Rail Safety Investigation
Report No 2008/06
Level crossing short warning time
Freight Train 9251
Queen Street Colac
9 July 2008
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
The Chief Investigator 5
Executive Summary 7
1. Circumstances 9
2. Factual information 11
2.1 The train and crew 11
2.2 Location 11
2.3 Environment 12
2.4 Infrastructure 12
2.5 HXP-3 level crossing predictor 15
2.6 Queen Street level crossing protection 17
2.7 Recorded data 21
2.8 Response to incident 26
2.9 HXP-3 software upgrade 27
3. Analysis 29
3.1 The incident 29
3.2 Mechanisms leading to system response 30
3.3 Level crossing equipment performance 30
3.4 Queen Street level crossing design and installation processes 31
3.5 System monitoring 32
4. Conclusions 33
4.1 Findings 33
4.2 Contributing factors 33
5. Safety Actions taken since the event 35
5.1 Recommended Safety Actions 35
The Chief Investigator
The Chief Investigator, Transport and Marine Safety Investigations is a statutory position established on 1 August 2006 under Part V of the Transport Act 1983.
The objective of the position is to improve public transport and marine safety by independently investigating public transport and marine safety matters.
The primary focus of an investigation is to determine what factors caused the incident, rather than apportion blame for the incident, and to identify issues that may require review, monitoring or further consideration. In conducting investigations, the Chief Investigator will apply the principles of ‘just culture’ and use a methodology based on systemic investigation models.
The Chief Investigator is required to report the results of investigations to the Minister for Public Transport and/or the Minister for Roads and Ports. However, before submitting the results of an investigation to the Minister, the Chief Investigator must consult in accordance with section 85A of the Transport Act 1983.
The Chief Investigator is not subject to the direction or control of the Minister(s) in performing or exercising his or her functions or powers, but the Minister may direct the Chief Investigator to investigate a public transport safety matter or a marine safety matter.
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Executive Summary
On 9 July 2008 a Warrnambool-bound freight train entered the Queen Street level crossing at Colac with the flashing lights and warning bells operating but before the boom barriers had commenced to lower. This type of incident is referred to as a ‘short ring incident’. The operation of the level crossing equipment was witnessed by a member of the public and reported as a near miss. There were no reported injuries or damage to rail infrastructure or other property.
As part of a state-wide program, Queen Street together with several other level crossings in Colac had recently been upgraded with HXP-3 level crossing equipment. This type of equipment is manufactured in the USA and distributed under licence in Australia. Neither the manufacturer nor local distributor could recall a response similar to that which occurred at Queen Street.
The investigation found that the short ring incident was the result of vandals placing a road traffic sign-post across the track late the previous evening. This act set up responses within the level crossing protection system which caused it to assume a condition that effectively masked the approach of the freight train until it was almost at the Queen Street crossing.
In response to the incident, the positive start timer setting of the level crossing equipment has been modified at the Queen Street and adjacent Hart Street level crossings. This change of equipment setting will result in the crossing protection ringing continuously if a similar event was to occur.
The investigation has recommended safety actions in the areas of network risk management, monitoring of level crossing operation and documentation control.
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1. Circumstances
On 9 July 2008 at about 0547 a Warrnambool bound freight train entered the Queen Street, Colac level crossing prior to the boom barriers being lowered. This late level crossing equipment operation was reported by a member of the public to the V/Line Train Control Centre (Centrol[1]) in Melbourne. The report indicated that the boom barriers had not commenced lowering until after the passage of the fifth wagon of the train.
When contacted, the driver of the train reported to Centrol that on the approach to the level crossing, a road sign placed across the track had been struck and pushed clear of the track and that the warning lights were operating when the train entered the crossing.
A road traffic sign-post was later found lying beside the track about 30 metres from the crossing. There were no reported injuries as a consequence of striking the traffic sign-post or by the short ringing of the warning devices.
