General Assembly, 1St Committee

UGAMUNC XIX

General Assembly, 1st Committee

______

Hello Delegates!

My name is Katie Per-Lee () and I would like to welcome you to the 2013 University of Georgia Model United Nations Conference (UGAMUNC). As a senior here at UGA, this is my first year at UGAMUNC and I am so excited to be chairing General Assembly 1, the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC). This year we have selected three topics that are sure to spark some lively debates. I very much look forward to hearing creative and insightful ideas that you prepare at UGAMUNC in February.

Now allow me to introduce myself. I am an International Affairs major and Chinese Language and Literature minor from Stockbridge, Georgia.My interests focus on cultural and diplomatic relations, particularly in East Asia. I absolutely love to travel and recently returned from a semester abroad in Beijing. I am also involved with the philanthropy organization UGA H.E.R.O.s and, in the free time I have left, I enjoy working at Chick-fil-A.

I am honored to have Casper Tolstrup() as my co-chair at this year’s conference. Casper is a senior international Rotary student from Denmark’s University of Copenhagen studying international affairs, political science, and economics. In the past, Casper has participated in DanMUN and is looking forward to organizing and recreating the great experiences he has had. He is spending his year at UGA taking courses in international affairs and philosophy.

As you begin your research, I hope that you will find this background guide useful as a starting point. I encourage you to look deeper into the positions of each of your countries and be creative as you begin to think about solutions to the issues that have been raised. I am so excited about this year’s DISEC and I look forward to meeting you all at UGAMUNC in February.

Best of luck,

Katie Per-Lee

Chair, GA1, DISEC

I. Embassy and Diplomatic Mission Security

Introduction

On September 11, 2012, American ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens and three other mission staff members died as a result of an attack and burning of the American diplomatic mission in Benghazi. In the days and weeks that have followed, attacks have also taken place against American embassies in both Yemen and Egypt. These attacks, the death of four diplomats, and the statements of US officials about the Americans’ response have led to many questions about the security provided for the missions and embassies inall nations and the protection of these predominately peaceful establishments.

Embassies and Diplomatic Missions

Embassies overseas serve to represent their countries to the world. From embassies, ambassadors and diplomats work to promote the foreign policies of home nations as well as presenting the face of their culture and values through the promotion of friendship and cooperation. In addition to serving as diplomatic bases, embassies frequently house intelligence and military stations of operation in order to ensure real-time information for analysts and leaders at home.

History of Violence

Incidents like those taking place in Libya, Egypt, and Yemen are not a new phenomenon. There have been many points throughout history when embassies have become a target for protestors and militants wishing to send a message to the country a station represents.

One of the most notable, long, and tense incidents occurred in Tehran, Iran beginning in November of 1979. A mob of Iranian civilians overtook the American embassy, took several dozen staff captive, and proceeded to hold them hostage for 444 days.[1] This crisis was similar to the September attack in Libya in that what little security was in place, was breached. Iranian police forces meant to serve as protection in Tehran stood by as the American embassy was overrun. In this case, should the Iranian government have taken responsibility for failed security and endangerment of foreign dignitaries? Or should the United States have had further measures in place with the knowledge that diplomats were stationed in a particularly volatile location?

Incidents of violence, however, are not isolated to historically unstable regions like the Middle East. In July 1994, a bomb was set off by what are believed to have been pro-Iranian terrorists outside the Israeli embassy in London, England.[2] While no diplomatic staff members were killed in this attack, 14 were injured and serious damage was done to Israeli property.[3] This incident demonstrates the possibility of attack no matter the host country. Embassies are influenced by events from all over the world, such as the meeting ending a 46 year war between the Jordanian king and Israeli Prime Minister just before the London attack.[4]

Protection

Not long after the attack in Benghazi, American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a statement claiming responsibility for the failure of security and subsequent death of four American representatives.[5] Many saw this announcement as a ploy to draw attention away from President Obama as he campaigned for re-election, but could blame be laid on an American leader at all?According to international law, it is the responsibility of host nations to protect dignitaries and resident foreign diplomats within their borders.[6] But how should countries respond in instances like the Tehran incident when local protection fails?

Past UN Action

The rights and protections of missions and embassies abroad were established by the UN in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic relations in 1961. Article 2 of the treaty says that any mission of a sending country is sovereign ground and cannot be entered by agents of the receiving country without the express permission of the head of the mission.[7] Referencing the safety and security of the mission, Article 2 also states that “The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.”[8] This means that in times of uprising and protest, embassies like the one in Iran or Libya should be protected by the host country.

