Promoting Security and Prosperity in South and Central Asia

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SCUSA 63

Thinking Beyond Boundaries:

Contemporary Challenges to U.S. Foreign Policy

Promoting Security and Prosperity in South and Central Asia

In the past several years, the United States has repeatedly assumed crucial roles in development and democratization efforts around the world. America has sought to promote stable governments and economic systems while at the same time tackling important and challenging security problems, addressing economic downturns, and conducting relief efforts after natural disasters at home and abroad. Although technology and its applications have changed the pace of communication with the advent of social networks, advanced transportation systems, and more specialized global economic systems, this interdependence does not necessarily translate into amore simplistic US foreign policy in South and Central Asia. Indeed, as US commitments in Afghanistan draw to a close and Afghanistan’s neighbors start to jockey to fill the vacuum, the dilemmas facing US policymakers have become all the more vexing.

Among the questions US policymakers face when considering Afghanistan and its neighbors are these: Has reliance on the ‘modern’ U.S. worldview and application of lessons learned from Iraq hindered our ability to understand Afghan culture, history, and regional relationships? Even further, has it impeded our ability to craftappropriate policies with realistic goals, expectations, and timelines? After ten years of operations, does the region’suncertain future call for a reassessment of the challenges facing Afghanistan and its neighbors, as well as a reevaluation of the appropriate policies to tackle these challenges?

Afghanistan

The goal that we seek is achievable, and can be expressed simply: No safe haven from which al Qaeda or its affiliates can launch attacks against our homeland or our allies. We won't try to make Afghanistan a perfect place. We will not police its streets or patrol its mountains indefinitely. That is the responsibility of the Afghan government, which must step up its ability to protect its people, and move from an economy shaped by war to one that can sustain a lasting peace. What we can do, and will do, is build a partnership with the Afghan people that endures – one that ensures that we will be able to continue targeting terrorists and supporting a sovereign Afghan government.

-President Barack Obama, June 2011[1]

The Fundamental Objectives. With these words to the American public in June 2011, President Obama signaled the beginning of the end of the American combat mission in Afghanistan. He called for the redeployment of 10,000 troops by year’s end, redeployment of 23,000 more troops by next summer, and the full transition of the combat mission to Afghan security forces by 2014. In so doing, the President announced that we have made progress on three fundamental objectives: refocusing on Al Qaeda, reversing the Taliban resurgence, and training Afghan security forces.[2]

Do the killings of Abdul Ghani in April, Osama bin Laden in May, and Ilyas Kashmiri in June, as well as estimates indicating that there are less than 100 full-time Al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan, demonstrate that ‘Al Qaeda central’ is severely degraded? Key questions to consider when assessing the success of US policy in refocusing on Al Qaeda include the following: Who are “Al Qaeda and its affiliates”?[3] What will this organization look like under the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri?[4] Even though Al Qaeda ‘central’ remains in Pakistan, does the “greater threat”to our homeland posed by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula warrant a shift in our counterterrorism focus?[5] What is the evolving Al Qaeda relationship with Pakistani based groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Haqqani network?[6]

After the initial invasion of and successes in Afghanistan, the Taliban slowly reconsolidated and reorganized. Beginning in 2006, the Taliban began a ‘resurgence’; by the end of 2008, they controlled 164 of 364 districts in Afghanistan (as compared to just 30 districts in 2003).[7] Immediately upon entering office in 2009, President Obama added 21,000 troops to help combat this resurgence. He augmented this number with a surge of 30,000 troops the following year and at the same time committed to anew counterinsurgency strategy.[8] Are recent gains in Helmand province, such as the March community council elections in Marjah, indications that this troop surge and new strategy has worked?[9] Does the death of 66 US service members in August in Afghanistan, the most in any month since the beginning of the operation, bring into question the impact of these gains?[10] Do the killings of General Daoud Daoud (the police commander in the north) in May, Ahmad Wali Karzai in July, and Burhanuddin Rabbani in September further debunk ideas of Taliban decline and negotiating from a position of strength?[11]What are the status of negotiations with the Taliban given reports that Pakistan arrested Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar because he was talking to the Afghan government without their permission, that the Afghan government deliberately leaked details of secret US-Taliban talks, and that the Taliban targeted Afghan High Peace Council Chairman, Rabbani, because of his role in negotiations?[12]

The Afghan National Security Forces are nearing their October 2011 force targets of 171,600 Afghan National Army and 134,000 Afghan National Police personnel. Force levels as of the March 2011 “1230-1231” report were 159,363 national army and 125,589 national police.[13] These forces continue to fight alongside US and coalition forces in major operations. For example, in late 2010, theAfghan National Security Forces comprised approximately 60 percent of the entire force engaged in major operations west of Kandahar.[14] In addition to the national forces, the Afghan Local Police initiative is a key component of the Afghan security plan; it attempts to bridge the gap in local districts in which the national forces are not yet able to provide security.[15] Though the national and local security forceshave demonstrated certain successes as indicated in recruitment and participation in major operations, questions remain about their sustainability given high attrition rates (upwards of 25%), questionable performance in their areas of responsibility such as Kabul, and allegations of brutality and abuse.[16] Will the Afghan National and Local Security Forces be capable of taking on the mission as US and coalition forces begin to draw down?

