Georgia: The Costs of Alienating the Russian Bear
Many believe the current crisis is a major power play planned by the Russians. That may be correct. Yet, Georgia lit the fuse to open this ugly chapter of a long-running crisis by moving troops into the disputed Georgian region of South Ossetia, which contains Russian “peacekeepers.” Tensions have been rising between South Ossetian separatists and Georgia for several years, but little has been done to restrain the Georgians. Instead, the U.S. in particular has long been ignoring warning signs about a resurgent Russia’s concern over deepening Westernties to a seemingly overconfident Georgia.
The first President Bush, even at a time of considerable Russian weakness, chose to consider Georgia and some other relatively remote areas of the old Soviet Unionas, effectively, asort of Russian sphere of influence. Matters have evolved quite a lot since then, with Georgia gaining independence, but facing nasty separatist movements within its own territory in two regions, one of them South Ossetia. Back in 1992, the OSCE established a mission in Georgia to monitor Russian and Georgian activity in South Ossetia. Nonetheless, since 2004, friction has been rising steadily, with both Georgia and Russia taking actions that have raised tensions, but with Georgia also making the first provocative move back in 2004.
A disturbingtendency on the part of the current Bush Administration since its first years in office has beento repeatedly anger Russia and thus drive Russia toward a more adversarial role. The U.S. has taken controversial actionsrelated to strategic arms, made little effort to try to address more diplomatically its differences with Russia concerning the former Yugoslavia, strongly backed the admission of former Soviet republics into NATO, is in the process of deploying anti-missile systems in Eastern Europe over vigorous Russian objections, and sternlycriticized the Russian ruling eliteover democratic reform—all moves that have infuriated Moscow.
One might argue that some of these actions, like pointing out how Russia has become more authoritarian recent years, are commendable. Yet, such U.S. rhetoric has done virtually nothing to improve the political situation in Russia;it has only further alienated the Russian leadership.
Why should that matter? More Russian cooperationhas long been needed to strengthen the hand of the international community in its efforts to resolve the Iran nuclear crisis diplomatically and more advantageously, but it comes as no surprise that the Russians have been reluctant to support efforts to pressure the Iranians more strongly. Also, many European countries are heavily dependent on Russian natural gas. To make matters still worse, Russia, once greatly weakened in the early 1990’s, has rebounded both economically and politically and is once againa real power to be reckoned with in key areas.
The current Administration has embarked on an effort to punish Russia for its military moves in Georgia. However, it has few options. Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and can veto any measures directed against it in the most important world forum. Moreover, our European allies are either too dependent onor too close to Russia to take on significant risks.
U.S. diplomacy to resolve the crisis also is getting off on the wrong foot. Secretary of State Rice flew off to Paris and Tiblisi, the Georgian capital, but has no plans to stop in Moscow. This will be viewed (correctly) by the Russians as yet another snub, showing that Washington can neither function as an honest broker between the parties nor take into account Russian sensitivities, making it even more difficult for Washington to secure Russian cooperation.
In a way, what the U.S. has done, along with some of its Western allies, resembles, in microcosm, a serious Soviet blunder at the height of the Cold War: the Cuban missile crisis. The Russians developed very close ties to Castro’s Cuba and then decided in 1962 to base nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles there—far beyond the reach of Soviet air and naval power and in America’s front yard. In the face of a robust U.S. military response, the Soviets were forced to back down—a humiliation that was the beginning of the end for Nikita Khrushchev.
Similarly, the U.S. and the Europeans have cultivated close relations with Georgia, trained its army, brought it into the European Union, and potentially set the stage for its admittance into NATO. Now, in the face ofa powerful Russian demonstration of force, the distant West is poorly positioned to take any decisive action to counter the Russians, despite desperate Georgian appeals for help.
So, whatever the outcome of this crisis, Moscowprobably will view itself as the winner—even if it is somewhat more isolated. And one wonders what lessons the Georgians will draw from this episode about America’s ability in particular to help them so far away from Washington’s military center of gravity—and, this time, in Russia’s front yard.