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Virginia Review of Asian Studies

CHINA AND TAIWAN:

THE FUTURE OF CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS: DEMOCRATIC PEACE OR POWER POLITICS

Tung-Chieh Tsai and Alexis Littlefield

National Chung Hsing University, Taiwan

Abstract

Being one of the international “hot spots”, cross-strait relations not only influence China’s future, but East Asian stability and even the global system. The majority of researchers focus attention not on the past of cross-strait relations such as why Mainland China and Taiwan fought each other, rather they seek to solve future problems. From the perspective of liberalists, they assert the so-called “Democratic Peace” or “Peaceful Transformation” may be the key answers, meaning when Mainland China’s economic reforms will lead to the political transformation and the problem of cross-strait relations will sort itself out as part of this process of democratization on both sides of the Strait. Realists, on the other hand, preach the concept of “Power Politics.” Rather than construct an (in)appropriate international regime to deal with the conflict (in)effectively, cross-strait relations will be decided by power contrasts between the Mainland and Taiwan. In this paper, we review the standpoints of liberalism and realism, and then examine these approaches in light of the deadlock of cross-strait relations.

Challenge of Cross-Strait Relations: Past and Now

After thirty-eight years of hostility, Taiwan made an obvious turn in its relationship with Mainland China during 1986-87 when the KMT-led government decided to allow traveling to the mainland. Then, the mutual indirect trade between Taiwan and Mainland (through Hong Kong mainly) flourished, and by 1992, Taiwan soon became the single largest source of foreign tourists to the Mainland.[1] In fact, the CCP-led government of China had by then called for establishing with Taiwan the so-called “three links” (mail, trade, and transportation) and “four exchanges” (tourists, academic groups, cultural groups, and sports) since 1970s, but the KMT response was delayed. Some possible reasons were:

．the negative memory of some KMT leaders of negotiations with the CCP;

．the military game and confrontation situation of Taiwan Strait;

．the antagonist education of both the Mainland and Taiwan;

．the lack of a dialogue regime between the Mainland and Taiwan; and

．the consideration of US strategy towards China and East Asia.

Anyway, because of the global tendency of détente, the peaceful-solving principle of the U.S.’s China policy, and especially the transformation of Taiwan’s domestic political phenomenon, the KMT authorities finally decided to lift the restrictions on cross-strait interactions. Andrew Nathan said: “Political reform in Taiwan has changed the fundamental assumption on which China’s Taiwan policy has hitherto been based, that the KMT has the power single-handedly to negotiate the future of the island with the CCP.”[2] In other words, the CCP now faces a new political reality in Taiwan that has complicated the application of its unilaterally declared unification strategy.[3] The democratizing movement of Taiwan since the 1980s has produced the following crucial changes to cross-strait relations:

．Taiwanization of the KMT regime and revision of the unification target;

．emergence of the opposition party (DPP) and its challenge to decision-making;

．the media liberalization and the awakening of people to public policy;

．Taiwan’s Democratization and its role for America’s China policy.

In response to the above developments, the CCP regime decided to employ the China-rush of Taiwan’s business community to fulfill its peaceful unification strategy, and the Taiwanese merchants guilds have been built immediately in several offshore Special Economic Zones (SEZs). During this time, the Beijing authorities suggested a “Third KMT-CCP Cooperation” to induce the KMT to the negotiation process, and the then CCP leader Deng Xiao-ping proposed the idea of “one nation, two systems” to Taiwan in 1984. It had been rejected until fairly recently because the elites of Taiwan couldn’t agree upon the national status. Nevertheless, the PRC never gives up the assertive approach for resolving the “Taiwan question”. That is, the CCP regime has always played a two-handed strategy of carrot and stick towards Taiwan,. Even then the CCP promised Taiwan could have high autonomy under PRC sovereignty since “Ye’s Nine Points” was declared in 1981.[4]

Relatively speaking, though the KMT-led government of Taiwan had a “re-conquer mainland” policy beginning in 1949-71, it changed the guise of the policy to the so-called “unification of China according to the Three Principles of People” from 1978. Then, when former President Lee Teng-hui announced the termination of the “Period of Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion” in May 1991, and the KMT government issued simultaneously the “Guidelines for National Unification”, it implies the cross-strait problem can be solved by way of peaceful resolution.

