Pacific Northwest Salmon

1

Pacific Northwest Salmon

Recovery Efforts

and the Pacific Salmon Treaty

prepared for the

DEPARTMENTS OF

FISHERIES & OCEANS

and

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

by

MARVIN SHAFFER & ASSOCIATES LTD.

With the Assistance of

I.A.S. INTERNATIONAL ANALYTIC SCIENCE LTD.

December 31, 1998

Table of Contents

Page

PRECIS...... /

(iii)

1.0INTRODUCTION...... / 1
2.0PACIFIC NORTHWEST SALMON RECOVERY PROGRAM EXPENDITURES...... / 4
2.1Columbia River Program...... / 4
2.2Puget Sound...... / 7
3.0DISTRIBUTION OF EXPLOITATION OF SELECTED PNW STOCKS...... / 10
4.0IMPACTS OF PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENTS AND HARVESTING RATES ON THE PROBABILITY OF EXTINCTION...... / 15
5.0CONCLUSIONS...... / 22
5.1Findings...... / 22
5.2Assessment...... / 22

APPENDIX A

BPA Post 2000 Salmon Recovery Costs

APPENDIX B
Summary Distribution of Exploitation of Selected Northwest Chinook Stocks

APPENDIC C

Detailed Distribution of Exploitation of Selected Northwest Chinook Stocks

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PRÉCIS

This study concludes that sustained reductions in ocean harvest of endangered Pacific salmon stocks are proportionately as important, in some cases more important for salmon recovery than costly in-river programs to improve habitat, productivity and survival.

The Pacific Northwest is currently investing an extraordinary amount – over $500 million U.S. per year – for salmon recovery. With more Endangered Species Act (ESA) listings pending and new program reviews, this amount could readily double to over one billion per year, or more, in the near future.

Salmon recovery efforts to date have concentrated almost exclusively on in-river programs. A clear implication of this study is that harvesting control, which is orders of magnitude less costly, is as important and potentially effective for salmon recovery.

A large percentage of Pacific Northwest salmon are vulnerable to fishing effort in Canadian and Alaskan fisheries. Historically, exploitation in these fisheries has generally exceeded that in the southern U.S. Measures to control, on a sustained long term basis, interception of endangered Pacific Northwest salmon in these fisheries are critically important to the success of recovery efforts. They should be an integral part of any comprehensive, cost-effective salmon recovery program. Pacific Salmon Treaty negotiations provide the principal means for achieving long term control on interceptions.

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The U.S. has been engaged in major efforts to preserve and rebuild salmon stocks in the Pacific Northwest. Since the early 1980s, programs have been developed and implemented pursuant to the Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Act to address the adverse impacts that hydroelectric facilities and operations have had on Columbia River salmon. More recently, mandatory salmon recovery programs have been developed and implemented as a result of the listings of Snake River sockeye and chinook under the Endangered Species Act.[1]

A recent U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) review of the status of chinook stocks on the West Coast[2] suggests that further listings under the Endangered Species Act are likely. Of eight groups[3] of chinook stocks in or north of the Columbia River that NMFS examined, five were considered to be at risk of extinction or likely soon to be so. NMFS concluded:

• Lower Columbia wild chinook stocks are all depressed; they are likely to be listed as endangered;

• Upper Columbia spring chinook escapements are the lowest in 60 years; they are at risk of extinction, and therefore almost certain to be listed as endangered;

• Snake River fall chinook is already listed as threatened and the newly defined Ecologically Significant Unit of which it is a part (including Deschute River chinook) is in danger of extinction in the foreseeable future;

• Snake River spring and summer chinook are already listed as threatened;

• Puget Sound spring, summer and some fall chinook runs are severely depressed and are likely to be listed as threatened or endangered.

Policy makers throughout the Pacific Northwest expect further listings on the Columbia River and new listings of Puget Sound chinook. It is clear that more extensive programs and measures will have to be developed and implemented to respond to these new ESA requirements. The numerous consultative fora that have been held of late are indicative of residents’ concerns about impending costs for individuals, businesses and government.

As discussed in section 2 of this report, salmon recovery programs in the Pacific Northwest are already costing the U.S. more than $500 million (US) per year. With additional listings and programs, the annual cost could grow to $1 billion or more. Within this context, proposed solutions that will improve in-river programs and help control rising costs are worthy of full public scrutiny.

U.S. recovery efforts have focussed almost entirely on habitat and other in-river measures that are intended to improve juvenile and returning adult survival rates. Surprisingly little attention and program effort has been directed to harvesting, particularly in Canadian or Alaskan interception fisheries.

It is increasingly recognized, however, that salmon recovery plans must incorporate appropriate controls on harvesting, not only in terminal areas but also in interception fisheries in Canada and, in some cases, Alaska. NMFS concluded, for example, that “nearly two-thirds of the ocean harvest impacts on Snake River Fall chinook occurred in Canadian fisheries … substantial ocean impact reductions which are necessary to protect the listed salmon can be achieved only with the cooperative involvement of Canada.”[4]

With respect to Puget Sound, the west coast director of Trout Unlimited stated, “while we need to do a great deal to improve the habitat in the Puget Sound watershed, we will not be able to restore chinook until we address the problems in the [Pacific Salmon] Treaty.”[5] The director of the Washington Department of Fish & Wildlife similarly stated “Even listing [Puget chinook] stocks under the Federal Endangered Species Act – which could happen this year – and its draconian economic and social remedies will fail if the international salmon mess [in particular interceptions of Washington-bound chinook] cannot be untangled.”[6]

The purpose of this report is to analyze the linkage between salmon recovery in the Pacific Northwest and the Pacific Salmon Treaty (PST) as it affects or may affect the exploitation of salmon (through harvesting and related mortalities) in Canadian and Alaskan fisheries. The report focuses on chinook salmon because of the weak condition of many of these stocks and their strong interrelationship, in many instances, with Canadian and Alaskan fisheries.[7] The impacts of Canadian fisheries are assessed over a wide range of conditions as have been experienced over the last 15 years. The fundamental issue that is addressed is the long term importance of Canadian and Alaskan harvesting on the recovery of U.S. Pacific Northwest chinook stocks.

The perspective taken in this report, it should be noted, is not what resolution of PST issues may offer in any one year, but rather over the longer term. Canadian fishing effort and interceptions of U.S. stocks depend on the abundance of Canadian salmon. Currently, for example, the very low expected returns for coho would have drastically curtailed Canadian fishing efforts with or without a PST agreement. In previous years, low returns for chinook have had a similar, if less drastic effect. Over time, however, abundance varies and currently curtailed Canadian fisheries will likely be restored.

Three specific questions are addressed in this report:

1. Where are U.S. Northwest chinook stocks harvested? What is the relative importance of Canadian, Alaskan and southern U.S. fisheries?

1. What impact would harvesting controls, as could occur with a PST agreement, have in reducing the probability of extinction of weak Pacific Northwest stocks? How does the impact of harvesting controls compare to that of the productivity improvements and increased survival rates being sought from the very expensive salmon recovery programs currently in place?

1. What impact would increased harvesting efforts in interception fisheries, as could occur without a PST agreement, have on the probability of extinction of weak Pacific Northwest stocks? To what extent would it negate the benefits of the in-river programs?

The answers to these questions are critical to assessing the importance of resolving harvesting issues under the PST for the cost and success of salmon recovery programs in the PNW. Specifically they are critical in identifying the opportunities successful resolution of the PST may afford and the consequences failure may have.

2.0PACIFIC NORTHWEST SALMON RECOVERY PROGRAM EXPENDITURES

2.1Columbia River Programs

As noted in Marvin Shaffer & Associates Ltd.’s 1996 report on the Columbia River Salmon Rebuilding Program,[8] U.S. salmon recovery efforts under the Northwest Power Planning Council’s Fish and Wildlife plans, and more recently in response to the listings under the Endangered Species Act, have been aimed at:

• increasing juvenile survival rates;
• increasing successful adult migration from the ocean to spawning areas;
• protecting and improving habitat;
• improving hatchery management; and
• reducing harvest of weaker stocks.

The major measures include:

• seasonal water releases, spills and reservoir drawdowns to improve water flows and thereby reduce juvenile mortalities due to predation and disease and reduce migration delays and pre-spawning mortalities of returning adults;
• construction and operation of bypass facilities to reduce mortalities in generating turbines;
• habitat protection and pollution control;
• predation control;
• hatchery programs; and
• commercial vessel buy-back and other harvesting control.

In MSA’s 1996 report, it was estimated that the U.S. will spend, on average over the 1996-2001 period, some $535-$700 million U.S. for salmon rebuilding measures on the Columbia. This includes not only the costs specifically required to recover endangered stocks, but also to rebuild stocks more generally throughout the Columbia. It does not include, however, base level state, tribal and federal fisheries management expenditures.

The majority of the costs are borne by Bonneville Power Administration (BPA). BPA’s expenditures over this 1996-2001 period are tied to a 1996 Memorandum of Agreement among the Departments of the Army, Commerce, Energy and the Interior which sets a cap on BPA Fish & Wildlife funding. As shown in the table below, the Memorandum calls for a growing level of expenditures, averaging over the six year period some $438 million per year, consisting of:

• $100 million of direct non-capital spending by BPA;

• $43 million of other agency spending appropriated by Congress and reimbursed by BPA;

• $112 million of capital costs incurred or reimbursed by BPA;

• $183 million of foregone power benefits and power replacement costs.

Net of spending for non-salmon programs, this yields an average annual BPA cost of some $405 million per year.

1996 / 1997 / 1998 / 1999 / 2000 / 2001 / 1996-2000
Average
Direct Program

• BPA

/ 100.0 / 100.0 / 100.0 / 100.0 / 100.0 / 100.0 / 100.0

• Reimbursed by BPA

/ 39.8 / 40.0 / 43.0 / 44.3 / 46.5 / 48.3 / 43.6
Capital Costs / 73 / 87 / 106 / 118 / 129 / 156 / 112.0
Power Costs* / 183.0 / 183.0 / 183.0 / 183.0 / 183.0 / 183.0 / 183.0
TOTAL: / 395.8 / 410 / 432 / 445.3 / 458.5 / 487.3 / 438.6

*Estimated average due to drawdowns and spills. Actuals can vary with water conditions, electricity prices and changes in operations.

Source: Memorandum of Agreement among the Departments of the Army, Commerce, Energy and the Interior, 1996.

Actual spending can vary from the planned amounts. Actual spending in 1996 and 1997 was in fact below planned amounts. The largest difference was for power costs, which were $102 million in both years, as compared to the $183 million estimate in the plan. Favourable water conditions and low power prices were key factors in the relatively low actual costs.

Under-spending in the program areas is carried over and available in future years. Lower than average expected power costs may be offset with higher costs, when water conditions and electricity prices are less favourable. Over the entire period, it is not expected that the average costs will vary markedly from planned levels.

In addition to the costs incurred or reimbursed by BPA, there are salmon recovery costs borne by other parties. Other Federal agencies, for example, the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management incur non-reimbursable costs to protect and restore habitat on Federal lands. Non-federal utilities who have an interest in the hydro electric facilities on the Columbia incur their share of dam operation costs. And other resource users (e.g., forestry, agriculture and recreation) bear costs associated with water flow and other salmon recovery measures. As shown in the table below these non-BPA costs increase the total estimated costs to $535 to $700 million per year.

Average Annual Columbia River Salmon

Rebuilding Costs - 1996-2001

($US millions)*

BPA / 405
Other Federal Agency / 45
Non-Federal Utility / 60 – 150
Other (Non-Power) Resource Users / 26 – 100
TOTAL: / 535 – 700

*From Marvin Shaffer & Associates Ltd., Columbia River Salmon Rebuilding Program, prepared for Fisheries & Oceans Canada, May, 1996.

After 2001, when the Memorandum governing BPA expenditures expires, costs will depend on the programs and operations then put in place. BPA has estimated its expenditures for the 2002 to 2006 period under a range of scenarios. Costs under the different scenarios are shown in Appendix A. They almost all suggest higher levels of spending. The annual expenditure estimates averaged over all of the different scenarios totals $593 million.

Average Annual

BPA Estimated Expenditures

2002 – 2006

Direct Program
BPA / 170
Reimbursement by BPA / 50
Capital / 148
Operational / 225
TOTAL: / 593

Source: Bonneville Power Corporation

(see )

Future cost estimates for other federal agencies, non-federal utilities and other (non-power) resource users are not available. However, if non-BPA costs increase proportionally, and the share of non-salmon costs remains the same, Columbia River salmon rebuilding efforts could total $720 to $945 million per year over the 2002-2006 period.

2.2Puget Sound

The extent and nature of the salmon recovery programs that will be required and implemented in Puget Sound, and their associated costs, is not yet known. However, the state and county governments are already incurring costs to develop plans and programs that may avoid ESA listings. As well, various parties are beginning to consider what habitat restoration may be required with ESA listings, and what costs that may entail.

Washington state recently budgeted $33 million to help restore dwindling salmon runs. This is in addition to the salmon-related expenditures that were already part of the state’s Fish & Wildlife budget. The $33 million will be used to support watershed planning and restoration efforts, measures to remove barriers to fish passage and various other initiatives.

King County has proposed a budget of $2.5 million to respond to the federal deadline for a salmon recovery plan. An additional $5 million is planned for early implementation of capital projects. Similarly, Snohomish and Pierce Counties are expected to budget for salmon recovery programs, although at a smaller rate than King County.

Impacts on urban development and municipal works, while not yet defined, are expected to be severe. Some have speculated that expansion of major industries (such as Boeing and Microsoft) and home building, could be slowed due to delays or refusals for water permits and other constraints. Loss of habitat due to urban development and polluted runoff from urban environments are widely held to be responsible for the decline in salmon stocks. Recovery plans will have to address those impacts.

There is concern as well about the loss or diversion of federal funding that ESA listings may entail. King County alone receives $70 million in federal funds for a variety of programs. King County is currently studying to what extent these funds may be diverted to salmon recovery or otherwise withheld as a result of an ESA listing.

The costs for salmon recovery will be markedly different for Puget Sound than for the Columbia. Nonetheless they too could be very large. Fisheries biologists P. Bergman and F. Haw suggested they could “certainly be hundreds of millions or perhaps a billion dollars per year.”[9] Puget Sound salmon recovery costs almost certainly will be more widespread than for Columbia. They will not be concentrated in one large power utility; they will be incurred by state and local governments and by industry and property owners throughout the region.

3.0DISTRIBUTION OF EXPLOITATION OF SELECTED PNW STOCKS

In order to assess the relative importance of Canadian and U.S. fisheries in the exploitation of Pacific Northwest chinook, coded wire data from the Pacific Salmon Commission Chinook Technical Committee were used. These data indicate the total mortality in each fishery (catch plus shaker and non-retention mortalities) by age cohort for different indicator stocks. Together with data on the number of releases (tagged fish) plus estimates of ocean mortality rates and spawning escapement, they permit a calculation of the percentage of the production of age two recruits from each stock, by brood year, that is exploited (caught or killed) in each fishery.

These calculations were made for a number of Puget Sound, Columbia and Northwest coastal indicator stocks. A west Coast Vancouver Island stock was also analyzed for comparative purposes. In each case the results for the indicator stock are used to represent the distribution of exploitation of wild chinook from the same area, as shown below.

Indicator Stock (Brood Years in this study) / Representing
Puget Sound: / George Adams (1972-91) / Hood Canal, Puget Sound
Samish (1974-91) / North Puget Sound
South Puget Sound (1971-91) / South Puget Sound
Squakum Pens (1986-90) / South Puget Sound
St’lam’quamish (1980-91) / Central Puget Sound
Columbia System: / Lyons Ferry (1984-90) / Snake River fall
Hanford Reach (1986-91) / Mid-Columbia
Upper River Brights (1975-91) / Mid-Columbia summer and fall
Coastal: / Sooes Creek (1985-91) / Washington North Coastal
Salmon River Hatchery (1977-91) / Oregon North Coastal
B.C.: / Robertson Creek (1983-91) / West Coast Vancouver Island

The results for all of these stocks are reported in Appendix B and illustrated in the graphs below. They clearly indicate the importance of Canadian as well as, in some instances, Alaskan fisheries in the exploitation of Pacific Northwest chinook.