Metro Mayors:devolution,democracy and the importance of getting the ‘devo-manc’ design right

Francesca Gains

Abstract

It is quite clear that the devolutionary settlement negotiated between the UK chancellor George Osborne and the leaders of theGreater Manchester Combined Authorities (GMCA)required local political actors to agree to oversight of the new arrangements by an elected metro mayor. In the intervening months since that announcement, governance arrangements for a Greater Manchester (GM)‘metro mayor’ have proved to be both unique and fluid, drawing on earlier arrangements for electing mayors in Greater London, other city mayors, the police and crime commissioner arrangements and the existing arrangements in the ten local authorities making up the GMCA. This article maps the development of the GMmetro mayor and argues the unique governance arrangements set a path for other areas who want to extenda devolutionary agenda and negotiate enhanced devolutionary powers. However the governance arrangements developing for the GMmetro mayor pose questions about the checks and balances built into these new executive arrangements. In particular how accountability and scrutiny of the metro mayorshould be conducted going forward in Greater Manchester, and elsewhere. In concluding it is argued that the metro mayoral model needs to include and prioritise democratic engagement alongside economic and social goals as a crucial element in making the new arrangements work.

Introduction

The substantial devolutionary deal offered to the ten leaders of the GMCA local authorities in November 2014 marked an unexpected step change in central local relations in the UK (BBC 3 November 2014). Although the agreed devolved budgetary decision making does not represent the kindof decentralisation of fiscal responsibilities found in other western European countries and elsewhere (Communities and Local Government Select Committee, 2014); or the kind of control over revenue raising powers as well as spending decisions demanded by local government itself (Core Cities, 14 May 2015); nevertheless in the context of English local governance, the extent and range of devolved decision making powers is remarkable.

The appetite amongst GMpolitical and officer elites for greater local responsibility and control over budgets addressing skills and employment development, transport and housing to meet local economic and social goals had been growing for several years dating back to the last Labour Government. This bottom up demand became matched by political will at the centre of Governmenttowards the end of the Coalition Government. As the economic case for devolving power to stimulate growth gained credence and the Conservative’s electoral weakness in the north of England seemed unchanging, Chancellor George Osborne was able to overturn decades of centralising forces to strike a deal. The ‘price’ of the deal however was the imposition of an elected ‘metro mayor’ with considerable executive authority to oversee the governance of the new devolved landscape. In subsequent announcements and in the legislation to formalise the ‘devo-manc’ deal, it became clear that other combined authority areas who wished to obtain similar devolved decision making powers would also have to agree to the imposition of a ‘metro mayor’. The GMarrangements then became a template for other areas and in setting the informal and formal rules of the game for devolution in England. This article examines the mayoral governance arrangements which have emerged since the ‘devo-manc’ deal was announced and considers the strengths and weaknesses of this significant development in democratic design.

Initially the international trend towards increasing local executive governance and directly elected mayors is discussed. The argumentation for this kind of executive facilitative leadership to address economic, social and democratic goals is set out and assessments made of existing mayoral arrangements in the UK. This section highlights the existing governance arrangements in Greater London and in areas with a city mayor and argues that strong executive powers need to have checks and balances through arrangements for transparency, scrutiny and accountability. A second section sets out the establishment of the GMarrangements and the political drivers and restraints on the institutional arrangements which emerged from the early negotiations. A third section then moves on to examine how the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016, drawing on the GMarrangements, creates a very loose framework for the adoption of further devolution governance arrangements and highlights that the checks and balances of mayoral executive authority are under specified in the Act. In concluding it is argued that the robustness of metro mayorgovernance going forward will be strengthened where a focus on economic and social goals is balanced with a commitment to democratic engagement and robust checks and balances.

Directly elected mayors – an emerging feature of urban governance

Mayoral governance has been a longstanding feature of local government across Europe and the US (Greasley and Stoker, 2009; Hambleton, 2015). Mayors appointed by councils in municipalities are a feature of French and Spanish local government for example (Schapp et al, 2009) and in some German Lander (Wollman, 2004). In the US,mayors are directly elected although have varying powers with only the larger cities having powerful mayors with strong executive powers (Mouritzenand Svara, 2002). The elected mayoral model has increasingly becomeestablished in the European landscape with directly elected mayors becoming more a feature of the German, Italian and UK local government (Denters and Rose, 2005;Schaap et al, 2009). A move towards a strong model of urban leadership with executive decision makings powers vested in a mayor (directly elected or not) is seen as an international phenomenon of governance in large urban areas (Borax and John, 2004; John, 2001; Rao, 2015). Economic, social and democratic drivers for reform are identifiable.

