Ben Saunders Issues in Democratic Theory 19/05/10
Republicanism and Abstention
Concern about low turnout à advocacy of compulsory voting.
Republicans are only worried about domination, not all compulsion.
Democracy is valued as instantiating freedom, but this need not require participation.
Republicanism vs. Liberalism
The contrast between republicanism and liberalism is not clear-cut.
Locke: Religious toleration and individual property rights à liberal.
Limited, constitutional state à liberal or republican.
Remarks on freedom à frequently republican.
E.g.s “freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to, and closely joined with a man’s preservation, that he cannot part with it” (Second Treatise, §23).
“[T]hat ill deserves the name of confinement which hedges us in only from bogs and precipices” (Second Treatise, §57).
Compatible with monarchy à need not be anti-republican.
Kant: Individual autonomy à liberal.
But concerned with subjection to another’s will.
Ideal state à republican commonwealth.
J. S. Mill: Concern with security of freedom.
Political participation (focused on common good) is beneficial.
No one has the right to power (domination) over others.
à incorporated many elements of republicanism.
But Mill tolerated empires. Not all republicans are anti-imperial.
Many liberals adopt republican elements, so beware false dichotomies.
The ‘Essentials’ of Republicanism
Understandings of concepts like liberty and power shaped by wider ideology.
Core components or commitments of republicanism:
i) virtuous rule
ii) pursuit of the common good
iii) liberty as non-domination.
I don’t include popular sovereignty so as to be ecumenical as possible.
Two kinds of republicanism:
i) strong (intrinsic, neo-Athenian, civic humanist) – see political participation as itself part of the good life.
ii) Weak (instrumental, neo-Roman) – do not value participation in itself, only as a means to freedom.
Republican Freedom and Democracy
Republican understanding of freedom = non-domination.
Absence of interference is neither necessary nor sufficient.
Liberals assume you can be free under a benevolent tyrant.
Democracy may be more likely to allow freedom, but can interfere.
Republican connection between freedom and democracy is constitutive.
To be part of self-governing demos is to be a free person, not dominated by ruler.
Calling this ‘instrumental’ is misleading. Participation is extrinsically but non-instrumentally valuable.
My argument will mainly be directed at weak republicans, who see little reason to object to compulsory political participation.
Direction and Non-Domination
To be non-dominated does not require active self-legislation.
One is not dominated by going along with others, rather than asserting oneself.
E.g.s: X heeds Y’s advice.
X does what his girlfriend, Y, wants.
X submits to restrictive regulations.
X is interfered with by just law enforcement agencies.
Abstention and Domination
Pettit’s contestatory democracy: positive responsiveness to popular will.
negative checks (decisions can be contested).
One need not actually exercise one’s rights.
One is dominated by the possibility of arbitrary interference.
Those who choose not to vote retain the possibility of doing so if they wish.
Perhaps if citizens do not exercise their civic virtues then they will be lost.
But not clear that this depends on voting. Moreover, it shows that the connection between participation and freedom is really instrumental.
Conclusion
The republican ideal of an active, virtuous citizenry does not follow from their commitment to freedom as non-domination.
Those who could participate, but choose to follow the direction of others, are not dominated. Republicans need not be concerned by low turnout.
References
Dagger, R. (1997) Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism (Oxford: OUP).
Maynor, J. (2005), ‘Modern Republican Democratic Contestation: A Model of Deliberative Democracy’, in I. Honohan and J. Jennings (eds.), Republicanism in Theory and Practice (London: Routledge).
Patten, A. (1996), ‘The Republican Critique of Liberalism’, British Journal of Political Science 26(1), pp. 25–44.
Pettit, P. (1999), ‘Republican Freedom and Contestatory Democracy’, in I. Shapiro and C. Hacker-Cordòn (eds.), Democracy’s Value (Cambridge: CUP).