POL 319

India – China – US

Dr. Lairson

9/15/17/22/24

How is China’s position in the world different in 2015 as compared to 2000?

Economy size

How does this size affect the global economy

Foreign direct investment – inward and outward

Foreign Exchange Reserves

Actions:

Latin America

Africa

Middle East

East China Sea

South China Sea

Silk Road

New Type of Foreign Relations?

Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, "Chindia or Rivalry? Rising China, Rising India, and Contending Perspectives in India-China Relations," Asian Perspectives 35 (2011) 437-469

What is a “strategic relationship” among major powers all about?

  • Whether an “Asian century” will finally arrive after five centuries of Western dominance of world affairs depends importantly not only on whether India and China can continue their respective rises but also on how each of these two Asian giants will deal with its own and the other nation’s ascent.
  • While the implications for the rise of China have been debated in various contexts (global or systemic, regional, and bilateral), much less scholarly attention has been devoted to the rise of India and how these two Asian giants perceive each other’s ascendancy.
  • Examine the key factors influencing India-China relations and analyzing elite perspectives on this relationship in each nation.

Chinese strategy

What factors do Chinese consider in making their assessment of the security and strategic environment?

•The structure of the international system after the Cold War
(multipolarity or unipolarity). BIPOLAR?

•The question of whether the US role in global affairs is in decline.

•China’s role in the international system and proper grand strategy (i.e., the distinctive combination of political, economic, and military means to ensure a state’s national interests or to achieve the objectives of the regime).3

•The best ways to deal with the United States.

•Relations with other great powers (Japan, Russia, and India).

What important conclusions about the security and strategic environment can China make?

  • China today is fairly sanguine that large-scale military conflicts involving great powers are unlikely to occur and that China is likely to be increasingly secure from traditional security threats (i.e., military threats by a foreign power against China’s territory or the physical security of China’s population). DOES THIS CREATE AN OPPORTUNITY TO ADVANCE CHINA’S POSITION?
  • In the 1970s and 1980s, China’s leaders concluded that the country needed a peaceful international environment for at least another two decades—a period of “strategic importance” for the country to concentrate on the further development of its economy. Economic development was to be the overriding linchpin to increasing China’s wealth, power, prestige, and international standing. ARE WE AT THE END OF THIS ERA?
  • The dominant position of the US meant that managing relations with the United States and navigating in an international system that many Chinese analysts saw as reflecting Western (especially US) values and strengths became critically important. IS THIS STILL TRUE?

The Evolution of China’s Strategy

Deng Xiaoping 24 character strategy:

“twenty-four character” strategy:

  • observe calmly;
  • secure our position;
  • cope with affairs calmly;
  • hide our capacities;
  • bide our time;
  • be good at maintaining a low profile;
  • never claim leadership;
  • make some contributions

IS THIS STILL RELEVANT?

Jiang Zemin – 1989-2002

post Tiananmen rebuild respect
integrate into the global economy, WTO

Hu Jintao – 2003-2013

Peaceful rise

1)anembrace of globalization as part of the solution to China’s growth imperatives.

2)to achieve the goal of rising to great-power status, China must secure a peaceful international environment that is crucial to sustaining China’s economic development and augmenting China’s power.

3)the new diplomacy is characterized by several important changes in style, if not substance. Instead of acting like an aggrieved victim, China now aspires to be a responsible great power and is acting increasingly like one. Whereas China used to distrust “multilateralism” for fear that multilateral institutions could be used to constrain or punish it, now Chinese leaders recognize that deeply en- gaging these organizations helps promote the country’s trade and se- curity interests and limits US power.7 On many contentious and intractable issues, China has also adopted more pragmatic stances.8 China is more aware that its rise has consequences for the Asia-Pacific region and beyond, so it is keen on easing the concerns of various countries.

4)The major instrument used in advancing China’s objectives is its economic power, which is buoyed by its phenomenal economic growth, rapidly expanding domestic markets, and voracious appetite for raw materials needed for its economic development.

5)In summary, China’s “peaceful rise” is a comprehensive long-term strategy leveraging globalization as a catalyst to accelerate China’s economic development and elevate China’s power and stature.

Xi Jinping

Not-So-Empty Talk: The Danger of China's “New Type of Great-Power Relations” Slogan

By Andrew S. Erickson and Adam P. Liff

China is Rising and US Declining

New Type of Great Power Relations?