But, what has happened between Taiwan and Mainland since the 1990s, ECFA notwithstanding? How do they influence the future of the cross-strait relations? What could Taiwan and Mainland’s authorities and leaders do when they meet a series of new challenges? And, what choices do the elites of Taiwan and Mainland have? In this paper, we will observe these problems above from both idealist and realist approaches, then try to predict or find out what would be the better answer or choice for increased interaction between Taiwan and Mainland China.

Idealist Approach and Democratic Peace

Most observers believe, the United States will continue to monitor the interaction between Taiwan and Mainland China. Though it “acknowledges” the so-called “One China” principle, the US still holds the peaceful-solving principle on the China question. In fact, the United States may not really care whether Taiwan finally became independent or falls under China’s control, so long as the outcome is reached peacefully. That is maybe why the US government insists upon selling Taiwan defensive weapons on the one hand, but maintains open dialogue with Mainland China on the other. Now that Taiwan is a maturing democratizing state, it seems the US hopes this could be a proxy for US values and influence for China.

Over the past decade, numerous articles have discussed the relationships between democracy and international conflict,[5] and the central theoretical claim is that decisions by state leaders rely upon either peaceful diplomacy or military force as the means to resolve their disputes. According to those viewpoints, two different outcomes have emerged:[6] the first claim is that while democratic states rarely if ever go to war with each other, patterns of military conflict between democracies are different from democracies and non-democracies; and the second claim is that democracies are less likely to initiate the threat against all other states.[7] As we all know, this insight is now an important basis for American foreign policy. As Clinton-era National Security Adviser Anthony Lake once noted: “…spreading democracy serves our interests because democracies tend not to abuse their citizens’ right or wage war on one another.”[8]

On the relative side, some scholars argue democratizing states are more likely to fight wars than are mature democracies, and we cannot reduce the risk even possibly reversing the process of democratization.[9] Many great powers have gone on the warpath during the initial phase of its entry into the era of mass politics, such as the Napoleon III’s France, Weimar Germany, or the Japan’s “Taisho democracy”. The problem is perhaps not that mass politics in democratizing states enjoy military adventure, but the elites of new democracy are dependent upon aggressive nationalism to achieve their political goals.

Nevertheless, because politics within a democracy is almost seen as a nonzero-sum enterprise, then all gain something even if all could not gain equally. The states in question probably might treat each other peacefully if they could be bound by common ties in an institutional network, such as Europe under the EU framework. Furthermore, some assert that democracies are more dovish internationally because of their political culture favoring to resolve disputes peacefully, or because the democratic processes produces restraint by the public which does not like to pay the price of war in blood and money.[10] However, no matter what the supporters of the idealist approach think, could it be applied to understanding a possible resolution of the problems of cross-strait relations?

Generally speaking, to solve an international dispute through the democratic peace approach means that disputers could make compensation by the following routes:

．open the process of negotiation or build the talking regime;

．reduce enmity through Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs);

．respect the principles of self-determination and plebiscites;

．encourage communicating actions;

．agree to prioritize disarmament.

Taiwan’s democratizing movement seems to support this approach. During the late 1980s, Taiwan decided to repeal the Martial Law, legalize opposition parties and end the ban on travel to the Mainland.[11] In the 1990s, Taiwan’s approach to security reflected changes in Taiwan’s politics and relationship with China since 1987. Taiwan has maintained its close relations with the United States by its democratization experiences while setting up the National Unification Council and the Mainland Affairs Council in 1990 and 1991. Taiwan then established dialogue opportunities with the Mainland twice via so-called “Koo-Wang meetings” in 1992 and 1998 through the Strait Exchange Foundation established 1 February 1991. This process was to facilitate peaceful conditions for cross-strait relations.

After several rounds of negotiation between Taiwan and Mainland, the chairman of China’s Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait, Wang Dao-han, announced in late June 1999 that he planned to visit Taiwan the following October, but, suddenly came Lee Teng-hui’s announcement of the “two states” theory, which plunged cross-strait relations to another low period.[12] Why this development happened and whether Taiwan’s behavior means the democratic peace is not applicable to the cross-strait relations is a matter of debate.

