India DA UM7wk
** CP Aff Answers
Theory Helpers
Say No – Generic
Say No – Lack of Trust
Say No – Moon
Say No – SPS
Say No – Weaponization
Say No – Moon
Say No – Launches
Solvency Deficits – Delay
CP Links to Ptx
Internal Link Turn – CP Crushes Future Relations
Rising Expectations Turn
Indo-China Relations Mod
Indo-China Ext – Coop Kills Relations
Heg DA Links
**Aff Answers
Non-Unique - MoonRise
Non-Unique - Restrictions
Non-Unique: Afpak
Non-Unique-Other Issues
Relations Resilient/Inevitable
Relations Doesn’t Solve the Impact
Relations Not Intrinsic
Impact Turn: India Militarization
** CP Aff Answers
Theory Helpers
Literature base doesn’t exist for bilateral India cooperation – err aff on theory
Garretson 2010 – former Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) International Fellow in India, Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) New Delhi. Previously the Chief of Future Science and Technology Exploration for Headquarters Air Force, former Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Service Academy Research Associate, recipient of the National Space Society’s (NSS) Space Pioneer Award
Peter A. Garretson “Sky’s No Limit: Space-based Solar Power, the Next Major Step in the Indo-US Strategic Partnership”
To arrive at its content and conclusions, this paper has employed several distinct research methods. This was required in part because there is no existing literature discussing organisational design for bilateral/ multilateral development of space solar power or significant previous discussion, or anything so ambitious and long-term in Indo-US relations. The researcher began the paper with fairly substantial knowledge of the topic of SBSP and US technical and industrial capabilities and methods, but with very little knowledge about Indo-US relations and Indian attitudes, priorities, organisations, capabilities, policies and methods of tackling relevant problem sets. Three principal research methods were employed. The first was targeted interviews of key individuals in relevant agencies regarding policies, outlook and important stakeholders and organs relating to the Indo-US bilateral relationship. The second was a review of official statements and documents relating to the Indo-US bilateral relationship, and of Indian government documents relating to the problems that SBSP seeks to address. The final method was a series of interactive presentations across a broad sampling of Indian society and bureaucracy where the researcher presented the general topic of SBSP, and took questions and comments from the audience to access attitudes, reactions, concerns and suggestions.
Say No – Generic
Say no – India would be afraid of being seen as dependent
Broniatowski et al. 06 [David Broniatowski S.B. and S.M. in Aeronautics and Astronautics, S.M. in Technology and Policy, all from MIT. at MIT pursuing a Ph.D. in Engineering Systems; G. Ryan Faith independent technology consultant and Adjunct Fellow for Space Initiatives at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, (CSIS), Vincent Sabathier senior associate with the CSIS Technology and Public Policy Program. “The Case for Managed International Cooperation in Space Exploration” By D. A. Broniatowski, G. Ryan Faith, and Vincent G. Sabathier.
cooperation.pdf
International cooperation inserts an element of programmatic dependence into the architecture of a system, requiring that all partners deliver what they promised on time and within the agreed-on parameters. These concerns give rise to the dictum that international cooperation is best for a nation when its partners are not on the system’s “critical path” (i.e., the nation’s partners’ contributions are not required to complete the system; instead, they merely present an additional noncritical capability). For example, the ISS has two partners on the “critical path” for crew transport and station resupply—the United States and Russia. Other nations, such as European Space Agency (ESA) member states and Japan, currently provide modules whose absence would not prohibit the station as a whole from functioning. This approach would suggest that, from a programmatic standpoint, there is little incentive to cooperate with a nation that cannot contribute a unique capability or that is not able to provide an existing capability at a lower cost than can be domestically produced. For example, a programmatic basis for cooperation between the United States and Japan is that the Japanese Kibo module is provided to the United States for free on a no-exchange-of-funds basis. In return, the United States is flying the module and attaching it to the ISS. This paradigm removes strong incentives for nations to collaborate since the noncritical-path nation (e.g., Japan) depends entirely on the goodwill of the critical-path nation (e.g., the United States). On the other hand, the critical-path nation (the United States) may operate independently and therefore view cooperation under this paradigm as providing extraneous benefits that, although desirable, can be dispensed with in an emergency. As such, the benefits of maintaining the critical path within the purview of one nation are clear—by preventing multiple participants from participating in this area of the architecture, coordination costs are reduced. A nation will not be “held hostage” by the policy, schedule, or budgetary difficulties of its partners. Too many cooks spoil the broth.
