Michael A. Eggleston

Michael A. Eggleston

History, GUI, Galway

Graduate Student

Essay-3000 words required

16 July 2010

Ireland’s Neutrality During World War II

By Michael A. Eggleston

16 July 2010

Introduction

This paper will examine Ireland’s neutrality during World War II. Background of Irish neutrality will be reviewed and the reasons for World War II neutrality will be explained. The fact that Ireland was neutral in name only will be explained and the cost of Ireland’s neutrality will be defined. This paper argues that the price of Ireland’s neutrality was far beyond what could have been expected by Ireland’s president, Eamon DeValera.

Origins of Ireland’s Neutrality

In 1790 Irish neutrality first surfaced during the British dispute with Spain over Nootka Sound. At the time Tone stated:

The people of this island are becoming more enlightened every day and will soon feel their power. . . Who out of Ireland ever hears of Ireland? What name have we among nations? Who fears us? Who respects us? Where are our ambassadors? A suburb of England we are sunk in her shade (Mansergh 128-9).

Two years later, the Presbyterians decided that they had no quarrel with France as Britain prepared to go to war. Tone’s theme was translated by DeValera years later. Prior to World War II, Ireland’s DeValera maintained that small states should stay out of conflicts among great nations. This theme would be repeated many times since Tone.

Reasons for Neutrality

The high-minded ideals expressed by Tone and DeValera were backed by more pragmatic reasons. In 1920, DeValera proposed a policy of Irish neutrality in order to reassure Britain that an independent Ireland would not be used by belligerent nations to attack Britain through its back door of Ireland (Mansergh 287); however, Irish neutrality was not included in Ireland’s constitution because DeValera wanted to maintain flexibility (Mansergh 28).

As World War II approached the only faction in Ireland that supported the Nazis was the Irish Republican Army (IRA) who viewed a Nazi victory as an opportunity to unify Ireland. The IRA followed up with bombings and assassinations. Churchill was infuriated and called for a report on “. . . the so-called neutrality of the so-called Eire. . . If they throw bombs in London, why should they not fuel U-Boats?” (Coogan, DeValera, Long Fellow, Long Shadow 592). Churchill followed with a typical broadside.

So far as ‘legality’ counts the question surely turns on whether ‘Eire is to be regarded as a neutral state.’ If this is conceded than the regular laws of neutrality apply. But is the neutrality which Mr. Devalera [sic] has proclaimed a valid condition, and on all fours with the neutrality say Holland or Switzerland? It is to this point that attention should first be directed. What is the judicial status of Southern Ireland? It is not a Dominion. They themselves repudiate this idea. It is certainly under the Crown. Nothing has been defined. Legally I believe that they are ‘At war but Skulking.’ Perhaps Sir William [Foreign Office Law Officer] should examine this thesis (Coogan, DeValera, Long Fellow, Long Shadow 536).

All of this talk achieved nothing and while Churchill fumed, DeValera had no difficulty interning IRA members in large numbers in order to assure the security of the state.

In view of the IRA threat, DeValera feared that an alliance with Britain could ignite another civil war (Fitzgerald 180).“And he felt that ‘for a divided people to fling itself into this war would be to commit suicide’” (Dwyer 113). Shortly before the outbreak of the war, DeValera made the following statement:

The desire of the Irish people and the desire of the Irish Government is to keep our nation out of war. The aim of Government policy is to maintain and to preserve our neutrality in the event of war. The best way and the only way to secure our aim is to put ourselves in the best position possible to defend ourselves so that no one can hope to attack us or violate our territory with impunity. We know, of course, that should attack come from a power other than Great Britain, Great Britain in her own interest must help us to repel it (Lee 243).

Privately, DeValera would admit that Ireland was totally unprepared for war and was unable to ally itself with any nation.Historian John P. Duggan summarized Irish unpreparedness.

The country was almost defenseless when the Second World War broke out. The ill-fated Polish cavalry stood a better chance against the mechanized Nazi war machine than the Irish armed forces would have done if Hitler launched a full-scale invasion against the country in 1939-nostalgic reminiscences about guerrilla prowess during the Anglo-Irish war notwithstanding. The strength of the army was 7,600 and 18,000 upon mobilization. . . In 1939, the Navy was still being formed. By 1940 there were two ex-fisheries patrol vessels, Muirchu and Fort Rannoch in service (Keogh 108-9).

In 1941 Joe Walshe explained Ireland’s neutrality when Britain challenged Ireland for not taking up the morale fight against the Nazis.

… small nations like Ireland do not and cannot assume a role as defenders of just causes except [their] own … Existence of our own people comes before all other considerations … no government has the right to court certain destruction for its people; they have to take the only chance of survival and stay out (Collins 371).

