Russian Election Watch

RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH

No.2, September 1999

Graham T. Allison, DirectorWriter, Editor: Henry E. Hale

Strengthening Democratic Institutions ProjectProduction Director: Melissa C. Carr

John F. Kennedy School of GovernmentProduction Assistant: Emily Goodhue

Harvard UniversityConsultant: Vladimir Boxer

TOP NEWS of the MONTH

Yeltsin fires Prime Minister Stepashin, anoints Putin “successor” for presidency
Fatherland enlists Primakov, All Russia in alliance that rivals Communists
Yabloko signs Stepashin up for #2 spot on party list, declares self “ready for power”
Broad Kremlin-backed coalition of “former reformers” falters
Communists lose allies to Fatherland-All Russia, smaller radical blocs
Fatherland candidate fails to make runoff in Sverdlovsk gubernatorial election

SEE INSIDE

On the Campaign Trail: Your crash course on the election campaign p.2
Insider Information: Some of Russia’s most respected political analysts explain the events of August p.6
Spin Control: Russia’s three largest parties put their spin on key stories p.5
PLUS: the latest polls, important dates, what “left” and “right” mean in Russia, and a key to the new coalitions

TRACKING THE POLLS

ParliamentVTsIOM Presidency VTsIOMPOF

AugustJuneAugustJuneAugustJune

Communist Party31 30Zyuganov26241617

Fatherland-All Russia1614Primakov19142217

Yabloko10 13Yavlinsky 91269

LDPR5 8Luzhkov915813

Gov. Tuleev’s Party4 n.a.Stepashin75117

Our Home is Russia4 4Zhirinovsky 6676

Women of Russia3 n.a.Lebed5756

New Force (Kirienko)3 5Kirienko34n.a.n.a.

Lebed’s Party3 7Chernomyrdin3222

Agrarian Party2 3Nemtsov2n.a.n.a.n.a.

Voice of Russia2 n.a.Putin2n.a.1n.a.

Right Cause2 2Pamfilova1n.a.n.a.n.a.

VTsIOM poll: August 20-24, 1999, 1600 respondents. Percentages are from the total of those who said they intended to vote.
Public Opinion Foundation (POF) poll: August 21-22, 1999.

IMPORTANT DATES

September 25Parties, Duma candidates can start registering with Central Election Commission
October 25 Deadline for parties to get on the ballot
December 19Duma Election (Yeltsin has now formally announced this date)
July 9Presidential Election (expected – Yeltsin must make announcement early 2000)

ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL

While August is down time in Washington and many other capitals, this is not so in Moscow. August 1991 saw a failed coup that triggered the collapse of the Soviet Union and August 1998 witnessed a financial meltdown that brought down a government. August 1999 did not disappoint. Yeltsin fired his fourth prime minister in just 18 months and Russia’s leading politicians forged two coalitions, one with Primakov and the other with Stepashin, capable of competing with the Communists in the December Duma voting.

(Does this mean the end of the Communist-Reformist standoff in Russia? Read Bunin & Makarenko on p.10.)

YELTSIN NAMES HIS CHOSEN “HEIR”

Predictions that Sergei Stepashin would not last 100 days as Prime Minister were right. On August 9, Yeltsin announced that he had fired Stepashin and nominated Vladimir Putin, chief of the FSB (former KGB) and secretary of the Security Council. While changes of PM have become rather routine, Yeltsin spiced up the story by declaring that Putin (pictured above) was also to be his hand-picked successor as President – to be elected fair and square, of course.

Although Yeltsin praised the departing Stepashin, analysts noted that he had not prevented some of the Kremlin-unfriendly political alliances described below. Indeed, he had stated publicly that the Prime Minister should be neutral during the election campaign. Putin, Yeltsin said, had the wherewithal to alter Russia's political landscape and lead it into the next century. Determined not to provoke a clash with Yeltsin that could cost them the resources of office they use to get reelected, Duma members quickly approved Putin, noting that he differed little from Stepashin.

