INFANTRY NCM TRAINING PROGRESSION REVIEW – STAGE 2 REPORT

1. Introduction. At the Extended Infantry Advisory Board (XIAB) the Infantry School was tasked to conduct a comprehensive review of NCM training progression. A project team was established to analyse the current situation and to generate training options that would, in turn, lead to the development of coherent and comprehensive plan that will optimise the infantry soldier’s training progression. This report presents the findings of the Gap and Training Needs analysis phases of the review. A copy of the presentation to be delivered to the CIA is attached as Enclosure 1.

2. Situation. It is anticipated that a bow-wave of young infantry privates and corporals will develop in the coming years and that these individuals will move rapidly through the junior ranks. They will have less time in each post, which will limit the experience level and maturity at each stage of the training system. The Infantry Corps must therefore maximize the value and effectiveness of the training progression in accordance with the needs of the battalions.

Fig 1. The current problem: a steep learning curve followed by skill fades.

Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the problems currently faced by the Infantry Corps. The DP 1 -3 training model teaches NCOs the basic skills necessary to command a section approximately 3-5 years prior to his taking on a section commander’s appointment, though he does occasionally and temporarily undertake these duties for operational reasons. A training gap emerges because we train section 2ICs to conduct tasks that they will not use (regularly) until they are section commanders. PLQ candidates do not have the requisite experience to fully assimilate the leadership and tactical training of the infantry section in all phases of war & the COE. The learning curve is extreme and the clarity of the conceptual understanding gained through this training is therefore questionable. This is compounded by the difficulties he experiences in maintaining his currency in these fields when he is not employed in a command role. Skill fade between training and appointment as a section commander is high. The current skill at arms course does little to mitigateagainst this since the individual is effectively given technical training when he needs to have his practical skills developed and command aptitudes honed.

NCM 2020 provided a frame of reference the Project Team’s analysis. It clearly articulates the skills and aptitudes that NCMs require in today’s army and the army of the future: they must be equipped to cope with massive change in the operational environment and the demands of ongoing military transformation. The following implications are particularly relevant:

• As the COE evolves so do the nature of the missions NCMs will undertake: there is therefore a requirement to ensure that training includes lessons learned both institutionally and on operations. Training methods and course content must keep pace with technological developments. Both of these factors underline the need for training to be up to date at the time of delivery.

•It is not enough for junior commanders simply to lead on operations. They must also be able to train their own troops and to prepare them for the fight. Arguably the best way to learn a subject in detail is to teach it to others. There is an emphasis here is on instructional ability.

3.Assumptions Made and Methodology. From the outset it was clear to the Project Team that some assumptions had to be made and that a coherent methodology had to be adopted:

  1. LFSAT. The project followed the conventions of the Land Force Systems Approach to Training (LFSAT). The team initially considered the range of non commissioned Job Based Specifications (JBS) in order to ensure the range of necessary task skills, performance levels and knowledge sets were clearly identified for each stage of the infantryman’s career. The team collaborated with DAT 3-6 in the production of new, more accurate and comprehensive JBS for non-commissioned infantrymen.
  1. JBS. The new JBS includes the tasks and knowledge sets associated with Stability Operations, including COIN and Peace Support Operations (in addition to, or as a subset of, war fighting). When this is translated into the training design process it will ensure that training includes FSO and is firmly based in the COE, thus institutionalising changes that have been made as a result of CF transformation and born of experience of combined, JIMP enabled, 21st Century warfare.
  1. Stakeholder Input. All Infantry Corps stakeholders were asked provide input to the study. The findings of this report will be briefed to the CIA 21 - 24 May 2009.
  1. Proposals For Change. Changes to the current system will not be made unless they are fully justified through proposed improvements to training outputs and increased resource efficiencies. A coherent change management programme must be established to deal holistically with changes to the progression if they are to be implemented successfully.
  1. Just in Time Training. Training must be delivered ‘Just in Time’ for the soldier to fulfill an appointment. This philosophy will ensure that individuals are given up to date and effective training. It will therefore ensure that individuals are current and competent on arrival for each appointment. This principle also implies that the soldier should receive ‘Just Enough’ training for his role.
  1. Lean production and Training Flow. The project focussed on the flow that individuals follow through the training system as they progress from Rifleman to SNCO. The Lean Production (LP) model must be followed if this flow is to be made as smooth and efficient as possible. The following tenets are germane to LP:

i. Add nothing but value (do not over train).

