I Jornada De Estudios Asiáticos. 5 De Abril De 2008

I Jornada de Estudios Asiáticos. 5 de abril de 2008.

“Characteristics of the decreasing growing rates in the Japanese population”.

By: Rodrigo Juri

Global Overview of the Problem

In August of 2006 several mass media were announcing the reduction in the size of the population in Japan (1,2).

Indeed, according to official sources, the population of Japan in 2005 was 127.757.000 inhabitants. This represents nearly 19,000 less people than the previous year (3).

Nevertheless this phenomenon it was not unexpected. During the last three a decades it has been possible to see a strong deceleration of the population growth in Japan. Since then, many studies had been attending this problem and many of them were anticipating this point where the growing rates finally became negative.

Even more, this demographic behavior is not an exclusive characteristic of Japan. Many nations had been showing population growing rates even smaller than those in Japan. Indeed,european countries has been dealing with this phenomenon even before than in Japan.

The CIA World Factbook in its 2006 edition (4), that estimate the population growing rate of Japan in this year as 0.02, it shows that other 35 countries has even lower numbers. Latvia (- 0,67), Bulgaria (- 0,86), and Trinidad and Tobago (- 2,43) are the names that are in the bottom positions of this ranking.

The countries with low population growth can be divided in two main groups. One of them is constituted by undeveloped countries, with low life expectancy, high infant mortality, and other variables that locate them in unfavorable positions within the Index of Human Development (5). In that group the main causes for the reduced growing rates are associated to physical, economical and political conditions that are serious threads for human life itself.

The other group, to which Japan belongs, refers to countries that has absolutely opposite characteristics; high life expectancy, low infantile mortality, and as a whole, nations with far better positions in the Index of Human Development. By simplicity, we will associate this group to that of the countries members of the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), which includes the most developed countries in the world.

Table 1

Annual Population Growth rates, Fertility, Life Expectancy, and Index of Human Development of the countries members of the OECD (4,5).

Country / Growing
Rate (%) / Fertility
(TFR) / Life Expectancy
(years) / Index of Human Development
and Position
Hungary / -0.25 / 1.25 / 72.40 / 0.869 (35)
Czech Republic / -0.06 / 1.18 / 76.02 / 0.885 (30)
Poland / -0.05 / 1.38 / 74.74 / 0.862 (37)
Germany / -0.02 / 1.38 / 78.80 / 0.932 (21)
Japan / 0.02 / 1.41 / 81.25 / 0.949 (7)
Italy / 0.04 / 1.18 / 79.81 / 0.940 (17)
Austria / 0.09 / 1.39 / 79.07 / 0.944 (14)
Belgium / 0.13 / 1.61 / 78.77 / 0.945 (13)
Spain / 0.13 / 1.15 / 79.65 / 0.938 (19)
Finland / 0.14 / 1.70 / 78.50 / 0.947 (11)
Sweden / 0.16 / 1.53 / 80.51 / 0.951 (5)
Greece / 0.18 / 1.33 / 79.24 / 0.921 (24)
United Kingdom / 0.28 / 1.74 / 78.54 / 0.940 (18)
Denmark / 0.33 / 1.73 / 77.79 / 0.943 (15)
France / 0.35 / 1.80 / 79.73 / 0.942 (16)
Portugal / 0.36 / 1.47 / 77.53 / 0.904 (28)
Norway / 0.38 / 1.81 / 79.54 / 0.965 (1)
Korea, South / 0.42 / 1.72 / 76.85 / 0.912 (26)
Switzerland / 0.43 / 1.47 / 80.51 / 0.947 (9)
Netherlands / 0.49 / 1.64 / 78.96 / 0.947 (10)
Australia / 0.85 / 1.79 / 80.50 / 0.957 (3)
Iceland / 0.87 / 2.03 / 80.31 / 0.960 (2)
Canada / 0.88 / 1.64 / 80.22 / 0.950 (6)
United States / 0.91 / 2.06 / 77.85 / 0.948 (8)
New Zealand / 0.99 / 1.80 / 78.81 / 0.936 (20)
Turkey / 1.06 / 2.16 / 72.36 / 0.757 (92)
Ireland / 1.15 / 1.91 / 77.56 / 0.956 (4)
Mexico / 1.16 / 2.67 / 75.19 / 0.821 (53)
Israel / 1.18 / 2.60 / 79.46 / 0.927 (23)
Luxembourg / 1.23 / 1.70 / 78.89 / 0.945 (12)

As it is shown in Table 1, most of the countries of the OECD has annual population growth rates lower than 0,50 and only 4 of them have higher rates than the average world growth rate (that is 1.14).