China receives Great Power Status (Without any requirements for earning it)

Assertion this will avoid the “Thucydides Trap”

“respect each other and treat each other as equals politically; carry out comprehensive, mutually beneficial and win-win cooperation economically; build up mutual trust and tolerance and share responsibilities in security matters; learn from and promote each other culturally; and seek common ground while reserving differences and live side by side in peace with each other ideologically.”

a very old type of values and order, in which spheres of interest, zero-sum gains, and great-power exceptionalism ruled the day

Xi expects the United States to make certain accommodations concerning China’s “core interests.”

that “China has never done anything to undermine the US core interests” and that, even in its own neighborhood, China is merely a “victim on which harm has been imposed.”

None of this is to deny the role of material power in shaping China’s trajectory. As China expert Thomas Christensen has argued, the United States’ military presence in the Asia-Pacific and its focus on solidifying ties with regional allies and partners are not only hedges against possible Chinese provocations but also important means for influencing Beijing’s foreign policy decision-making. Indeed, the story of China’s rise remains incomplete. No doubt, we’re in a rough patch today. But despite widespread claims to the contrary, nothing about China’s future course -- and certainly not military conflict -- is predetermined. How things play out will depend on the choices made by leaders in many countries, but especially in Beijing and Washington.

China Rising and US Declining?

•Do the US-originating economic crisis and US military entanglement in Iraq and Afghanistan signify the decline of the United States in both power and legitimacy?

•Does that mean the international system will move toward a genuinely multipolar or even an a-polar one?

•While in relative terms China’s economy has so far outperformed all leading nations, how much can China expect to really close the gap with the United States?

•How should China adjust its behavior as its capabilities continue to grow, in absolute and relative terms? Should China continue to “hide its capacities and bide its time” Or is it in its interest to start “making contributions”?

•If China is to take a more active (if not assertive) approach in its external strategy, would its interests be best served by focusing on playing the role of being number two? This basically means accepting and hoping to reap the most benefits from a Western-directed world order. Molding China into a “responsible stakeholder” seems a more acceptable scenario to Western elites and has become the dominant discourse. Or—a more likely possibility—should China play both a stakeholder and a challenger role, working with the existing system (cooperating and soft-balancing if necessary) while also challenging US preeminence through persuasion rather than enforcement.

US pivot to Asia
Rebalancing or De-Balancing: U.S. Pivot and East Asian Order Wei Ling China Foreign Affairs University

its nature and tactics have changed significantly between 2009 and 2012. Simply put, the pivot started with power cooperation but turned into a balance-of-power, especially military power, situation. Such pivot features both continuities and changes in terms of the U.S. strategies in the region. But its key components, the high-profile military deployments and exercises, the expansion of geopolitical domain from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, and the ‘‘forward-deployed’’ diplomacy, have been very conspicuous. The U.S. pivot to Asia has so far produced mixed results. Seemingly, it has reassured U.S. allies in the region and balanced the rising power of China. But, upon closer examination, the pivot has created a ‘‘Georgia Scenario’’2 among some U.S. allies and partners, unnecessarily provoked China and increased U.S.–China distrust, disrupted ongoing regional processes, and, hence, to a considerable extent, de-balanced the region.

If the 2009 U.S. pivot to Asia was about ‘‘cultivating spheres of cooperation,’’ then in early 2010, it started to look increasingly like ‘‘competing spheres of influence.’’

By 2010, the center- pieces of the U.S. pivot to Asia had become clear— maintaining U.S. leadership and counterbalancing the increasing influence of China.

[Subtext: China bears no responsibility for the US pivot and has not destabilized Asia through its actions]

First, the pivot has created a potential for a ‘‘Georgia Scenario’’ in territorial disputes and a side-taking dilemma for ASEAN countries. ‘‘Georgia Scenario’’ refers to a situation where a state in a region takes too seriously U.S. reassurance and security commitment and ‘‘takes on a bigger fight than it can handle itself, only to find out that Washington had no intention of going to war in its defense over that particular issue.’’38 Neither the South China Sea nor the East China Sea ter- ritorial disputes are newly emerging issues. But they have become intensified after the United States directly inserted itself into these complex disputes.

The oft-repeated U.S. security commitment and increased U.S. military deployments and joint military exercises were interpreted by the Philippines, Vietnam, and Japan as U.S. commitment to defend the disputed waters, reefs, and islands, hence adding oil to the fuel of their nationalism and wishful thinking of taking advantage of China on these issues. They seem to have refused to question the U.S. intention of going to war with China in defense of a few reefs and islands that are of little strategic significance to the United States.

[Subtext: The US does not have sufficient interests in the East or South China Sea to justify its involvement in settling these disputes.]

To ASEAN countries, the U.S. pivot to counterbalance China has put them in a position of having to take sides.

[Subtext: China’s actions are in no way contributing to ASAEAN states taking sides.]

ASEAN has balanced its relations with regional powers well enough in the past two decades to remain institutionally central in and has benefited enormously from regional integration processes. Once it had to take sides between China and the United States, not only would the balance be tipped, but ASEAN itself would lose its identity and value.