Strengthened executive authority, and vesting authority over strategic and budgetary decision making in a single individual can be seen in part as a response to a neo-liberalisedeconomic agenda where the ability of regions to compete internationally and attract inward investment demands speedy and effective decision making (Hepburn and Headlam2016).These arguments were made most persuasively by the City Growth Commission in a series of highly influential reports in the build up to the devolution agreement in Greater Manchester. The Commission argued that the international experience is that growth is driven by cities, but that UK cities are still dependent upon centralised funding which inhibits the opportunity to exploit economic opportunities in the global economy. The Commission argued devolved funding arrangements would allow cities to respond dynamically to the needs and opportunities of their economies: and that with improved connectivity between northern cities these city regions could achieve greater growth through agglomeration effects (City Growth Commission, 2014, 13).

Also important in driving reformis the recognition that the achievement of many social goals tackling the cross cutting and often ‘siloed’ issues of inequality, deprivation, and supporting improvements in health, education and sustainability require co-operation between a wide range of actors from public, private and third sectors to work together in localities. Although the pattern of reform is diffuse,Denters and Rose (2005) suggest a trend towards the idea of local governance with local authorities working with other statutory and non-statutory providers in multi-agency partnerships to achieve policy delivery.

Taking these economic and social drivers together reformers argue for constitutional arrangements which support the exercise of stronger, strategic leadership to deal with cross cutting issues such as economic development, regeneration, transport, crime and the environment which are beyond the scope of one single body (Borraz and John 2004; Denters and Rose 2005;John, 2001). There is a pattern across Europe of strong city leadership, with Barcelona, Lille, Rotterdam and London demonstrating how high profile, entrepreneurial leaders can compete on the world stage for economic and cultural development for the benefit of their localities (Borraz and John 2004; Pimlott and Rao 2002).

Alongside the achievement of economic and social goals, strong executive leadership is also proffered as a solution to concern about a loss of democratic legitimacy indicated by falling electoral turnout at the local level (Borraz and John 2004; Denters and Rose 2005). The election of a single individual who can act as advocate for the area is argued to encourage voter engagement with greater name recognition than for indirectly elected municipal leaders. InLondon turnout for the election of the Greater London mayor rose from 34 percent in 2000 to 45 percent in 2008 (although then fell back to 38 percent for the 2012 election). And the current London mayorBoris Johnston has the highest approval ratings of any UK politician (Merrick, 15 June 2013). The visibility of a mayor means the public knows who to hold to account for the spending decisions made in devolved arrangements.

Beyond improvements in democratic engagement through improved voter turnout, the mayoral model is seen to have other features to enhance democratic gains over indirectly elected strong executive leadership. As Haus and Sweeting (2006) set out, developments in local governance are linked with different understandings of the concept of local democracy and have consequent different implications for the leadership role in a locality. The weak engagement between electors and representatives argues for a more visible and accountable leadership. Calls for more participation require an activist leadership reaching out to citizens and bypassing entrenched interests such as parties. After all, as Fung points out (2008),elections are often an imperfect and always retrospective form of citizen engagement. But an electoral mandate for a single individual can encourage democratic innovation in-between elections. Their individual mandate frees up mayors from party management, enabling time to devote to advocacy and lobbying for the area. Being directly elected encourages responsiveness to all communities with less restrictions arising from party loyalties or geography. This feature of the mayoral model is well exemplified by the Mayor of New York, Bill de Blasio, when he says on his website ‘every neighbourhood gets a fair shot’. Being directly elected incentivises mayors to find ways of engaging with the public which can encourage innovation and extend policy consultation in between elections.

In addressing these economic, social and democratic challenges, local leaders are required therefore to be more strategic, networked and responsive. Leaders need to balance a focus on lobbying and advocacy, performance and delivery, partnership work, party and political coalition building and direct engagement with the public (Gains, 2006; Leach and Wilson, 2002). The mayoral model of strong executive leadership has features which are seen to address these challenges and facilitatea new type of urban political leaders “a facilitator who provides positive interaction and high level of communication amongst officials in city government and with the public and who also provides guidance and goal setting and policy making” (Greasley and Stoker, 2008; Svara, 2005, 157).