ii. Concentrate on Flow (commit training resources only where and when necessary).

iii. Eliminate waste in the training system:

(a) Remove unnecessary material at each stage of training.

(b) Avoid unnecessary transportation (between employment locations and training establishments – decentralise where possible).

(c) Correct defects (remove incorrect or inappropriate training or processes).

4.Criteria For a Successful Sequencing Option. This report outlines 3 proposed sequencing options for the training progression for Inf NCMs. The criteria for the best sequencing choice would be a training solution that delivers:

  1. Meets the Strategic Objectives of NCM 2020 by producing soldiers and commanders who are current and competent and have learned all of the latest lessons through ‘Just in Time’ training and are tactically excellence. Leadership training should quickly establish the emphasis on instruction, mentorship and development of subordinates.
  1. The training flow that will match the JBS requirements for each Infantry position: i.e training must be delivered in time and according to need.
  1. Resource efficiency must be maximised especially in terms of training time. This is important from the individual perspective as well as that of the battalions and training establishments.

5. Options Considered. A full breakdown of the proposed options can be found at enclosure 1.The following options were considered:

  1. Option 1. The Status Quo was the first option considered. As noted in para 3.d the status quo will only be abandoned if changes can be fully justified. That said, the situation as described in para 2 clearly identifies a growing training gap that is developing as a result of the current training sequence.
  1. Option 2: Improved Sequencing. Option 2 does not involve the addition of any new material to the training courses, but it proposes movement of content of the courses around in order to provide a better flow through the training progression. Some key features of this option are:
  1. Removal of some duplication on DP1 Inf would make it possible to move 9mm and 60mm training into this phase. This effectively means that a rifleman will be trained on all of the individual and section weapons that he may operate.
  1. IPSWQ would remain, but will now be a true support weapons course, including CASW.
  1. Section 2ICs would complete PLQ plusthe amended PLQ Inf. They will receive an introduction to section commander’s duties, the estimate and orders process and the requirements of tactical command in all phases of war. However, the emphasis will be on section administration and command support tasks. There will be a new emphasis on instructional competencies (specifically through conventional range management and weapons instruction) and the section 2IC will be well placed to support the Section commander in mentoring troops and the training and preparation of the section for operations.
  1. Section commanders would receive comprehensive and up to date tactical command training immediately before they assume a command appointment.
  1. Field Firing Qualifications will be attained at the DP 3B stage. The vast majority of individuals currently trained to conduct field firing never use that skill set. When they are called upon to do so it is usually as Warrant officers, rather than as Sgts. A training gap inevitably develops as a result of skill fade etc. Under this model Field Firing Training will be delivered at the time when the individuals are most likely to use it i.e. as a Pl Warrant of senior instructor i.e. at the DP 3B stage. This will ensure that those running field firing are current and competent.
  1. Option 3: Improved Sequencing & Train FFQ to Need. Option 3 builds onthe themes developed in Option 2, but also suggests the benefits of improved sequencing and providing field firing training of a ‘train to need’ basis, thus delivering better resource efficiency through Lean Production. Training individuals in subject matter that they never use is quite obviously an example of over training and a waste of resources. This option proposes that a Field Firing Qualification Course is established as an OSS and that the infantry employs a train to need policy: those who are going into appointments that involve field firing (Platoon Warrants positions, instructor billets and the like) undertake the training when they actually need it.

