Gibson Burrell and Gareth Morgan 1979

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All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, storedinare"trieval·systern,ortrans1nittedinanyfonnorbyany1neans, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherv,ise without the prior permission of the publisher

First published in 1979 by Heinemann Educational Books Reprinted 1980, 1982

Reprinted 1985, 1987, 1988by Gower Publishing Company Limited Reprinted 1992 by Ashgate Publishing Limited

Reprinted 1993, 1994 by Arena

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Burrell, Gibson

Sociological paradigms and organisational

analysis : elements of the sociology of corporate life.

1.Organization

L Title II. Morgan, Gareth 302.3'5HMI3l

ISBN13: 978 O 566 05148 7 (Hbk)

13: 978 l 85742 114 9 (Pbk)

Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Comwall

i, 1

S j

Contents

List of Figures List of Tables

Ack nowledgemen ts lntroduction

PART 1: lN SEARCH OF A FRA MEWOR K

lAssumptionsaboullheNatureofSocialScience The Strands ofDebate

Anal y"sing Assumptions abou t the Nature of Social

Sci.ence

2Assumptions about lhe Nature of Society Toe Order-Conflict Debate 'Regulation· and 'RadicalChange'

3Two Dimensions: FourParadigms

Toe Nature and Uses of the Four Paradigms Toe Fu nctionalist Paradigm

Toe lnterpretive Paradigm

Toe Radical Humanist Paradigm Toe Radical Structuralist Paradigm Exploring Social Theory

PART li: TH E PA RADIG MS EXPLORED

4Functionalist Sociology

Origins and lntellectual Tradition Toe Structure of the Paradigm Social System Theory

lnteractionism and Social Action Theory

lntegrative Theory Objectivism

Toe U nderl yi ng U ni ty of the Paradigm

S Functionalist Organisation Theory

Theories of Organisation wi thin the·Functionalist Paradigm

Social System Theory aad Objectivism

Theories of Bureaucratic Dysfu nctions

page

V V

viii

102

106

118

121

123

lS4

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278 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis

creation - of autonomous hu man bei ngs i nvolved i n lhe tlow of everyday life, the problem will be to develop epistemologies and methodologies adequate for studying the nature of this world. For those for whom structure and pattern i n social reality appear ali too 'real', a consideration of the power dimension i nherent in the ability of the individual to create his reality is likely to prove a major issue and , pursued to i ts logical end, will undoubtedly éall for a major reorientation i n theoretical perspective. lt will cal! for a perspecti ve which has much more i n common with radical human ism than with the sociolqgy of regulation which characterises the i nterpretiveparadigm.

Notes and References

l. Silverman, in defence of Bi ttner's view, has suggested that he uses 'structural determi nants' in a highly specific sense (Silverman in McKinlay, 1975, p.282).

2.We shall not consider here Silverman's book Reading Castaned a ( 1975b), w h i ch seeks to prov i de an elhnomethodological analysis of Castaneda (1970) and lhus does not focus upon practices wilhin organisational contexts.

3.We shall confine our discussion here to lhe implications of ph enomenol ogy for theories characteristic of the functionalistparadigm.ltisclearlhatlherearealsoimplica tions for theories located in the other paradigms. U nfortu nately, it is beyond lhe scope of our present endeavour to address lhesehere.

4.For a discussion of some of the epistemological and melhodological implications of phenomenological sociology, see, for example, Blumer (1%9), Cicourel (1964), Douglas (1970b). Many of lheir argu menls are conveniently brought together in Menne!I(1974).

5. We wish to emphasise here lhe point made in note 3 above. Toe nature of lhe concept of paradigm, as used here, necessarily implies that the !egitimacy of the world view reflected in a particular paradigm is fundamentally opposed by lhe perspectives characteristic of lhe other lhree.

8. Radical Hu mani sm

Origins and Intellectual Tradition

The i ntellectual origi ns of the radical humanist paradigm can be traced back to the tenets of German idealism and the Kantian notion that the ul ti mate reali ty of the u niverse is spiritual rather than material i n nature. lt thus derives from the sarne intellectual source as the i nterpretive paradigm , though the essentiall y subjec tivist orientation which the two paradigms have in common are made to serve fundamentall y different ends.

