Archdiocese of Washington v. Moersen, 925 A.2d 659 (Md. 2007) (Employment)
A. Overview:
o Circuit Court for Prince George’s County granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment and the Court of Special Appeals subsequently reversed. In majority opinion by Chief Justice Bell, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, holding that the ministerial exception to Title VII did not apply to church organist.
B. Affirmative Claims:
o 1) Breach of Contract, Wrongful Discharge, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against the Parish, its pastor, and the Archdiocese of Washington (Title VII): Respondent, former Catholic church organist, had informed pastor in charge of Parish and employment decisions that he had been sexually abused by Parish choirmaster. Following reporting of abuse, respondent alleged that employment situation deteriorated, and eventually he was told he should retire. A few months later his employment was terminated unilaterally and without notice.
C. Religious Defenses:
o 1) Constitutional; (Free Exercise Clause—“ministerial exception”): Archdiocese of Washington asserts that organist for Catholic church falls within the Title VII “ministerial” exception, carved out in deference to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Court holds that, under the facts of the case, an organist holding a position similar to that of respondent does not come within the ministerial exception and he may prosecute a Title VII claim.
§ Title VII carves out a statutory exception to its employment discrimination law:
· “. . . an employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation, association, education institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.”
· This “exception” for religious organizations is also embodied in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (e).
§ “This court . . . has recognized that under Title VII, ‘the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment precludes the application of these Title VII provisions to employment decisions by religious organizations concerning ministers, teachers, and other employees whose duties are ‘integral to the spiritual ad pastoral mission’ of the religious organization.’ ”
· This allows that church significant latitude in its employment decisions when employee in question has duties that are integral to religious mission.
§ Per Rayburn v. General Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985), “ministerial exception” applies to any employee whose “primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship.”
· Rayburn established the “primary duties” test: ministerial exception “does not depend upon ordination but upon the function of the position.” (emphasis added)
· This Court recognized the exception in Montrose Christian School Corp. v. Walsh, 770 A.2d 111 (2001).
§ Assessment of Moersen’s Duties:
· According to respondent, only duties at Parish were to provide at certain times Sun. services instrumental music and/or musical accompaniment to both congregation and choirs of Church, to provide those services at weekly Sat. evening service, to provide musical accompaniment for Tues. and Fri. evening weekly choir rehearsal, to provide musical accompaniment at special services, and to provide musical accompaniment for congregation at Mon. night weekly novena service. Respondents says he did not plan, nor select, music associated with worship at any of liturgies. He didn’t supervise anyone, and never performed any duties in leadership, teaching, or training capacity. Not required to attend staff meetings and not listed as staff member on church directory. Not required to profess, support, or become member of Catholic faith.
o “merely an organ player”
· According to petitioners, Moersen’s K required him to: build and sustain congregational song at all liturgies, assist in selecting and planning music associated with liturgical worship, and participate in special liturgical celebrations. Also supposed to support the Gospel message through the music ministry of Church and encourage congregation to assume active part in musical participation at all liturgical parish functions.
§ Court agrees with appellate court’s assessment that although music is generally important part of Catholic faith, Moersen’s position fell outside ambit of ministerial exception.
· Reasons:
o Moersen merely played organ at various services. Beyond playing the organ and occasionally selecting which songs to play, there was no evidence that he participated in services beyond that of playing the organ or that he was part of ministry to spread Catholic religion.
o No evidence that primary duties consisted of spreading Catholic faith and his role as organist did not play integral or important role in religious ritual or worship.
o Simply not convinced that respondent’s role was supervisory in any respect, involved any form of church governance, or directly required the teaching or spreading of the religious faith.
o It’s not enough to say that Moersen’s music is central to church’s method of worship.
o Respondent was not in absolute control of music played, and he did not lead any choirs, teach any hymns, or control any part of the church services in which he participated. Not required to have specialized knowledge of Catholic faith, nor expected to have any particular religious training. Only needed to know how to play the organ.
o Fact that respondent could have easily been replaced easily by another qualified organ player highlights the non-ministerial-like nature of his position.
o Court distinguishes various cases on which petitioner relies—in each, subject job or position had far greater significance to religious mission than does respondent’s position.
