Northwestern Debate Institute 2010 1
Seniors GPR CP
Global Defense Posture Review Counterplan
GDPR – 1NC 2
***Solvency*** 3
Generic Solvency – GPR --> Presidential Support 4
Generic Solvency – Relations 5
Generic Solvency – Withdrawal 6
Generic Solvency 8
Generic Solvency – Consultations Build Support 11
Generic Solvency – Solves Alliances 12
Generic Solvency – Logistics 13
GPR Accepts Recommendations 14
GPR Happening This Year 15
***Regional Solvency*** 16
East Asia Solvency 17
Japan Solvency – Generic Withdrawal 18
Japan Solvency – Okinawa 19
Korea Solvency - Generic Withdrawal 20
Korea Solvency – Alliance 21
**Alliances Net Benefit** 22
Ext – Alliances Net Benefit 23
***Politics*** 24
Top Level Politics Link Differential 25
Politics Net Benefit 26
GPR Avoids Politics 27
GPR and BRAC = Tightly Linked 28
BRAC Avoids Politics 30
**Military Morale Net Benefit** 31
***Aff Answers*** 32
AT: GPR Kills Heg 33
AT: Perm Do CP 34
AT: Theory 35
AFF – GPR Fails 36
AFF – GPR Kills Heg 37
AFF – Military Recommendations/Reviews Fail 38
GDPR – 1NC
Text: The Department of Defense should include <insert plan here> as a recommendation included in the 2010 Global Defense Posture Review.
Contention 1: Solvency
GPR can downsize the US military presence
O’Hanlon 8 (Michael, Senior Fellow of Foreign Policy at Brookings, June, “Unfinished Business: U.S. Overseas Military Presence in the 21st Century”, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2008/06_military_ohanlon/06_military_ohanlon.pdf, AV)
The GPR encompasses everything from the creation of new bases in Central Asia and Eastern Europe to the downsizing of the U.S. military presence in Germany to a reduction and realignment of the American presence in South Korea and Okinawa, Japan. These changes are designed to improve U.S. and allied options for handling new developments — such as the ongoing struggle against extremism and terrorism, the rise of China — and enduring problems such as the North Korean and Iranian regimes. Of course, there have also been enormous changes in the Persian Gulf, the largest related to ongoing operations in Iraq, and the elimination of American combat forces from Saudi Arabia and Turkey. (Deployment patterns of naval vessels have also changed a good deal, but the base infrastructure supporting them has changed less in recent years.) According to the plan, about 70,000 U.S. military personnel would return to the United States over a ten-year implementation period — just under 30 percent of the 250,000 the United States deployed abroad prior to 9/11 (though less than 20 percent of the total deployed when the review was announced in 2004 with the Iraq and Afghanistan operations fully underway).2 The total number of American military sites abroad would decline from 850 to 550 over that same ten-year period of drawdown (not counting sites in Iraq or Afghanistan).3 That 35 percent cut in numbers of facilities will translate into a reduction of somewhat more than 20 percent of the total value of the assets used by U.S. forces abroad, which topped $100 billion earlier this decade.
Solves politics – Congress loves consultation with the DOD over the GPR
Critchlow 05 (October, “U.S. Military Overseas Basing: New Developments and Oversight Issues for Congress,” http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/2623.pdf)
Mr. Henry also took issue with the Commission’s argument that DOD had not sufficiently coordinated the Global Posture Review across government agencies. He cited meetings with the regional combatant commanders that began shortly after the 2001 QDR, as well as consultation with the Department of State, the National Security Council, and 45 briefings to capitol hill staffers and members of Congress. His view was that Congress had indicated satisfaction with the amount of oversight consultation to this point. He also highlighted visits to the government leadership in over 20 foreign countries that could be affected by the moves. While he noted the number of meetings, he did not indicate whether the briefings were in- depth or ongoing, nor the state of progress, particularly regarding the delicate status of forces agreements that guide basing rules with the foreign countries. He stated that the Global Posture Review was intended to serve as a starting point to feed the 2005 QDR, as well as the 2005 BRAC and the Mobility Capability Study, all of which were to be coordinated in parallel. Therefore, it would fall to the QDR to address the timing of lift procurement and other needed acquisition to ensure it supports the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS). However, since the QDR is intended to be the keystone document outlining DODs future strategic vision, selecting how the military will align its bases before determining the strategy they are trying to achieve raises questions of appropriate sequence.