Toe i nterpretive and radical hu manist paradigms are both fou nded upon the notion that the indi vidual creates the worl d in which he lives. Bu t, whereas the i nterpretive theorists are content to understand the nature of this process, the radical hu manists subject it to critique, focusing upon what they regard as the essen tially alienated state of man.

This critique proceeds along two avenues of discourse. One of these is associated wi th a 'subjective idealist' position, which derives from the sarne source as the philosophy of Husserl and other phenomenologists discussed i n Chapter 6. Although the roots of the subjective idealist tradi tion can be traced back to the philosophy of Kant and earlier, ít is i n the work of Fichte ( 1762-1814) lhat i t first receives i ts most explicit and coherent expression. 1 Fich te was a follower of Kant, and his brand of subjective idealism rested upon the assu mption that i ndi vidual consciousness is a continuousl y creative entity generating a per petuai stream of ideas, concepts and perspectives through which a world externai to mi nd is created. From Fichte's poi nt of view, any u nderstanding of this created reali ty involved u nderstandi ng the nature, structure and fu nctioni ng of conscious mi nei. However, he was at paios to disti ngu ish between this i nternai domai n of con sciousness and what was created by it and thus made externai to it. ln so doing he was able to steer clear of the solipsist perspecti ve by recognisi ng the existence of an externai world, thus establishi ng a position some way between the i mmaterialism of Bíshop Berkeley and the perspective of 'objective idealism' as, for example,

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280 SocioloRica l ParaditJ mS and Organisational Anal ysis

reflected i n the work of Hegel(l770-183 I ). For Fichte, the exter. nal world was to be u nderstood in terms of the projection 0{.t>

i ndi vid ual consciousness. Fich te saw h u man beings as externalisl '{

i ng thei r experiences i nto a form ofreality which i n turn is reflectecf'} back upon them , and through which they became conscious of >. .

themselvesandtheiractions.Asnoted above,thisperspectivehas:•y had a widespread i nfluence u pon contemporary ph ilosoph y and social theory th roug h the work of H usserl and other.phenomenologists. lts _i nfluence upon the radical hu manist para. digmismostclearlyev,den_trntheworkofSartreandh1sfollowers with i n the French ex1stent1ahst movement. ln essence, they have radi calised the phenomenological perspective which characterises thesubjectiveidealist'sposition,viewingtheindividualastrapped

withinthemodeofexistencewhichhecreates.Ontologically,they view the world as the product of i ndividual consciousness; con-

sciousness is seen as bei ng projected onto the externaithrough·r:

accs of i ntenti onali ty '.thereby creati ng i t. The subjecti_ve idealists ·..,•_withi n radical hu manism focus upon the pathology of mtent1onal-,. ity, whereby, i n creating the externai world, man separates h i mself• ·.. fromhistrue'Being'. ·!·

The second avenue of díscourse wi thín radical humanismis;

based upon the tradi tíon of 'objective ídealis':"', whichreceivedits[

earliest and most comprehens1ve express,on m the workofHegel.'l·

_ RadicalHumanism281

111ent. This dialectical process is seen as a universal pri ncipie, which generates progress towards the state of 'absolute knowl

edge'inwhichthedistinctionbetweensubjectandobjectisover come and human consciousness becomes aware of its location within 'absolutespirit'.

Hegel,likeFichte,sawindividualconsciousnessasafocalpoint

for the understandíng of lhe nature of the social world. However, whereas in Fichte's brand of subjective idealism , the individual creates his world , i n Hegel's brand of objective idealism , indi vidualconsciousnessissubservienttoanexternaipatternofuni versal reason which reflects the existence of a u niversal forceor spíritaboveandbeyondtheindividual.Humanconsciousnessand buman history, for Hegel , are to be u nderstood in terms of the unfoldingoftheuniversalspiritwhichwillleadwithcertaintyto the perfect society. ln his !ater years, Hegel increasi ngly saw the Prussia of his day as the embodi ment of the 'absolute spirit', the perfectsocietyinwhichtheindividual becamesubservíenttothe state.

