Re the Attachment: (Best viewed at 150%)
I will paraphrase a bit of it for you. The origin is within the investigative body (but it's not the CTSB)(and the release is official - it has a Title and a Release number on it).
Dated 01 May 99:
1. A preamble about the trouble they're going to in reconstruction [first 10m of fuselage to just past L1
& R1 doors, fwd galleys, cockpit wiring and IFE wire runs], the extent of that, 88% debris by weight
recovered, etc - not much new in that. It goes on to make several bland statements of findings i.e. a
summary of points uncovered and concluded (as if some of it was "news")). However the way in which
it's phrased makes me believe that it is data based on tests (FAA won't like that at all).
2. An arcing event (aka ticking fault) can disburse a very large current (i.e. larger than CB rated
capacity) that can create a fire - yet it will not pop the affected CB.
3. If a CB has been tripped and the associated wiring insulation in that circuit has been damaged,
RESETTING THE CIRCUIT BREAKER MAY CAUSE THE WIRE INSULATION TO BURN
(their wording and capitalization).
4. F/O died in his seat. They cannot confirm that the Captain was in his (the inference being that he
was not). This confirms the Boeing info via Stephen Thorne (but later recanted).
5. Several AD's regarding wiring issues were actually submitted after SR111 wreckage examination.
(inference here is that they weren't really based upon "discoveries" made on sister-ships).
6. The intense fire and smoke patterns in the cockpit ceiling area still have them puzzled. I still go for
the arcing piercing the HP oxy-line to the jump-seat and the resulting oxy blow-torch constituting the
alarming event that unseated the captain, as he went for the hand-held F/Ext [a point that they actually
later concede i.e. no mobility for a crew tied to their seats due to oxy umbilical, yet the need to leave the
seat to fight a fire) - anyway surely they can replicate the arcing/oxy line scenario and verify this as the
cause of the scorch-marks (but no mention of this being contingent upon recovery of missing bits).
However they have found sections of s/s oxy line with holes burnt in it. I'd have thought that that
obviously meant that the oxy was the final conflagrator??
7. Whilst the origin of the fire is unknown it is possible that it was caused by an electrical short or
arcing (these guys are really earning their dollars).
8. The TSB has issued/is issuing (not clear) a second (non-specific) safety advisory regarding overhead
cockpit wiring in the MD-11. It doesn't say so but I'm betting that it's a repeat of the misgivings about
McDD designers running high power wiring through the cockpit switches (instead of control of that
power via switched control relays).
9. Expect a final report not inside a year from now.
10. TSB investigation is seeking to factually reinforce recommendations aimed at preventing a
repetition. Now this statement IS encouraging.
11. The rest is very specific and I cannot say much about it beyond remarking that 6 conclusions have
been reached about the accident's causes and moreover what must be done as a result:
Four out of the six are issues that have been much earlier addressed by me. Two of them constitute
acceptances of the Virgin Bus Proposal (and the fundamental problem that it addresses). So!
so much for all the professionals who spoofed the concept. The remaining two are important (but not
critical or especially relevant) house-keeping design issues (aircraft and checklist depiction).