***Solvency***
Generic Solvency – GPR --> Presidential Support
Solves—president can shape GPR and recommendations become policy
O’Hanlon 08 (Michael, July 24th, “Unfinished Business: U.S. Overseas Military Presence in the 21st Century”, http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/06_military_ohanlon.aspx?rssid=us+department+of+state),
The next American president will inherit an overseas military base realignment process begun in the first term of the George W. Bush administration. This realignment, guided by an effort known as the Global Posture Review (GPR), was perhaps former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s chief intellectual and policy accomplishment during his six-year tenure at the Pentagon. Unlike his likely warfighting legacy, particularly in regard to Iraq, the GPR is on generally sound conceptual foundations. But a successful outcome for the Global Posture Review, roughly halfway implemented as of mid-2008, will depend on the next U.S. administration refining numerous rough edges of the current plan — and redefining the broader national security policy context in which any base realignment will inevitably be viewed.
Generic Solvency – Relations
Solves leadership and relations
Ryan Henry 06 (Naval War College Review, “Transforming the U.S. global defense posture
“http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_2_59/ai_n16689836/pg_5/?tag=content;col1)
Strengthen Allied Roles and Build New Partnerships. Changes to our global posture aim to help our allies and friends modernize their own forces, strategies, and doctrines. We are exploring ways in which we can enhance our collective defense capabilities, ensuring that our future alliances and partnerships are capable, affordable, sustainable, and relevant. At the same time, we seek to tailor our military's overseas "footprint" to suit local conditions, reduce friction with host nations, and respect local sensitivities. A critical precept in our global posture planning is that the United States will place forces only where those forces are wanted and welcomed by the host government and populace.
More evidence
Ryan Henry 06 (Naval War College Review, “Transforming the U.S. global defense posture
“http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_2_59/ai_n16689836/pg_5/?tag=content;col1)
Building and sustaining political access--that is, the will of host-nation allies and partners to support U.S. military action when needed--require two posture elements: relationships and legal arrangements. Our ability to act around the world is supported by key security relationships with allies and partners. These relationships involve interactions at all levels--from heads of state to students studying together in the schoolhouses that we and our allies provide. Changes in global posture seek both to strengthen our existing relationships and to help cultivate new relationships founded upon common security interests and common values. These are critical to enhancing allied and partner military capabilities in key areas, such as counterterrorism. The set of bilateral and multilateral legal arrangements pertaining to our military personnel and activities worldwide constitutes the formal framework for our military presence, access, and activities in other countries. It defines the rights and obligations of the parties, sets the terms for military access and activities, and provides protections for American personnel. Some of our planned posture changes require a foundation of new and more flexible legal arrangements. Our new legal arrangements tend to be more concise than the elaborate arrangements we entered into after World War II, addressing only key things the United States needs for an expeditionary (rather than permanent) presence. These include operational flexibility, training, logistics, financial arrangements, and status coverage for our forces. Critical to our success in this effort has been close collaboration by the State and Defense departments to develop a solid interagency team and a good diplomatic structure for consultations and negotiations.
Generic Solvency – Withdrawal
GPR is the key strategy for any withdrawal
Ryan Henry 06 (Naval War College Review, “Transforming the U.S. global defense posture
“http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_2_59/ai_n16689836/pg_5/?tag=content;col1)
The Defense Department's strategy was exported to the U.S. government as a whole, so that the Global Defense Posture Review would not be driven just by military considerations. The Defense Department collaborated closely with its interagency partners--particularly the State Department--from the start. The National Security Council, as the body overseeing posture changes, provided high-level guidance and input. Thus the global defense posture realignment became the strategy of the U.S. government. The Defense Department also consulted extensively with allies and partners. In November 2003 the president formally announced intensified consultations with allies and partners on the Global Defense Posture Review. Subsequently, senior Defense and State officials held joint consultations in over twenty foreign capitals, many of which are still going on in various forms.