Hegel's philosophy thus became wedded- to a very conservative

poli tical creed, and has been subjected to a wide range of inter pretation. Ear!y on a deep cleavage of opinion arose between the perspectives of the so-called 'Right Hegelians', who more or less acceQt.ed Hegel's system of philosophy in its entírety, and the

The He_gelian system of though t rests upon his first a_nd perhps

f,.·i

views of the 'Left' or 'Young Hegelians', who directed Hegel's

most s,gmficant work, The Phenomenolofly of Mind, wh1ch·· i nvestigates the ontological status of hu man knowledge.lnthis : book Hegel seeks to demonstrate how knowledge passesthrougha 1· series of forms of consciousness u ntil a state of 'absoluteknowl- · edge'isreached,whereinthe_individualisatonewiththe'absolute

spirit'whichpervadestheumverse.ForHegel,theultimatereality· rests í n 'spi rít' (Gl'isr ). 'Absolu te knowledge· rests upon lhe real isacion that consciousness is 'spirit' and thal the object of con sciousness is nothi ng other than itself. Hegel presents hu man beings as livi ng í n a world characterised by a constant i nterplay between i ndivid ual conscíousness and its objectification in the externai world. Consciousness and the externa! world are viewed

as two sides of the sarne reali ty. They are locked i n a dialectical relacionship i n whích each defi nes and i nfluences lhe other.3 For Hegel,everythingisitsownopposite.Thetruthlíesonbothsides of every question in an antagonistíc relationship to itself. As a method of anal ysis the dialectíc stresses that there is a basic antagonism and conflíct withi n both the natural and the social world which , when resolved , leads to a higher stage of develop-

system of thought to fundamentall y different ends.

Prominentamongthe'YoungHegelians'wastheyoungKarl Marx (1818-1883), who in essence ínverted the Hegelian system anduniteditwithacritiqueofthesocietyofhisday.•lnsodoinghe laidthebasisforthedevelopmentofaradicalhumanisminthe objectiveidealistmould.MarxemployedHegel'shistoricalper spectíveanddialecticalmethodofanalysiswithínthecontextofa philosoph y which placed the i ndividual rather than 'absolute spirit'aithecentreofthestage.Marx,alongwiththeotherYoung Hegelians,particularlyFeuerbach,'arguedthattherewasnoabso luteaboveman.TheyarguedthatreligionandtheStatewerethe creationsofmanratherthanreílectionsofany·absolutespirit'. Theyemphasisedthatallobjectíficationsencounteredinthesocial worldwerehumanlycreatedandpointedthewaytoanemancipat ory philosophy which stressed how i ndividuais, through self consciousness,couldcreateandthuschangethesocietyinwhich they lived. Marx, in particular, started from the premíse ofthe alienationofman.Hesawthesocietyofhisdayasdominating human experience; objectified social creations reflectedback

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282 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Ana/ ysis -

·uponman as an _alienating f?rce, dominating his esentialbeing' nature.Th,spointofv,ew1sexpressedmostforc1blyinEconó and Philosophical Mauscripts (1844), in _which Marx deiti, stratedhowthecap1tahstsystemofproductJonlayatthehearb man's alienation.6 Whereas for Hegel alienation was a neces · phenomenon on the path to self-realisation and 'absoÍiÍ' knowledge', for Marx it beca me a concept wedded to an attat uponthestatusquoandtheshortcomingsofthetota!ityofcapi•'

ln !ater work Marx moved away from the idealist perspective: ,_ ,

one rooted in a more realist interpretation of the· nature of the'ii'

social world. ln The German ldeofog y ( 1846), W?tte with Engel{{;;>,Marx sought to settle accounts with German 1deal1sm, and !bis''\

workisoftenseenasdefiningtheso-called'epistemo!ogicalbreai(•, )'

inMarx'sthought(Althusser, 1969);Fothepointofviewofth:e 5·.1_._

Radica/ Humanism283

line in terms of detailed development. We may consider the work 1ocatedwithinthisparadigmunderfourbroadheadings:(a)solips ism; (b) French existentialism; (e) anarchistic individualism; (d) criticaitheory.

Toe broad interrelationships between these four categories of

social theory are illustrated in Figure 3.3.

Solipsism characterises the most subjectivist region of the para digm, just as it does withi n the interpretive paradigm. As we have argued, it represents a philosophical position without sociological equivalent, although some social theories, when taken to their logical extremes, ru n dangerousl y close to what Sartre (1969) has described as the 'reef of solipsism'. Since we considered this perspective in Chapter 6, we will not discuss it further here.