Research examining the introduction of the first city mayors provided some evidence that these aspirations for a mayoral model were met. Compared to areas operating a leader/cabinet model where the leader was indirectly elected,respondents to surveys of councillors, officer and local stakeholders in mayoral authorities agreed more strongly that there was quicker decision making, that the mayor had a higher public profile, that decision making was more transparent, that the council was better at dealing with cross cutting issues that relationships with partners improved and disagreed more strongly with the statement that political parties dominated decision making (Gains et al, 2006). However the evidence base for improved performance under mayoral governance is weak (Schaap et al, 2009b); Hambleton, 2015; Hepburn and Headlam, 2016 )and the elected mayoral model in the UK both the Greater London version and the city mayor model have been subject to critique.

The governance model adopted in London was said to not offer enough executive powers for the Mayor and these powers have twice been increased with subsequent legislation (Travers, 2013). At the same time the accountability and scrutiny arrangements with the mayor being held to account by a greater London assembly was said to be blurred and weak (Pimlott and Rao 2002; Rao, 2015). Given high profile mayoral failures, for example in Doncaster, the need to have effective checks and balances on the exercise of executive power vested in a single individual is highlighted.

The importance of balancing a governance design to address and economic, social and democratic requirements is highlighted when considering the recent election of the new mayor of Barcelona, Ada Colau. Leading a minority coalition committed to a radical extension of citizen participation, Colau’smayorality is linked to a failure to balance economic and social goals and tackle inequalities alongside securing growth and economic development (Kassam, 2015). The next section of this article will chart the adoption of the ‘metro mayor’ model alongside and as a condition of devolution in Greater Manchester. What comes across from the ‘devo-manc’ developments is an initial focus on economic and social goals and early neglect both of the need for innovation to promote democractic engagement, and the development of robust democratic checks and balances needed to support a balanced institutional design.

The imposition of a metro mayor in GM- a tale of two cities

The announcement that GMwould have a directly elected metro mayor in return for receiving decision making power over devolved budgets on skills and employment development, transport and housing came relatively unexpectedly in November 2014. Although popularly billed at the time as the outcome of backroom deals between officials at the Treasury, the Chancellor George Osborne, the Chief Executive of Manchester City Council Sir Howard Bernstein and the leader of Manchester City Council, Sir Richard Leese: in fact these negotiations represented the culmination of several years of institutional reform in Greater Manchester, and the articulation of economic and social goals for the city region by local political elites coupled with a powerful economic case made nationally about the need to address regional disparity in economic growth (City Growth Commission, 2014). The deal certainly does also reflect the entrepreneurial inclinations of the key political actors in the wake of the Scottish referendum result as well as political calculations by the Chancellor about improving both representation for the Conservative party in northern cities and enhancing his own personal reputation ahead of a likely leadership race. However it is argued here that the antecedents to the GMdeal also fundamentally represent a frank assessment by all these political elites of the relative economic prospects of two cities London and Manchester.

In the Treasury the Chancellorand his officials were increasingly persuaded by the case made by the City Growth Commission and others about the disparity of economic performance between London and the other city regions (City Growth Commission, 2014). Regional economistsargued analysis of economic activity and government spending by region showed both the dominance of London and the South East in terms of inward investment,with consequent pressures on the region’s infrastructure, and the relative underperformance of the other key city regions in England. The solution they advocated was devolved decision making coupled with better connectivity linking cities in the North to stimulate ‘agglomeration’ effects - the development of a critical range of transport infrastructure, housing and business innovation necessary for economic growth (see Raikes, 2016 in this publication). The City Growth Commission’s argument was that ‘If our closely geographicallylocated cities can have the best transportbetween them, allowing their current,and potential future consumers andproducers to feel as though they are allpart of one urban mass, then the benefitsthat typically accrue to London couldbe repeated elsewhere’ (2014, 9).

Away from the centre of government and in the context of a system of very little fiscal autonomy in UK local government (Wilson and Game, 2011), the desire for greater devolution, accompanied by local fiscal autonomy, was advocated by political actors across local government. For example the Communities and Local Government Select Committee held an enquiry and published ‘Devolution in England: the case for local government’ earlier in 2014 (CLG Select Committee, 2014). It was in GMhowever that the necessary cross authority infrastructure needed to address key cross cutting policy agendas affecting the city region had been established. Political elites in GMhad maintained a tradition of cross authority working since the abolition of the GMCounty Council in 1986. In 2011 they became the first group of authorities to establishacombined authority and made it work, despite the political and organisational frictions this entailed (Broadbridge and Raikes, 2015).