights in business contracts.