French existentialism occupies the middle range of the para digm. li represents a perspective in the tradi tion of subjective

analyt1calschemepresented here,lis1grufies Marx's break with \i

radicalhumanism,andthebeginningofamovetowardsradica(•istructuralism. Toe perspectives characteristic of the latter para digm,whichareexploredinChapterlO,receiveincreasingatteO:

tion in Marx's Grundrisse andCapital.Í Despite these earl y origins, the radical humanist perspective J emained dormat until the early 1920s, when _Lukác , under the Í 10fluenceofneo-1dealism,soughttore-emphas1setheinfluenceof f

Hegel upon Marx. The discovery of the iost Economic and Philosophical M_anuscript orne ten yers !ater rinforced, nd in -_, .

somewaysleg1t1mated,th1smterest,whtchfoundttsexpress,onin · a radical hu manist criticai theory. The growth of criticai theory, -• along with French existentialism, its subjective idealist

cou nterpart, can largel y be understood as the radical response to 1

the renewal of i nterest in the idealist tradition which , as we have ·

seen from Chapter6, emerged at the turn of the twentieth century.

ideaiism.DerivinglargelyfromtheworkofFichteandHusserl,it

receives its clearest expression in the work of Sartre. This variety of existentialism has influenced li terary interpretation and some psychiatry, as well as philosophy.

Anarchistic i ndividualism, most usuall y associated wi th the thought of Max Stirner, occupies a position in the least subjectivist and most change-orientated region of the paradigm.Itis a category ofthoughtwhich fewsubscribeto,butitisworthyofconsideration asan example of an extreme social theory which advocates radical change, focusing upon individual consciousness as the basic u nit ofanalysis.

Criticai lheory represents the principal tine of development in the objective idealist tradition and is located i n the least subjectiv ist region of lhe radical humanist paradigm. Within criticai theory we recognise three broad schools of thought based upon Lukác sian sociology, Gramsci's sociology and the work of the Frankfurt School. These differ considerably at a substantive leve!but are ali predicated upon Marx's inversion of the Hegelian system of thought.

The Structure of the Paradigm

1We begin our detailed consideration of these categories ofthought wilh 'CriticaiTheory'.

Aswillbeapparentfromlheabovediscussion,theradicalhuman-1 ist paradigm comprises the subjective and objective idealiststra11

ofthought,bothofwhichhavetheiroriginsinGerrnanidealistu.1 Theseconstitutetheprincipalphilosophicalperspectives.lnaddi

tion. it is possible toidentify the shaping influence of solipsismand1

a category of anarchist thought which, though deriving largely fromHegelianism,mustberegardedashavingfollowedadifferent

Criticai Theory

Criticaitheoryrepresentsacategoryofsociologicalthoughtbuilt explicitlyupontheworkoftheyoongMarx.'Asatermitisoften

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284 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis

.usedasasynonymfortheworkoftheFrankfurt,Schoolofsocial

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RadicalHumanism285

It is i mportant to note; however, that Lukács'-influence stems

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theorists, but we wish here to expand its usage to cover three i nterreiated yet discrete schools of.!flought. The Frankfurt Schoo! owes much to the work of Lukács, which , in turn , bears a remark able similarity to that of Gramsci, so that these approaches have substantial areas of overlap. Criticai theory is a brand of social philosophy which seeks to operate simultaneously at a philosophi cal , a theoretical and a practical levei. lt stands firmly in the ideaiist tradition of critique deriving from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason ; its proponents seek to reveai society for what it is, to unmask its essence and mode of operation and to lay lhe founda tions for human emancipation through deep-seated social change. lt is an overtl y political philosoph y , in that it stresses the need to follow lhe logic of one's philosophical and sociological analysis with practical action of a radical kind. Lukács, Gramsci and lhe Frankfurt School , whilst sharing this overall aim, differ in the nature and methods of their specific critiques. We will examine each intum.

Lukácsian sociology

lnthe early 1920s Georg Lukács (1885-1974) sought to deveiop a criticai theory which offered an alternative to the orthodox Marx ism of his day.• ln essence, he was concemed to overhaul its socio-philosophical foundations, by emphasising and restoring the strong Hegelian i nfluence which characterised Marx's work before the so-cal led 'epistemological break'. ln particular, Lukács sought to develop a theory of revo!ution which laid strong emphasis u pon the role of the proletariat and its class conscious ness i n the overthrow of capitalist society. For Lu kács, as we shall see, the proletariat provided a soiution to the epistemological, theoretical and practicai issues facing Marxism in the1920s.

