Colombia: Paradox, Intervention and Survival

Week 5:

Colombia: Paradox, Intervention and Survival

Topics: -

1. The Paradox of Colombia

2. The Legacies of Conflict: Violencia, Guerrillas and Paramilitaries

3. The Drug Trade as an International Problem: Looking Beyond the Cartels

4. From Plan Colombia to 'Democratic Security'

5. Colombia in Its Regional Setting

6. Colombia: A Surviving Culture in the 21st Century

1. The Paradox of Colombia

Colombia is one of the most paradoxical countries in South America. From 1932 down to the mid-1990s it had a strong and growing economy based on diversified resources, including a strong agricultural base (tobacco, coffee, tropical fruits, beef, hides), sizeable resources of petroleum, gas, coal, gold, emeralds, silver, platinum, nickel and iron ore, and a modest industrial sector including steel and chemical production projects, machinery and electrical goods, and processed foods (Safford & Palacios 2002, p314; Johnson 2003). Major exports include oil, coffee and coal (Colombia has around the fourth largest supply globally) in that order (Jonhson 2003; Richani 2005). In particular, from 1953 through 1996, 'the Colombian economy and per capita income grew at stable but moderate rates' (Sánchez & Avilés 2001, p6). During the last 25 years the average growth in GDP was 4.5% and even over the 1995-1999 was still growing at around 1.6%. However, economic stagnation began to affect the country through 1999 with increasing unemployment rates, with some slight recovery in 2000-2001, and around GDP real growth of 1.8% in 2002. Recovery become more noted thereafter with GDP growth of 4% for 2003, 4% in 2004, and 3.7% for 2005 (Johnson 2003; DFAT 2003; DFAT 2005). Through 2000-2005, unemployment was estimated at 13-15% with inflation at 5-9% (Johnson 2003; DFAT 2004a; DFAT 2005). Foreign debt is also relatively high, around 46.2% of GDP in 2002 (Johnson 2003).

The U.S. remains Colombia's strongest trading partner, accounting for 41% of exports and 29% of imports through 2004 (DFAT 2005), and negotiations have continued over the details for a bilateral Free Trade Agreement between the two countries (Murillo 2006). Colombia has sought to widen its regional trade cooperation in a number of areas: -

In terms of trade policy, Colombia is committed to the Cairns Group and further agricultural liberalisation. It is at the forefront of the development of regional trade agreements and groupings such as the Andean Community (Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela) and the G3 (Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela). Colombia is also seeking to increase its role in the Asia-Pacific region, and is a full member of the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) and a member of two APEC working groups. (2005b).

Through 2004-2005, Colombia has also drawn in investment from the U.S., Spain and prospectively China: -

The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) announced recently that Colombia had been the fourth most attractive country in Latin America for foreign investment, after Brazil, Mexico and Chile. According to ECLAC, US$2.23 billion was invested in Colombia during 2004, an increase of 35 per cent compared to 2003. Most of the investment came from the USA and Spain and was directed to the banking, telecommunications and energy sectors. . . .

Following the pattern of other Latin American countries keen to take advantage of China's growing economy, President Uribe visited China in April 2005 to promote Colombian coal sales as well as discuss financing for an oil pipeline that would run through to the Pacific coast from the east of Colombia. The Colombian delegation to China also sought Chinese investment in several proposed Colombian hydro-electric plants. BHP-Billiton has coal mining interests in Colombia. (DFAT 2005b)

In general terms, in spite of the ongoing conflict, Colombia was able to draw in increasing amounts of foreign investment through the 1990s, and over recent years some 400 multinational corporations have been active in the country, and according to one source generate around $15 billion a year and around 15% of GDP, focusing on resource extraction, security services, financial and then service sectors (Richani 2005). These companies included BP, Texaco, Occidental Oil, Drummond, Carbones Cerejon, Colgate Palmolive, and General Motors (Richani 2005). Private security firms operating in the country include Lockheed Martin, Syncorp, Northrop Grumman, Rendon Group, Science Applications International, Military Professsional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), AirScan and others, with U.S. based contracts initially totalling some $3.5 billion, while other companies have been involved in insurance and risk assessment, e.g. Kroll Inc., Control Risks Group, Hiscox Group, Lloyds, and IAG (Richani 2005).

Strategically located at the top of South America, abutting Panama, the Caribbean Coast, and the top Andes, it is also a democracy with regular elections, and has a long history of constitutional and political reform (though often contested or violent). With a population of approx. 44 million, it has a well-educated upper and middle class, as well as an active civil society that has sought to publicise and moderate social and justice problems. Its military was often less directly involved in politics than in other countries, such as Argentina and Chile in past decades, but this trend was complicated by the fierce conflict with guerrilla groups over the last two decades. Over the last ten years the Colombian army has become more professional and less involved in human rights crimes, though some abuses continued through the mid-1990s (Avilés 2001, p33) and there have been ongoing claims of ongoing covert cooperation with right-wing paramilitaries. On this basis, Colombia, after a slow phase of development in the 19th century, should now be one of the thriving success stories of Latin America. These benefits, however, have not been translated into a stable society or strong state (for further aspects of this paradox, see Foreign Policy 2002), largely due to the nexus of political violence among paramilitaries, left-wing guerrilla activity, and the drug trade.