This Vienna Convention was referenced again in 2011during the Arab Spring when uprisings in Libya led to the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi. A UNSC resolution establishing a UN support mission to the region included a strong reminder to the government. While the resolution praised the forward movement of the Libyan people and their desire for change, italso “strongly [urged]the Libyan authorities to ensure the protection of diplomatic personnel and premises” of foreign missions.[9]

A Threat without Borders

The issue of security for embassies and diplomatic missions is one faced by all states at all times. Embassies represent a sovereign, if small, slice of another government and people. This fact makes missions a target for those wishing to express their opinions without having to travel to the state against which they hold a grievance. It presents an opportunity for extremists to strike, as with the Israeli embassy in London, without having to pass the high levels of security surrounding important buildings inside the targeted state. Whether states have the resources to do so or not, diplomatic missions must be protected in an effort to further international cooperation. The UN should consider whether receiving or sending states should maintain responsibility for the safety of foreign property and dignitaries and what measures should be taken to prevent violent attacks in the future.

Questions for consideration:

• Should the protection of foreign dignitaries remain the responsibility of host nations, or should this burden be placed on embassies and missions?
• What level of force should be permitted by countries to protect their dignitaries?
• Does an attack on an embassy or mission abroad (essentially foreign soil in a host country) constitute an act of war?
• How should nations with a military and police force incapable of protecting dignitaries respond to instability or protests that threaten missions and embassies?

II. Nuclear North Korea

Introduction

In 1985, North Korea became a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), fifteen years after it was formally put into effect.[10] Their initial signing of treaty was in exchange for assistance from the Soviet Union in the development of the nation’s first nuclear reactor.[11] Almost from the beginning, North Korea was at odds with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), charged with monitoring suspected nuclear sites, and other signers of the NPT (namely the United States, South Korea, and Japan). As early as 1992, they were found to be concealing nuclear sites, resisting inspections, and underreporting the production of enriched plutonium used in the production of nuclear weapons. Years of bargaining and compromise with South Korea and the US culminated in North Korea formally withdrawing from the NPT in January of 2003. The North Korean government, then under the control of Kim Jong Il(who succeeded his father in 1994), insisted their withdrawal did not indicate intent to begin developing weapons. International concern continued to increase as North Korea reactivated several known plutonium enriching sites.[12]

In October of 2006, North Korea claimed to have successfully tested its first nuclear weapon in defiance of warnings from the UN Security Council (UNSC) of the consequences. While it could not be confirmed whether the device detonated was in fact nuclear due to the secret nature and location of the test, US intelligence indicated that North Korea, by their withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, had obtained enough weapons-grade enriched plutonium to build at least one nuclear device.[13] North Korean warnings to China mere minutes before the device was exploded also contributed to the legitimacy of the claim.

In May 2009, again in contempt of UNSC cautions, North Korea successfully executed a second nuclear test. A radio announcement from the North Korean government declared that this test was "safely conducted at a new high level in terms of explosive power and control technology".[14] Russian intelligence calculated the explosion to be between 10 and 20 kilotons, a blast size attributable to a nuclear device.[15] This confirmed the significant improvement claimed by the North Korean government compared to the 2006 test, measured at less than one kiloton, barely enough force to confirm the test’s nuclear nature.[16] Throughout this short crisis, North Korea continued to maintain that the development and testing of nuclear weapons are a response to threats to sovereignty by countries like the United States and are to be kept for defensive purposes only.

Past UN Action

The traditional approach to influencing North Korea has come in the form of economic sanctions and the withholding of energy and food aid,a stiff punishment for a country that faces extreme poverty and struggles to feed its own people. The UNSC has settled into a pattern of punishment and retaliation with the authoritarian government. A failed rocket launch in April 2012, said by the North Korean government to be an attempt to launch a satellite, led to an increase in existing sanctions against goods, companies, and individuals connected to the development of ballistic missiles.[17] This increased pressure was applied in the form of a “presidential order,” not carrying the weight of a resolution, but still indicating heightened concern by the international community.[18]

In response to North Korea’s first “successful” nuclear test in 2006, the UNSC issued a resolution instituting sanctions on nuclear technology as well as “large-scale” weapons and luxury goods. This resolution, like others, did allow for the continuation of international aid, acknowledging the impact that economic sanctions have on the people.[19] These sanctions proved to have little impact on North Korea’s determination to pursue acquiring a nuclear weapon. In 2009, they were once again before the UNSC after a failed satellite launch raised security concerns about missile launch capabilities. Sanctions were tightened and the attending delegation responded by walking out of the meeting. North Korea’s second, and much improved, nuclear test was conducted just a month later.[20] This ineffective cycle seems to suggest that options outside of sanctions must be considered moving forward.