It is clear that in comparison to rest of the nations of the world, the countries members of the OECD, as a group, have significantly smaller population growth rates. Also, and by definition, they enjoy a remarkably higher level of development.

Also it can be seenin the same table that small population growth is associated to low total fertility rates (TFR).

The TFR represents the number of children that a woman gives to birth during all her fertile life (assumed between 15 and 49 years old), and indicates how many children has a woman in average. Therefore, if the size of a population is going to stay stable in time (at least by its mathematical definition) this variable should be 2, assuming equal amount of children men and women. Nevertheless, and considering other conditions, it is accepted that industrialized countries needs a TFR of 2.08 in order to keep the size of its population unchanged (6). A higher value implies that the population is growing.

The world-wide TFR in 2006 was of 2.80. No country member of the OECD has a TFR higher than the world average.

As it is possible to see in table 1, only 5 of the 30 OECD countries have fertility rates equal or higher than 2. This means that only in fertility terms, the women of the great majority of the developed countries are not giving to birth a sufficient amount of children to maintain the population levels. The fact that many of these countries still have positive rates of population growth should be consequence of other factors that compensate in part the effect of their small fertility rates. Two main factors in this sense are low mortality and incoming net flow of immigrants.

Therefore, it is possible to say that the low rates of population growth in the developed countries are associated to small rates of net fertility. Within the group of the developed countries, Japan is not an exception. It is not the country that shows the lowest growth rate (Hungary), nor smallest rate of fertility (Spain). Nevertheless some elements make its case special.

If we observe the top ten developed countries with smallest population growth rates, Japan is the only one that at the same time it is within the top ten countries with highest Index of Human Development. Also it is the only one with a life expectancy higher than 80 years. In fact, should be noted in this last sense that the proportion of people of 65 years or older has increased from 12% in 1990 to 14,6% in the 2005 (3), and it is expected to reach 22% in the 2010 (7).

It is not only that Japanis showing very low rates of population growth, and even negative if we look at the last official reports, but also:

a) These processes represent long term tendencies, given the low fertility rates and the significant increasing in the proportion of older people in the population. It is not the typical scenery consequence of unfavorable economic or political conditions, as it can be the case of most of the underdeveloped nations or historical examples of the past. Rather than that, it corresponds to a behavior that can be appreciated in most of the developed countries with relative abundance of resources and stable political environment. Thisphenomenonhas never seen before in past ages.

b) Even within the developed countries, Japan shows the most accelerated ageing of the population (7).

Both elements together make that the demographic estimations anticipate that Japan will be the developed country that will show the most significant and accelerated reduction in its population during the next the 50 years (See Table 2).

Table 2

Estimation of the Population Growth Rate for the member countries of the OECD (8)

Country / Growth Population Rate in 50 years (%) / Country / Growth Population Rate in 50 years (%)
Australia / 0.00 / Luxembourg / 0.67
Austria / -0.50 / Netherlands / -0.20
Belgium / -0.36 / New Zealand / -0.16
Canada / 0.22 / Norway / -0.10
Czech Republic / -0.70 / Poland / -0.79
Denmark / -0.21 / Portugal / -0.63
Finland / -0.42 / Spain / -0.67
France / -0.32 / Sweden / -0.13
Germany / -0.45 / Switzerland / -0.45
Greece / -0.39 / United Kingdom / -0.11
Hungary / -0.56 / United States / -0.67
Iceland / -0.08 / Israel / 0.20
Ireland / 0.19 / Mexico / 0.22
Italy / -0.61 / Turkey / -0.12
Japan / -0.85 / Korea, South / -0.77

General Characteristics of the Population Growth in Japan

In the years after the end of World War II, Japan showed a sudden increase in its population growth rates, reaching levels of 5% in 1946. During the two following decades the population growth returned to more normal values (around 1% annual), although in the first years of the 70' a new increase in the growth is observed, reaching 2.3% in 1972.