The Murkiness of Success, the Evolution of Development, the Question of Governance, and the Challenge of Alliances. Evaluating the instability in Afghanistan today as well as the progress towards stability in the future is imperative to assessing the current US policy as a function of the three objectives discussed above – refocusing on Al Qaeda, reversing the Taliban resurgence, and training Afghan security forces. Some of the questions to ask include: What are the internal and external variables causing stability and instability? How do we sustain the initiatives fostering stability, while addressing the areas of instability? Does the administration’s strategy and proposed timeline for withdrawal adequately account for these concerns? Can the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) accomplish its objectives by 2014? Even more, how should we define “success” and how will we know when we achieve it?

Acknowledging that soldiers alone are not enough, the international community has also enhanced development and democratization efforts. Since 2001, the US has provided nearly $52 billion in security, development, and counter-narcotics reconstruction assistance.[17] The US Agency for International Developmentleads much of this effort in creating economic growth, strengthening governance, and investing in human capital.It works in consultation with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan which, in accordance with the 2001 Bonn Agreement, coordinates all international donor assistance and activity.[18] Has the UN approach fully integrated Afghans into the process to foster ownership or have these efforts failed to incorporate the local populace, resulting in misidentified needs, unsustainable development, and discrediting of the Afghan government? Has the military’s involvement in development assistance (i.e. provincial reconstruction teams) politicized the humanitarian space?[19] With a 306% increase in the price of dry opium this year, are the counter-narcotics gains of the past several years in jeopardy of reversing?[20] Or, in light of the 2010 offensive in Helmand, an area that supplies about 54 percent of Afghanistan’s opium, are these counter-narcotic gains sustainable?[21] What are the implications of this discussion on Taliban and other insurgent group financing, local support, and resolve?[22]

As evidenced by the 2009 presidential elections and last year’s parliamentary elections in Afghanistan, concerns over governance continue to impede prospects for future stability. Though President Karzai was deemed the winner of the presidential elections, there were numerous election irregularities. Former UN Deputy Envoy to Afghanistan, Peter Galbraith, was fired for his unwillingness to accept what he says was wholesale fraud on the part of Karzai.[23] Further, the prolonged electoral crisis generated by last year’s parliamentary elections continues. Following the elections, the electoral commission threw out 1.3 of the 5.6 million votes and disqualified 34 candidates.[24] Dissatisfied with the lack of detailed explanations for these dismissals and the disproportionate impact on Pashtun politicians , President Karzai established a ‘Special Election Tribunal’ and set off a constitutional crisis that seemingly ended in August when he dissolved this tribunal and accepted the electoral commission’s reinstatementof nine previously disqualified candidates.[25] Will all parties accept the revised electoral commission’s ruling and focus their attention on the issues of governance ahead? Is the current Karzai regime the reliable and effective partner that counterinsurgency literature prescribes and that ISAF requires to be successful? What are the implications of the timing of the full transition to the Afghans in 2014 with the next scheduled presidential elections that same year?

Amidst these pressing concerns, the commitment and diverging perspectives of the NATO member states raise doubts for future success. Criticism over the unequal distribution of the “fighting force” and domestic pressure within the European countries to withdraw their troops continue to strain the coalition. Upon taking office in 2009, the NATO Secretary General, Andrer Fogh Rasmussen reiterated President Obama’s words that “the campaign in Afghanistan was one of necessity, not choice.”[26] However, given the ongoing economic difficulties in Europe and the killing of Osama bin Laden, will NATO resolve waiver in the face of domestic opposition to the Afghanistan war?[27]Concurrently, how will public opinion, the economy, and the results of the US midterm elections affect our commitment of resources to Afghanistan and the characterization of Afghanistan as vital to American national interests? These questions will be at the center of the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago as member states review the new Strategic Concept and reevaluate the updated Afghanistan timeline.[28]

The Neighborhood: Pakistan, India, and the Rest

And finally, together with the United Nations, we will forge a new Contact Group for Afghanistan and Pakistan that brings together all who should have a stake in the security of the region – our NATO allies and other partners, but also the Central Asian states, the Gulf nations and Iran; Russia, India and China. None of these nations benefit from a base for al Qaeda terrorists, and a region that descends into chaos. All have a stake in the promise of lasting peace and security and development.

