On Dispositional Sentences
Paula Menéndez-Benito
University of Göttingen
This paper deals with the interpretation of generic sentences like 1) and 2). A widespread approach to genericity takes all generic sentences to express universal quantification over worlds (see e.g., Krifka et al. 1995 for discussion and references). Building on Dahl (1975), I argue that, on their dispositional reading, generic sentences involve a covert possibility modal that expresses a particular type of circumstantial modality. This proposal accounts for the acceptability of F(ree) C(hoice) any in dispositional sentences like 3).
1)This car goes 200 kph.
2)This printer prints 100 pages per minute.
3)This printer prints any (kind of) document.
Background: Generic sentences like 1) and 2) above have been claimed to have both a dispositional reading and a habitual reading (see, e.g., Dahl 1975 and Green 2000). On their habitual reading, the sentences above convey that the printer regularly prints 100 pages per minute and that the car goes 200 kph habitually. On their dispositional reading, they inform us that the car has the capacity of going 200 kph and that the printer is able to print 100 pages per minute. On the latter reading, generic sentences license FC any, as shown by 3) above.
The Universal Approach: Assuming that all generic sentences (dispositional and habitual) involve a universal modal operator yields wrong truth-conditions for dispositional sentences. Take, for instance, the sentence in 1). On the Universal Approach, 1) will be paraphrased as ‘in all the worlds selected by the modal base which come closest to the ideal set up by the ordering source, every situation (of the appropriate size) s in which the car is driven is part of a situation s’ in which the car goes 200 kph’. The sentence in 1) is interpreted with respect to a circumstantial modal base (the relevant circumstances being the car’s design and condition in the world of evaluation) and an empty ordering source: in order to interpret 1) we do not need to take into account any of the conversational backgrounds that would constitute proper ordering sources for a circumstantial modal base (see Kratzer 1991), e.g., ‘what the driver wants’, ‘what the law provides’, etc. Suppose that in the world of evaluation the car is actually designed to go 200 kph and the car’s engine is in proper condition. We would then be quantifying over the set of worlds in which the car is designed to go 200 kph and the car’s engine is in proper condition. Clearly, this set contains some worlds in which the car doesn’t go 200 kph every time it is driven (for instance, all the worlds in which 200 kph is above the maximum speed permitted by the law and the car’s driver does not do anything illegal.) Thus, the Universal Modal Approach predicts 1) to be false in the actual world even if the car is actually designed to go 200 kph, and its engine is in proper condition. This is contrary to our intuitions.
The Possibility Hypothesis: If, following Dahl (1975), we take dispositional sentences to express possibilities, we will get the right truth-conditions for sentences like 1). Intuitively, 1) can be paraphrased by 4), with an overt possibility modal. (Note that both of these sentences can be true in scenarios where there are no actual events of the car going 200 kph.) However, there are obvious counterexamples to this analysis, namely cases where a sentence with an overt possibility modal and its dispositional generic counterpart behave differently. Consider for instance, 5) and 6) below. Suppose that little John, who has never played the trombone, wants to take lessons. However, John’s mother is worried that his asthma will prevent him from doing so, and she consults the family doctor. While in this scenario the doctor could utter 5)as his expert opinion, he could definitely not utter 6).
4)This car can go 200 kph.
5)John can play the trombone
6)John plays the trombone.
Refining the Possibility Hypothesis: I contend that these apparent counterexamples to the Possibility Hypothesis can be explained away once we pay closer attention to the type of modality expressed by dispositional sentences. Kratzer (1981) notes that when we evaluate a circumstantial modal statement we may take into account a variety of circumstances. For instance, the sentence in 7) below may be used to convey an inner disposition, that I don’t know how to play the trombone (i.e., the “mental program” that would allow me to play the trombone has not been filled in). Alternatively, 7) can be used to convey that my physical condition prevents me from playing the trombone (e.g., because I suffer from asthma), or that the outside situation prevents me from playing the trombone (e.g., because I left my trombone at home).
7) I cannot play the trombone.
It is well known that modals may impose restrictions on the kind of conversational backgrounds they can combine with. Not surprisingly, there are modals that select for a particular type of circumstantial modality (see, e.g., Kratzer 1981). I propose that the covert modal involved in dispositional sentences can only express “inner dispositions” of the type illustrated by the first reading of 7) above.
This restriction of dispositional sentences explains why 6) would not be considered true if John has never played the trombone. Accepting 6) as true in such a scenario requires us to assume that John has acquired the skill of playing the trombone without ever having played it, which is highly implausible. But this implausibility may disappear if we manipulate the context, e.g. if we assume that John is a robot who has been programmed to play the trombone. In this scenario, 6) can be judged true even if John has not practiced his trombone-playing skill yet. This account also gives us a way of explaining why 1), but not 6), can be paraphrased by a sentence with an overt possibility modal. In the case of the car, the capacity of going 200 kph is ‘hard-wired’– no learning is necessary. In the case of John the human, however, it can only be learned. And learning how to play the trombone involves actual trombone-playing events.
FC licensing: On the Universal Modal Approach the acceptability of FC any in sentences like 3) is puzzling: While FC any is licensed in possibility sentences (as in 8)), it cannot appear within the scope of universal modals, witness 9). Proposing that dispositional sentences express possibilities renders the acceptability of 3)unproblematic by assimilating the licensing of any in 3) to that in 8).
8)John can take any card.
9)* John must take any card.
Summary: To sum up, I argue that dispositional sentences involve a covert possibility modal that can only express a particular type of circumstantial modality. This renders the acceptability of FC any in dispositional sentences unproblematic. Furthermore, this investigation of the covert modal responsible for the dispositional reading of generic sentences contributes to the research program that investigates the distribution and interpretation of covert modality (see, for instance, Bhatt 1999).
REFERENCES: Bhatt, R. (1999): Covert Modality in Non-Finite Contexts. Dahl, O. (1975): On generics. In E. Keenan (ed.). Green, L. (2000): Aspectual BE-type constructions in English. Natural Language Semantics, 8, 1–25. Krifka, M., et al (1995): The generic book. Kratzer, A. (1981): The Notional Category of modality. In H. J. Eikmeyer & H. Rieser (eds.). Kratzer, A. (1991): Modality. In A. von Stechow & D. Wunderlich (eds.)
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