Empirically Proven – GPR solves any withdraw or realignment in Korea
China Daily 04 (May 20, 2004, S.KOREA, US TO DISCUSS TROOP CUTS p. Lexis)
The Republic of Korea (ROK)is preparing for negotiations with the United States on possible reducing American forces stationed in the country, the government said yesterday. The announcement followed reports that a US decision announced on Monday to pull a crack army brigade out of the front line facing the North signalled deeper future cuts to half-century-year-old US military presence on the Korean Peninsula. "The government will consult with the United States if it makes the request to discuss the US forces in Korea as part of the Global Posture Review, and we are preparing for it," the ROK Foreign Ministry spokesman Shin Bong-kil said in a statement. But he denied that Seoul had yet held any negotiations with Washington on possible troop cuts. The posture review refers to the Pentagon's policy of realigning its global deployments to draw more from advanced military technology and lessen the number of soldiers. ROK Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon said on Tuesday that the redeployment of 3,600 US troops to Iraq was not the beginning of larger cuts. But he forecast that more changes are coming. "(The Iraqi redeployment) is part of the Global Posture Review conducted by the United States, and the ROK and the United States will take time to closely consult on the issue," he said.
Generic Solvency
The GPR is the core foundation for changing US military presence abroad
Henry 6 (Ryan, Naval War College Review, Spring, “Transforming the U.S. global defense posture”, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_2_59/ai_n16689836/pg_10/?tag=content;col1, AV)
While the global posture strategy does not comprise everything the American defense establishment is doing overseas, its implementation serves as the foundation for changing U.S. defense policy abroad. It is the department's vehicle for translating transformation into relevant and effective defense relationships and capabilities for the emerging security environment. The global defense posture strategy is composed of five key themes, which emerged from the review and the evolving transformational thinking of the department described earlier. These themes now serve as the measures of effectiveness for global posture changes. Improve Flexibility to Contend with Uncertainty. Much of our existing overseas posture was established during the Cold War, when we thought we knew where we would have to fight. Today, however, we often have to deploy to places that few people, if anyone, would have predicted. Thus, we should plan in ways that mitigate surprise. Our goal is to have forces positioned forward on a continual basis, with access and facilities that enable them to reach any potential crisis spot quickly. Strengthen Allied Roles and Build New Partnerships. Changes to our global posture aim to help our allies and friends modernize their own forces, strategies, and doctrines. We are exploring ways in which we can enhance our collective defense capabilities, ensuring that our future alliances and partnerships are capable, affordable, sustainable, and relevant. At the same time, we seek to tailor our military's overseas "footprint" to suit local conditions, reduce friction with host nations, and respect local sensitivities. A critical precept in our global posture planning is that the United States will place forces only where those forces are wanted and welcomed by the host government and populace.
GPR is a key platform for changing our military presence
Henry 6 (Ryan, Naval War College Review, Spring, “Transforming the U.S. global defense posture”, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_2_59/ai_n16689836/pg_10/?tag=content;col1, AV)
In a sense, security cooperation is capabilities-based planning as applied to relationships with our allies and partners. Whereas during the Cold War we supported our NATO and Pacific Rim allies against threats to their borders, today we work with allies and partners who share our sense that security challenges transcend specific borders and threaten societies on a global scale. Just as capabilities-based planning positions the United States to contend with adversarial capabilities in an uncertain environment, security cooperation enables the United States to confront a spectrum of threats to its own security and that of allies and partners--anywhere, at any time. This invokes an important, symbiotic relationship between security cooperation and our global defense posture. Global posture serves as the platform for implementing security cooperation activities. Conversely, security cooperation activities help develop and maintain the access needed for posturing our forces to contend with future uncertainties. In sum, transformation is far more dynamic than the common conception of applying high technology in war. For the Defense Department, it is about: * A command climate that swept away preconceived notions of strategic affairs and of the department's traditional role in those affairs * The shift from a threat-based to a capabilities-based approach * The need for increased efficiency and effectiveness * The shift from engagement to security cooperation. Transformational thinking respects the facts, rejects fixed ideas, and promotes new and necessary relationships and capabilities that position us to contend with the uncertainty of the new strategic landscape.
The GPR can produce substantial re-ordering of military forces