From that point the population growth rates had been descending until reaching negative values in 2005 (3).

The main features of this phenomenon are shown in figure 1.

Figure 1

Population and growth rate in Japan

(Taken from “Population Statistics of Japan, 2006” (3))

Essentially, the cause of this phenomenon is a synchronized reduction (although in different magnitude) of birth and mortality rates in the country. The migration rates, the other variable that could generate modifications in the population size, shows an erratic and unpredictable behavior but usually with negative character (3), producing even smaller results in the composition of the three factors.

In fact, the deceleration of the Japanese population growth is strongly associated with a relatively constant reduction in the amount of births. In 1949, 2.696.638 births were registered in Japan (excluded the Okinawa prefecture), and never after this line has been surpassed again. Between 1953 and 1970 the people born stayed below 2 million per year. A small “baby boom” took place at the beginning of the 70', but soon the birth rate fall again in 1975. In 2004, 1.110.721 births were registered, representing only a 41.19% of the 1950 births (3). If after the War, 5 children were born in Japan, today only 2 do the same.

Tables 3 and 4 show the evolution of the births and the TFR from the end of the World War II until now.

It is possible see in table 4 that from second half of the 70', the TFR reached such low values that it could not sustain the levels of population by itself, ceteris paribus. In spite of that, further expansion in the population is observed in Japan until 2005. Indeed, if the other variables that affect the population growth (migrations and mortality) were kept unchanged, the reduction in the size of the Japanese population should have been much more fast and dramatic. Therefore, one of these variables has been delaying the full expression of the direct consequences of a low TFR.

For example, in the case of the United States, that also it has low fertility rates (around 2), the population increase that has been verified in the last decades is consequence of a constant incoming flow of immigrants (6).

Table 3

Births registered in Japan (1947-2004) (3)

Table 4

Average Total Fertility Rates in periods of 5 years (1950-2004) (3)

It is possible see in table 4 that from second half of the 70', the TFR reached such low values that it could not sustain the levels of population by itself, ceteris paribus. In spite of that, further expansion in the population is observed in Japan until 2005. Indeed, if the other variables that affect the population growth (migrations and mortality) were kept unchanged, the reduction in the size of the Japanese population should have been much more fast and dramatic. Therefore, one of these variables has been delaying the full expression of the direct consequences of a low TFR.

For example, in the case of the United States, that also it has low fertility rates (around 2), the population increase that has been verified in the last decades is consequence of a constant incoming flow of immigrants (6).

In the Japanese case, this does not explain the apparent contradiction. The behavior of the net migration rate is quite erratic (See table 5). Nevertheless, two main features characterize this variable:

First, it is an index that most of the time has a negative values, expressing the fact that more people is leaving the country than people coming to live into it. So, in general, the migration rate, aggravates the situation produced by the reductions in the TFR, this is, it helps in the deceleration of the population growth.

Second, the added net values of migration, even when they are positive, represent a minimum fraction in comparison with the amount of births. Approximately 1% of the change in the Japanese population can be explained by the rates of migration.

Table 5

Added Net MigrationFlow in periods of 5 years (rounded) (3).

If not migration, the other variable capable of moderate the effects of the low TFR over the population size is the mortality. In fact, only an important reduction in mortality rates could explain this evidence.

As can be seen in table 6, since the end of World War II, and until the middle of the 50', there is a notorious reduction in the amount of deaths in the country. From that point, the variable stays in a relatively constant value, around 700,000 deaths by year, during a quarter of a century. From the beginnings of the 80' it is observable a slow increasing in the deaths, surpassing the barrier of the million in 2003.

Table 6

Deaths registered in Japan (1947-2004) (3)

Other indexes could help us to understand this process. As an example, the life expectancy when being born in 1947 was 50.06 years for men and 53.96 for the women (3). So, if life expectancy had stayed constant in time, in the last decade more than 2 million of japaneses should have dead by year. Of course, the real number is at least half smaller.

Although in the last decades the numbers of deaths in Japan have been increasing, this increase has been much smaller than if not by the fact that nowadays the japaneses are living much longer that before.

Indeed, the life expectancy when being born in the 2004 was of 78.64 years for the men and 85.59 for the women (3). Today, a recent born baby was expected to live 30 years more than his grand-grandfathers.