Few observers give this low-profile administrator, who once worked as a spy in East Germany, much chance of becoming president. Not only has he never proven himself as a major public figure, but Yeltsin's endorsement is widely seen as a kiss of political death. Nevertheless, the aging President has given Putin a chance to prove himself as a leader, and if he justifies his reputation as a skilled administrator, his authority may begin to rise just as Stepashin's did before him.

Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin (POO-teen)

Born: Leningrad, October 7, 1952

Degrees: Law, Economics

1975-90: KGB official, agent

1990-94: Mayor’s Administration, St. Petersburg

1994-96: First Deputy Mayor

1996-98: Yeltsin Administration: property

management, regional affairs

1998-99: Director, FSB (ex-KGB)

Mar.-Aug. 1999: Security Council Secretary

Aug. 1999: Prime Minister

July 2000: President?

BUILDING BLOCS

Fatherland-All Russia. Russia has a new electoral powerhouse. First, Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov won the commitment of the powerful governors’ bloc, All Russia, to join his Fatherland movement in creating the “left-center” alliance “Fatherland-All Russia.” Then, on August 17, Russia’s most popular politician, former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov (pictured here), formally accepted Luzhkov’s longstanding invitation to lead the new bloc. At the same time, the Agrarian Party also joined the coalition as a junior partner. Fatherland-All Russia, as the bloc continues to be known, immediately became the favorite to gain the largest number of seats in the Duma and to provide the winning presidential candidate in summer 2000. Primakov’s popularity, Fatherland’s organization, and the governors’ political machines are formidable assets. The bloc is also full of self-proclaimed “proven managers” who can sell the popular message that prudence and competence, not youth and economic theory, are the keys to Russian revival.

One big unanswered question, of course, is how Russia’s two leading presidential contenders – Primakov and Luzhkov – will decide which of them will run. While Primakov’s true intentions remain uncertain, Luzhkov has publicly announced that he would defer to Primakov if the latter launches a presidential campaign. Luzhkov would naturally want to be sure that he is the one to succeed Primakov, who is now pushing 70 years of age. This deal could be sealed if a Duma dominated by Fatherland-All Russia, together with regional leaders, amends the Constitution to create a beefed-up prime ministership or even to restore the vice presidency. In this scenario, Primakov would focus on his beloved foreign affairs while Luzhkov (pictured here) would run the economy.

(Is Fatherland-All Russia nothing new? Read Golosov on p.14. Read Markov on p.16 for a different opinion.)

Yabloko-Stepashin. Leading liberal presidential hopeful Grigory Yavlinsky and freshly fired Prime Minister Stepashin (pictured below to Yavlinsky’s left) shocked the political establishment by announcing that Stepashin would run as the number two man on the party list of Yavlinsky’s Yabloko Party. This move came as a surprise because Yabloko had long blasted what it saw as Yeltsin’s corrupt governments for blackening the good name of economic reform, refusing to join forces with any official “tainted” by such public service.

Vouching for Stepashin’s honesty and reliability as a corruption-fighter, Yabloko used the opportunity to declare that it had shed its prima donna image and was now “ready for power.” Stepashin, for his part, attached himself to a party that is sure to clear the 5% barrier into parliament and that adds credibility to his claims to be an honest battler against corruption. As with the Primakov-Luzhkov tandem, questions remain as to whether one of the two will defer to the other’s presidential ambitions, but both have said that this is a question best left until after the Duma elections.

(Is this the last chance for the liberals? Read Gelman on p.12. Or is this bloc a paper tiger? Read Nikonov on p.6.)

Left-Wing Forces. The Communist Party has been much less successful in its coalition-building efforts, which are now in deep trouble. In Fall 1998, it decided to run for the Duma on its own, shedding smaller allies in the “Popular Patriotic Union” that had entered Parliament on its coattails in 1995. Over the course of the Spring, however, the Communist leadership increasingly came to believe that this had been a mistake, that they would be better off keeping the other groups as part of a united team.