DeValera’s position on neutrality was supported by the overwhelming proportion of the Irish population (O’Halpen 191). To the Irish people and DeValera, the right to remain neutral and the assertion of that right was the ultimate test of Ireland’s sovereignty and independence from Britain (Doherty 192). Within the government James Dillon, until 1942 deputy leader of Fine Gael argued against neutrality and in favor of joining the Allies. With that he was promptly expelled from the party (Lee 242). Ireland maintained its neutrality during World War II despite pressure from Churchill and Roosevelt.

DeValera had a trump card and had no difficulty in using it. When Churchill threatened to attack Ireland and seize Irish ports, DeValera countered by reminding Americans and especially Irish-Americans that he sought peace and neutrality as they did. The Secretary of State in Washington cautioned the British ambassador that an attack on Ireland should not be considered and London provided assurances that there would be no British attack on Ireland unless Germany attacked first (Dwyer 119). DeValera would use this card whenever danger of an attack by Britain loomed. He would occasionally call on Irish-Americans to support Ireland’s neutrality and they would do so with rallies and public statements that undoubtedly made Roosevelt nervous. While he had no love for DeValera he did support him to include merchant ships and rifles that Ireland desperately needed. After the U.S. entered the war, Roosevelt joined Churchill in applying pressure on Devalera to join the Allies. This took the form of economic sanctions but these were never pushed too far (Nowlan 23).

While he publicly espoused neutrality, DeValera privately made it clear that an alliance between Ireland and the Allies was available if the price was right. He was willing to strike a naval treaty with Britain in return for a resolution of the Partition (Jesse 74). This was not accepted by Britain. At the start of the war, Churchill sent a lengthy cable to DeValera urging him to join in the war against the Nazis. The cable included the phrase that Ireland could be “a nation once again.” This phrase offered possibilities to DeValera, but the fact that Churchill was drunk at the time the cable was sent may have added a bit of skepticismfor all involved in the affair.DeValera was reminded of the old Irish Parliament Party song “A Nation Once Again.” He immediately cabled the Foreign Office asking if Mr. Churchill meant reunification of Ireland as a consequence of an alliance.The Foreign Office replied that Mr. Churchill meant no such thing (Mansergh 355).In June of 1940, Britain offered to accept the end of the partition if Ireland would join the Allies. The devil was in the details of the offer that provided that, if acceptable to Ireland, the United Kingdom would attempt to secure the assent of the government of Northern Ireland for reunification. DeValera knew that this would never happen and he rejected the offer (Ferriter 153). The holy grail of reunification remained out of reach.During this period according to John A. Murphy, DeValera always placed the security of his nation ahead of the vision of a reunited Ireland (Ferriter 153).

DeValera maintained neutrality though out the war. This of course did not play well with the victims of the Holocaust and it infuriated Churchill who on VE Day launched a violent criticism of Ireland and DeValera noting that they were allowed to “Frolic with the Germans” while Briton fought the war. Churchill added that Britain should have invaded Ireland. DeValera responded.

Mr. Churchill makes it clear that in certain circumstances he would have violated our neutrality and that he would justify his action by Britain’s necessity. It seems strange to me that Mr. Churchill does not see that this, if accepted, would mean that Britain’s necessity would become a moral code and that when this necessity became sufficiently great, other people’s rights were not to count….this same code is precisely why we have the disastrous succession of wars… shall it be world war number three? ("Politics.ie - The Irish Politics Website").

There are a number of reasons that have been put forward to explain the antipathy between Churchill and DeValera.

Much of the problem . . . was grounded in the character of DeValera and of Churchill, each of whom hated the other from youth. Each was a kind of genius with one or more human flaws. For their personal political reasons, each said much to conceal the fact that the Eire [sic] was a significant help to the Allies and neutral in name only – a fact well known to the Germans and the Japanese (Coogan, DeValera, Long Fellow, Long Shadow 592).

Beyond this was aspect of personality: Churchill was an adventurer (Gallipoli and Dieppe, for example), while DeValera was a pragmatist. More direct reasons for the antipathy between Churchill and DeValera may have been Churchill’s involvement and plots against Ireland following the Easter Rising of 1916. However, in the end, a truce seemed to settle between the two men.It came about when DeValera sent a note of sympathy to Churchill following the death King George VI. Churchill was impressed with DeValera’s gesture and invited him to London where the two met and discussed past and future. Churchill would say after the meeting “I like the man.” This was the same comment made by Lloyd George thirty years earlier when he was trying to coerce DeValera. (Doherty 101). This seemed to end the feud between Churchill and DeValera.

Whatever the reasons the problem between them effected Ireland’s participation in World War II and the consequences of neutrality. The issue continues into the 21st Century. In 1995 and again in 2003, Ireland apologized to Israel for its neutrality during World War II and especially for its restrictive policy in regard to allowing Jewish immigration (Ferriter 259).

