Russian IR Theory: The Сrisis of a Globally-Pluralist Discipline
By Andrei Tsygankov, San Francisco State University
Pavel Tsygankov, Moscow State University
In European Review of International Studies
“Inevitably, we leave our national footprint on everything that we do.”
Vladimir Solovyev[1]
Abstract
The article contributes to the recent discussion of roles played by the global core and periphery in forming knowledge about the world. As a “semi-peripheral” nation,Russia may speak on behalf of both the center and peripheral parts of the world,therebybecoming an important voice in the global conversation. This paper reviews discussions among Russian scholars by identifying the dominant schools as Universalist and Pluralist. Both are in favor of Russia’s continued integration with the global IR community, but stress different sides of such integration. While Universalists argue for theontological and epistemological unity of the world, Pluralists emphasize social, cultural, and intellectual diversity. Based on a survey among those teaching IR theory in Russian educational institutions, the paper also reviews development of the discipline as viewed by the Russian academic community. Russian academics assess the state of IR theory as in crisis relative to intellectual developments in the country’s recent past and abroad. The progress of Russian IR depends on its continued global integration and the development of indigenous Russian political thought.
1. Introduction
Knowledge and power are intimately connected: knowledge informs power, and power shapes knowledge. As the world movesaway from the U.S. political hegemony, the global scholarship on international relations too reflects a greater cultural diversity. The recent attempts by International Relations scholars to create room for knowledge from the perspective of the “non-American” and “non-Western” periphery[2] have implications for Western, particularly American, intellectual hegemony. While inviting a dialogue across the globe, new voices from Asia, Africa, and Latin America are challenging the position of the West’s ideological and cultural dominance. The increasingly multipolar world may be becoming multicultural as well.
The (re)emergence of discussion in International Relations theory on roles played by the global core and periphery in forming knowledge about the world raises important questions about the potential of “non-Western” cultures to contribute to global academic developments. If the world is indeed movingaway from the U.S. political and intellectual hegemony, what role would local cultures have in knowledge formation? What happens to the assumptions about world’s ontological and epistemological unity when othersenter the field of discussion, each with their own special assumptions and suppositions? Should the U.S.- and West-centered discipline of IR be overturned by developing periphery-based approaches, or there is a way to build a common and non-hegemonic standard of theorizing? What criteria of progress in IR should be employed? If more room is to be given to indigenous cultural and political theory, how will it affect the traditional disciplinary boundaries of IR? Ifa globalized discipline of IR is possible, what might be the global conditions to sustain it?
Russia presents an interesting casethat has the potential to improve our understanding of the described themes. A “semi-peripheral” economy,[3] a geopolitical borderland located between Western and non-Western countries,[4] and a culture with special relations with Europe, Asia and the Muslim region,[5] Russia may speak on behalf of both the centraland peripheral parts of the world. It is therefore well positioned to represent and articulate various sides of the debate, thereby serving as an important voice in the global theoretical conversation. However, a number of questions must be asked about Russian IR’s ability to become such a voice. What is the distinct contribution of Russian IR approaches? Do they resonate within the larger international audience and have the potential to expand the horizons of the global discipline? Is Russian IR sufficiently independent from Western, particularly American knowledge? From this perspective, are Russian claims to a power pole substantive? Which issues do Russian scholars address with particular vigor and creativity? Which historical memories, traditions, and ideologies are especially important in understanding the structure and the dynamics of Russian IR? Finally: is there a Russian school of IR?
This paper attempts to address three aspects of IR developments in Russia. First, we review discussions among Russian scholars and argue that after the Soviet disintegration the new IR community in the country has made important progress in adapting to the global academic world and defeating previously strong voices of isolationism. The dominant currents in today’s Russia can be described as Universalist and Pluralist. Both are in favor of Russia’s continued integration within the global IR community, but stress different sides of such integration. While Universalists argue for the ontological and epistemological unity of the world, Pluralists emphasize social, cultural, and intellectual diversity. Second, we review the self-perceived state of affairs in the Russian academic community based on a survey of IR theory taught across the country’s educational institutions. Russian IR is a highly eclectic mix of local and Western approaches to post-Cold War realities. We find that Russian academics are dissatisfied with the state of IR theory and are beginning to reassess the twenty-five years that have passed since the end of the Cold War. They describe development in the field with alarm,characterizing it as a crisis in comparison to Russia’s own history and developments abroad.Third, we analyze ways forward for Russian IR theory, both as perceived by experts and based on our own understanding of its crisis. In particular, we argue that progress of Russian IR depends on simultaneouslymeeting two challenges: continued global integration and the development of Russian indigenous political thought.
The article is structured as follows. We first describe the state of Russian IR theory by locating it within the discussion on the “Western” core/non-“Western” periphery and proposing a typology of main currents in the Russian academia. We then proceed to discuss the notion of the crisis of Russian IR theory as defined by members of Russian academia and explained by its various currents. Following this is our discussion of possible ways out of the perceived crisis, in particular whether Russia should aim to establish its own school within the global community of IR scholars. The conclusion summarizes the article’s key points and offers final reflections on the contemporary and future development of Russian IR theory.