The country has suffered extreme social violence over several decades, and through late 1990s and early 21st century was still subject to social crisis, insurgency, problems linked to organised crime and the international narcotics industry, as well as subject to indirect international intervention and tensions over the control of its borders. This in part goes back to earlier strong regional differentiation within the country, as well as a fierce debate between centralised verses federal views of political authority, and to civil wars between Conservative and Liberal forces through the 19th century (Safford & Palacios 2002).

Colombia Map (Courtesy PCL Map Library)

In recent years, from one million (official figures) up to three million people (NGO based figures) have been internally displaced within Colombia (the second highest after Sudan, Alford 2004; Farfan 2004), out of a population of 44.6 million. Poverty remained at a high rate: through the mid-1990s 52% lived in relative poverty and unemployment reached 20%, and both guerrillas and paramilitary forces control large sections of the country (Sánchez & Avilés 2001, p7). In the 1994-1998 period some 15,000 Colombians died as a result of a counterinsurgency war or as a result of political killings (Avilés 2001, p31). In 1999 the cycle of violence among these groups led to 2,000-3,000 deaths, and around 4,000 in 2001, while conflict in rural areas displaced 300,000 civilians during 1998 alone (Sánchez & Avilés 2001, p5; Sweig 2002, p123). Through 2001-2004, the Colombian state remained relatively embattled. Ironically, 'Democracy, liberalization, and stability in economic management have been combined with inequality, repression, and widespread corruption' (Sánchez & Avilés 2001, p7).

Nonetheless, the government of former President Andrés Pastrana remained functional through 1998-early 2002, and was able to engage strong foreign actors such as the European Union and the United States in its future development, as well as trying to strike some kind of balance of force with revolutionary guerrilla, paramilitary groups, and with the fragmented drug cartels. At the same time, with large sections of the territory of Colombia effectively 'colonised' by non-state actors that exercise control of resources and use armed force. Thus an oligopoly of sovereignty has been established, in which counter-state powers (guerrilla groups), para-state powers (self-defence and paramilitary forces) and organised crime (Melguizo 2001, p111) have established complex alliances and parasitic relations with the state and civil society. In spite of sustained dialogue, plus efforts to strengthen the armed forces, peace talks eventually collapsed in 2002, and have only begun in limited form again in late 2005 (Johnson 2003; Murillo 2006). Through 2002-2006 the government of President Alvaro UribeVélez broke of peace-talks with rebels forces (FARC), and sought to use military means to control them, under the rubric of 'democratic security', since the peace process of earlier years had not resulted in national stability (see further below).

Several theories have been put forward to explain the length and intensity of the conflict in Colombia, with political violence being extreme from 1947 onwards (with various phases, see below). One is the idea of a failed political process leading to guerrilla groups using armed force, stalemating government efforts at control, and creating this system of oligopoly of sovereignty (Melguizo 2001). Others suggest that conflicts over resources (oil, coal, gold, cocaine) has intensified conflict, provided the means to continue fighting, and brought in international actors (external state interests, multinational corporations, security forms and subcontractors) that have in the end sustained the conflict (Richani 2005). A third possibility is that Colombia has inadvertently built an irrational 'war system' whereby 'a pattern of violent interaction among different actors sustained over a period time' has led to a partial balance among different forces, while resource extraction and daily life, though insecure, continues across much of the country (Richani 2005).

In this session there will not be time to go through the entire history of this fascinating country (see Safford & Palacios 2002). Colombia was at first part of the large state of New Granada where from the early 19th century Simón Bolívar Palacio began the revolution that would overthrow the control of Spain and also establish the early framework for South American states. By 1830 Venezuela and Ecuador had split off, while by 1903 the region of Panama (with U.S. support) secured its independence, leaving Colombia with its present borders. The possibility of Panama's independence had worried Colombia as early as 1831, with tensions escalating after 1849, with thousands of people crossing the isthmus on the way to the goldfields in California (Safford & Palacios 2002, p132, pp217-218).