-President Barack Obama, March 2009[29]

Pakistani interests in Afghanistan stem from its military policy of “strategic depth” in the event of war with India. Therefore, Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban remains in question, particularly in light of its close ties to the Taliban in the past. Pakistan, for instance, was one of only three states to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan prior to 9/11. Insurgent groups operating in Afghanistanare able to seek refuge in Quetta and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan. In addition to launching cross-border attacks, these militants have steadily gained influence in Pakistan, perhapswith the support of (former) intelligence officials. After a suicide-bomb attack on an Islamabad hotel in September 2008, President Asif Ali Zardari promised to rid his country of terrorism.[30] Yet, in November 2008, a Pakistani-based terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, conducted a devastating assault on Mumbai, killing at least 172 people.[31] Post-Mumbai, Zardari became the first Pakistani head of state to admit that his country created and nurtured such organizations as Lashkar-e-Taiba for tactical objectives against India.[32]

Though over the past several years the Pakistani Army has increased and been more effective in operations against these militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Swat Valley, the presence of Osama bin Laden within a mile of the National Military Academy in Abottabad raises further questions about the reliability of Pakistan as an ally, as do reports alleging Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) links with the Haqqani network.[33] Yet, from a Pakistani perspective, the American violations of their sovereignty during the raid on bin Laden’s compound and from unannounced drone strikes beg the question of whether America itself is a reliable ally.[34]

In the background of discussions regarding this trust deficit remains Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and its relationship with India, a country with which it has fought three wars and numerous skirmishes since 1947. American concerns over the safety of these nuclear weapons have resulted in a $100 million assistance program to help Pakistan safeguard them.[35]The A.Q. Khan nuclear black market, growing distress over the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorist groups, and worries of an Indo-Pakistani nuclear arms race further accentuatethese concerns.[36] Pakistan views the US India-Civil Nuclear deal and Indian accession into the Nuclear Suppliers Group as unfairly privileging India and forcing Islamabad to further develop its weapons program.[37] Though this agreement helped further Indo-American relations, it resulted in increased Pakistani security concerns. This raises larger questions on U.S. nonproliferation efforts both in the region and throughout the world. What are the economic and security risks and benefits of improving India’s civilian nuclear capabilities? How are proliferation risks weighed against future benefits of a more interdependent relationship with India? Does this strengthening Indo-American relationship place more pressure on China to solidify its relationship with Pakistan? How does Pakistan perceive these relationships and what are the implications for continued American cooperation with Pakistan in Afghanistan?

Since 2001, India has been the largest regional donor to Afghanistan, not only providing $1.3 billion in reconstruction aid, but also leading development programs, ranging from highways and dam power projects to a new parliament building.[38] Indians state that their interests in Afghanistan are a function of its ability to serve as a gateway to Central Asia to help provide for India’s energy requirements. Pakistan, however, views Indian motives quite differently and remains nervous about allowing its greatest enemy to establish a presence on its other border.[39] What are India’s interests in Afghanistan? How does the India-Pakistan relationship impact Afghan stability?

In addition to Pakistan and India, China, Iran, Russia, and Central Asian states continue to have vested interests in Afghanistan. These interests revolve around such subjects as instability in border areas, economic relations, reductions in the drug trade, and aspirations of regional hegemony.[40] How can the US and its NATO partners funnel these diverse interests into a coordinated effort to facilitate the stabilization of Afghanistan? What does the 2014 withdrawal timeline indicate for a post-NATO regional scramble for influence?

Conclusion

Afghanistan and its neighbors continue to be at the forefront of issues that challenge America’s role in the world today. Policymakers must determine what the current strategy in Afghanistan entails, what it should entail, and how the gaps between normative analysis and empirical reality contribute to the future of American influence in the region. Under what conditions should the United States encourage and support multilateral solutions among the countries in the region to include those discussed and others of relevance not mentioned? How might the United States demonstrate cultural sensitivity toward the region to avoid inflaming anti-American sentiment and political extremism? Lastly, what is the best possiblescenario for Afghanistan and its neighbors once NATO leavesand how close are we to achieving it?

Recommended Readings

Atlantic Council. “Transcript: India-Pakistan Security Dilemma.” 26 July2011.

Bergen, Peter and Katherine Tiedemann. “The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2010.” Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, 24 February 2010.

Coll, Steve. “India and Pakistan’s Secret Kashmir Talks.” The New Yorker(2 March 2009).