India says no- they see the CP as only making them counter China
AFP, 08 (American Free Press- international news source, “India wary of being US card in China play: analysts”, 9/14/08, ) AFL
The US push to end India's status as a nuclear pariah was partly motivated by a desire to counter China's rise, but New Delhi does not want to get sucked into a US-Sino power play, analysts say. "India does share many US concerns regarding China," said Anupam Srivastava, director at the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia. But New Delhi has conveyed "in very clear terms from the outset that it is not interested in being drawn into any such balance of power games in Asia or outside," Srivastava told AFP. Washington spearheaded efforts that resulted this month in the Vienna-based Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) lifting a global ban on trade with India, despite New Delhi's refusal to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NSG waiver followed the striking of an India-US pact on civilian nuclear cooperation in 2005 between Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and US President George W. Bush which still requires Congressional approval. The financial incentives are obvious, with the United States expecting to be rewarded with a major slice of India's civilian nuclear energy market -- estimated to be worth tens of billions of dollars. But there are also geopolitical considerations. Building India as a counterweight to China was "at least part of the motivation among some of the (US) decision-making circle," said Michael Quinlan from the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. For decades, India had close relations with the former Soviet Union despite its official policy of non-alignment during the Cold War years. But New Delhi recrafted its foreign policy after launching market reforms in 1991, focusing on improving ties with Washington -- a process that culminated in the nuclear deal. Former Indian diplomat K. Shankar Bajpai said Washington's support for the pact and the NSG waiver had been lent with the expectation of exacting some leverage in return. "Specifically, the US sees a strong India as an asset in a world in which China is the second world power," Bajpai said, while adding that India had its own firm ideas about the role it should play. "One can accept American help in becoming strong without ganging up against China," he said. India has its own set of concerns regarding its relations with its giant neighbour and economic rival -- ranging from a festering border dispute to fierce competition in securing energy sources to fuel their fast-growing economies. India has also been upset by perceived Chinese moves to "checkmate" its own rise -- allegedly supporting arch-rival Pakistan with arms and economic aid and reportedly trying to block the NSG waiver last week, Indian officials say. While India may baulk at the idea of being a counterweight to China, it knows it can reap certain strategic benefits from a closer relationship with the United States. According to Srivastava, India-US collaboration in areas like counter-terrorism and maritime security are aimed at circumscribing "Chinese latitude and propensity for actions that could undermine economic or security equations across Asia". India will continue to expand economic ties with China, but security relations "will remain disputed," he said, while at the same time New Delhi's policies will become "more convergent" with Washington's in security and technology areas. Indian analyst C. Uday Bhaskar said India's entry into the global nuclear trading club had introduced "a certain degree of strategic equipoise" into Asia. "Clearly till now, China has been the major power in unipolar Asia," Bhaskar said, adding many countries in the region were keeping a wary eye on Beijing. "The wariness stems from the lack of clarity over how China is going to behave as it becomes even more powerful," he said.
India wants to be independent – they will say no
Cohen and Xacier 5/26/11 *Stephen P. Cohen, a former professor, conducts research on South Asian political and security issues.\ **Constantino Xavier is a Portuguese Fulbright scholar and Ph.D. candidate at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University,
U.S.-India Relationship on the Rocks? | More Stephen Cohen, Constantino Xavier | May 26, 2011
It was good while it lasted. But the United States needs to move on and recognize that India’s commitment to strategic autonomy is a fundamental constraint to further improvement in bilateral relations. New Delhi wants to take it slowly because it is wary of becoming another Japan, a client state. It is this grand concern with self-reliance—and not technical or other factors—that led to India’s surprising decision last month to exclude two American contenders, Lockheed and Boeing, from an $11 billion contract for one hundred and twenty-six fourth-generation fighter jets—India’s biggest defense purchase ever. New Delhi’s preference for two European jets (France’s Rafale and the Eurofighter Typhoon), while excluding Swedish and Russian contenders along with the American F-16 and F/A-18, came as a rude shock to those who had banked on surging U.S.-India defense and security relations. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, India purchased $223 million worth in military equipments from the United States in the last five years—twice as much as in the preceding twenty years. Both countries also held over sixty joint exercises and military exchanges since 2000 and set up a new counterterrorism dialogue that included unprecedented levels of intelligence sharing after the 2008 terrorist attacks on Mumbai. Defense analysts jumped in immediately to offer possible explanations for the American defeat. Some underlined the fighters’ different performance during high-altitude tests in the Himalayas, along with other technical factors, including speed and radar systems, which may have given the European fighters an advantage. Others privilege political reasons—including pockets of anti-Americanism in the Indian air force—as well as a government plagued by corruption scandals, which may have limited its capacity to make a decision on more than purely objective criteria. Another explanation highlights the controversies involving the quality of previous purchases from the United States, especially that of the USS Trenton, a 1971 amphibious transport dock on which an