2. IR Theory: Global or Parochial?
Scholars of international relations and comparative politics have long established that Western social science is frequently biased and, upon a close scrutiny, reveals intellectual assumptions and political preferences of those residing in the West.[6]IR scholars have referred to American mainstream approaches as “parochial”,[7] not global, and attempted to address theirethnocentric biases by proposing to take seriously various insights of “non-Western” thinkers in post-colonial studies. In particular, post-colonial scholarship proposes that IR theory must offer a reciprocal engagement with the Other,rather than merely expect it to follow the West’s lead. In contrast to eeeeeedsdthnocentrism and treatment of “non-Western” theorists as dependent subjects (“subalterns”) and consumers of the already developed knowledge, production of a more global knowledge requires defining the Self and its moral values as something open to negotiation, rather than absolute, exclusive, and essentialist; and viewing the Other as different, but morally equal and, for that reason, as a source of potential learning.[8]In practical terms, such an approach would promote negotiations to establish mutually acceptable norms and reduce space for hegemonic actions.
Post-colonial thinking has made room for the active promotion of pluralist approaches in IR beyond the traditional Western cannon. Arlene Tickner, Ole Weaver, and David Blaney, who teach in Latin America, Europe, and the United States, respectively, initiated a series of books on IR theory as viewed from the global periphery.[9]HelenePelerineeditedavolumefor French-speakingaudiencesdevoted toovercoming Anglo-American bias in IR.[10]JohnHobsonpublishedanimportantbook that analyzesthe colonial Eurocentric underpinnings of Western IR theories.[11]IRtheoristsarealso increasinglyinterestedinproblemsofcivilization, civilizational identity and their impact on the formation of different worldviews.[12]
Those critical of the idea of global pluralism within IR knowledge expresstheir concern about the field’s coherence. To preserve such coherence, they recommend basing scholarship on the notion of rationality and universal scientific standards. Western realists and liberals tend to view such standards as reflecting the ontological unity of the global world withprescribed principles of behavior and procedures to resolve disputes among states. While liberals emphasize the importance of international institutions, realists continue to highlight the military-economic dimension of the world order,with some favoring the leading role of the United States in preserving the West-favored international balance of power.[13]However, bothrealists and liberals are convinced that the ontological unity of the world assumes a commitment tocertain epistemological and scholarly standards. As a result, these scholars viewattempts by non-Western cultures to create their own schools of IR as unsustainable and even prone to self-marginalization because such ambitions are perceived as questioning the established universal principles of scientific knowledge (analysis, verification, falsifiability, and others). For example, the American scholar Jack Snyder expressed his readiness to study Confucianist thought for an understanding Chinese strategic culture, while refusing to consider Confucianism as a legitimate philosophical foundation behind a special Chinese school of IR.[14]
Challenging the identified pluralist voices are not only Western rationalists, namely liberals and realists, but also some representatives of post-structural IR theory. Despite being critical of West-centered IR, these post-structuralist scholars support some commonly agreed principles of research and express reservations about special schools in IR or even the idea of dialogue between “Western” and “non-Western” approaches.[15]For instance, according to the British scholar Kymberly Hutchins, the very juxtaposition of “Western” and “non-Western” excludes the possibility of a dialogue and may result in endless mutual criticisms and reinforced parochialism.[16]
As with other discussions in social sciences, the “Western/non-Western” debate is difficult to understand without analyzing its social and political underpinnings. This theoretical debate is taking place against the backdrop of rapidly changing practices of international relations that challenge the idea of universal knowledge and common behavioral standards. Withoutthe declineoftheAmerican and, more broadly, Western hegemony, this debate might have not taken place. The West’s ability to project global power is now challenged in some principal ways. The Russia-Georgia war of August 2008 undermined the United States and Europe’s monopoly on the use of force in world politics; and the global financial meltdown revealed the West’s economic vulnerability. During September-October 2013, Russia and other non-Westernpowers greatly contributed to preventing the United States from using force in Syria.Some European nations, including Germany, Great Britain, and others,also did not support use of force.
