ADI 2010 1
Fellows--Mendenhall Consult Mexico CP
Consult Mexico CP Index
Consult Mexico – 1NC Shell 1/2 2
Consult Mexico – 1NC Shell 1/2 3
Theory – Consult CPs Good 4
Theory - Functional Competition Good 5
Uniqueness – US/Mexico Relations High Now 6
Uniqueness – US/Mexico Relations High Now 7
Uniqueness – US/Mexico Relations Low Now – Lack of Consultation 8
Solvency – Short Time Frame for Consultation 9
Say Yes – Economy Adv 10
Say Yes – Poverty Adv 11
Say Yes – General 12
Consultation key to Relations 13
Consultation key to Relations 14
Consultation key to Relations 15
Consultation key to Relations 16
US/Mexico Relations Impact – State Collapse - Uniqueness 17
US/Mexico Relations Impact – State Collapse - Impact 18
US/Mexico Relations Impact – Drug War Escalation 19
Net-Benefit– Trade Liberalization 20
Mexican Economy Impact – Case Turn/ Bioterrorism 21
Mexican Economy Impact – US Economy 22
Internal Link – US/Mexican Economy are Tied 23
Mexican Economy Impact – Global Economy 24
Impact – Mexican Drug Traffickers 25
Brink – Mexican State Collapse 26
Brink – Drug Cartel Violence 27
AT – Lie Permutation 28
** Aff Answers**
2AC Frontline 29
Ext – No Leaks 30
Consult CPs Bad 31
Textual Competition Good 32
Aff Answers – Hegemony DA 33
Aff – Hegemony DA 34
Aff – Interbranch Conflict Turn 35
Aff – Consultation is Normal Means 36
Aff – Consultation Now 37
Aff - US/Mexico Relations are Resilient 38
Aff – No link to relations 39
Aff – No Solvency for NB 40
Aff – Mexican State Strong Now 41
Aff – Mexican State Collapse Inevitable 42
Aff – Mexico Says No – Drug Adv 43
Aff - Mexico Says No – Must Be Comprehensive 44
ADI 2010 1
Fellows--Mendenhall Consult Mexico CP
Consult Mexico CP – 1NC Shell 1/2
Text: The United States federal government should enter into binding consultation with the government of Mexico over whether the United States federal government should <insert the plan>.
Mexico expects to be consulted on immigration
O'Neil 09 Douglas Dillon Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations
Shannon, July/August, “The Real War in Mexico,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, Iss. 4; pg. 63, 16 pgs, 2009
The United States views immigration as a domestic concern, but when it comes to Mexico, this perspective is both inaccurate and counterproductive. During her April 2009 visit to Mexico, Janet Napolitano, the U.S. secretary of homeland security, announced, with Patricia Espinosa, the Mexican foreign secretary, a new high-level joint working group to make immigration safer and more orderly. This is a step toward greater consultation and cooperation. Still, fundamental and comprehensive immigration reform in the United States is necessary to address the economic and security concerns on both sides of the border. New policies should be designed not only to improve border security and management. They should also regularize the status of the unauthorized work force already in the United States, ensure employer verification and responsibility, and create an expanded flexible worker program to meet changing U.S. economic demands.
There’s an established forum for consultation, but using it genuinely isn’t normal means
US-Mexico Binational Council 01
“NEW HORIZONS IN U.S.-MEXICO RELATIONS: Recommendations for Policymakers,” A Report of the U.S.-Mexico Binational Council, cosponsored by CSIS, September, 2001 http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/newhorizons%5B1%5D.pdf
The U.S-Mexico Inter-Parliamentary Group (IPG), which has been meeting once a year since its founding in 1961, has been an effective vehicle for relationship building among members of Congress from both nations. The two Congresses play an important role in bilateral issues such as drugs, immigration, border infrastructure, and energy policy and therefore should engage in more consultation on legislation that has bilateral implications. The IPG has been plagued in the past by ad hoc participation by U.S. members of Congress, in part, in response to the relative weakness of the Mexican legislative branch—attributed to its uneven partisan distribution and the perpetual turnover of Mexican legislators due to the prohibition of consecutive reelection. Thus, the IPG has not realized its full potential as a forum for binational policymaking. The current structure of the IPG has not kept pace with the maturing of the Mexican Congress which is now more independent and plays a greater role in policymaking. The IPG should enhance communication and collaboration between the legislative branches of each country on a year-round basis.