When the Communist Party, led by Gennady Zyuganov (pictured below), called on the other left-wing forces to join it in a broad coalition called “For Victory” in early August, it was too late. The bulk of the Agrarian Party left to join Fatherland-All Russia, as did Aleksei Podberezkin’s slavophilic “Spiritual Heritage.” The radical communists formed their own blocs, one of them openly calling itself Stalinist and featuring Stalin’s grandson in the leadership. While the Communist Party is sure to finish among the top three parties in the new Duma, it is likely to be more isolated in the parliament, squeezed by the more broadly palatable leftism of Fatherland-All Russia and losing votes to smaller radical parties unlikely to clear the five-percent barrier.

Union of Right-Wing Forces. The liberal reformists with government experience, known widely as the “right-wingers,” are notorious for their inability to work together outside of government. August found them facing the same old problems. Former Prime Ministers Gaidar, Chernomyrdin, Kirienko, and Stepashin engaged in seemingly endless negotiations, at times appearing on the verge of forging a formidable coalition with the blessing of Yeltsin’s Kremlin.

These efforts came largely to naught. To the consternation of Yeltsin’s “Family,” Chernomyrdin refused to be associated with Gaidar or to give Kirienko one of the top three spots in the proposed coalition’s leadership. With Chernomyrdin out, Stepashin chose not to reinforce an image as part of the governing clique and instead joined Yabloko.

This left Gaidar’s “Right Cause” and Kirienko’s “New Force” virtually alone, and these rump rightists in the end formed the “Union of Right-wing Forces” with Governor Konstantin Titov, leader of the governors’ bloc Voice of Russia. By that time, Titov’s “governors’ bloc” had shrunk to primarily Titov himself due to internal conflicts over whether to align with the right-wingers. Topping the “Union’s” party list are Sergei Kirienko (pictured center), Boris Nemtsov (right), and Irina Khakamada (left). The unpopular Gaidar and Chubais remain behind the scenes. Chernomyrdin’s “Our Home is Russia” managed to pluck away one former leader of Right Cause, Boris Fedorov, but now effectively plans to contest the Duma elections on its own. (Why did the rightists fail? Read Boxer p.8.)

Telling “Left” from “Right” in Russia

Analysts disagree on how to characterize Russia’s political spectrum, but most resort to a standard “left-right” axis.

Right: favoring the smallest government role in economics and advocating a rapid transition
Left: favoring the highest degrees of state control over the economy and minimal transition
Centrist: favoring gradual economic reform and a targeted state role in the economy, especially state support for restructuring older industries
Patriots: characterized less by economic views than by nationalism, in terms of either cultural values or the need to restore Russia’s Great Power status in the international arena

A Failed Bloc. In one of the more comic episodes of the election season so far, Boris Berezovsky, reputedly Yeltsin’s modern-day Rasputin, went on a tour of some major Russian regions in August. Word soon got out that he was trying to form his own bloc in preparation

for the Russian elections, targeting such tough-guy governors as Gen. Aleksandr Lebed of Krasnoyarsk, former Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi of Kursk, and former presidential candidate Aman Tuleev of Kemerovo. The working name of the bloc, Muzhiki, roughly translates as “Macho Men.”

Aside from their bravado, these governors found little reason to work together, especially under

the auspices of the unpopular Berezovsky (pictured here), and the effort collapsed. Tuleev has shown signs of backing the Communist-led coalition and Lebed will likely field his own party, which stands a reasonable chance of clearing the five-percent barrier.

FATHERLAND SLIPS IN SVERDLOVSK

On August 29, citizens of Sverdlovsk Region went to the polling places to vote in gubernatorial elections. No candidate won 50 percent of the vote, meaning that a runoff will have to be held in September. As expected, incumbent Eduard Rossel (pictured here) easily made it into the second round of balloting, surviving charges that he, an ethnic German, was linked to local fascist groups. The big surprise was that Arkady Chernetsky, the mayor of the region’s capital city, came in third and thereby failed to make the runoff. Chernetsky had been strongly backed by Luzhkov’s Fatherland, provoking Rossel to declare that the Moscow Mayor had betrayed him. While this was a clear defeat for Fatherland itself, Rossel did receive signs of support from Primakov, Fatherland’s new partner, illustrating the challenges that the Fatherland-All Russia alliance will have in producing a united front in some regions.

