Feminism and Ecological Feminism

ECOFEMINISM

Mark Woods

Ecofeminism, sometimes called ecological feminism, is a blending of feminism and environmental philosophy.

FEMINISM AND ECOLOGICAL FEMINISM

Why feminism? All feminists typically believe that the following statements are true:

Part of the structure of the world has been and still is patriarchy––a system where men have more power than women and where men have more access to what societies esteem.
Under patriarchy, sexist oppression occurs. (Such oppression is sometimes called domination or subordination.)
Sexist oppression is wrong.
Sexist oppression should be eliminated, and we should work toward a non-patriarchal (or post-patriarchal) world.

There is much disagreement about what oppression is, about how and why it occurs, and about how it should be eliminated.

Liberal feminists tend to focus on oppression based on the intersections of gender differences in political, economic, and social realms and aim at the equality of all people through the progressive elimination of the importance of gender categories.
Marxist feminists tend to focus on oppression based on the intersections of gender and economic class differences and aim at equalizing economic and gender roles and opportunities by restructuring economic systems, primarily capitalism.
Radical feminists tend to focus on oppression based on the intersections of gender, sexual, and sexuality differences and aim at either (a) liberating sexuality through sexual freedom and androgyny or (b) elevating the low values traditionally associated with femininity based on sexuality and eliminating the dangers of sexuality, especially heterosexual sexuality.
Socialist feminists tend to focus on oppression based on the intersections of gender, economic class, sexual, and sexuality differences and aim at equalizing economic and gender roles and opportunities in ways outlined by Marxist feminists and at liberating sexuality in ways outlined by radical feminists and also, for some socialist feminists, at the equality of all people as outlined by liberal feminists.
Psychoanalytic feminists tend to focus on oppression based on the intersections of gender and psychosexual development differences and aim at restructuring psychosexual development and child-raising.
Gender feminists, sometimes called feminist ethicists, tend to focus on oppression based on the intersections of gender, moral, and moral developmental differences and aim at articulating feminist ethics by (a) giving attention to traditionally neglected women’s voices and experiences, (b) elevating the virtues and values traditionally associated with femininity, and/or (c) critiquing non-feminist ethics and values of masculinity.
Existentialist feminists tend to focus on oppression based on the intersections of gender, ontological, and philosophical differences and aim at critiquing how women’s existence has been constructed philosophically and at articulating new philosophical accounts of the existence of women.
Phenomenological feminists tend to focus on oppression based on the intersections of gender, subjectivity, and experiential differences and aim at articulating new accounts of how gender affects how people directly experience the world.
Postmodern feminists tend to focus on oppression based on the intersections of gender, phallocentric, and logocentric differences and aim at deconstructing a wide variety of traditional philosophical theories and essentialist feminist theories and at articulating alternative language accounts for feminism.
Multicultural feminists, sometimes called feminists of color (Black feminists, Chicana feminists, etc.), tend to focus on oppression based on the intersections of gender, economic class, sexual, sexuality, racial, and ethnic differences and aim at ending all forms of oppression based on these differences.
Global feminists tend to focus on oppression based on the intersections of gender, economic class, sexual, sexuality, racial, ethnic, imperial, colonial, military, and national differences and aim at ending all forms of oppression based on these differences. Global feminists sometimes shun the label “feminist” and/or call themselves “womanists.”

There is considerable overlap between many of these different feminist positions. In particular, multicultural and global feminists believe that one cannot merely combat one single form of oppression, such as sexist oppression, because different forms of oppression typically are linked together. For example, a poor, lesbian, Black, single mother living in Haiti will experience multiple and interlinked layers of oppression that will differ from the oppression experienced by a middle-class, heterosexual, white, married woman living in San Diego.

Ecological feminists build on all of the above and add in another form of oppression: the oppression of nature. That is, in addition to all of the ways women and men are oppressed, nature itself is oppressed, and the oppression of nature is linked to the oppression of people, especially women. Ecological feminism thus can be seen as the most inclusive type of feminism, going beyond even multicultural and global feminism.

ECOLOGICAL FEMINISM: CONCEPTUAL LINKS

Throughout her writings, Karen J. Warren discusses and critiques the conceptual links between the domination of women and the domination of nature. In her book Ecofeminist Philosophy: A Western Perspective on What It Is and Why It Matters (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), she reconstructs arguments that explain a common logic of domination.

Warren believes that underlying the domination of nature is the following argument:

Humans do, and plants and rocks do not, have the capacity to consciously and radically change the community in which they live in self-determined ways.
Whatever has the capacity to consciously and radically change the community in which it lives in self-determined ways is morally superior to whatever lacks this capacity.
Thus, humans are morally superior to plants and rocks.
For any X and Y, if X is morally superior to Y, then X is morally justified in subordinating (dominating) Y.

Thus, humans are morally justified in subordinating (dominating) plants and rocks.

Warren believes that underlying the domination of women is the following argument:

At least in Western societies, whenever a group is historically identified with nonhuman nature and the realm of the physical, it is conceptualized as morally inferior to whatever group is historically identified with culture and the realm of the mental.
At least in Western societies, women as a group historically have been identified with nonhuman nature and the realm of the physical, while at least dominant men have been historically identified with culture and the realm of the mental.
Thus, at least in Western societies, women as a group are conceptualized as morally inferior to at least dominant men.
For any X and Y, if X is conceptualized as morally inferior to Y, then Y is justified in subordinating dominating X.

Thus, at least in Western societies, dominant men are justified in subordinating (or dominating) both women and nonhuman nature.

As both an environmental philosopher and a feminist, Warren rejects both of these arguments as bad arguments. What she is trying to show is that a similar “logic of domination” pervades those who dominate nature (what she calls “naturism”) and those who dominate women (sexism). The first premise of each argument sets up a hierarchy. The hierarchy is coupled with a value judgment in the second premise of each argument. The fourth premise of each argument is a subordination premise that states that whatever is higher in a hierarchy and has more value is justified in dominating whatever is lower and has less value in the hierarchy.

Warren claims that feminism (a movement to end sexist oppression) is necessarily linked with environmentalism (a movement to end the domination of nature and to end naturism):

Feminism is, minimally, a movement to end sexism.
Sexism is conceptually linked with naturism.

Thus, feminism is (also) a movement to end naturism.

Warren also claims that environmental ethics is necessarily linked with feminism:

Minimally, environmental ethics is a twofold commitment to the moral considerability of nonhuman nature and to the elimination of naturism in ethical theory and practice.
But naturism is conceptually linked with sexism.

Thus, environmental ethics must (also) involve a commitment to the elimination of sexism in environmental theory and practice.

Thus, if one is a feminist, one also should be an environmentalist, and if one is an environmentalist, one also should be a feminist. This is the “power and the promise” of ecological feminism, according to Warren.

As a type of feminist ethic, Warren argues that ecological feminism involves a commitment to critique male bias in ethics wherever it occurs (including in environmental ethics) and to develop ethics which are not male-biased. In addition, she lists eight boundary conditions which delimit ecological feminism, much like the boundaries of a quilt or collage delimit the territory of the piece. An ecological feminist ethic:

Cannot promote any thinking or acting that embodies a form of a logic of domination.
Must be contextualist and arise out of felt experiences.
Must be structurally pluralistic.
Should reconceive of ethical theory as in-process and that favors first-person narratives.
Must be inclusivist, especially of the felt experiences and perspectives of oppressed peoples.
Should be subjectively “biased,” recognizing that no ethical theory is unbiased, and striving to achieve better biases.
Needs to be attentive to and appreciative of traditionally “feminine” values such as care, love, friendship, and appropriate trust.
Should be interested in receiving of humans in terms of networks of historical and concrete relationships and communities rather than in terms of abstract individualism.

ECOLOGICAL FEMINISM: COMBATING DUALISMS

In the book Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (London: Routledge, 1993), Val Plumwood argues that dualisms lie at the heart of the domination of both nature and women. Consider the following dualisms:

culture / nature

reason / nature

male / femalePlumwood claims that what is on one side of

mind / body (nature)these dualisms is defined in radical opposition to

master / slavewhat is on the other side, and higher value

reason / physical mattercommonly is assigned to what is on the left side of

rationality / animalitythe dualism. She also claims that these dualisms

reason / emotionpervade much of western thought.

public / private

civilized / primitive

human / nature

self / other

Plumwood argues that the dualistic distortion of culture and the historical inferiority of women and nature in western thought and history have been based on the following network of assumptions:

Set A:

Women = Nature Assumption: identification of the female with the sphere of physicality and nature.
Inferiority of Nature Assumption: assumed inferiority of the sphere of women and of nature.
Dualistic Assumption: conception of both women and nature in terms of a set of dualistic contrasts opposing the sphere of nature to that of reason or the human.

Set B:

Men = Reason Assumption: corresponding identification of the male with the sphere of reason, of true humanity and culture.
Superiority of Reason Assumption: assumption of the superiority of the sphere of reason, humanity, and culture to that of nature.
Dualistic Assumption: conception of the human or cultural sphere in terms of a set of dualistic assumptions opposing it to nature.

Plumwood questions these assumptions and finds reasons to reject them, especially the dualistic assumptions.

