M65the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction

M65The G8 Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction: successes and challenges

Introduction

On June 26-27 2002, the G8 group of nations met in Kananaskis, Canada. On 27 June, leaders of the G8 nations–Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK and the US–released a statement entitled “the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction [WMD]". The G8 agreed to raise $20bn over ten years towards a range of measures for non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety projects.[1]

Sometimes referred to as the “ten-plus-ten-over-ten”, the Global Partnership was first discussed when US President Bush met Germany's Chancellor Schröder in May 2002.[2] The Global Partnership is an initiative aimed at accounting, securing and dismantling Russia's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons stockpile. To achieve this, the US will spend $10bn over the next 10 years, matched by $10bn from the other G8 countries, on non-proliferation assistance to Russia, which aims to dismantle Russia's WMD; to decommission nuclear submarines; to safeguard fissile materials and spent nuclear fuel (SNF); and employ weapons scientists.[3]

Contributions to date

As of October 2002, Canada had pledged $650m, the UK $750m, Germany $1.5bn, the European Union $1bn and Japan an initial $200m.[4] France and Italy are to announce their contributions, although Italy may pledge $400m. And while most of G8 nations have at some stage provided non-proliferation assistance to Russia, the US, through its Co-operative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme, has since 1992 contributed $7bn towards disarmament projects in the former Soviet Union. This works out roughly $900m-$1bn a year in assistance.

US non-proliferation assistance to Russia

The CTR programme, also known as Nunn-Lugar, was established in December 1991 by US Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Richard Lugar (R-IN), whom pushed the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 through Congress. The act, renamed CTR in 1993, was established to help the countries of the former Soviet Union destroy nuclear, chemical and biological WMD and associated infrastructure and establish verifiable safeguards against weapons proliferation.[5]

Working through private contractors, CTR funds the destruction of inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and launch silos, as well as ICBM mobile launchers in accordance with the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-1). CTR funds the elimination of strategic heavy bomber aircraft and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) launch tubes and the dismantlement of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs),

Given the enormity of the task, CTR’s results are impressive. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine are now nuclear weapons-free states. In addition, the world's largest anthrax production facility at Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, was taken down. The first prototype chemical weapons destruction plant at Shchuch’ye in the Urals is ready to operate and more than 50,000 scientists who once worked in nuclear, biological and chemical weapons facilities have received aid.

As of 21 February 2003, CTR had deactivated 6,032 nuclear warheads and put beyond use 104 heavy bombers, 525 ALCMs, 408 SLBM launchers and 377 SLBMs. 25 SSBNs have been dismantled using CTR money and equipment.[6] Security of nuclear weapons in transit to storage facilities has been improved. When completed, the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility will house fissile material from 12,500 dismantled nuclear warheads and store 50 metric tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium.[7] The Material Protection, Control, and Accounting programme has provided funds for the installation of security, control and accounting equipment to help safeguard weapons-usable fissile material stockpiled in the former Soviet Union, facilitated the re-location of it from the newly independent states to Russia, and has consolidated it into fewer sites.

The tasks ahead in weapons disposal

Despite CTR’s successes, there is much more to be done to dismantle Russia’s vast WMD stockpile, improve storage infrastructure and provide employment.

A joint report “Reshaping US-Russian Threat Reduction: New Approaches for the Second Decade” by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council found that more ambitious measures from a wider variety of countries are needed to improve threat reduction in Russia.[8] While the report praised past efforts it found that basic security upgrades had been completed at: “facilities containing only 46 percent of the approximately 603 metric tons of Russia's weapons-usable nuclear materials” identified by the US Department of Energy (DoE). In fact, in 1999 senior US DoE officials privately conceded that the US knew only to within (plus or minus) 30% what Russia’s total military inventory of nuclear weapons materials might be.[9]

The joint report also found that “virtually none” of Russia's plutonium and “less than one-seventh” of its highly enriched uranium has been rendered unusable for nuclear weapons. Indeed, theft of these materials continues to be a risk. Indeed, over the past decade, “there have been 18 incidents involving the seizure of stolen highly-enriched uranium or plutonium that have been confirmed by the relevant states” of the former Soviet Union. The most troubling of these, according to the report, was a foiled 1998 conspiracy to steal more than 20kg of highly- enriched uranium at one of the closed nuclear facilities near Chelyabinsk.

Moreover, Russia has the world's largest chemical weapons arsenal. Russia has an estimated 40,000 metric tonnes of chemical weapons including sarin, VX and other nerve gasses at Shchuch’ye. Blister agents like mustard gas and lewisite are also stockpiled there. Because these chemical weapons could be lost, stolen or traded they remain a serious proliferation threat. And while tens of thousand of Russian weapons scientists have been employed in peaceful pursuits by the State Department’s International Science and Technology Centers and the DoE’s Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, some chemical weapons scientists have reportedly been assisting other countries considered proliferation risks. Another 7,000 biological weapons scientists are searching for work.