Realist Approach and Power Politics

Concerned about its size and existing policy, it is not surprising that China should be regarded as Taiwan’s main external military threat. Anyway, when the Nationalist (KMT) regime led by Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) claimed that Taiwan was always a part of it and has been preparing to invade Taiwan since 1950; because of the intervention of U.S., there were two rival Chinese government existing simultaneously, each claiming to be the sole legal one.[13] The KMT’s approach to defense against attack by the PRC consisted of maintaining a high level of military preparedness and a formal alliance with the US since 1954. However, Taiwan faced a series of new challenges by 1970s, because the PRC took the seat of ROC in the UN, and the US decided to normalize relations with the PRC and terminated its mutual defense treaty with Taiwan.[14] Although the US Congress subsequently passed the “Taiwan Relations Act,” declaring a continuing American interest in Taiwan’s security, whether the US would actually come to Taiwan’s defense in the future would be contingent on geo-strategic circumstances and public opinion in the U.S.; it remains unclear which way the US would lie in the event of conflict between Taiwan and Mainland.[15]

Ben Miller has said: “…the intensity of US interests at stake and the intensity of the regional constraints on intervention best account for the scope of US military interventions in the post-Cold War era.”[16] And the realist explanation integrated the classical realist focus on state interests with the structural realist emphasizing constraints on state action could provide a model explaining why and when the US might decide to intervene. According to neo-realist theory, states act to balance the power of others in order to preserve their independence under the anarchic situation within the structure of the international system.[17] More importantly, we want not only to realize what the US might do, but also to ask: could structural realism help explain China’s foreign and cross-strait policies?

During the Cold War, China was one of several second-ranking powers, each of which pursued its foreign policy interests within the tight constraints and resulting clear incentives bipolarity provided.[18] Under Mao Ze-dong’s leadership, China’s decision-making approach was distinctively realist. After Mao’s death, China’s grand strategy retained its basic orientation, identifying the Soviet Union as the main adversary, and the US was useful for balancing the former. Now, after the Cold War, according to the balance-of-power theory, the self-regarding states act to counter the potential threat. Mainland China’s limited resources induced it to pursue rapid growth, especially after the 1989 Tiananmen Square suppression, China chose to cooperate with America in trade to speed economic development.

For China, the prospect of an international system dominated by the US was disturbing not only because of unmatched capabilities, but also because of renewed American hostility toward the communist regime after the Tiananmen Crisis of June 1989.[19] That is, ideology played an increasing role in Sino-American relations in the 1990s. During this period the US tightened its relation with Japan in the late 1990s, regarding Mainland China as its “strategic competitor” for the new millennium, and continued arms sale to Taiwan. To solve this problem, China’s foreign policy elites have attempted to use some multilateralism to counter American dominance and the U.S.-led East Asian military alliance.

The power-politics approach means disputes among the great powers, especially between China and the US over Taiwan, will be determined by Taiwan’s military power comparative to the Mainland. As Taiwan becomes more and more weak, and its relationship with American tends to be more and more unreliable, then it is possible China will employ brinkmanship in solving the Taiwan problem.

Crossroad: Rational Choice vs. National Populism

Lee Teng-hui openly defined the relations between Mainland and Taiwan as “between two countries” on 9 July 1999. The Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan was instructed to replace its previous reference of “two equal political entities” to that of “two countries” in its future document.[20] As expected, China wanted Taiwan to explain this and demanded the latter return to the “one China” position. Beijing blamed Lee for taking an extremely dangerous step towards splitting China.

Perhaps what Lee has said is in practice correct; however, what’s more important is that Taiwan fundamentally changed its unification policy. Lee wanted to lay further groundwork for the future of Taiwan before his presidential term expired. But, why did Lee choose this time to raise the so-called “two states” theory? The first explanation might be that he hoped the leaders of Beijing would lose control of emotion and use force, thus entangling the US militarily.[21] And the second reason might be that Mr. Lee hoped any president after him wouldn’t change his basic policy. So his successor Chen Shui Bian the following President who led the opposition DPP continued this assertive Taiwanese nationalist approach to China. Anyway, in contrast to the earlier belief that international forces were a threat to China’s reunification, now Beijing saw Lee and then Chen as the threat.