Jorea M. Marple v. West Virginia Board of Education and L. Wade Linger, Jr.

Client: West Virginia Board of Education

AIG/BRIM Claim Number 410-124609G

Attorneys: J. Victor Flanagan, Julie Meeks Greco, and Katie L. Hicklin

Jurisdiction: Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia (Civil Action No. 14-C-731)

Opposing Counsel: Timothy N. Barber; Honorable Andrew MacQueen, III; and Thomas Patrick Maroney

Brief Summary of Ruling: The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found qualified immunity barred each of Plaintiff’s claims as Plaintiff’s Complaint failed to allege a cause of action sufficient to overcome Defendants’ discretion to terminate her at-will appointment and, thus, reversed the Circuit Court’s Order and dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Brief Summary of Facts and Claims:

Plaintiff, Jorea M. Marple, filed the instant lawsuit arising out of the termination of her constitutionally and statutorily prescribed at-will appointment as Superintendent of Schools for the State of West Virginia on November 15, 2012, and reaffirmed on November 29, 2012. Dr. Marple asserted that Defendants, West Virginia Board of Education and L. Wade Linger, Jr., Board President at all relevant times, violated her substantive and procedural due process rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the State of West Virginia based upon alleged deprivation of her property interest in her purported entitlement to continued government employment as Superintendent and deprivation of her liberty interest in her potential for future employment, predicated on Mr. Linger’s Statement adopted by the Board on November 29. Dr. Marple also asserted common law claims for defamation, false light, and punitive damages.

Dr. Marple demanded compensatory damages for loss of “life-time reputation in the field of education,” loss of ability to gain employment on “any level approaching” that of Superintendent, extreme mental anguish and suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life; punitive damages; and equitable and injunctive relief in the form of a full hearing to establish the exact charge that led to her employment termination and her response.

By Order, entered November 3, 2015, the Circuit Court denied the Board’s and Mr. Linger’s Motion to Dismiss predicated on qualified immunity from Dr. Marple’s claims.

Summary of Key Rulings in Opinion:

On November 10, 2015, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia filed its Opinion, dismissing Dr. Marple’s Complaint in its entirety against the Board and Mr. Linger. In short, the Supreme Court ruled that qualified immunity bars each of Dr. Marple’s claims as her Complaint fails to allege a claim sufficient to overcome the Board’s and Mr. Linger’s discretion to terminate her employment as Superintendent pursuant to her at-will employment prescribed by the West Virginia Constitution, statutory law, and employment contract. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court’s Order and dismissed Dr. Marple’s Complaint.

As a preliminary matter, the Supreme Court specifically addressed Dr. Marple’s repeatedly misconstruing the legislatively-created State insurance policy exception to sovereign immunity as applying to bar the Board and Mr. Linger from asserting the defense of qualified immunity, holding in new Syllabus Point 2:

The state insurance policy exception to sovereign immunity, created by West Virginia Code § 29-12-5(a)(4) [2006] and recognized in Syllabus Point 2 of Pittsburgh Elevator Co. v. W. Va. Bd. of Regents, 172 W.Va. 743, 310 S.E.2d 675 (1983), applies only to immunity under the West Virginia Constitution and does not extend to qualified immunity. To waive the qualified immunity of a state agency or its official, the insurance policy must do so expressly, in accordance with Syllabus Point 5 of Parkulo v. W. Va. Bd. of Probation & Parole, 199 W.Va. 161, 483 S.E.2d 507 (1996).

The Supreme Court found that Mr. Linger’s Statement that the Board adopted during the Board meeting on November 29 was not stigmatizing enough to implicate Dr. Marple’s liberty interest in her good name and potential in future government employment. The Supreme Court recognized that Mr. Linger’s Statement “may have come as a shock to Dr. Marple, especially in light of her previous accolades,” but that the Statement made clear that the Board did not affix blame upon Dr. Marple and that “[t]he Board is charged with promoting education in West Virginia. In fulfilling that duty, it is not bound to the leadership of a particular superintendent when it discerns that change is in the best interest of West Virginia’s students. To find otherwise, would eviscerate the Board’s discretion as created by the West Virginia Constitution.”

Important to all State agencies having similar discretion to discharge at-will employees, the Supreme Court found that Dr. Marple had no protected property interest in continued employment as Superintendent. The Supreme Court stated that the clear and unambiguous language of the West Virginia Constitution, Article XII, § 2, and West Virginia Code § 18-3-1, designate the position of Superintendent to be at-will, and “the fact that Dr. Marple’s termination came as a surprise to her is insufficient to implicate a property interest.”

The Supreme Court found that qualified immunity also bars Dr. Marple’s remaining claims for defamation, false light, and breach of contract as qualified immunity is not limited to claims for constitutional violations and Dr. Marple’s Complaint fails to show how the Board and Mr. Linger violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right.

Case Significance:

Essentially, the Supreme Court’s ruling settles any question whether persons appointed to statutorily and constitutionally prescribed at-will positions are entitled to life-long appointments or serve at the will and pleasure of the appointing authority. Accordingly, this matter is especially of public importance because had the Supreme Court allowed Dr. Marple to proceed on her meritless claims, for which the Board enjoys qualified immunity, such would have precluded the Board, here, and possibly any other State agency having similar constitutionally and statutorily prescribed authority, from discharging an at-will employee at its will and pleasure, essentially creating an unintended life-long position. Consequently, denying the Board’s qualified immunity would have potentially opened the Court’s floodgates to similar meritless lawsuits by similarly situated employees who are disgruntled by being discharged from their at-will position.

1