Some 40,000 nuclear weapons scientists in Russia are looking for work. Some support has been offered to them through the DoE’s Nuclear Cities Initiative and programmes run by the Department of Defense. But the jobs these programmes provide are often short-lived, making higher wages in proliferation risk countries wishing to obtain nuclear programmes look all the more attractive.

Nevertheless, despite the successes of US-sponsored non-proliferation programmes in Russia, they have managed to provide security safeguards for only 40% of Russia's nuclear facilities. The figure is lower for biological and chemical sites. Only 50% of nuclear facilities that have received improvements have complete security systems. According to Lugar, at the current rate of progress it will take another 27 years before some Russian facilities are secure.[10]

Nuclear submarines and their spent nuclear fuel

Still, CTR’s military orientation only focuses on strategic threats to the US in accordance with US-Russian arms reduction treaties. In fact, in spring 2001, the National Security Council rejected a Russian proposal to fund the dismantlement of non-strategic vessels.[11] This has ignored the environmental threats and proliferation risks of decommissioned non-strategic submarines waiting to be dismantled in north-west Russia and the Russian Far East.

Of the 249 nuclear-powered submarines built in the Soviet Union and Russia, 191 had been taken out of service by March 2002. Of the 191 decommissioned vessels, SNF has only been removed from approximately 95 submarines. 157 submarines were built as non-strategic submarines. Only 25 of these are considered operational, 132 have been decommissioned, although only 40 vessels have been dismantled using Russian money. Today, more than 90 Russian non-strategic submarines are waiting to be defulled and dismantled.

Most of the laid-up decommissioned non-strategic submarines waiting to be dismantled are the oldest first and second generation vessels with SNF still in their reactors. Moored at piers, some of these vessels’ ballets tanks are leaky and they have to be kept afloat with pontoons to stop them sinking. In addition to the threat that laid-up vessels with SNF onboard could sink at their piers with the environmental consequences that would bring, there is also a security threat if the SNF were stolen and diverted to build a radiological dispersal device (RDD).

SNF from decommissioned subs is sent to the Mayak (lighthouse) reprocessing plant RT-1 in Chelyabinsk county. Currently, there is no reprocessing of naval SNF in Russia and CTR funding does not permit the reprocessing of naval SNF from SSBNs, although US officials have granted a waiver for SNF from 15 dismantled SSBNs to be shipped to Mayak RT-1. According to one report, there is a backlog of some 40,000 spent-fuel assemblies at Russia’s naval bases.[12]

Most non-strategic submarines are equipped with two nuclear reactors with 210-215 fuel assemblies in total.[13] Each reactor contains around 400kg of uranium with enrichment levels ranging from 21%-90% U-235, although the majority use fuel enriched to 21%-45% U-235. The uranium enrichment content in naval SNF would make it an ideal ingredient in a RDD, especially the 90% U-235 contained in the liquid metal cooled reactors of the six Alfa class attack submarines laid-up in north-west Russia.

Security at naval sites in inadequate and the age and condition of laid-up non-strategic submarines requires SNF to be handled and unloaded with caution. This situation promoted Senator Lugar to include the dismantlement of non-strategic subs in a list of top ten disarmament priorities.[14]

The build-up of naval SNF in Russia not only represents a potential hazard to the surrounding area, but is a security threat to countries further a field. If a terrorist group were to intercept naval SNF they may be able to build and detonate a RDD in a heavily populated city.

While there is no danger of a nuclear-yield explosion if a "dirty bomb" were exploded, depending on the material used it coulddisperse radioactive contamination over a wide area. The contaminated area may bebecome uninhabitable, with grave consequences for the environment, the economy and future generations. The Economist reported in June 2002 that although a radiological weapon had never been used, they are suitable for terrorists because of their ability to inflict psychological impact, rather than kill.[15]

Submarine dismantlement takes place at the Nerpa Shipyard, Murmansk Oblast, and at the Zvezdochka and Sevmash Shipyards in Severodvinsk, Arkhangelsk Oblast. The Northern Fleet operates these three facilities and the Pacific Fleet runs the fourth facility at Zvezda, near Vladivostok in the Far East.

There are three START-1-declared SSBN dismantlement sites in Russia: the Northern Fleet operates Nerpa and Zvezdochka shipyards and the Pacific Fleet operates Zvezda Shipyard. From 1992-1997, CTR delivered equipment (cranes, conveyors, guillotine shears, plasma cutters and oxyacetylene torches) to dismantle and cut SSBNs’ tempered steel hull plates at these three shipyards. By the end of fiscal year 2002, CTR had appropriated more than $350m for efforts to dismantle SSBNs at Russia’s START-I declared dismantlement shipyards.[16]

Allocating funds and initiating work

The Russian authorities have estimated the cost of comprehensive general-purpose submarine dismantlement in Russia to be around $4bn. According to Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy, Minatom, it would cost an average of $6m to decommission and dismantle a non-strategic sub, excluding transportation and logistical costs.[17] While CTR-funded cutting equipment has significantly reduced the labour intensive nature of the dismantlement process, submarine decommissioning remains a loss-making activity, despite the sale of scrap metal.