§ Moersen not required to have specialized knowledge of Catholic faith.
§ Moersen not “voice” of church. It was Cantor that led Parish and choir in song and Moersen merely accompanied him.
§ Moersen was not “music minister” and not “pivotal figure” at church, did not plan any liturgies himself, and was not in charge of church’s “musical life.” He didn’t teach choir any music and not listed as Parish Staff.
§ Moersen not asked to train any ministers and not in charge of reading scripture.
§ Moersen did not lead any choirs, teach any music, and with rare exceptions, music he played was chosen for him.
D. Dissenting Opinion: Justice Harlan wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Raker and Cathell.
o Majority minimizes role played by Moersen as organist for Church and lost sight of the simple reality that because Moersen’s “primary duties consist[ed] of . . . participation in religious ritual and worship, he . . . should be considered ‘clergy.’ ”
§ Moersen’s employment K indicates clearly that his position is “ministerial”:
· Objective of position was “[t]o Support Gospel message through music ministry of Saint Catherine Laboure Church” and to encourage congregational participation in liturgies through music.
· Position entailing performance of religious music, for church during its religious services, to a religious end cannot possibly be perceived as anything but religious.
· Required to attend Parish staff meeting and was considered an ex officio member of all committees relating to liturgies in which he performed.
· Majority overtly ignored religious duties assigned to Moersen and instead accepted his characterization of his role in the Parish.
§ Moersen’s role solely as organist was ministerial:
· Simple reality that playing organ for religious services at Catholic church is important facilitation of liturgies in which Moersen participated, obviously an activity “important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church.”
· Because music inheres vital linguistic significance, performance of that music is equally as significant—there is not such thing as “just an organ player” in religious rituals and ceremonies such as those that Moersen performed in.
· Moersen served for all intent and purpose as “the primary human vessel through whom the church chose to spread its message in song.”
· Majority makes too much of leadership role of music directors—Moersen didn’t have to be in position of leadership to impact Parish’s liturgies through exercise of his primary responsibilities.
E. Subsequent History:
o Direct History:
§ Denial of Certiorari: Archdiocese of Washington v. Moersen, 128 S.Ct. 1217 (2008).
Key Issues Raised: # 5
Blume v. Denville Township Board of Education, 34 N.J. Super. 13, 2000).
A. Overview: The trial court granted defendants renewed motion for entry of judgment, moving for judgment notwithstanding the verdict after a jury verdict for the plaintiff. Court reversed and remanded for consideration of plaintiff’s application for interest, attorneys’ fees and cost, to reinstate the jury verdict. Plurality opinion by Justice Brochin.
B. Affirmative religion claims
(i) Termination /Disparate Treatment (N.J. Law Ag. Discr.) Decision not to continue employment based on prejudice against her because she was Jewish and had a recurrence of breast cancer. Result: Judgment reversed and matter remanded.
Presentation of the Argument:
1. Disparate Treatment
a. McDonnell Douglas Analysis
i. Choice of Prima Facie Case: Court adopted the Supreme Court’s rule in International Brotherhood of Teamster, that pf case need to show that an employment decision was based on an [illegal] discriminatory criterion.
ii. Application of PF case: trial court properly dismissed claim of alleged anti-Semitism, as Blume failed to produce evidence of illegal discrimination.
iii. Asserted religious discrimination: Teacher made a comment to her about being able to “[j}ew down the price.” Blume was told she needed to be more sensitive to the culture of Denville; the way she wore her hair and jewelry and the way she spoke might be acceptable to her friends and family but may not be acceptable in Denville. Also testified that kids would write “Dot Heads” on Asian Indians’ locker and no action was taken aside from cleaning the lockers.
iv. Failure to provide adequate evidence: There is no evidence from which jury could infer that Ms. Dohrewend was not making a valid point about the customs of Denville. Nothing in the record to show the school should have responded more forcefully to racist graffiti on lockers; does not tell whether the conduct occurred frequently or only in an isolated instance. Other teacher’s insulting remark does not provide a rational basis for attributing prejudice to Ms. Dohrewend.
b. Court determines plaintiff failed to produce evidence of religious discrimination.