explosion killed five Indian navy personnel in 2008. While each of these factors may have played a role, they ignore the most fundamental reason: India’s concern for strategic autonomy in the event of another war with Pakistan and its attempt to maintain a balance in its lineup of military suppliers.Washington may well have promised New Delhi the world, but in the end India will always fear that its actual combat capacity in such critical moments could be severely affected by relying exclusively on American technology, supplies and support.This sensitivity and mistrust is aggravated by the fact that the United States is also the major supplier to the Pakistani air force, having in recent years transferred thrity-two F-16 variants and several air-to-air missiles and P3C Orion surveillance aircrafts to Islamabad. New Delhi also justifiably sees Washington as overly stringent on end-use monitoring; Washington would never have allowed these planes to be fitted with nuclear warheads and play a role in India’s nuclear deterrent. In contrast, reports indicate that the Eurofighter offered access to significantly more advanced technology as well as the possibility of assembly in India. This indicates to what extent India remains committed to self-reliance, not only in terms of production, but also operability—the nightmare of 1965, when the United Stated cut off Indian access to crucial military supplies at the height of another Indo-Pakistani crisis, is still fresh in the minds of many Indian strategists. The decision should therefore be seen as one privileging diversification, diffusing the risk of excessive reliance and dependence on a single partner. American experts implicitly acknowledged this Indian concern by speculating in recent months that India might split the order among two or three different suppliers, perhaps an American, a European and a Russian one. But they ignored the specific cyclical way India diversifies, rotating among different suppliers. In recent years, Russia, the United States, Israel and even Brazil were able to secure important contracts from the Indian air force, but (excepting Britain) European countries have remained largely absent from its acquisitions basket. From this perspective, the Eurofighter Typhoon is particularly attractive as it is developed by a consortium including not only habitués Britain and Germany but also newcomers Spain and Italy.
Say No – Lack of Trust
India doesn’t trust the US – fear of cooperation being one sided, specifically in space
Center for Nonproliferation Studies 06
Date Created: July 20, 2006 U.S.-India Space Cooperation Reaches New Heights, Despite Lingering Proliferation Concerns By Jennifer Kline
The Chandrayaan project notwithstanding, concerns of this kind continue to constrain U.S. space-related exports to India, making some Indian analysts skeptical that the new U.S.-India space cooperation agreement will result in significant high-technology transfers from the United States. One editorial writer noted, for example, that: An effort by Boeing and ISRO to jointly build satellites for the international market collapsed, largely on account of onerous U.S. licensing procedures...Another area of friction is commercial satellite launches, which Washington is able to control because many satellites contain critical U.S.-made components. ISRO has reportedly lost a commercial launch contract as a result of uncertainty over securing American clearances. [32] Fears have also been voiced that expanded cooperation will lead to U.S. interference in Indian scientific programs. [33]
US proposals receive heavy skepticism
Kronstadt, 8 - Specialist in South Asian Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division (K. Alan, “India-U.S. Relations,” August 12, 2008)
Some Indian analysts, wary of U.S. intentions in pursuing bilateral civil nuclear cooperation, believe the initiative may be cover for a broader effort to cement India’s cooperation in a number of non-energy-related areas, such as defense trade and New Delhi’s relations with Iran. From this perspective, the U.S. government repeatedly “shifted the goalposts” to forward its own (veiled) nonproliferation goals. 140 India’s influential communist parties, whose Left Front provides crucial support to the Congress-led ruling coalition in New Delhi, have focused their ire on geopolitical aspects of the civil nuclear initiative. In late 2006, the leader of India’s main communist party declared the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal “not acceptable” as it would “seriously undermine India’s independent foreign policy.” Previously, the Left Front had called India’s two IAEA votes on Iran a “capitulation” to U.S. pressure. 141 Indian leftists thus have been at the forefront of political resistance to India’s becoming a “junior partner” of the United States. Equally stinging and perhaps more substantive criticism came from several key Indian scientists, whose perspectives on the technical details of the civil nuclear initiative are considered highly credible. India’s nuclear scientific community, mostly barred from collaboration with international civil nuclear enterprises as well as direct access to key technologies, has worked for decades in relative isolation, making its members both proud of their singular accomplishments and sensitive to any signs of foreign “interference.” Many viewed the enabling legislation passed by the U.S. Congress as being more about nonproliferation and less about energy cooperation. They considered it both intrusive on and preclusive of their activities. The major criticisms of existing plans for U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation made by Indian commentators (and at times by the Indian government) are summarized as follows: ! India’s unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests was being codified into a bilateral obligation through a clause that would allow the United States to reclaim any supplied nuclear equipment if India were to test a nuclear device; ! India was being denied nuclear reprocessing technologies warranted under “full cooperation;” ! India was not being given prior authorization to reprocess spent fuel; ! India was not being given assurances that it will receive uninterrupted fuel supplies in perpetuity; and language on securing India’s assistance with U.S. efforts to prevent Iran from obtaining weapons of mass destruction would limit New Delhi’s foreign policy independence