The Game Takes Shape

On the same day that he dismissed Stepashin, President Yeltsin decreed the date of the 1999 State Duma election to be December 19 and made official the beginning of the campaign period. Russia’s 141 parties have until October 24 to submit their candidate lists to the Central Election Commission (CEC). The International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) is working to train journalists throughout Russia on election coverage and will continue working with the CEC and regional election commissions to provide support.

Information from the International Foundation for Election Systems’ September report. For more from IFES, see:

A KEY TO THE NEW COALITIONS

Fatherland-All Russia = Primakov + Luzhkov + All Russia (governors) + Agrarian Party

Yabloko = Yavlinsky + Stepashin

For Victory! = Communist Party + small allies

Union of Right-Wing Forces = Gaidar/Chubais + Nemtsov + Kirienko + Titov

SPIN CONTROL: IN THE PARTIES’ OWN WORDS

SDI posed a simple question about the campaign to top officials of a small set of leading Russian parties: What event of the past month (August 1999), in your opinion, will have the greatest effect on the results of the Duma elections in December 1999 and why? Here are the answers.

COMMUNIST PARTY

Yevgeny Primakov's agreement to head the electoral coalition “Fatherland - All Russia.” The previous year gave rise to the high popularity of Primakov, thanks to his personal qualities as well as to his actions as the head of the government of the Russian Federation. He was appointed during a most difficult period and he was able to stop a series of destructive tendencies. The increase in his authority was assisted by the left opposition’s, including the Communists’, positive attitude towards him. The unjustified dismissal of Primakov only increased the level of his authority. At the same time, the campaign-related activeness of August is characteristic only of the top political elite of the country. The public (voters) does not, in practice, take part in the process of forming coalitions. In August, processes and events that could sharply change the pre-election situation and become defining factors gathered strength: a fuel-energy crisis in the face of the coming winter, increases in prices for basic food products, etc.

-- Tamara Gudima, Duma

FATHERLAND/ALL RUSSIA

In August, Fatherland united with the movement of regional leaders “All Russia” and the Agrarian Party of Russia to create a new electoral bloc. The popular former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov became the bloc’s leader. Fatherland softened its image as the “Party of Moscow” and significantly gained political clout in the ethnic republics of the Northern Caucasus and the Volga region along with sturdy popularity in the regions of central Russia and a part of the Urals and Western Siberia. It is especially worth mentioning the fact that the second intellectual center of Russia, St. Petersburg, joined the bloc. The Agrarian Party broke away from the leftist communist union that had previously been considered monolithic. The Agrarians who went with Fatherland were those behind whom stand large and efficient producers of agricultural products who have successfully adapted to market conditions.

-- Fatherland Representative

YABLOKO

The dismissal of the government of Russia and the fact that the ex-premier of Russia, Sergei Stepashin, and his supporters have joined Yabloko. Today Russia is on the verge of a new epoch. The task at hand in the elections of 1999 and 2000 is not only the transition of power, but also the transition from an authoritarian, corrupt, and half-federal regime into a genuine democratic and lawful state. The Yabloko party and its constant supporters cannot accomplish this task alone. Therefore a new electoral union has appeared, founded in the ideology that was announced by Sergei Stepashin: “I would not discard a single point from Yabloko’s program from my own program both as an individual and as head of government.” This is seriously changing the pre-election situation. First of all, the myth that Yabloko is not capable of joining a coalition because of the ambitions of its leaders has been dispelled. The path has been cleared for the unification of the majority - the people who have been deceived and betrayed by the regime. Secondly, the union, in the opinion of the experts, increases Yabloko’s chances in the December elections by one and a half to two times. -- Grigory Yavlinsky