Document version: 24 May 2005

ORGANISATIONS PARTICIPATING IN CONSOLIDATED APPEALS DURING 2005:
AAH
ABS
ACF/ACH
ACTED
ADRA
Africare
Alisei
AMREF
ARC
Atlas Logistique
AVSI
CAM
CARE Int'l
CARITAS
CEASOP
CESVI
CIRID
COLFADHEMA
COMED
COOPI
CORDAID / CPA-LIRA
CPAR
CPCD
CRC
CREAF
CRS
DDG
DENAL
DRC
EMSF
ERM
FAO
Fondn. Suisse Déminage
GAA
GPI
HA
HABEN
Handicap Int'l
HDIG
HDO
HFe.V / HIA
Horn Relief
HWA
IFRC
ILO
IMC
INTERMON
INTERSOS
IOM
IRC
IRIN
Islamic Relief
JVSF
KOC
LIBA
LSTG
MAG
Mani Tese
MAT
MDA
NE / Non-Violence Int'l
NPA
NRC
OCHA
OCPH
OHCHR
Open Continent
Orphan's Aid
OXFAM-GB
PAPP
PIN
PRC
RUFOU
SBF
SCF / SC-UK
SCU
SERLO
SFP
Solidarités
TASO
TEARFUND / TEWPA
UNAIDS
UNDP
UNESCO
UNFPA
UN-HABITAT
UNHCR
UNICEF
UNIFEM
UNMAS
UNODC
UNRWA
UNSECOORD
VESTA
VETAID
WACRO
WANEP/APDH
WFP
WHO
WV Int'l

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The 2005 Common Humanitarian Action Plan

1.Changes in the Situation

1.1.Locust Invasion

1.2Food security

1.3Population Movements

1.4Impact of Sub Regional Instability

2.Most Likely Scenarios

2.1Desert Locust Situation

2.2Political Instability in the Region

3.Strategic Priorities for Humanitarian Response

The figures for funding requirements in this document are valid as of 11 March 2005. Project budgets and requirements normally change during the course of the year. For the latest figures, see the Financial Tracking Service on:

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1

WEST AFRICA

REVISION

In view ofsignificant effects of the Desert Locust invasion in West Africa during the second half of 2004 and the change in the political/security situation within the region since the development of the United Nations (UN) Consolidated Appeal 2005 (CA), UN Regional Representatives and Non-governmental Organization (NGO) partners as well as other humanitarian partners decided to review the situation analysis provided in the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) for 2005 and to prepare a supplementary chapter (addendum) for the Regional Appeal.

The Addendum includes projects that aim to mitigate the damage caused by the Desert Locusts and to ameliorate the food security situation for the affected populations, many of whom have lost their harvest, pasture and have had their livelihoods seriously affected.

As humanitarian concerns and priorities for humanitarian response and the sector response plans remain essentially the same, the CAP was not completely revised.

The 2005 Common Humanitarian Action Plan

1.Changes in the Situation

1.1.Locust Invasion

The Desert Locust invasion that was witnessed across the northern and western part of Africa as well as the Middle East represents the worst scourge registered in 15 years. Since the beginning of the infestation in October 2003, a total surface area of nearly 13 million hectares has been treated with pesticides.

Swarms initially formed in small outbreak areas in Mauritania, Mali and Niger and invaded Northwest Africa (the Maghreb region) where they bred during the spring of 2004, giving rise to a new generation of swarms that invaded ten countries in West Africa in the summer of 2004. Mauritania, Senegal, Mali and Niger were the most affected countries but Burkina Faso, Cap Verde, Chad, the Gambia, Guinea Bissau and Guinea also faced the consequences of theI invasion. Of the estimated 3.5 million hectares[1] that were probably infested with Desert Locusts in West Africa, some 2.5 million hectares were treated with pesticides by the end of 2004. Most of the locust swarms subsequently left the Sahel region for their spring breeding grounds in the Maghreb, from where they are expected to return in the summer of 2005, albeit on a much smaller scale than in 2004. A smaller portion of immature swarms have remained in the Gulf of Guinea states in the southwestern part of the region.

The rapid deterioration of the Desert Locust situation in the region in 2003-2004 can be explained partly by the favourable breeding conditions and partly by the minimal preparedness as well as response mechanisms in place to deal with the outbreak and treatment of the pests nationally and within a regional framework. The response has been hampered by obsolete equipment, limited stock of pesticides, a lack of contingency plans and reduced knowledge and capacity to treat the menace. The countries affected have likewise been slow in acknowledging the extent of the crisis and the donor community was slow in contributing with financial support needed to fight the Desert Locusts in the initial stages of the invasion[2].

While the various governments on the whole have succeeded in protecting the national food baskets of the affected countries with assistance of the international community, the weak capacity to undertake community level surveillance and control in the early stages and the delay in initiating large scale control interventions led to failure in curbing the locust invasion and had a serious impact on the rural and poorer populations.