In Russian IR, the global-parochial controversy yields three theoretical approaches or intellectual trends, each emphasizing different sides of the debate. First, there are Universalists whose position corresponds with the above-described views favoring IR as a global discipline with clearly established and universally shared scientific standards. Critical of Russian international studies, Universalists find Russian IR to be parochial and not integrated with global research. Themajorityofthemisconvincedthatthe global integration is largely ahead of Russian IR and that only such integration may preserve Russia from isolationism and self-marginalization. Even those who argue that Russia generally completed the process of adapting to global science after the Soviet breakup find that Russian IR lacks the genuine diversity or richness of discussion necessary for theoretical progress and remains under the heavy influence of realist and geopolitical approaches.[17]Not surprisingly, Universalists do not favor the idea of creating Russian school of IR and view such attempts as excessively ambitious, prone to isolationism and the ideological suppression of scientific independence.[18]
The second visible intellectual trend is Isolationism. Although the post-Soviet developments considerably weakened this trend within academia, Isolationism remains influential among some politicians and in the larger cultural community that includes writers, experts, and media circles. Isolationists are convinced that Russia has everything it needs for its intellectual development and only lacks state ideological guidance. To a degree, isolationism has developed in response to Westernization. Western knowledge, with its parochial issues and epistemological biases, may indeed invite rejections and even hostilities. But Isolationism––a refusal to learn from the "other"––also has deep roots in Russia's own superiority/inferiority complex. During the Soviet era, the official Marxism assumed the mantle” of speaking on behalf of the "most progressive social class" and therefore, by definition, knowing the "Truth". Post-Soviet IR, alas, is not free from Isolationism either.[19]Interestingly enough, while proclaiming that Western post-structuralist approaches are alien to Russia’s indigenous values, Isolationists nevertheless borrow from Western traditional geopolitical theories. For example, the recent text by Alexander Dugin, the founder of neo-Eurasianistschool within Russian geopolitical thought, demonstrates knowledge of various IR approaches, but in constructing a theory of a multipolar world itrelies on Carl Schmitt, Samuel Huntington, and other traditional geopolitically-minded thinkers.[20]
Finally, there are Pluralists who advocate a culturally sensitive integration and a sustained dialogue with the global IR community. This intellectual trend is increasingly powerful and shapes Russian IR discourse by taking issue with Universalists as well as those falling into the Isolationist camp. Pluralists support Russia’s integration and dialogue with the global IR community, but they also argue for the mobilization of indigenous intellectual capital as a necessary condition of such integration. In particular, for the purpose of bringing the “Russianness” out, some Pluralists advocate a stronger interaction of Russian IR theorists with those specializing in Russian political philosophy.[21]They see the weakness of Russian IR not only in its insufficient integration with global developments, but also in its lack of knowledge of Russia’s own intellectual roots. Russia has left behind Soviet Marxism but has not yet developed a new framework for the growth of academic knowledge. Because of the latter, Pluralists argue, Russian IRis frequently caught in ideological confrontation between Universalists and Isolationists with little space for productive discussion. The main assumptions of the two approaches are simply too difficult to reconcile. While Universalists hold the potential of underestimating the indigenous intellectual tradition, Isolationists respond to the excesses of Universalism and call for Russia's autarchic intellectual development, thereby depriving Russian IR of opportunities to learn from foreign cultures and social sciences.
3. The Crisis of Russian IR
During the more than twenty years of post-Soviet development, Russian IR has come a long way by introducing a number of fruitful approaches and theories for understanding the international system and state foreign policy. Instead of one dominant worldview, as it was with the officially-sanctioned Marxism of the past, a variety of new schools have emerged and begun to develop. During the post-communist period, Russian IR has built a relevant academic infrastructure by way of establishing scholarly associations, specialized journals, and venues for preparing and defending dissertations in the field of international relations. In particular, the Russian Association of International Relations has been established and conducts annual meetings with the participation of several hundred members from various regions of Russia and beyond. IR-related sections or committees have also been functioning within other social science conferences such as the Russian Political Science Association, Russian Sociological Association, and the like. Dissertations on various subjects of international studies have been defended not only in Moscow and St. Petersburg, but also in Ekaterinburg, Nizhni Novgorod, Kazan’ and other cities of the country. In addition to several established social science journals, a specialized journal of IR theory (Mezhdunarodnyyeprotsessy: Zhurnalteoriyimezhdunaronykhotnosheniy, or International Trends: Journal of thetheory of international relations) has been published since the 1990s. Although Russian scholars occasionally approach IR from the perspective of of other social sciences such as of History, Philosophy, or Sociology,[22] the trend of developing IR theory within specialized departments has grown stronger. Most specialists in Russian IR agree that its most important formative stage is now behind it and that Russian international studies have established themselves as an important scholarly discipline and teaching subject in educational institutions.[23]
At the same time, new serious problems have appeared that complicate the further development of Russian IR theory (RIRT). Many Russian scholars specializing in IR are no longer satisfied with merely consuming the knowledge as developed by their foreign colleagues. Increasingly, their standards for developing Russian IR include global visibility and independent thinking. In our survey conducted among those teaching IR theory in Russian universities,[24] we asked the respondents to assess the state of RIRT relative to its development in the 1990s and in comparison with foreign/Western countries. In particular, we asked them to choose among the categories of “successful development”, “crisis”, and “overcoming crisis,” or propose a classification of their own. Their answers are summarized in table 1.
Relative to the 1990s, only 10% of respondents assess the state of RIRT as a “successful development.” Most common assessment was that of a “crisis” supported by 50% of the experts. Some of them qualified their assessment using characteristics such as “no accomplishments and no failures”; “nothing original is created”; “the existing results are not visible abroad”; and even “a backward movement relative to the early 2000s”. Anothergroup (23%) assessesRussian IR as “overcoming its crisis.” Some of those who endorsed such categorization clarified their assessment with characteristics close to those of a crisis state – “sluggish development,” “stagnation”, or “reproduction of old stereotypes”. Others preferred characteristics such as “beginning of movement out of the crisis”, “stabilization”, and “beginning of development”. Still another group of respondents, around 17%, presented their own categorization using definitions such as “slow progress” and “accumulation of potential for development.”