Consult Mexico – 1NC Shell 2/2
Mexico would say yes
Villarreal 10 Specialist in International Trade and Finance, Congressional Research Service
M. Angeles, March 31, “U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications,” Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf, 2010)
Mexico has voiced concern in the past about alleged abuses suffered by Mexican workers in the United States and for the loss of life and hardships suffered by Mexican migrants as they use increasingly dangerous methods to cross into the United States. During his administration, former Mexican President Vicente Fox held the view that the migrants are “undocumented workers” and that because the U.S. market attracts and provides employment for the migrants, it bears some responsibility. He pressed proposals for legalizing undocumented Mexican workers in the United States through amnesty or guest worker arrangements as a way of protecting their human rights. In 2004, President Bush proposed an overhaul of the U.S. immigration system to permit the matching of willing foreign workers with willing U.S. employers when no U.S. documented workers could be found to fill the jobs. The U.S. Senate began consideration of comprehensive immigration reform in May 2007. Mexico had long lobbied for immigration reform in the United States and cautiously watched the debate in 2007 on this measure. Legal immigration reform stalled in the 110th Congress. It is unclear whether the 111th Congress will attempt to tackle comprehensive immigration reform. It may, however, consider legislation on selected immigration reform issues, such as foreign workers. Additional border security measures may also be considered.
Unilateralism hurts US/Mexico relations
Starr 04 professor of international studies and political economy at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México
Pamela K., professor of international studies and political economy at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, “U.S.-Mexico Relations,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, HEMISPHERE FOCUS Volume XII, Issue 2, January 9, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/hf_v12_02.pdf, 2004
Mexico’s active support for increased multilateralism in world affairs as a means to protect itself from the unilateralist tendencies of the United States was destined to create friction with one of the most unilateralist U.S. administrations in recent memory. While this traditional aim of Mexican foreign policy had the virtue of mitigating the domestic political costs of Mexico’s new North American policy—the appearance of Mexican subservience to the United States that played so poorly in Mexico—it also risked irritating the Bush administration just as Mexico needed the U.S. president to use his scarce political capital to push a migration accord of unclear political benefit through a reticent Congress. The volatile nature of the international setting at the time Presidents Bush and Fox took office seemed to ensure that an international crisis would emerge somewhere, sooner rather than later. When this happened, the unilateralist bias of the Bush foreign policy team would inevitably clash with Mexico’s newly activist pursuit of multilateralism. Mexico’s decision to campaign successfully for one of the rotating seats on the Security Council of the United Nations, a clear reflection of the zeal with which the Fox administration would advance multilateralism in global affairs, ensured that this inevitable policy clash would be more visible and hence more damaging to U.S.-Mexico relations and to the success of Mexico’s North American strategy.
Theory – Consult CPs Good
1. Consult CPs are key to test the resolution -
A) RESOLVED - forces the affirmative to prove the desirability of definite action
B) SHOULD – is “used to imply obligation or duty,” that’s American Heritage Dictionary 2004 – the CP tests whether the USFG is obligated to do the Aff
2. Built in Aff offense – the counterplan guarantees a delay and potential non-adoption of the plan. This structurally ensures ground for the aff based on the immediacy of the plan or critical advantages.
3. Real world education – the CP allows us to learn about international decision-making processes that affect the U.S., the debate between unilateral and multilateral action is a core question of the topic
4. The alternative is conditions or international fiat CPs which are worse – no predictable mechanism or actor
5. Competition and literature check – even if there are a ton of organizations or countries we could consult only a few can substantiate a net benefit that applies to the topic
6. PERMs check abuse – we can’t win without proving that genuine and binding consultation is key to the net benefit, and that they’ll say yes
7. Err Neg on theory – the Aff gets first and last speech and infinite prep time
Theory - Functional Competition Good
The CP is competitive because its function is mutually exclusive with the Aff’s commitment to immediate and guaranteed action – functional competition is good
1. Eliminates the word PIC which hurts competitive equity and topic education
2. Topic education – focuses the debate on the action of the plan rather than the wording of the text
3. Ground – there’s more likely to be literature on both sides of an action rather than a text – ensures both the link and the link turn
4. Key to test the entire Aff – it’s the only way to question every internal link of the plan action
Uniqueness – US/Mexico Relations High Now
US/Mexico relations high now
Martin 09 associate professor at Georgetown University and director of the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service.