The modern social and political life of the nation has been partly shaped by its geography: 15% of its territory is above 1000 metres, and three major mountain ranges (cordilleras) divide different parts of the country from each other, with distinct differences between the north (on the Caribbean), the eastern lowland plains fronting onto the Amazon region), and the Pacific coast (Safford & Palacios 2002, p3). This made early transport and trade extremely difficult, with even rivers such as Magdalena only partly making up for the shortage of road and railways during the 19th century (Safford & Palacios 2002, p6). These factors also changed the ethnic composition of the emerging Colombia state: on the north coast a large number of African slaves were brought into to act as a labour force, leading to a more 'Caribbean' culture and Afro-Caribbean style in the 20th century (for the influence on music culture, and the emergence of revitalised Afro-Colombian communities, see Floyd 1999; Gamboa 2001, p98), while in the eastern highlands more indigenous peoples survived, leaving traces of the pre-Columbian Muiscas culture (Safford & Palacios 2002, p7). At first a rural country, by the end of the 20th century 70% of Colombians lived in cities, with a number of major cities in different regions, e.g. Bogotá, Medellín, Cali and Barranquilla (Safford & Palacios 2002, pp301-302). Correlated with this was an increase in rural poverty, with up to 76% of rural, non-town residents living in poverty in 1995 (Safford & Palacios 2002, p307).

Some historical legacies have fed into the challenges that face Colombia today. In brief, they include the following issues: -

Before European contact, Mesoamericans from Central America arrived circa 1200 B.C., followed by later waves of settlers, forming distinct cultures, including the arrival of Chibchas, Arawaks and Caribs (Hanratty & Meditz 1988). From the 1500s, the Muisca and Tairona tribes developed advanced settled cultures based on the cultivation of the potatoes and corn (Hanratty & Meditaz 1988). The Tairona constructed temples, stone roads, bridges, and extensive irrigations works (Safford & Palacios 2002, p20). The Inca empire only expanded to include tribes in the region of the southern border of Colombia with Ecuador (Safford & Palacios 2002, p21). Rapid depopulation of the indigenous tribes occurred shortly after Spanish settlement, and in the 17th century the Spanish administration sought to concentrate indigenous people in larger local towns, so that they could be more easily Christianised, controlled, and their labour used (Safford & Palacios 2002, p41). From the 18th century onwards, a sizeable minority of mixed (mestizo) background emerged in the cities of Colombia, e.g. up to 34%, though many Indians simply redefined themselves as mestizo for political reasons (Safford & Palacios 2002, pp42-43). In 1810 the Congress which set up the state of New Granada declared Indians to be citizens and henceforth, at least in theory, to be able to hold office (Safford & Palacios 2002, p109). Trends of political and social equality, as well as the trend to free slaves, were at first resisted by some land-owners and by Colombian elites (Safford & Palacios 2002, p180). Current estimates suggest that mestizo's are 57% of the population (Johnson 2003), but this is not strongly reflected in national-identity politics. There was a strong trends towards Hispanicisation of these mixed groups.

Except for small groups, most Indians were absorbed culturally and linguistically into Colombian society, with only low numbers retaining definite indigenous status (Hanratty & Meditaz 1988). Nonetheless, the treatment of indigenous people has remained an important issue, with a strong division between those in the 19th century who were willing to see an upwardly mobile indigenous and mestizo group, and those who sought a 'white' Hispanic heritage for the Colombian state (Safford & Palacios 2002, p26). However, by the "latter part of the eighteenth century people largely of mixed race, but completely Hispanic in culture, had become more numerous in most regions than any of the other socioracial groups - whites, Indians, or black slaves" (Safford & Palacios 2002, p51). Although at first there was an effort to keep coloured groups out of universities or positions of authority, in time a mestizos with wealth or a public office might 'claim to be effectively white and eligible for positions of honor' (Safford & Palacios 2002, p53). In the contemporary period, indigenous areas are sometimes highly disputed between revolutionary groups (such as FARC) and the government, e.g. in southeast Colombia, making it hard for native groups to run local development programs, such as the Nasa Project which has reduced poverty through sustained development strategies in the Cauca area (see Murillo 2006). Under the 1991 Constitution 'indigenous territorial zones' have high levels of autonomy and provide a strong role for indigenous councils, but these rights have been eroded under reforms launched by the Uribe government (Murillo 2006). Indigenous councils and the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC) have found it difficult to run their agenda for local rights and interests, and seem to have little faith either in the protect of the guerrilla or the army (Murillo 2006).

Original Spanish exploration was conducted by explorers such as Alonso de Ojeda (1499), Rodrigo de Bastidas (1500) and Pedro de Heredia (1533). As a result coastal towns such as Acandí and Cartagena were founded (Hanratty & Meditaz 1988). The present-day capital of Bogotá was founded in 1538 during an exploration of a land route to Peru (Hanratty & Meditaz 1988). However, the rough terrain and the division of Colombia into different coastal, riverine, and mountainous regions left a difficult legacy for the early modern Colombian state (Safford & Palacios 2002).

The Catholic Church had a strong influence on modern Colombian culture. The Franciscan and Dominican orders arrived first, followed by the Jesuits. In 1580 a University of General Studies was set up in the territory, followed by other universities in 1622 and 1653 (Hanratty & Meditaz 1988). One early bone of contention between Liberals and Conservatives from the early 19th century was over the role of the Church: Conservatives were willing to concede the Church a strong role in education and the Universities, Liberals were not and wanted to regulate Church rights and to limit the Vatican's ability to appoint Colombian bishops and priests unless nominated by the Colombian government (a first agreement was reached in 1827, and over Church lands (Safford & Palacios 2002, pp112-114). From 1939 Pope Pius XII was concerned to 're-evangelise' Latin America, leading to more religious orders moving into Colombia after 1946 (Safford & Palacios 2002, p285). However, in the twentieth century some radical priests were willing to support social revolution, inspired by socialist ideals and liberation theology.

Discontent with Spanish rule evolved from several sources: high taxes and restrictions on trade, excessive influence of those who came out from Spain (peninsulares) verses those born in the colony, the general influence of the Enlightenment, an the need to establish some level of independent government once the French invaded Spain and Napoleon tried for a time to control Spanish politics. Local self-governing councils or military juntas began to form from 1810 in Bogotá, Caracas, Cartagena, Pamplona and Socorro (Safford & Palacios 2002, p87). Fierce conflict with Spanish forces emerged through 1813-1816, with Spain for a time re-establishing complete control of the most populated areas, though subject to guerrilla warfare elsewhere, with the abortive attempt at independence in 1810-1816 being remembered as the Patria Boba, or Foolish Fatherland (Safford & Palacios 2002, pp94-95). Only through 1819-1820 would an independent state be refounded (Johnson 2003), following Simón Bolívar's decisive defeat of Spanish forces at the Battle of Boyacá. In 1822 the United States would move to recognize the newly independence states of the region, including Colombia (Safford & Palacios 2002, p98).

The military during the late 18th and 19th century was also a major career path for creoles, along with roles in the professions such as lawyers. Such groups would form key elements in the impulse toward independence, and provide leadership for the new state. One of the early problems would be the degree of control exercised by the civilian government over the military, and the need to cut back to size of the army which absorbed large amounts of a fairly small budget during the 19th century. From 1832 the officers corps was reduced in size, and taken as a whole the military had less direct 'corporate' influence on political life in Colombia than was the case in such states such as Mexico, Peru or Venezuela (Safford & Palacios 2002, p131). The armed forces modernised at first on European traditions (Prussian and French), but after World War II on U.S. models (Safford & Palacios 2002, p284).

A government law in 2001reduced some of the restrictions on the army, based on the ongoing conflict with the guerrillas, but this again opened the door to increased human rights abuses. More generally, the army at times has supported paramilitary groups, while increased military budgets through Plan Colombia tended to emphasise militarysolutions (see below). Rules within Plan Colombia also insisted that human rights vetting occur for those trained for new U.S.-backed battalions, and that the military break links with paramilitary groups (Sweig 2002, p130), but this has been difficult to enforce. Through 2002, the Colombia army had 117,000 soldiers, of which 52,000 were full-time soldiers, but only 35,000 could be effectively deployed into aggressive (verses defensive roles) operations (Sweig 2002, p135). In the 1990s, the Colombian army had a very high administrative vs combat personnel ration (8 to 1), rather than the 3 to 1 modern armies would prefer (see Richani 2005). Through 2005, total armed forces personnel were around 207,000 included some 63,888 conscripts and 60,700 reserves, plus 9 special mobile counter guerrilla forces (Chipman 2005; Chipman 2004). US Special Forces have also been sent into the country to train special Colombian army units, including those guarding major pipelines (Johnson 2003; Richani 2005). It has been argued, however, that aside from this special mobile groups, the army remains too reliant on conscripts and cannot yet achieve an outright victory against guerrilla forces. Police in the country (circa 100,000) have been augmented by over 130,000 private security guards (Richani 2005).

Colombian elites were influenced by the reformist ideas of the French and U.S. revolutions, and by the general ideas of the Enlightenment, while some would also be influenced by 19th century Freemasonry, a movement which would influence many of those who would later on form the Liberal Party (Safford & Palacios 2002, p115).

Although Spanish control would be excluded during 1819-1822, this would not end conflict in the new state: -

Colombia succeeded in its military task of ending Spanish control of Andean South America. But once this strategic aim was achieved, the union of Venezuela, New Granada, and Ecuador began to fail as a polity. In 1826 the union entered in a prolonged political crisis - involving concurrent, and often interconnected conflicts between clergy and university-educated liberal politicians, between the central government in Bogotá and elites in Venezuela and Ecuador, ultimately between <political leaders> Bolívar and Santander and their respective adherents. The crisis continued to 1831, by which time the Republic of Colombia had fragmented into its original parts - Venezuela, New Granada, and Ecuador' (Safford & Palacios 2002, p104).