Lu kács's i nfluence, li ke that of his one-time teacher Simmel ,is dissipated and fragmented. Lukácsian sociology consists nol much of Lukácsians who are dogmatically faithful to his key texts, problems and conceptualisations, as of a widel y constituted body of though t which uses, to a greater or lesser·extent, Lu kács's key notions. This influence has been felt i ntemationaily, so that in France Lu kács's work has been developed by Lucien Goidmann, inBritainbyMészárosandintheUSAbyAlvinGouldner,whohas gene sofar as to describe Lu kács as 'the greatest Marxist theorist of lhe twentieth century' (Gouldner, 1976, p. x).

fromhisearlyworkandthathislateroutputissteadfastlyignored. lnfact,Lukácsisathinkerwhoseworkcanbelocatedonatleast three.points on the subjective-objective dimension of our analyt icalscheme.HebeganhiscareerinHungarywiththepublication of a series of books connected wi th the theory of the novel, in whichheacknowledgeshispositiontobethatofsubjectiveideal ism. Lukács had been attracted to subjective idealism under the influenceofDilthey'sapproachtotheGeisteswissenschaftenand Husserl's phenomenology th rough his studies at Berli n and !ater Heidelberg. At Heidel berg Lukács was introduced to Hegel's workandby!923hadproducedacollectedseriesofessaysentitled HistoryandC/assConsciousness.BaseduponHegelianobjective idealism, this work represemed an attempt to emphasise the hu manist, more subjective aspects of Marxism some len years before lhe rediscovery of Marx's Economic and Phi/osophical Manuscriptsof1844.ThereactionagainstHistoryandClassCon sciousness withi n orthodox Marxism was such that Lu kács was labelledanultra-LeftistandahereticinsofarasEngels'interpreta tion of dialecticai materialism was concerned. 9 As a result, he retractedhisviewsonthelinkbetweenHegelandMarxandmoved to a position of middie-of-the-road materialism. This was done, one might suggest without exaggeration; in order to survive in Stalinist. Russia at a time when the life expectancy of heretical intellectualswasnothigh.lnourterms,Lukácsmadeacomplete paradigmatic shift in the face of this threat. So total was his embraceofmaterialism, andsounexceptionablehistreatmentof ít, that Lichthei m maintains that Lukács's writings in the thirties were 'the work of a man who had performed a kind of painless lobotomyuponhimself,removedpartofhisbrai,:iandreplacedit byslogansfromtheMoscowpropagandists'(Lichtheim,1970,pp. 83-4).

ln the sixties, however, relations with the West were 'normal ised' and Stalin's intellectual and political i nfluence explicitly rejected. Lu kács could assert again that History and Class Con sciousness,aithoughflawed,was abookhewaspreparedtodis cussandseerepublishedunderhisname.Thisbookhashadaquite crucialimpactuponMarxismandissignificantinthat'material ism' and the ideas of Engels play only a minor role. Lu kács stresseslheroleofsuperstructuralfactorswithinsocietyandtheir partinitstransformation.Emphasisisplaceduponconsciousness, ideology,literatureandart,which areseennotasepiphenomenal totherelationsandmeansofproduction,butasquitecentraltoany

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286 S0ciolo1?ical Paradigms and Ori!anisational Ana / ysis

understandi ng_ of capitalism.· Consciousness, in particular, assigned key importance, for proleterian consciousness was cru cial to both Lukács's philosoph y and his political methodology.

Class consciousness was central for Lukács, because he saw it · as the escape route from a fundamental problem associated with Hegel's notion of alienation. For Hegel , alienations occurred as a result of the objectificatíon of 'ideas' in the externai world which reasserted themselves withi n man's consciousness. Toe abi!ity to move beyond alienation withi n this dialectical loop was provided

by the existence of an 'identical subject-object' which is 'atone·"

Radical Humanism281

andstandsrevealedtoalimenin·themomentsofhistorybeforéits overthrow.

A central aspect of this notion of totality lies i n the intimate

connection, first postulated by Hegel , between objective and sub jective dimensions withi n social reality, which are synthesised, according to Lukács, within the class consciousness of the pro letariat. The process whereby these dimensions are made falsely discrete and differentiated , so that they are no longer seen as 'identical'. Lukács calls 'reification•. This has clear links with both Hegelian and Marxist views of alienation, which revolve in differ