1.2Food security

The humanitarian impact of the Desert Locust has been very uneven throughout the region. While Mauritania and Niger have been seriously affected, Mali and Burkina Faso have isolated geographical pockets are also facing severe food shortages in the coming year as a combined result of the Desert Locust, the low rainfall and subsequent drought.

The effects of the Desert Locusts have been most severe in communities, whose fields and grasslands were infested by the insects, adding pressure on their limited coping mechanisms and increasing their vulnerability. As a consequence their food security has been reduced significantly.

For the Sahel region, it is estimated that a total of 9,366,804 million people (equivalent to 1,461,632 households[3]) have been negatively affected by the combined impact of the locust upsurge and reduced rainfall. In the zones where the insects have attacked the crops and pastures, the price of cereal has increased while the price of livestock has fallen due to the distress sales by pastoralists and agro-pastoralists, who can no longer feed their herds, and who face rising food prices.

In Mauritania the cereal production has fallen by 44% compared with the 2003 harvest, and 36% compared with the average for the last five years. The country is moving towards a food crisis that will be worse than the one experienced in 2002/2003. It has been estimated that 60% of the households are food insecure or highly vulnerable to food insecurity.

Despite the fact that the cereal production in Mali has been higher than the average over the last 5 years, it is less than last year’s bumper harvest. Nevertheless in the areas infested pasture land has been destroyed and there have been large crop losses and the food situation has become precarious. Approximately 1.7 million poor farmers in 130 communities have been affected by the locusts and uneven rain during the year.

In Niger the net cereal production has been severely reduced by the locust infestations and drought. It has been estimated that the losses account for a 26% reduction in the most affected regions and 7% loss at the national level. More than 3.5 million people living in more than 3000 villages have been identified as extremely vulnerable to food insecurity.

Burkina Faso has experienced a reasonable harvest at national level, but some northern regions bordering Mali have had their millet crops completely wiped out by locusts, which have also destroyed up to 80% of pasture in the districts. Almost 3 million persons have been affected.

Finally the effects of the Desert Locust invasion, currently affecting Guinea Bissau and Guinea are still to be evaluated. Serious damage on the cashew nut trees that currently are in flower could impact on the livelihood of the majority of the rural population, and also impact the national economy as it generates a large part of the country’s export earnings.

1.3Population Movements

Furthermore, as a consequence of the shortage of food and pasture, the seasonal transhumance has been advanced by several months, putting nomads on collision course with sedentary farmers and creating conflicts among herders over scarce water and pasture resources. Young men have also been registered leaving the villages earlier than normal to seek work in the cities of the West African region and the countries on the coast. There is even evidence of a rural exodus as whole villages have been deserted to swell the ranks of the urban destitute. These migration flows contribute to the existing social tensions and confrontations between ethnic tribes, already struggling with chronic poverty and hardship.

1.4Impact of Sub Regional Instability

The renewed fighting in Cote d’Ivoire also played a major role for the humanitarian partners to revisit the CHAP for West Africa due to the possible humanitarian implications for the neighbouring countries and the whole sub-region.

The situation in the country has developed into a political deadlock between the parties to the conflict, de facto dividing the country into two. No significant progress has been made in the peace process and the security situation continues to deteriorate. Increased inter-intra ethnic clashes in the West have been reported and harassment of civilians and humanitarian aid workers in the West and North particularly within the confidence zone has been registered. Attempts made by the African Union and President Thabo Mbeki from South Africa have not made any viable advance towards reinvigorating the peace process. With lack of clean solutions to the crisis one cannot rule out the resumption of armed hostilities with possible population movements in CDI.(See also: Côte d’Ivoire CAP 2005)

The instability in Cote d’Ivoire could have important implications for the West African region, and shows the lack of national cohesion, progress in nation building, reconstruction and reconciliation that many war torn post-conflict West African countries face. The spill over of small arms and combatants that continues to affect the country and region could lead to a further destabilisation of the situation in Liberia, Guinea/Guinea Forestière as well as Guinea Bissau.

The political and economic situation in Guinea has steadily declined over the last year and the country could become the next in the sub region to be plunged into open conflict. Shots fired on the President Conte’s motorcade in January 2005 form part of the latest expression of discontent by the country’s population who over the last year has staged a number of strikes against increased food and fuel prices. The political dialogue between the President and the opposition is limited and the situation could deteriorate further in the coming months.

The prospects for presidential elections in Guinea Bissau, due to take place before 7 May 2005, remain bleak. President Rosa has limited space to manoeuvre politically to ensure a peaceful transition and the successful conduct of the election following the military uprising on 6 October 2004 and the negotiated settlement of 10 October 2004. The proliferation of candidates, major differences among the leading political parties on key national issues, and the segmentation and tensions within some of the leading political parties indicate the intensity of the power struggle that is taking place a few months before the election. The role of the Army also remains unclear as they continue to be entangled and engaged in the political processes.

