John Rawls’s Political Liberalism (1993).
1.Political Justification
The question of political justification is a central topic in Modern Political Theory.
What are the questions to which political justification is the answer?
Q1Why is it better that the state exists rather than not? (Question of existence.)
Q2.What makes it alright for the Govt. to coerce citizens, for example in order to exact compliance with law, in ways we do not ordinarily allow citizens to do? (The question of justified coercion.)
Q3.The question of why I should obey the law, irrespective of the reasons in 2 above. What independent reason do I have to obey the law, apart from the fact that others do, and that I might get caught and punished if I do not? (Question of political obligation, question of compliance.)
Note that these are not the questions which Rawls’ early work,notably A Theory of Justice, sets out to answer. That question is more like:
Q4.What is Social Justice? or more specifically
Q4a.What principles of justice should we choose for evaluating and if necessary redesigning the basic structure of a society of free and equal persons?
N.B. Hence A Theory of Justice can be read as providing an answer to a different set of questions to Political Liberalism rather than as providing a different answer.
However, it can be read as providing a different kind of answer to questions 1 and 2 above. On this view PJ 1 and 2 furnish the criterion of a just society.
The validity of PJ 1 and 2 are established on the basis of familiar conceptions of human nature, personhood and rationality.
Suppose we establish that our society – say the US – more or less conforms to PJ 1 and 2. Now we ask the questions of political justification.
Q1.Question of existence.
Q2.Question of justified coercion.
Q3.Question of compliance or political obligation.
A1.Because the principles according to which the basic structure of society conforms are
a)the ones you would voluntarily choose
b)fair, and the ones you would have chosen if you were fair minded
A2Because this is necessary to the maintenance of the basic structure, which conforms to the principles of justice which are
a)the ones you would voluntarily choose
b)fair, and the ones you would have chosen if you were fair minded
A3.Ditto.
Now there is a problem with this answer, and it is the problem from which Political Liberalism but not A Theory of Justice sets out.
Rawls calls this problem: the fact of reasonable pluralism.
…the serious problem I have in mind concerns the unrealistic idea of how well ordered society as it appears in Theory. An essential feature of how well ordered society associated with justice is fairness is that all its citizens endorse this conception on the basis of what they now call a comprehensive philosophical doctrine. They accept as rooted in this doctrine, its two principles of justice…Now the serious problem is this. A modern democratic society is characterised not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but by pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines. No one of these doctrines is affirmed by citizens generally. Nor should one expect that in the foreseeable future one of them, or some other reasonable doctrine, will ever be affirmed by all, or nearly all, citizens. Political liberalism pursues that, for political purposes, a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of the exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a constitutional democratic regime political liberalism also supposes that a reasonable comprehensive doctrine does not reject the essentials of a democratic regime. Of course a society may also contain unreasonable and irrational, and even mad, comprehensive doctrines. In their case the problem is to contain them so that they do not undermined unity injustice of society. PL xvi
In Theory “the social contract tradition is seen as part of moral philosophy and no distinction is drawn between moral and political philosophy. In Theory a moral doctrine of justice general in scope is not distinguished from a strictly political conception of justice. Nothing is made of the contrast between comprehensive philosophical and moral doctrines and conceptions limited to the domain of political. PL xvi
What he is admitting here is that as presented in Theory the principles of justice, and thus the conception of justice as fairness, rests on comprehensive moral and philosophical doctrines, that given the fact of reasonable pluralism, not everyone can be expected to affirm or accept. But if not everyone accepts the premises, then not everyone can be expected to accept the conclusions.
There are two ways of reading this change of directions.
a)As a retreat from theory.
Richard Rorty’s in “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy” in Rorty, Objectivity, Relativity and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
Chastened by his critics (Sandel among others) Rawls has retreated from the grand theoretical ambitions of Theory. He now offers a contextual defence of modern Western constitutional democracy, rather than a theoretical defence on the basis of slender assumptions and weak, but widely acceptable premises.
b)As an argument to the same conclusions from a different set of premises, that are not open to objection, since they are not based on comprehensive moral and philosophical doctrines.
Anyway Rawls frames the question of political justification in the light of the problem of reasonable pluralism.
“How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal individual citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral theories. Put another way: How is it possible that deeply opposed and thought reasonable comprehensive doctrines may live together and all affirm the political conception of a constitutional regime? PL xviii.
2.Reasonable.
About truth or validity of political principles PL must be silent. Rawls calls this the ‘strategy of avoidance’, and Raz calls it ‘epistemic abstinence’.