C. Religious Defenses (none in this case)
D. Concurring/Dissenting Opinions: None
E. Subsequent History: Treatment of the case on appeal: 756 A.2d 1019, affirming treatment of trial court’s determination that evidence did not support a claim for religious discrimination. Affirming trial court’s determination that evidence did support superintendent was prejudiced against vice-principle because she was suffering from cancer.
Brown Transport Corp. v. Com., Pennsylvania Human Relations Com'n,
578 A.2d 555 (Pa.Cmwlth.1990) (Employment)
A. Overview: Majority opinion by McGinley, J., affirming The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission’s, granting relief to employee.
B. Affirmative Religious Claims:
1. Religious discrimination (Section 5(a) of the PHRA, 43 P.S. § 955(a)): Claim that P’s paychecks began to include Bible verses printed on the face of the checks and company newsletter contained religious content.
a. Evidence supported determination of religious discrimination.
i. Supervisors testimony lacked credibility regarding company’s rationale for P’s dismissal conflicted with their reported evaluations of P’s job performance .
ii. P’s evaluation indicates he was given a raise on time.
iii. P commended by the district vice president for his efforts in loading patterns tasks.
iv. No evidence regarding P’s alleged shortcomings in employee and customer relations, and poor job performance.
v. Supervisor’s memorandum stated that P's objections stunted his career growth.
2. Evidence supported determination that employer retaliated against employee.
a. Short time period between P’s complaints in January 1984 and his June 29, 1984 termination supports Hearing Examiner's conclusion.
3. Evidence supported determination of religious harassment.
i. The Bible verses on his paychecks and the religious material in the newsletter caused P to question his job security and led him to believe that an employee of the company needed to be Christian to be promoted into upper management.
4. Evidence supports employer failed to reasonably accommodate employee's religious-based objections.
a. Company made little or no effort to remove the religious content from P's paychecks or his copy of the newsletter after P’s objections.
C. Religious Defenses: none
D. Concurring/Dissenting Opinions: none
E. Subsequent History: none
F. Key Issues Raised: 1
Celnik v. Congregation B’Nai Israel, 139 N.M. 252, N.M.App. 2006 (Employment)
A. Overview: Trial court denied Plaintiffs’ Rule 1-056(f) motion and granted motion to dismiss. Trial court dismissed all counts, except for Count II relating to contract. Court affirmed the district court. Plurality opinion by Justice Bustamante (with Kennedy and Vigil).
B. Affirmative Claims:
1. Disparate Treatment on the basis of medical condition (New Mexico Human Rights Act): Claim that Plaintiff’s medical condition resulted in a campaign to oust Plaintiff from his rabbinical position.
C. Religious Defenses:
1. Constitutional (First Amendment:“church autonomy doctrine”): doctrine is based on provision in First Amendment stating that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof”
a. Church Autonomy Doctrine:
· Prevents legal entanglement between government and religion
· Prohibits courts from resolving disputes related to ecclesiastical operations
· Limits civil interference with workings of religious institutions
· Free exercise of religion is protected
· Court may not interfere with right of ecclesiastical organization to freely select its leaders
· Plaintiff’s prima facie tort claim would force the court to ignore the core principles of the church autonomy doctrine
o Application of intrusive balancing test
b. Should not bend church autonomy doctrine to social policies underlying Title VII
· Analogize to “Ministerial Exception”
o Relationship between religious institution and leaders is its “lifeblood”
o “Minister is the chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose”