Japan BMD Case Neg

Northwestern Debate Institute 2010 93

Seniors Japan BMD Neg

Japan BMD Case Neg

***Proliferation Turn*** 3

Proliferation Turn---1NC 4

Proliferation Turn---2NC---Uniqueness/Brink 5

Proliferation Turn---2NC---Impact 6

Proliferation Turn---2NC---Alliances Impact 7

Proliferation Turn---2NC---AT: BMD Causes Prolif 8

***North Korea Turn*** 9

North Korea Turn---1NC 10

North Korea Turn---2NC---Uniqueness 12

North Korea Turn---2NC---Link---Deterrence 13

North Korea Turn---2NC---Internal Link---Adventurism/Arms Races 14

North Korea Turn---2NC---Impact---Probability 15

North Korea Turn---2NC---Impact---Aggression/Terrorism 16

North Korea Turn---2NC---Impact---Prolif/NPT Collapse 17

North Korea Turn---2NC---Impact---Korea War (Chol) 18

North Korea Turn---2NC---Impact---Korea War---Russia-China 19

North Korea Turn---2NC---AT: BMD Causes North Korean Prolif 20

North Korea Turn---2NC---AT: Six Party Talks Solve 21

North Korea Turn---2NC---AT: Prolif Causes Stable Deterrence 22

***Iran Turn*** 23

Iran Turn---1NC 24

Iran Turn---2NC---Uniqueness---Yes Iran Threat/Nuclearization 25

Iran Turn---2NC---Uniqueness---AT: European BMD Now 27

Iran Turn---2NC---Uniqueness---AT: U.S. Abandoned European BMD 28

Iran Turn---2NC---Link---Japan Key to European BMD 30

Iran Turn---2NC---Link---BMD Key to Deterrence 32

Iran Turn---2NC---Internal Link---Iranian Adventurism 33

Iran Turn---2NC---Impact---Iranian Prolif 34

Iran Turn---2NC---Impact---U.S. Retaliation 35

Iran Turn---2NC---Impact---AT: No Lashout/Adventurism 36

***U.S.-Japan Alliance Turn*** 37

U.S.-Japan Alliance Turn---1NC 38

U.S.-Japan Alliance Turn---2NC---Uniqueness 40

U.S.-Japan Alliance Turn---2NC---Link---BMD Key 41

U.S.-Japan Alliance Turn---2NC---Impact---Laundry List 43

U.S.-Japan Alliance Turn---2NC---Impact---Asian Stability 44

U.S.-Japan Alliance Turn---2NC---Impact---Economy 46

U.S.-Japan Alliance Turn---2NC---Impact 47

U.S.-Japan Alliance Turn---2NC---Impact---Korea/Taiwan War 48

U.S.-Japan Alliance Turn---2NC---Impact---Rearm 49

U.S.-Japan Alliance Turn---2NC---Impact---Warming 50

U.S.-japan Alliance Turn---2NC---Impact---Chinese Rise 51

U.S.-Japan Alliance Turn---2NC---Impact---Taiwan 52

***Japan Politics Disad*** 53

Japanese Politics Disad---1NC 54

Japanese Politics DA---2NC---Uniqueness---Top of Agenda 57

Japanese Politics DA---2NC---Japanese Economy---Brink 58

Japanese Politics DA---2NC---Japanese Economy Impact 59

***Case*** 60

AT: BMD Fails 61

AT: BMD Fails 62

AT: BMD Fails---AT: ICBMs 63

AT: No Japanese Commitment 64

AT: Constitution Impact 65

AT: BMD Collapses Nonprolif 66

China Advantage---1NC 67

China Advantage---1NC---AT: Taiwan 69

China Advantage---1NC---AT: ASATs 70

China Advantage---1NC---AT: ASATs 71

China Advantage---2NC---Modernization 72

China Advantage---2NC---Modernization Inevitable 73

AT: Sino-Russia Alliance Add-On 74

AT: Defense Budget Add-On 75

AT: Defense Budget Add-On 76

AT: Defense Budget Add-On---2NC Uniqueness 77

AT: Defense Budget Add-On---2NC---BMD Key to Japanese DIB 78

AT: Defense Budget Add-On---BMD Lifts Export Ban 79

AT: Russia Add-On 80

AT: Russia Add-On---AT: INF Impact 81

AT: Russia Add-On---AT: INF---Iskander Missiles 82

AT Russia Add-On – Russia Likes BMD 83

***Misc*** 84

Politics Link---Plan Unpopular 85

Politics Link---Flip-Flop 86

Japanese BMD Good – SoKo/Australia/India Relations 87

***Ban Space Weaponization CP 88

Ban Space Weaponization CP---1NC 89

Ban Space Weaponization CP---2NC---Solvency 91

***US-Russia Cooperation CP 92

U.S.-Russia Cooperation CP---1NC 93

***Proliferation Turn***

Proliferation Turn---1NC

US-Japan BMD key to checking prolif

Swaine et. al. ‘7

(Michael D. Swaine, 12/7, Ph.D., Harvard University, Senior Associate and Co-Director of the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Rachel M. Swanger and Takashi Kawakami @ Rand, “Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense,” p.RAND)

Finally, Japanese participation in a successful BMD program might contribute to a reduction in the global and regional proliferation of ballistic missiles and related technologies. Japan strongly supports global arms control and counterproliferation efforts. By demonstrating that ballistic missile defense is both technologically feasible and financially affordable, those who seek to acquire or transfer ballistic missiles or ballistic missile technologies might conclude that their efforts are worthless and wasteful.5

Nuclear war

Utgoff ‘2

(Victor – deputy director for strategy, forces and resources division at the Institute for Defense Analysis, Survival, p. OUP Journals)

Widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear "six-shooters" on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations

Proliferation Turn---2NC---Uniqueness/Brink

Spread of advanced tech is increasing prolif

Swaine et. al. ‘7

First and foremost, the spread of advanced military technology over the past ten years has made it possible for a growing number of countries to acquire, by indigenous production or importation, basic ballistic missile systems and matching conventional and unconventional warheads, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD)— chemical, biological, and possibly nuclear weapons. Second, of perhaps greatest concern, these missile-related capabilities are being developed or acquired by specific “countries of concern” to the United States, such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya. Even the possibility of ballistic missile use by such states could severely complicate U.S. and allied decisionmaking during future crises, especially if such missiles are WMD-armed. Third, the danger posed by such developments to U.S. forward-based forces, allies, and friends was demonstrated by Iraq’s use of shortrange ballistic missiles against United Nations (UN) coalition forces during the 1991 Gulf War and by North Korea’s development of medium-range ballistic missiles in the 1990s. Moreover, the potential danger posed to the United States was at least suggested by Introduction 3 Pyongyang’s subsequent efforts to develop a long-range missile capable of striking U.S. territory.

Proliferation Turn---2NC---Impact

Prolif makes global diplomatic relations unstable – even small triggers set off nuclear wars and make U.S. intervention impossible, destroying U.S. influence

Sokolski ‘9

(Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, serves on the U.S. Congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, June-July 2009, “Avoiding a Nuclear Crowd,” Hoover Policy Review, online: http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/46390537.html)

So far, the U.S. has tried to cope with independent nuclear powers by making them “strategic partners” (e.g., India and Russia), NATO nuclear allies (France and the UK), “non-NATO allies” (e.g., Israel and Pakistan), and strategic stakeholders (China); or by fudging if a nation actually has attained full nuclear status (e.g., Iran or North Korea, which, we insist, will either not get nuclear weapons or will give them up). In this world, every nuclear power center (our European nuclear NATO allies), the U.S., Russia, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan could have significant diplomatic security relations or ties with one another but none of these ties is viewed by Washington (and, one hopes, by no one else) as being as important as the ties between Washington and each of these nuclear-armed entities (see Figure 3). There are limits, however, to what this approach can accomplish. Such a weak alliance system, with its expanding set of loose affiliations, risks becoming analogous to the international system that failed to contain offensive actions prior to World War I. Unlike 1914, there is no power today that can rival the projection of U.S. conventional forces anywhere on the globe. But in a world with an increasing number of nuclear-armed or nuclear-ready states, this may not matter as much as we think. In such a world, the actions of just one or two states or groups that might threaten to disrupt or overthrow a nuclear weapons state could check U.S. influence or ignite a war Washington could have difficulty containing. No amount of military science or tactics could assure that the U.S. could disarm or neutralize such threatening or unstable nuclear states.22 Nor could diplomats or our intelligence services be relied upon to keep up to date on what each of these governments would be likely to do in such a crisis (see graphic below): Combine these proliferation trends with the others noted above and one could easily create the perfect nuclear storm: Small differences between nuclear competitors that would put all actors on edge; an overhang of nuclear materials that could be called upon to break out or significantly ramp up existing nuclear deployments; and a variety of potential new nuclear actors developing weapons options in the wings. In such a setting, the military and nuclear rivalries between states could easily be much more intense than before. Certainly each nuclear state’s military would place an even higher premium than before on being able to weaponize its military and civilian surpluses quickly, to deploy forces that are survivable, and to have forces that can get to their targets and destroy them with high levels of probability. The advanced military states will also be even more inclined to develop and deploy enhanced air and missile defenses and long-range, precision guidance munitions, and to develop a variety of preventative and preemptive war options. Certainly, in such a world, relations between states could become far less stable. Relatively small developments — e.g., Russian support for sympathetic near-abroad provinces; Pakistani-inspired terrorist strikes in India, such as those experienced recently in Mumbai; new Indian flanking activities in Iran near Pakistan; Chinese weapons developments or moves regarding Taiwan; state-sponsored assassination attempts of key figures in the Middle East or South West Asia, etc. — could easily prompt nuclear weapons deployments with “strategic” consequences (arms races, strategic miscues, and even nuclear war). As Herman Kahn once noted, in such a world “every quarrel or difference of opinion may lead to violence of a kind quite different from what is possible today.”23 In short, we may soon see a future that neither the proponents of nuclear abolition, nor their critics, would ever want.

Prolif magnifies international tensions – creates pressure to demonstrate resolve, which causes escalation – prolif optimists assume static threat perceptions

Knopf ‘2 (Jeffrey W. Knopf, Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, October 2002, “Recasting the proliferation optimism-pessimism debate,” Security Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1, p. 57-58)

Nuclear weapons can exacerbate tensions in two ways: by creating an increased perception of threat and by prompting efforts to limit damage in the event of nuclear war. On the first point, proliferation optimists write as if potential adversaries exist at a given, fixed level of hostility. This is unlikely to be the case. Rather, a state that acquires nuclear weapons is likely to be perceived as more threatening than it was before. This will be partly because of the new, more destructive capabilities at its disposal. In some cases, however, a state’s pursuit of nuclear weapons may also change how other states view its intentions. This is especially likely because new and aspiring nuclear states are not always circumspect in their pronouncements. In March 1994, in the midst of a crisis over North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons program, the North’s chief negotiator threatened his South Korean counterpart that a war could break out in which the South would be turned into “a sea of fire.”47 After the May 1998 nuclear tests in India, Prime Minister Vajpayee wrote President Clinton and explicitly cited a threat from China as a motivation for the tests. Statements by Defense Minister Fernandes shortly before and again shortly after the tests also described China as “potential threat number one” to India.48 Other Indian officials publicly warned Pakistan to end its support for separatist insurgents in Kashmir. Home Minister Advani called on Islamabad to “realize the change in the geostrategic situation” and said that in the new circumstances even the option of “hot pursuit” would not be ruled out.49 Such statements are bound to be provocative to the states against which they are directed. States on the receiving end of new, public nuclear threats will likely feel a need to display their toughness as a way to show they will not be intimidated. While nuclear weapons do encourage caution, they can also create pressures to demonstrate resolve, and any such demonstration carries with it some risk of escalation.

Proliferation Turn---2NC---Alliances Impact

Prolif crushes alliances

Pfaltzgraff and Van Cleave ‘9

(Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School, Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis; Dr. William R. Van Cleave, Professor Emeritus Department of Defense and Strategic Studies Missouri State University, “Missile Defense,the Space Relationship,& the Twenty-First Century” https://www.claremont.org/repository/docLib/200901291_iwg2009.pdf)

This itemized list of advances in ballistic missile capabilities in recent years, if viewed individually, might still understate the dangers to the United States and its allies. The proliferation of ballistic missile capabilities by potential enemies, both states and non-state actors, must be viewed more broadly. It carries with it the implication that America and its allies may face coalitions of missile powers as additional states acquire such capabilities. For example, Russia or China could decide to back North Korea in a confrontation with South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Likewise, U.S. allies may drop out in the face of such a combined threat stemming from enemy coalitions whose members are armed with ballistic missiles, thus possibly confronting the United States with the larger missile threat presented by such a combination of missile possessors. Furthermore, in an emerging multi-polar world where ballistic missile and nuclear proliferation create an increasingly complex coalition dynamic, the unpredictability factor increases dramatically and must be addressed. The analogy of two scorpions in a bottle that characterized the U.S.-Soviet confrontation in the Cold War is giving way to multiple scorpions in a bottle, with all the complexity, unpredictability, and danger that this possibility implies.

Alliances prevent nuclear war

Ross ‘99

(Ross, Winter 1998/1999, Douglas – professor of political science at Simon Fraser University, Canada’s functional isolationism and the future of weapons of mass destruction, International Journal, p. lexis)

Thus, an easily accessible tax base has long been available for spending much more on international security than recent governments have been willing to contemplate. Negotiating the landmines ban, discouraging trade in small arms, promoting the United Nations arms register are all worthwhile, popular activities that polish the national self-image. But they should all be supplements to, not substitutes for, a proportionately equitable commitment of resources to the management and prevention of international conflict – and thus the containment of the WMD threat. Future American governments will not ‘police the world’ alone. For almost fifty years the Soviet threat compelled disproportionate military expenditures and sacrifice by the United States. That world is gone. Only by enmeshing the capabilities of the United States and other leading powers in a co-operative security management regime where the burdens are widely shared does the world community have any plausible hope of avoiding warfare involving nuclear or other WMD.