Another related index is the infant mortality, that in 1947 it was of 76.7 by 1000 births. In the 2004 that number has been reduced to 2.8 (3). So, deaths had been concentrating in the last periods of the life cycle, not anymore in the first stages.

Then, during last the thirty years it is possible to appreciate an important deceleration of the population growth in Japan, whose main cause is a reduction in the fertility. On the other hand, this effect has been compensated by an increase in the life expectancy of the japaneses that has produced smaller mortality rates.

The major direct consequences of this situation are two;

a) A progressive increase in the average age of the japaneses, or in other words, a relative ageing of the population. It is not only that expectancy of life has increased, but every time is greater the proportion of Japanese whose age is in the last phases of the life cycle. In 2005 one of five Japanese (21.2%) were 65 years or older. It is expected that this number goes on increasing until reaching 36.9% in 2055 (2).

b) A reduction in the amount of new born babies in the time will implies a reduction in the size of each age group. The fact that today less children are being born means that in fifteen years there will be less teenagers, and in thirty years, less working adult people.

Causes of the Deceleration of the Population Growth

MacKellar and Horlacher from works of Ogawa, Retherford and Yashiro (7) affirm that the main cause for the decreasing fertility is an important reduction in the amount of women (in fertile age) married. Amazingly, the fertility within the marriages has stayed constant and even increased slightly in the last decades, but on the other hand every time is smaller to the proportion of women who contract marriage.

It contributes in that sense a raising number of divorces.

At the beginning of the 70' a million marriages were registered in Japan every year. But since then, the amount of weddings has fallen down below the 800,000 by year, and in 2004 there were 720.417 marriages in the country.

Also, the amount of divorces has duplicated in the same period, reaching 270.804 in 2004 (3).

Here it is important to emphasize the fact that only a minor proportion of births are registered as illegitime in Japan. As an example, in 2004 only 1.99% of the total births were in that category (3). Although this value has been in slow but persistent increasing from the 70', still is possible to say that the impact of the single women on the fertility rates is non significant.

The strong association between marriage an motherhood, at least in Japan, is the main reason to focus the search for some of the causes of the decreasing fertility in the circumstances that are producing a decreasing interest in the japaneses into getting married.

This reduction in the proportion of married japaneses is the result of two main processes; a growing delay in the age of the first marriage, and an increase in the proportion of women who never have married (7).

Again looking at the official statistics (3) it is possible to see that by 1930 55.4% of the women got married by the first time between 20 and 24 years old. However, in the 2004 this proportion had been reduced to only 23.2%. In the same period, the women who contracted their first marriage between 25 and 29 years old raised up from 14.5% to 46.1%.

That means that the average fertile period of married women is much lower than before. And of course, the expectative and interest in motherhood in women in their thirties could be different from than the ones in their twenties. In fact, women average fertility is systematically higher in younger age groups (3).

Then, it is nor surprising that the proportion of people who has never married in every age group has grown accordingly (See table 7). Although most of the people get married in some moment in their lives, this is happening in more advanced ages than half a century behind.

Table 7

Proportion of never married japaneses by sex and age group (3)

Men / Women
Age Group / 1950 / 2000 / Age Group / 1950 / 2000
20-24 / 82.9 / 92.9 / 20-24 / 55.3 / 87.9
25-29 / 34.5 / 69.3 / 25-29 / 15.2 / 54.0
30-34 / 8.0 / 42.9 / 30-34 / 5.7 / 26.6
35-39 / 3.2 / 25.7 / 35-39 / 3.0 / 13.8
40-44 / 1.9 / 18.4 / 40-44 / 2.0 / 8.6

The cause of this phenomenon should be a strong increase in the opportunity costs of marriage and motherhood for women. Yashiro (9) offer evidence in this sense emphasizing the fact that women with high level of studies and women who live in the city of Tokyo got married 2 and 3 years (respectively) after than the general average.

This behavior is consequence of two factors:

First, the expansion of laboral opportunities for the japanese women that has implied an increase in their economical expectations.

Second, the traditional laboral practices developed and used in the country, that includes a lot of obstacles for women with children.

Therefore, the offer of rentable works and their hard exigencies generate a high alternative cost for the marriage and motherhood (9).