Plumwood calls dualism “the logic of colonisation” because what is on one side of a dualism (the left side of the dualisms listed above) denies its dependency on what is on the other side and subordinates what is on the other side. For example, just as masters have colonized and dominated slaves, men have colonized and dominated women, and humans have colonized and dominated nature. Plumwood believes that there are five important characteristics of the logical structure of dualisms, and she suggests ways to change these characteristics so that dualisms can be eliminated:

Backgrounding: this results from the irresolvable conflicts a relationship of domination creates for the dominator because the dominator attempts to make use of the other, relies on the other, benefits from the other’s services, and denies the dependency this creates. As an example, think of the historical invisibility of women’s housework (in the private realm) that has made the public lives of many men possible. Plumwood argues that the dependency and contribution of who or what is dominated should be acknowledged, and what is backgrounded should become part of the foreground.
Radical Exclusion (Hyperseparation): What is on each side of the dualism must be radically exclusive (hyperseparated) because one side of the dualism is considered to be inferior and part of a lower, different order. As an example, think of how many white people in the United States believed that Black people were inferior as slaves and could be radically excluded from what was distinctively considered to be human, as free and autonomous individuals. Plumwood argues that continuity between both sides of the dualism should be affirmed and reconceived as integrated.
Incorporation (Relational Definition): What is on the inferior side of a dualism is defined as a lack or absence of what is on the superior side, and what is on the inferior side becomes incorporated into the needs and desires of the what is on the superior side. As an example, think of how primitive nature historically has been valued only as a resource or a commodity for civilization, incorporated into the desires and needs of civilized peoples. Plumwood argues that languages and stories of what is considered inferior need to be rediscovered, and what is inferior should be acknowledged as having its own identity that is not a mere lack or absence of what is on the superior side of the dualism.
Instrumentalism (Objectification): What is on the inferior side of a dualism is obliged to put aside their or its own interests for what is on the superior side of the dualism, and what is on the inferior side of a dualism is conceived of as mere instruments or as a means to the end of what is on the superior side. As an example, think of how nature historically has been conceived of as having only instrumental value for human ends; the economic view of the environment regards all of nature as mere resources for human preferences. Plumwood argues that what is on the inferior side of a dualism should be recognized as having its own needs, value, and striving, whose needs can be independent of what is on the superior side of the dualism.
Homogenisation (Stereotyping): Members of what is on the inferior side of a dualism––the dominated class––are made to appear homogenous (the same), differences between members of the dominated class are disregarded, and members of the dominated class are said to conform to their own “nature.” As an example, think of how members of particular ethnic groups historically have been stereotyped: all Mexicans are lazy, all Polish people are dumb, all Black men are criminals, etc. Plumwood argues that homogenisation and stereotyping should be rejected and replaced with notions of complexity and diversity.

Importantly, Plumwood argues that dualisms should be replaced with non-hierarchical concepts of difference.

ECOLOGICAL FEMINISM:

ELIMINATING PATTERNS OF DOMINATION AND PROMOTING FLOURISHING

In the book Feminism and Ecological Communities: Toward an Ethic of Flourishing (London: Routledge, 1998), Chris Cuomo argues that ecological feminists should learn to recognize and eliminate patterns of domination that oppress both nature and people, especially women. Cuomo argues that much work in ecofeminism has been centered on identifying the similarities between women, as dominated by men, and nature, as dominated by humans; she calls this “object-attentive” because such work is attentive to the ways in which the objects of domination are similar. In contrast, she identifies her work in ecological feminism as being “patterns of domination-attentive” because it is centered on identifying the similarities between supposedly different patterns of domination and how these patterns are used to dominate different kinds of people and natural entities. The focus of her analysis is domination or oppression itself and not just the objects of domination, namely women and nature.

Cuomo claims that there are four important features of any ecological feminist ethic:

It should explore the practices and values that derive from a foundation that takes women, nature, and other excluded beings or groups seriously and as morally relevant.
It recognizes that when nature gets harmed, women and other oppressed peoples also are harmed or are harmed more than the socially and economically privileged.
It recognizes that ‘women’ and ‘nature’ are socially created concepts.
It explores and creates ethical options and alternatives and critically evaluates traditional ethical ideas and practices, as well as evaluating what some feminists have reclaimed as traditional feminine ideas of practices, such as an ethic of care, rejecting what is problematic.

Unlike many other ecological feminist projects, Cuomo does not merely provide critical analysis of problematic ideas and practices. She articulates an ecological feminist ethic of her own she calls an “ethic of flourishing.” She argues that human and non-human organisms, species, and communities have goods that can be promoted and thus can be made worse-off or made better- off. She calls the latter “flourishing,” and the goal of ethics is to enable living individuals and communities to flourish. Such individuals and communities have what Cuomo calls “dynamic charm:” a “diffuse, ‘internal’ ability to adapt to or resist change, and its unique causal and motivational patterns and character” (p. 71). Dynamic charm is ethically significant because:

Entities that exhibit dynamic charm are the same entities that moral agents depend upon for their own flourishing and survival.
Entities with dynamic charm have active well-beings associated with their capacities for change and response, and they can be harmed.
Entities with dynamic charm evoke moral responses such as respect, attending, responsibility, commitment, and duty.

Everything that is alive exhibits dynamic charm, according to Cuomo. This includes aggregates or collective entities such as communities, because individual organisms––including humans––are always found in communities and cannot exist independent of a communal context. And just as individual organisms themselves can flourish, communities as a whole can flourish.