[Subtext: ASEAN nations must remain closer to China than the US in order to remain beneficiaries of the Asian production system.]

Second, the U.S. pivot to Asia has fueled the suspicion of the U.S. containment of China and increased U.S.–China distrust. Many in the policy circles in Washington claim that the U.S. pivot is not at all about China, while many in China believe that it is all about China. A fair statement might be that the pivot is essentially about China. The U.S. pivot was developed based on the premises of China’s military modernization and diplomatic assertiveness. The U.S. direct involvement in the South China Sea disputes is driven by the perceived threat to the freedom of navigation. However, the United States has ‘‘greatly overestimated China’s military capabilities’’;40 Chinese behavior in territorial disputes has been largely responsive and peaceful.41 And, given China’s trading status and military capability, the threat to the freedom of navigation on the South China Sea is a false proposition.

[Why is this such an important paragraph?]

The TPP has also been regarded by many as dis- ruptive to ongoing regional Free Trade Area (FTA) negotiations and divisive to ASEAN.

Does the US pivot increase the chances of conflict with China or reduce the chances?

How could it reduce the chances of conflict and increase the chances for a cooperative solution?

India and China

Much more attention to China’s rise than to India’s rise

China-India Early Years

Though India was committed to the idea of positive relations with China, the realities of conflict soon changed this. China’s seizure of Tibet in 1950 brought China and India into a direct boundary relationship and in 1962 led to a war between China and India, which India lost. This led to a closer alignment of India with the Soviet Union and the alignment of Pakistan with China. In 1964, China developed an atomic weapon, which prompted India to do likewise in 1974. Pakistan developed atomic weapons in 1998. Only after 1976 did India and China resume normal diplomatic relations.

See page 454 for comparative capabilities

Strategic interactions

CHINA
Initially, China accepts contending spheres of influence: China concedes South Asia as India’s sphere of influence. It seeks to confine India in that region by establishing good relations with India’s other South Asian neighbors (particularly Pakistan)—a balance-of-power strategy—while preventing India from getting deeply involved in East Asia.

In recent years, each has treaded into the other’s sphere of influence: As a result of its growing dependence on foreign trade and raw materials and its desire to develop maritime power commensurate with its growing stature and interests, China has become more active in the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, India’s “Look East” policy has led it to forge stronger ties with Asian democracies such as Japan, Australia, Taiwan, and certain Southeast Asian countries that lie at the western Pacific littoral and have strong relations with the United States.

throughout the Cold War and until the late 1990s, Beijing was not convinced that relations with India would be as strategically significant for China as the relations it was cultivating with other major powers

The generally skeptical or dismissive view of India held by Chinese elites resulted from several sources. One was China’s confidence stemming from its military victory over India in 1962. China’s more impressive economic performance compared to India’s is an- other reason, as recounted earlier. Beijing’s much earlier start of economic reforms, its higher growth rates and GDP, the greater wealth of the average Chinese (see Table 3), and its far larger direct foreign investment and foreign exchange reserves all contribute to the self-confidence of Chinese elites. In addition, Chinese analysts generally view India’s ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity (or cleavage) as a handicap. And they also generally view India’s domestic politics (its federal system, extremely fragmented party politics, and chaotic, inefficient democracy) as a serious impediment to India’s future prospects.

Bilateral relations did not begin to improve and Chinese evaluations of India did not begin to change until the impetus provided by India’s 1998 nuclear tests. Since then, official relations have considerably warmed. In June 2003 Indian prime minister AtalBihariVaj- payee made a historic visit to China, the first in over a decade. The two have elevated their relationship to one of “strategic and cooperative partnership” for peace and stability. During Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to India in November 2006, the two sides adopted a ten-point strategy to further strengthen the bilateral relationship. Jing- dong Yuan, a China expert, quoted a Chinese diplomat by characterizing China’s new perspective: “Beijing now views its relationship with India as one of global and strategic importance that is long-term, all around, and stable”

perspectives on India can be reduced to several specific elements. First, while China must accomplish its goal of “peaceful rise” and to some extent reckon with the gains it has achieved so far, China must also accept that India is also rising. India, too, has ambitions to play a greater role in regional and global politics and economics. But China must “manage” India’s rise by reducing the threats a rising India will pose to China and by selectively cooperating on issues of mutual interest. There- fore, China should reduce or eliminate the chance that India may harm China’s interests by compartmentalizing the border disputes, containing the Tibet issue, and keeping alive the “Pakistan card.” Moreover, China must carefully monitor the implications of India’s military modernization and India’s growing security and overall relations with the United States, lest they harm China’s interests or aspirations.