A review of the crossing event logs validated the reported late activation of the warning devices and the position of the boom barriers.
Post incident testing of the level crossing equipment by V/Line did not identify any fault with the operation of the crossing equipment and at 0843 normal rail operations over the level crossing were authorised to re-commence.
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2. Factual information
2.1 The train and crew
The train involved was the 0230 Melbourne to Warrnambool freight train, number 9251 which was crewed by a qualified locomotive driver and a trainee driver. It was operated by El Zorro Transport Pty Ltd and consisted of two locomotives and 17 wagons with a total mass of 448 tonnes. Data from the locomotive speed recorder indicated that the train passed through the level crossing at approximately 60 km/h; 10 km/h below the designated line speed for freight trains.
There is no evidence to suggest that the condition or operation of the train contributed to the incident.
2.2 Location
Colac is an intermediate location on the Melbourne to Warrnambool line with a single platform and a siding. The Queen Street level crossing is situated approximately 400 metres on the Melbourne side of the Colac Railway Station, 152.8 rail kilometres from Melbourne and is one of four level crossings within a distance of about 2.3 kilometres.
Figure 1: Rail approach to the Queen Street level crossing looking towards Warrnambool.
The crossing is an integral part of a significant intersection within the Colac Township incorporating route C154 which is the connecting highway to Forrest and Apollo Bay.
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2.3 Environment
The following conditions were observed at Mt Gellibrand; the nearest weather recording location.
On the evening of 8 July 2008 at 2100 the temperature was 6.6 degrees Celsius with a relative humidity of 85 per cent and a south-west wind of about 20 km/h.
At 0600 on 9 July 2008 the temperature was about three degrees Celsius with a relative humidity of 93 per cent and patchy fog.
2.4 Infrastructure
2.4.1 Infrastructure management
The rail line and associated infrastructure including the level crossing warning system is owned by VicTrack (Victorian Rail Track Corporation) and managed by V/Line Passenger Pty Ltd.
2.4.2 Level Crossing Upgrade Program
An upgrade of the Queen Street level crossing was part of the State-funded LCUP (Level Crossing Upgrade Program). The crossing protection was upgraded from incandescent flashing lights to LED (Light Emitting Diode) flashing lights with boom barriers.
2.4.3 Level crossing design and construction
The scope of the works and the governing standards of design and installation were developed by VicTrack. RSS (Rail Signalling Services) was subsequently appointed by VicTrack to undertake all elements of the Queen Street level crossing design, construction, commissioning and handover, under a ‘turnkey’ contract.
The preliminary design phase included a risk workshop with road and rail stakeholders. In summary, no high or extreme risks were identified for the Queen Street crossing. The design was recognised as being based on current rail practice in Victoria, and was consistent with industry standards. The controls proposed were identified as having been used successfully at other locations. There were a number of follow-up actions identified during the risk workshop. Of note, in the context of this investigation, was that consideration should be given to enabling the positive start feature[2] to cater for stopping trains at Colac station.
The detailed design involved ongoing stakeholder consultation and the preparation of documentation to support the installation and commissioning of the upgraded crossing. It was subjected to an internal review in accordance with the contractor’s quality assurance procedures and a final review by an external, independent reviewer engaged by the contractor.
RSS was responsible for planning, installing, testing and commissioning the crossing in liaison with VicTrack and V/Line. Acceptance of the upgraded crossing into service required the sign-off of RSS, VicTrack and V/Line and the crossing was subsequently commissioned on 30 May 2008. At this time the management of the upgraded crossing became the responsibility of V/Line under their safety management system. The steps in the upgrade process are shown at Figure 2.
Figure 2: Queen Street level crossing upgrade process.
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2.4.4 Track circuitry
The track circuits for the Queen Street level crossing overlap three other level crossing circuits; that for Church Street towards Melbourne and those for Hart Street and Armstrong Street towards Warrnambool. Separate operation of the circuits is facilitated through the use of a different frequency band for the circuit of each crossing. The Queen Street level crossing circuits extend about 1,000 metres either side of the crossing and operate on 430 Hz.
2.4.5 Track environs
On the approach from Melbourne, the Queen Street level crossing is situated on a rising gradient of two per cent (1:50). The track is rated as Class 2 with timber sleepers and CWR (Continuous Welded Rail) of 47 kg/m. On the approach to Queen Street the ballast was fouled with mud and had a thin, low shoulder (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: View of the Down approach to Queen Street, looking towards Warrnambool.
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2.4.6 Post incident crossing equipment testing
Functional testing of the crossing did not identify any fault with the crossing system or equipment.
2.4.7 Site re-enactment
Tests were conducted by V/Line in an attempt to replicate the events leading up to the incident. Separate tests were conducted using a hard-wire shunt and a galvanized pipe similar to road traffic signage. The test using wire resulted in a good sudden shunt which was readily detected by the system as a false shunt and the system responded as designed. By contrast, testing with a length of galvanized pipe produced erratic and varied shunts depending on the amount of downward pressure applied to the pipe.
Additional testing with the galvanized pipe was conducted using water at the pipe to rail interface in an attempt to simulate any moisture that may have been present on the night of the incident. This latter testing was inconclusive and a system response similar to that which occurred on the night of the incident could not be replicated.
2.5 HXP-3 level crossing predictor
2.5.1 Predictor philosophy
As part of the Queen Street upgrade, the method of crossing activation was modified to incorporate predictor technology. Prior to upgrade, the crossing protection was activated using a fixed circuit system.
Crossing protection using fixed circuits results in level crossing activation whenever a train comes within a fixed distance of the crossing. The crossing circuitry in such systems is designed to accommodate a train approaching at the track speed limit. However, this makes for longer warning times for trains approaching the crossing at lower speeds. In some cases this may result in minutes, rather than the preferred 25-30 seconds of warning time, thus delaying road traffic or inducing motorists to drive around or through the crossing protection, potentially with a train approaching.
By contrast, a predictor system is designed to provide consistency in level crossing warning times. The system estimates the speed of the train, its arrival time at the crossing and activates the crossing protection to achieve a pre-determined warning time. This activation method is the preferred option in Victoria when upgrading level crossing sites outside the electrified network.
The upgraded Queen Street level crossing was fitted with an HXP-3 predictor system manufactured by GE Transportation of the USA and distributed in Victoria by RSS.
2.5.2 HXP-3 operational overview
To achieve constant warning times for level crossings, the HXP-3 predictor monitors the position and speed of an incoming train by transmitting and monitoring a low voltage AC signal along the track. After entering the track circuit area, the lead axle(s) shorts the circuit across the rails, typically referred to as a shunt. As the train closes on the crossing, the movement of the axle is monitored by the system.
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Measurements of transmitted track current, transmitted check voltage and receiver voltage are analysed to calculate RX. The RX is a measure of circuit impedance and is used to determine the train’s distance from the crossing and its expected time of arrival at the crossing.
The functionality of the HXP-3 unit is illustrated by Figure 4 which depicts the HXP-3 in normal operation with the numbers 1 to 5 indicating train positions as follows:
1. The train is beyond range of the HXP-3 and not yet detected (RX = 100).
2. The train is detected and RX begins to fall. The rate at which the RX changes is used to calculate the speed of the train. This speed is used to calculate the time the train will reach the crossing.
3. At this point the calculated train approach time equals the programmed crossing warning time, causing the crossing warning system to activate. RX continues to fall.
4. As the train arrives at the crossing, the RX = 0.
5. RX commences to increase following the train leaving the crossing, the RX increases to 100 once the train leaves the range of the HXP-3.
Figure 4: HXP-3 philosophy of operation
2.5.3 Key HXP-3 protective features
High signal detection feature