Persons are reasonable
a) to the extent that they are motivated and willing to abide by the idea of fair social cooperation, that is, will abide by fair terms so long as others will do likewise.
Reasonableness lies between impartiality and rationality action, between altruistic and self interested action.
b)they accept that even after free and full discussion on moral philosophical and religious matters people are unlikely to reach agreement, and conflicting reasonable judgments are possible.
c)therefore are committed to toleration of other reasonable doctrines
3.Comprehensive doctrine.
“A moral conception is general if it applies to a wide range of subjects and in the limit to all subjects universally. It is comprehensive when it includes conceptions of what is value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct and in the limit to our life as a whole.” PL 13, 175.
It is a scheme of thought that unites some or all values, including importantly non-political values.
Not all moral, philosophical and religious doctrines are fully comprehensive.
“Comprehensive doctrines…belong to what we may call the “background culture” of civil society. This is the culture of the social, not the political. It is the culture of daily life, of its many associations: churches and universities, learned and scientific societies, and clubs and teams, to mention a few…Society’s main institutions and their accepted forms of interpretation, are seen as a fund of implicitly shared ideals and principles.” PL p.14
A CD is a non-public basis of justification.
A CD is a conception of the good, and implies or contains a way of living.
- Political not metaphysical. (Justice as Fairness – Political not Metaphysical.)
So what does he mean by saying that a conception of justice is political?
1.The first of the question of scope. A political conception justice applies to the basic structure of society
“The framework of basic institutions and the principles, standards, and precepts that apply to it, as well as help those norms are to be expressed in the character and attitudes of the members of society who realise its ideals.” (PL 11)
2.The second is the mode of presentation of the conception has a freestanding view.
“The political conception is a module, and essential constituent part, that fits into and can be supported by various reasonable comprehensive doctrines that endure in the society regulated by it.” PL 12
Principles of justice do not depend on any comprehensive moral philosophical or religious doctrine – or the contents thereof. Note even comprehensive liberalism (i.e. liberalism as a scheme of values such as the “liberalisms of Kant and Mill”. PL 135)
- The third feature of a political conception of justice is that it is expressed in terms of certain fundamental ideas. The fundamental idea "of society as a fair system of co-operation over time" along with the idea “of citizens as free and equal persons” and the idea of how well ordered society as a society effectively regulated by political conception of justice.” PL 13
These fundamental ideas are part of an overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines.
Overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines is not a modus Vivendi. A modus vivendi is an agreement to abide by a treaty, not because its terms are fair and because each party is motivated by fair terms of cooperation, but because for each party it would not be wise to violate and to be seen to violate the treaty. This is sometimes the case between states.
But in general both states are ready to pursue their goals at the expense fo the other, and should conditions change they may do so. This background highlights the way in which such a treaty is a mere modus Vivendi. A similar background is present when we think of social consensus founded on self- or group interests, or on the outcome of political bargaining: social unity is only apparent, as its stability is contingent on circumstances remaining such as not to upset the fortunate convergence of interests. PL 147
With the transition from A Theory to Political Liberalism the idea of the person also changes
“The idea of the person as having moral personality with the full capacity of moral agency is transformed into the idea of the citizen.” xlv.
5.The Priority of the Right over the Good.
Overlapping consensus of reasonably doctrines provides a fund of public reasons that can form the basis of public justification.
There is, then, no public justification for political society without a reasonable overlapping consensus, and such a justification also connects with the ideas of stability for the right reasons as well as legitimacy. (RH PL 388-9)”
The idea of public justification is a close cousin of the idea of political legitimacy
The idea of public justification is the key idea in contemporary liberal-democratic political theory. The idea is, roughly, that no regime is legitimate unless it is reasonable from every individual's point of view.” (D’Agostino 1996:
Rawls’s idea of the priority of the right over the good is that the right has priority for functional reasons, namely its demonstrable capacity for producing stability for the fright reasons. It can give rise to public agreement because it is based in an overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines.
Three Levels of Justification
A)Pro tanto – based on the coherence and completeness of the political conception e.g. justice as fairness.
B)Full justification – each citizen checks whether or not they can embed the political conception (whose content is worked out in A above) in their comprehensive doctrine.
C)Public justification – establishing and mutually assuring that all citizens or a sufficiently large number thereof can complete B) such that the political conception is supported by an overlapping consensus.
In order for C) to happen priority must be assigned to all and only political values i.e. all and only contents of an overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines.
Why should priority be assigned.
- political values are “very great values and hence not easily overridden
- value conflicts are much reduced because the political conception