Japan will fund the dismantlement of the Pacific Fleet’s decommissioned non-strategic submarines, laid-up with their SNF onboard. As part of the $200m contribution to the G8 initiative, Japan will spend $120m on submarine dismantlement. Tokyo has also released $168m in funds previously frozen under the Japan-Russia Committee for Co-operation in Reducing Nuclear Weapons.

In addition, Norway--a non G8 nation with experience of co-operating with Russia and the US through the trilateral Arctic Military Environmental Programme, AMEC--plans to fund the dismantlement of two non-strategic submarines in the Northern Fleet, estimated to cost $12m. AMEC was established in 1996 to address the harmful effects of Russian military activities in the Arctic area. Most of AMEC’s projects relate to the danger of nuclear contamination from military sources in north-west Russia; particularly laid-up decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines.[18] AMEC has five groups of “nuclear” projects which have been instrumental in providing improvements to the Russian Navy’s Northern Fleet infrastructure. As of October 2002, the US has contributed $25m, Norway $9.9m and Russia $6.5m towards several projects dealing with naval SNF.[19]

Germany, Canada, Sweden and the UK are in active talks with the Russian authorities on funding nuclear clean-up in north-west Russia. It is not known whether these countries will fund non-strategic submarine dismantlement, but their plans suggest financing infrastructure for managing SNF, radioactive waste and reactor sections from scrapped submarines. Technical co-operation between Russia and donor countries could help to improve economic and technical efficiency. The UK and France have decommissioned a number of submarines (10 in the UK, 3 in France) and must dismantle them. Minatom could therefore provide both countries with technical co-operation in the hope of making a profit.

Conclusion – further issues

Since CTR has fitted out shipyards with SSBN dismantlement equipment, this infrastructure could be utilised to dismantle non-strategic submarines. But Russia’s naval shipyards would be unable to handle additional waste and their infrastructure would have to be upgraded. Nuclear service ships need to be emptied and refitted before they could take on defuelling duties. Mayak’s reprocessing and storage capacity is inadequate to handle additional SNF from dismantled non-strategic submarines, so new onshore SNF and radioactive waste repositories would have to be built in both the north-west and Far East.

In the past, equipment sent to Russia was subjected to a 20% value added tax, although a procedure is in place that allows the import of American equipment tax free. Third party liability remains a bone of contention between Russia and donor countries, however. And the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian Federation “umbrella” agreement should be concluded as soon as possible. Still, this should not hold up the G8 and other nations’ pledges to the G8 Global Partnership. Nor should it delay the initiation of programmes aimed at the destruction of Russia’s stockpile of chemical and biological weapons, the deactivation of nuclear weapons and the disposition of plutonium “pits”, the employment of weapons scientists, the dismantlement of decommissioned non-strategic submarines and the storage of naval SNF.

The author

Zackary Moss received an M.A. in political economy from the University of Middlesex 1999-2000, specialising in defence economics, defence-industrial relations and defence-industrial restructuring with a particular focus on the political economy of military expenditure. His dissertation was "The rise of militarism in the United Kingdom: a heterodox economic inquiry".

Notes

1 of 10

[1] The G8 Leaders' statement (

[2]The Economist, “Anti-proliferation wrangles: cleaning up”, 30 May 2002.

[3] G8 Leaders' statement. Ibid.

[4] Richard Lugar, “The Next Steps in US Non-proliferation Policy”, Arms Control Today, December 2002, Arms Control Association, (

[5] See the Defense Threat Reduction Agency website: (

[6] DTRA, CTR Scorecard, (

[7] DTRA, Fissile Material Storage, (

[8] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, “Reshaping US-Russian Threat Reduction: New Approaches for the Second Decade”, 2002, (

[9] “Beyond Nunn-Lugar: Curbing the Next Wave of Weapons Proliferation Threats from Russia”, Strategic Studies Institute, edited by Henry Sokolski and Thomas Riisager, April 2002, pp.15-16.

[10]The Washington Post, 17 June 2002.

[11] Charles L. Thornton, “The G8 Global Partnership”, The Nonproliferation Review, Fall-Winter 2002, pp.135-152.

[12] CSIS Report. Ibid. p. 111.

[13] CSIS Report. Ibid. p. 107.

[14] Richard Lugar, Ibid.

[15]The Economist, “Radiological devices: weapons of mass dislocation'”, 15-21 June 2002.

[16] CSIS, “Protecting Against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons: An Action for the Global Partnership”, 2003, Vol.2, p.102, (

[17] CSIS Report. Ibid. p. 105. See footnote 47 in the report.

[18] Morton Bremer-Mærli ‘Strengthening Cooperative Threat Reduction with Russia: the Norwegian Experience’, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, pp. 4-5, December 2002, (

[19] Mark Helmke, “Arms Control and the Environment: the future”, World Wildlife Fund Arctic Bulletin, No 3.02, p.18, October 2002, (

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March 2003