The unconstitutional presidential transition in Togo to Faure Gnassingbe, the son of the late President Gnassingbe Eyadema on 6 February 2005 has left the country with a very unstable and volatile political situation. The transfer of power has been condemned by the international community and diplomatic sanctions have been imposed by ECOWAS to insist on the reestablishment of the constitution. International pressure has forced Faure Gnassingbe to agree in the conduct of general elections within 60 days although, according to the Constitution, this responsibility should have been placed under the leadership of the impeached Togolese Parliament speaker Ouattara Natchaba. Political manifestations by the opposition and by supporters of the new President have increased the political tension in the country and threaten to destabilize Togo and to affect neighbouring Ghana, Benin and Burkina Faso. According to the ongoing contingency planning exercise undertaken by the United Nations system and its partners in Togo, populations movements to be expected should an open conflict erupts are respectively estimated from 150,000 to 300,000 refugees and from 100,000 to 150,000 IDPS.

2.Most Likely Scenarios

2.1Desert Locust Situation

For the victims of the Desert Locust crisis, food insecurity will continue to persist throughout the region if not addressed. Rural to urban migration patterns are further expected to increase. The desert swarms will most likely return to West Africa from Northwest Africa at the beginning of the summer of 2005, probably in June or July. Although the scale of this invasion will be much smaller than in 2004, it is essential to expand the planning and early reaction capacities and to maintain the control operations to reduce the scale and impact of the locusts. Humanitarian response to the continued food insecurity is paramount and imperative to contain larger scale suffering of the most vulnerable.

2.2Political Instability in the Region

While the situation remains very fragile in Côte d’Ivoire, the likelihood of a continued situation of “no peace and no war” is the most probable between the Forces Nouvelles in the North and President Laurent Gbagbo’s government in the South. Core assumptions and scenario need to remain flexible as further deterioration of the situation could be expected with the breakdown of social cohesion; increased inter-ethnic and inter-community tensions; and a steady increase in the level of crime particularly in Abidjan, as the economy continues to deteriorate.

The recent socio-economic and political developments in other countries in the region highlight the fact that West Africa continues to face interlinked and multifaceted crises due to political instability and the lack of effective post conflict transitions towards democracy. These trends will continue to affect the sub-regions strive towards peace adversely.

3.Strategic Priorities for Humanitarian Response

The strategic priorities for humanitarian response in the 2005 CAP will continue to strive to:

  • Mitigate the immediate life threatening consequences of both active and simmering civil conflicts in the sub-region;
  • Preserve coping capacities and social cohesiveness in host communities directly or indirectly affected by complex emergencies; and
  • Manage the aftermath of the Desert Locust invasion that has affected almost the entire sub-region.
  • Foster sub-regional coordination of humanitarian actors to ensure efficiency in a resource-stringent environment and intertwined areas of instability.

The political situation in West Africa remains precarious, and the region’s population will continue to face a high level of insecurity. However no additional programs have been included in the addendum to address the political crisis and mitigate its possible effects.

The deterioration of the food security situation for the households affected by the Desert Locust has on the other hand led to substantial changes and addition in the strategic priorities for the humanitarian response originally set for the overall framework of the 2005 Consolidated Appeal. Serious attention will have to be drawn to responding to the diminished food security and the increased vulnerability experienced by the victims of the locust scourge and other protracted slow onset emergencies.

It is therefore imperative that food assistance and agricultural inputs be provided to the victims of the Desert Locust to bring them through the lean season and prepare them for next year’s harvest.

The UN has through this addendum developed programmes to mitigate the effects through food for work programmes; support of agricultural inputs for food crop production and by providing supplementary animal feed to avoid the exacerbation of conflicts due to the scarce natural resources. The programmes also aim to strengthen the capacity of the farmers to retain their agricultural production in the winter months of 2004 as well as the summer production for 2005. A lack of funding could exacerbate the socio-economic and political stability in the region and increase the number of people affected by chronic poverty.

The CAP 2005 appeals for US$ 190,258,786 to cover the humanitarian needs for the regions affected populations, of which more than 9 million have been affected by the Desert Locusts, and more than 2.5 million have been forced to leave their home due to ongoing slow onset conflicts and complex emergencies within the region.

Aware of the possible shift in media attention and donor commitment to other parts of the World hit by complex emergencies and/or natural disasters such as the impact of the tsunami in south-east Asia, the United Nations system in West Africa urges the donor community to remain committed to other humanitarian crises that are affecting large populations groups hence requiring additional resources for building in-country as well as sub-regional capacity for monitoring, preparedness and response.

NEW PROJECT

Appealing Agency / FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION
Project Title / Emergency support to the production of vegetables in the regions of the Sahel affected by Desert Locusts
Project Code / WA-05/A01
Sector / Agriculture
Objectives / Improve the availability of sufficient quantities of nutritious food, and generate income, by promoting vegetable production through the distribution of seeds, fertilizer and hand tools.
Targeted Countries / Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal
Targeted Beneficiaries / 100,000 households severely affected by harvest loss caused by the Desert Locusts and drought, in particular women and chronically vulnerable groups
Implementing Partners / International and national NGOs, Ministries of Agriculture
Project Duration / January – December 2005
Total Project Budget / US$ 1,885,050
Funds Requested for 2005 / US$ 1,685,050

SUMMARY