The Friendly Neutral to the Allies

Following World War II, Viscount Cranborne, the British Secretary of State for Dominion affairs wrote to the British War Cabinet regarding Irish-British collaboration during 1939-1945.

They agreed to our use of Lough Foyle for naval and air purposes. The ownership of the Lough is disputed, but the Southern Irish authorities are tacitly not pressing their claim in present conditions and are also ignoring any flying by our aircraft over the Donegal shore of the Lough, which is necessary in certain wind conditions to enable flying boats to take off the Lough.

They have agreed to use by our aircraft based on Lough Erne of a corridor over Southern Irish territory and territorial waters for the purpose of flying out to the Atlantic.

They have arranged for the immediate transmission to the United Kingdom Representative’s Office in Dublin of reports of submarine activity received from their coast watching service.

They arranged for the broadening of reports by their Air observation Corps of aircraft sighted over or approaching Southern Irish territory. (This does not include our aircraft using the corridor referred to in (b) above.)

They arranged for the extinction of trade and business lighting in coastal towns where such lighting was alleged to afford a useful landmark for German aircraft.

They have continued to supply us with meteorological reports.

They have agreed to the use by our ships and aircraft of two wireless direction-finding stations at Malin Head.

They have supplied particulars of German crashed aircraft and personnel crashed or washed ashore or arrested on land.

They arranged for staff talks on the question of co-operation against a possible German invasion of Southern Ireland, and close contact has since been maintained between the respective military authorities.

They continue to intern all German fighting personnel reaching Southern Ireland. On the other hand, though after protracted negotiations, Allied service personnel are now allowed to depart freely and full assistance is given in recovering damaged aircraft.

Recently, in connection with the establishment of prisoner of war camps in Northern Ireland, they have agreed to return or at least intern any German prisoners who may escape from Northern Ireland across the border to Southern Ireland.

They have throughout offered no objection to the departure from Southern Ireland of persons wishing to serve in the United Kingdom Forces nor to the journey on leave of such persons to and from Southern Ireland (in plain clothes).

They have continued to exchange information with our security authorities regarding all aliens (including Germans) in Southern Ireland.

They have (within the last few days) agreed to our establishing a Radar station in Southern Ireland for use against the latest form of submarine activity (Fanning 124-5).

The above is a partial list. Keogh provides a more exhaustive list of Ireland’s support to the Allies (Keogh 120-123). These include over-flights by British and American aircraft that were permitted. Irish intelligence furnished information to Britain and weather was reported which was vital to the invasion of Europe. Thousands of aircraft crashed in Eire and while the British, Canadian, and American flyers were released at the border, Germans were interned and became “Guests of the State” requiring payment by the German Embassy for their rations and quarters. Over 70,000 citizens of Eire fought with the British armed forces against the Nazis. When the Nazis bombed Belfast in 1941, DeValera sent help across the border to assist Ulster and protested the raid to Hitler.

The Cost of Neutrality

Ireland paid a high price for its neutrality. At sea, Irish ships sailed with running lights flying the tri color and “Eire” broadly painted and plainly visible on their hulls. Many Allied seamen were rescued by Irish vessels, but Irish merchant ships were preyed upon by belligerents on both sides. It is estimated that nearly 20% of Irish seaman lost their lives during the war.

Jesse summarized the consequences of Ireland’s neutrality.

Four major consequences followed from Irish neutrality in World War II. First, Ireland emerged from the war relatively unscathed, compared to the rest of Europe. Second, neutrality contributed to international diplomatic isolation of Ireland after the war; Ireland failed to gain United Nations membership until 1955, owing to Soviet vetoes. Third, it widened the divide between the North and the South; the Germans had bombed Northern Ireland mercilessly, and the inhabitants of Northern Ireland suffered, unlike most of their neighbors to the south. Fourth, the success of neutrality created a popular attachment to the policy and fostered enduring illusions about the moral basis of staying out of other people's wars (Jesse 78).

Conclusion

This paper examined the impact of Ireland’s neutrality. Specifically, this paper argued that unlike other neutral nations such as Sweden and Switzerland, Ireland paid a price for its neutrality that may have been out of proportion to its decision to remain neutral especially since it was neutral in name only and assisted the Allies against the Nazi. It has been shown that neutrality for Ireland was essential in view of the IRA threat, the possibility of reigniting the civil war, and the fact that Ireland was totally unprepared to go to war.

While Ireland paid a price for its neutrality, the price of an alliance with Britain against Germany would have been much higher in terms of the war dead and the devastation sustained by the belligerents. The bombing of London and Belfast provide examples.