6.Comparison of Options. Each option should be assessed according to the criteria established in para 4. The Project Team conducted a thorough analysis of the training days associated with each of the courses for DP1-3, and will make the figures available to the LFDTS staff for further staff scrutiny. This report will not delve into the various spreadsheets in question, however, a quick summary of the figures will bring this slide to life. The headline issues are:

•Option 2 & 3 would deliver efficiencies by removing duplication in DP1 and realigning some of the content of IPSWQ. 3.5 days worth of duplication could be removed from DP1 and 9mm trg and 60mm mortar training inserted. We have assumed the need to fit CASW, .50 MG firing into this phase, which would still result in a total reduction in IPSWQ by 1 Day.

•Realignment of content means that Option 2 & 3 may result in a small increase of 4 days trg at the PLQ stage. However, graduates of this course would be range qualified and weapons instructors, making them far better equipped to train and mentor their subordinates. The tactical training of section commanders would also be delivered at the right time i.e. there would be no skill fade between course and employment. The potential increase in PLQ could be prevented through innovative training design and delivery methods.

• Both options 2 &3 would see a significant reduction in the time allocated to DP3A (i.e the pre section command course). This course would be 14 days shorter than the current skill at arms course and it would be reoriented towards tactical leadership. Institutionally Option 2 will still result in an overall reduction in time allocated to training since the Field Firing package will be delivered at the DP3B stage, which has a lower throughput than DP3A. Option 3 would provide even greater savings by training only those who actually need the field firing qualification.

•Option 2 would provide a saving of 2240 Army Trg Days per year over Option 1 (Removing the FFQ portion from 3A, which amounts to a saving of 3360 trg days per year, and then adding 1120 days of FFQ trg to 3B.)

•Option 3 would provide a minimum saving of 2240 Army Trg days per year, potentially saving many , many more. (This will be dependant on the number of personnel the chain of command identifies as needing the FF Qualification).

7. Recommendation. The Project Team’s believes that Option 3 is represents the optimal blend of strategic relevance, smooth training flow and resource efficiency. Figure 2 demonstrates the expected results of this proposal:

Fig 2. Expected results of Option 3: a smoother training progression and no training gap.

If training was resequenced and FFQ training delivered on a train to need basis the Infantry NCO would be developed more progressively. At the DP1 and early DP2 stages to be competent and qualified to operate all infantry weapons systems. Later in DP2 the soldier would be trained in the arts of discipline, physical fitness training, conventional range management. Infantry-specific training would now emphasise instruction and small arms coaching. A portion of basic section tactics training would be remain in PLQ Inf for Section 2ICs; they would be introduced to battle drills, the control of direct fire, patrolling, and FSO in the COE (this will be delivered on PLQ). MCpls who are selected for promotion to Sgt would then receive further training in section tactics and leadership at the section level in the platoon and company context (delivered on DP3A).Field Firing would become an OSS, where the traintoneed principle would be used to determine who will be needed as qualified individuals to run stage 4 & 5 ranges. This training could be delivered anywhere in the DP3 stage.

The end product would be Section 2ICs who are current and competent in section administration, weapons instruction, small arms coaching and section tactical tasks and Section Commanders who would be experts in section-level operations in a platoon and company context. The Project Team therefore recommends that the Infantry Corps adopts option 3 as the optimal training sequencing solution.

CONCLUSION

The results of this report will be briefed to the CIA in May 2009. The Project Team will recommend that Option 3 is adopted, but it is expected that there will be lively debate before any decision is made. Should the Director of Infantry decide to proceed with any of the resequencing options there will be a clear need to brief AITA, DAT and the wider LFDTS chain of command. A carefully constructed and managed change management programme would be needed to ensure the success of the proposed initiative. The existing Project Team will be ready to provide the focus and leadership necessary to guide the programme to a successful conclusion.

D DOBSON

Major

Ext 2400

Enclosure 1. Project Team Presentation for the CIA 21 – 24 May 09.