North Korean Leadership

From Kim Il-sung to his son Kim Jong-Il, and finally to his grandson Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s leaders have built a reputation for being erratic in their decision, if not borderline irrational. In his first year as ruler, Kim Jong-un has appeared more open to change, new ideas, and relationships with the outside world. Reports of more liberal western dress for women, Disney character appearances, and images of the ruler interacting with soldiers and citizens show him as more approachable and charismatic than his father before him.[21] However, it should be remembered that Kim Jong-un still controls one of the most unstable nuclear forces in the world. He has not stopped military development discouraged by the UNSC, as demonstrated by the September rocket launch (North Korea claimed it was an attempt to launch a satellite). North Korea’s desire to be seen as a world power cannot be disregarded.

Global Issue

The United States has said that the fear of a nuclear North Korea comes not so much from an expectation that they will use the weapons they have, but from their “proclivity to proliferate.”[22] In 2002, before its withdrawal from the NPT, President George W. Bush identified North Korea as part of an Axis of Evil and a safe haven for terrorism (along with Iran and Iraq).[23] While this declaration was quickly condemned by many states including the “axis,” it touches on some of the fear brought by the possibility of unstable nations obtaining nuclear weapons. North Korea’s “proclivity to proliferate” would be a direct violation of Article I the NPT, which states that “each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”[24] Though North Korea has since been removed from the list of countries that the US sees as sponsors of terrorism, it has shown few qualms in the past about sharing weapons technology with those willing to pay the price. Even if weapons are not directly transferred to non-nuclear states, the fear remains that one violation of the NPT will open the door for others, particularly in those countries without proper security and oversight capabilities and concerns.

It should also be considered whether treaties such as the NPT are an infringement on states’ rights to protect their citizens from more powerful nuclear states. North Korean representatives have repeatedly spoken of the “double standard” used in the evaluation of the threat posed by the American nuclear weapons program.[25] While it may seem reasonable to view North Korea, as well as many others, as an ongoing security threat, the UN should be mindful of the concerns of non-nuclear states over the protection of its citizens in a nuclear world.

Questions for Consideration:

• In a threatening international environment, should North Korea be forced to disarm?
• If so, with extensive sanctions already in place and pressure on the North Korean government from all sides, what other measures can be taken in order ensure disarmament compliance?
• What approach should be taken to North Korea as well as other nations who claim defense as a reason for developing weapons in a nuclear world?

III. Private Security Companies and the Privatization of War

Introduction

As governments around the world face fiscal shortcomings in the wake of the financial crisis, they have taken different measures to meet their individual deficits. Common to all has been the inexorable pressure to look to defense spending to curb these deficits. This has exacerbated a trend that has been gathering strength for years – the use of private security companies (PSC) in war or war-like situations. For example, there were as many as 100,000 “private contractors” working in Iraq in 2007 doing military tasks. These guards are heavily armed and work in highly unstable environments, yet treated as civilians according to international law.[26]

Private Security Companies

“Since the end of the Cold War there has been an abundance of unemployed, highly-trained soldiers in the Developed World”.[27]PSCs – such as Academi, formerly known asBlackwater – hire these ex-soldiers and use them to supply military and security services to entities ranging from governmental departments to multinational corporations.[28]Their tasks range from protecting people and items to training locals. Since they are not taking an active part in a conflict or war, and are not controlled by a state military, they are not considered soldiers. They will also often work in places of low-intensity conflict, meaning that they work where national governments are weak and there is no distinct front line, where the need for protection is strong.[29]

PSCs operate in a multitude of countries, developing and developed, war-torn and stable, with an aggregate value of contracts estimated as high as $200 billion - and growing. Two major problems arise from the PSCs:

1. Heavily armed unsupervised actors inside sovereign countries pose a potentially significant challenge to a nation’s monopoly on lethal force and its ability to protects its own citizens
2. The status of the PSC staff is very unclear, possibly even undermining international law as well as the Geneva Conventions

Armed Actors Inside Sovereign Countries