Susan F, “Waiting Games: The Politics of US Immigration Reform,” Current History, Apr 2009, Vol. 108, Iss. 717; pg. 160, 7 pgs
Although migration has long existed between Mexico and the United States, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), implemented in 1994, heralded a new era of cooperation and consultation on migration management. Until the 1990s, each government saw migration from its own perspective, and did little to understand the position of the other or to negotiate common approaches. The US government pursued largely unilateral policies. While many recognized that changes in immigration policies might have a disproportionate effect on migrants from Mexico, there was no interest in designing Mexico-specific policy responses. Rather, legislation such as the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 provided legal status to Mexican undocumented aliens on the same basis as to those who came from other countries. The Mexican government, for its part, chose until the late 1980s to maintain a "policy of no policy" on migration to the United States. During the 1990s, however, that position changed and Mexico's government became more visibly engaged. Mexican authorities began to lobby in the United States on political and economic matters, something they had not done before the NAFTA negotiating process. Today the Mexican government no longer operates solely via its Secretariat for Foreign Relations and the US Department of State, but rather fans out across the spectrum of US private interest groups, public agencies, and Congress. The increased closeness of the USMexico economic relationship, and that relationship's salience for Mexican economic recovery and growth, also increase the need to handle other problems in ways that avoid harming economic cooperation. Among these "other problems," immigration is the most significant.
Uniqueness – US/Mexico Relations High Now
US/Mexico relationship strong now – cooperative ventures and economic ties
Villarreal 10 Specialist in International Trade and Finance, Congressional Research Service
M. Angeles, March 31, “U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications,” Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf, 2010
The United States and Mexico have strong economic ties through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which has been in effect since 1994. In terms of total trade, Mexico is the United States’ third-largest trading partner, while the United States ranks first among Mexico’s trading partners. In U.S. imports, Mexico ranks third among U.S. trading partners, after China and Canada, while in exports Mexico ranks second, after Canada. The United States is the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mexico. These links are critical to many U.S. industries and border communities. In 2009, 12% of total U.S. merchandise exports were destined for Mexico and 11% of U.S. merchandise imports came from Mexico. After increasing 10% in 2008, U.S. exports to Mexico decreased 19.6% in 2009 as a result of the global financial crisis and the effect on the U.S. economy. Imports from Mexico decreased 18.5% in 2009, after a 3% increase in 2008. For Mexico, the United States is a much more significant trading partner. Over 80% of Mexico’s exports go to the United States and 48% of Mexico’s imports come from the United States. The stock of U.S. FDI in Mexico totaled $95.6 billion in 2008. The overall effect of NAFTA on the U.S. economy has been relatively small, primarily because two-way trade with Mexico amounts to less than 3% of U.S. GDP. Major trade issues between Mexico and the United States since NAFTA have involved the access of Mexican trucks to the United States; the access of Mexican sugar and tuna to the U.S. market; and the access of U.S. sweeteners to the Mexican market. Over the last decade, the economic relationship between the United States and Mexico has strengthened significantly. The two countries continue to cooperate on issues of mutual concern. President Barack Obama met with Mexican President Calderón and Canadian Prime Minister Harper at the North American Leaders’ Summit in Guadalajara, Mexico, in August 2009 to discuss key issues that affect the three countries. They agreed to continue cooperation in North American competitiveness and security.
Uniqueness – US/Mexico Relations Low Now – Lack of Consultation
Cooperation is low now because of lack of consultation on immigration issues – the CP rebuilds it
Mexico Institute 09 Woodrow Wilson Center
January, “THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO: Towards a Strategic Partnership,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2009, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/ The%20U.S.%20and%20Mexico.%20Towards%20a%20Strategic%20Partnership.pdf